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aweiker dc2e1ca5de Merge pull request 'feat: reject cross-host redirects and HTTPS→HTTP downgrades (#95)' (#111) from review-bot-issue-95 into main
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Reviewed-on: #111
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 16:58:49 +00:00
claw 7de6fdd9ec fix: address review feedback on redirect policy
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- Replace Unicode arrows (→) with ASCII (->) in error messages and
  comments for log compatibility (gpt-review NITs #19626, #19628)
- Improve guard comment to clarify it exists for testability, not
  runtime safety (sonnet-review NIT #19619)
- Add cross-reference comments noting intentional duplication between
  gitea/client.go and github/client.go (sonnet-review #19618,
  gpt-review #19625, #19627)

Pushed back on:
- internal/ package for dedup: structural overhead not warranted for
  a single ~25-line function
- strings.EqualFold for scheme: Go's url.Parse normalizes schemes to
  lowercase, making case-insensitive comparison unnecessary
2026-05-13 09:28:46 -07:00
claw 1e0959b077 feat: reject cross-host redirects and HTTPS→HTTP downgrades (#95)
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Add defaultCheckRedirect to both GitHub and Gitea clients that rejects:
- HTTPS→HTTP protocol downgrades (prevents plaintext leakage)
- Cross-host redirects entirely (prevents consuming untrusted responses)

Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects remain allowed.

Both NewClient constructors wire the policy, and SetHTTPClient(nil)
restores it. Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for
configuring their own safe redirect policy.

Closes #95
2026-05-13 08:51:36 -07:00
aweiker 67c3db70cb Merge pull request 'feat(github): support HTTP-date format in Retry-After header' (#110) from review-bot-issue-94 into main
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Reviewed-on: #110
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 15:34:25 +00:00
aweiker a845ce32eb Merge pull request 'feat(gitea): harden GetPullRequestDiff against unbounded diff size' (#109) from review-bot-issue-92 into main
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Reviewed-on: #109
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 14:01:22 +00:00
claw 49d6ca77a3 refactor(gitea): eliminate retry duplication, harden redactURL and MaxInt64 edge case
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- Extract doGetWithReader to share retry/backoff logic between doGet and
  doGetLimited, eliminating ~60 lines of duplicated code (addresses MINOR
  finding from all reviewers).
- redactURL now strips userinfo credentials (user:pass@host) in addition
  to query parameters (addresses security-review-bot finding).
- GetPullRequestDiff treats MaxDiffSize == math.MaxInt64 as disabled,
  preventing the silent enforcement bypass where the overflow clamp makes
  the size check unreachable (addresses security-review-bot finding).
- Improved error message wording: 'response exceeds N bytes' (NIT fix).
2026-05-13 13:39:37 +00:00
claw 6ebf66aefb fix(gitea): address review feedback on diff size limiting
- Add concurrency safety note to MaxDiffSize field documentation,
  mirroring the existing note on RetryBackoff
- Consolidate six individual test functions into a single table-driven
  test (TestGetPullRequestDiff_SizeLimits) reducing repetition
- Add //nolint:errcheck annotation to test handler w.Write calls
2026-05-13 13:39:37 +00:00
claw 004343d05f fix(gitea): address review findings — clamp overflow, clarify maxSize doc
- Clamp maxBytes+1 to prevent integer overflow to negative when
  maxBytes == math.MaxInt64 (falls back to math.MaxInt64)
- Update MaxDiffSize doc: 'any negative value' disables the limit,
  matching actual behavior of 'maxSize < 0' check
2026-05-13 13:39:37 +00:00
claw 92b84976cf feat(gitea): harden GetPullRequestDiff against unbounded diff size
Add a configurable MaxDiffSize field to Client that limits how much
data GetPullRequestDiff will read into memory. The default is 10 MB
(DefaultMaxDiffSize). When the diff exceeds the limit, ErrDiffTooLarge
is returned, allowing callers to skip position translation gracefully.

Implementation uses io.LimitReader to read maxBytes+1, detecting
overflow without buffering the entire response. Setting MaxDiffSize
to -1 disables the limit entirely.

Closes #92
2026-05-13 13:39:37 +00:00
claw 9f8e9aa8d3 fix: timer leak and http field shadowing in github client
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- Add timer.Stop() to the timer.C branch to prevent timer leak on the
  normal path (previously only called in ctx.Done branch)
- Rename struct field 'http' to 'httpClient' to avoid shadowing the
  net/http import

Addresses self-review findings on PR #110.
2026-05-13 06:22:30 -07:00
aweiker 881ce232eb Merge pull request 'docs(deps): update CONVENTIONS.md allowlist for go-yaml' (#108) from review-bot-issue-91 into main
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Reviewed-on: #108
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 13:16:40 +00:00
claw 31a28b1dd5 address review feedback: baseURL TODO, timer-cancel test, fast retry test, doc note
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- Add TODO comment on unused baseURL field explaining its intended
  future use by higher-level exported methods
- Rewrite TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled to actually exercise the
  timer-cancel path in the retry select (goroutine cancels context
  while client is blocked in timer.C select)
- Change Retry-After: 1 to Retry-After: 0 in IntegerSeconds test
  to avoid unnecessary 1s sleep during test runs
- Add doc note on SetRetryBackoff explaining that an empty non-nil
  slice silently drops Retry-After delays
2026-05-13 06:08:51 -07:00
claw e414471a16 fix(github): address review feedback on Retry-After implementation
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- Fix data race: copy retryBackoff slice per-request to prevent
  concurrent doRequest calls from racing on shared state
- Fix parseRetryAfter: trim whitespace before parsing for robustness
- Fix parseRetryAfter: treat delta-seconds of 0 as valid per RFC 7231
- Add bounded read on success path (10 MB limit) for defense-in-depth
- Clean up TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds: remove dead
  code block and commented-out reasoning
- Fix import ordering: context before errors (goimports compliance)
2026-05-13 05:54:06 -07:00
claw 41e1d48b54 feat(github): support HTTP-date format in Retry-After header
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Implement the github package client with Retry-After header parsing that
supports both integer seconds (e.g. "Retry-After: 120") and HTTP-date
format (e.g. "Retry-After: Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT") per RFC 7231
§7.1.3.

Key design decisions:
- Use http.ParseTime which handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats
- Cap maximum retry delay at 60s (maxRetryAfter) to prevent stalling
- If HTTP-date is in the past, use delay of 0 (retry immediately)
- Inject time.Now via c.now field for deterministic testing

Closes #94
2026-05-13 05:10:52 -07:00
claw bf52fceea0 docs(deps): update CONVENTIONS.md allowlist for go-yaml
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Update the approved dependency table to document go-yaml subpackage
usage (ast, parser) and remove the deviation comment now that the
proper allowlist process is being followed.

Closes #91
2026-05-13 02:56:06 -07:00
aweiker d722035629 Merge pull request 'fix(deps): replace gopkg.in/yaml.v3 with github.com/goccy/go-yaml' (#89) from review-bot-issue-87 into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 03:47:01 +00:00
claw b9b7be3b4e fix: address review #2888 findings (comment clarity, test cleanup)
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- Clarify depth-aware short-circuit comment to unambiguously describe
  the relationship between current depth and previous validation depth
- Add comment to MappingValueNode case explaining intentional depth+2
  behavior from parent MappingNode perspective
- Restructure unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit doc comment as bullet list
  covering all three safety checks (depth, multi-doc, strict fields)
- Replace t.Error with t.Fatal in TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection to remove
  redundant nil guard on subsequent err.Error() call
2026-05-12 19:06:52 -07:00
claw baa917f228 fix: handle MergeKeyNode explicitly in depth check, add size limit to ParsePersonaBytes
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- Add explicit case for *ast.MergeKeyNode in checkYAMLDepth switch to
  make it clear this is an intentional leaf (no children to recurse)
  rather than relying on the default case. Prevents future library
  changes from silently bypassing depth checks.

- Add MaxPersonaFileSize bound check at the top of ParsePersonaBytes.
  While callers already check size, the public API should defend itself
  (defense in depth) against arbitrarily large inputs that could cause
  excessive memory/CPU before AST validation runs.

- Add tests for both behaviors.

Addresses review #2879 findings.
2026-05-12 18:45:48 -07:00
claw b0352ba1c9 docs: address review findings on YAML depth validation
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- Add safety note on Strict() decoder not expanding aliases recursively,
  since alias resolution uses the pre-validated AST (finding #1)
- Document that ast.Node map keys rely on pointer identity, which holds
  because all goccy/go-yaml AST types are pointer receivers (finding #2)
- Clarify AnchorNode comment: effective depth budget is reduced for
  anchor+alias pairs, not literally halved (finding #3)
- Improve test depth trace comment for accuracy (finding #4)
- Add HTML comment in CONVENTIONS.md referencing #91 for the two-step
  process deviation (finding #5)
2026-05-12 17:39:38 -07:00
claw 0b16c4143a test: use per-subtest TempDir in TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection
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Move t.TempDir() inside each subtest for idiomatic test isolation,
as suggested by reviewers.
2026-05-12 15:22:27 -07:00
claw 493349e11a fix: correct comment accuracy and improve trailing-content check clarity
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- Fix validated map comment: says 'minimum depth' but stores the maximum
  depth at which a node was validated (overwritten on deeper visits).
- Replace dec.More() with explicit dec.Decode check for trailing JSON
  content. More() is documented for use inside arrays/objects; the
  explicit EOF check is clearer at the top-level stream.
2026-05-12 14:51:49 -07:00
claw 5cedeee9f4 address self-review findings on PR #89
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MINOR fixes:
- docs/DESIGN-57-yaml-persona.md: fix Error Cases table entry to reflect
  custom AST walk (checkYAMLDepth) instead of stale library-level reference
- review/persona.go: add EOF check after JSON decode to reject trailing
  garbage after a valid JSON object (prevents silent acceptance of malformed
  input like '{"name":"x"}garbage')
- review/persona_test.go: add TestJSONTrailingContentRejected test

NIT fixes:
- review/persona.go: add default case to checkYAMLDepth switch with
  explanatory comment about scalar leaf nodes
- review/persona.go: document AnchorNode depth+1 conservative asymmetry
- review/persona.go: simplify redundant if-guard in ListBuiltinPersonas
2026-05-12 14:42:22 -07:00
claw 01b6af03a8 fix(review): address review 2792 feedback
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- Document nodeCount overcounting as intentional conservative behavior
  (bounds total validation work, not unique nodes)
- Improve TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection comment with concrete depth trace
- Replace outdated gopkg.in/yaml.v3 pseudocode in design doc with
  reference to authoritative implementation
- Update PR description to clarify pre-approval via issue #57
2026-05-12 14:24:06 -07:00
claw 80091fb080 fix(review): address feedback from reviews 2788, 2789, 2791
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- Move nodeCount increment after cycle detection to avoid over-counting
  cyclic references (sonnet #2)
- Use underscores in test case names used as filenames (sonnet #3)
- Fix function comment: 'prevent silent data loss' → 'prevent confusing
  behavior where additional documents are silently ignored' (sonnet #4)
- Mark design doc pseudocode as historical since implementation uses
  goccy/go-yaml ast.Node, not gopkg.in/yaml.v3 yaml.Node (sonnet #5)
2026-05-12 14:13:59 -07:00
claw b5f17ddfc4 fix(security): prevent alias depth bypass in YAML validator
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The global 'seen' set allowed anchored subtrees validated at a shallow
depth to be skipped when later referenced via alias at a greater depth.
This could let effective nesting exceed MaxYAMLDepth, enabling DoS.

Fix: replace the single 'seen' set with two tracking maps:
- validated (node -> min depth): only short-circuits when current depth
  <= previously validated depth; re-checks at deeper contexts.
- visiting (node -> bool): per-path recursion stack for true cycle
  detection (breaks alias loops without suppressing depth checks).

Add TestYAMLAliasDepthBypass that constructs a document with an
anchored 15-level subtree referenced via alias under 6 levels of
nesting, verifying the combined effective depth (22) is rejected.

Addresses security-review-bot findings on review #2774.
2026-05-12 14:07:05 -07:00
rodin 144a36a2a7 docs: update DESIGN-57 to reflect goccy/go-yaml as the supported YAML library
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2026-05-12 20:52:37 +00:00
rodin 12f5f5a5e4 docs: update YAML library to github.com/goccy/go-yaml in CONVENTIONS.md
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2026-05-12 20:52:31 +00:00
claw 45d009dd06 fix(review): address review feedback on persona YAML handling
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- Reorder empty doc check before multi-doc check for natural flow
- Detect nil-body docs (whitespace-only, comment-only input)
- Add explanatory comment on pointer identity for cycle detection map
- Improve depth-counting test comment with AST walker specifics
- Add TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection covering empty/whitespace/comment inputs

Addresses MINOR and NIT findings from sonnet, gpt, and security reviews.
MAJOR (allowlist violation) tracked in issue #91.
2026-05-12 13:38:48 -07:00
claw 8991260333 fix(deps): replace gopkg.in/yaml.v3 with github.com/goccy/go-yaml
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Fixes #87.

PR #58 incorrectly added gopkg.in/yaml.v3 (abandoned library) instead of
github.com/goccy/go-yaml as required by issue #57.

Changes:
- Replace gopkg.in/yaml.v3 with github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2
- Update review/persona.go to use goccy/go-yaml API:
  - parser.ParseBytes for AST-based depth/node count checking
  - yaml.Strict() decoder option instead of KnownFields(true)
  - ast.Node types instead of yaml.Node for tree walking
- Update review/persona_test.go to use ast types for cycle tests
- Remove gopkg.in/yaml.v3 from go.mod and go.sum

All existing YAML tests pass with the new library.
2026-05-12 13:27:30 -07:00
rodin 6f86e66943 fix(patterns): default patterns-files to empty (fetch all) (#77)
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2026-05-11 17:45:19 +00:00
aweiker 019b815280 Merge pull request 'fix(gitea): handle single-object response in ListContents' (#74) from issue-73 into main
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Reviewed-on: #74
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
2026-05-11 15:38:59 +00:00
Rodin c27dfd0f08 fix(gitea): guard against empty response in ListContents fallback
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Add defensive check for empty Name and Path fields when unmarshaling
a single ContentEntry in the fallback path. While Gitea API won't
return empty objects for valid file paths, this guard:
- Explicitly documents the invariant we expect
- Catches potential API behavior changes early
- Costs nothing at runtime

Addresses [MINOR] from sonnet-review-bot on PR #74.
2026-05-11 07:47:03 -07:00
Rodin 1b6c37605f fix(gitea): handle single-object response in ListContents
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When ListContents is called with a path that points to a file (not a
directory), Gitea returns a single JSON object instead of an array.
Previously this caused json.Unmarshal to fail with:
  json: cannot unmarshal object into Go value of type []gitea.ContentEntry

Now ListContents tries array unmarshal first, and falls back to single
object unmarshal, wrapping it in a slice. This allows patterns-files
config to specify individual files like 'README.md' without triggering
a parse error.

Also updates TestGetAllFilesInPath_File to reflect actual Gitea behavior
(single object response, not 404).

Fixes #73
2026-05-11 07:21:15 -07:00
aweiker 036e96d9b7 Merge pull request 'fix(gitea): normalize "." path to empty string in ListContents' (#72) from issue-70 into main
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Reviewed-on: #72
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-11 14:16:22 +00:00
Rodin ea74f7e088 ci: use rodin/security-patterns with '.' path for security reviewer
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Tests the dot path normalization fix end-to-end.
2026-05-11 07:12:25 -07:00
Rodin e6b1840ffc fix(gitea): normalize "." path to empty string in ListContents
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Gitea API rejects "." with HTTP 500 (malformed path component).
When patterns-files is set to ".", normalize it to empty string
before making the API call.

Fixes #70
2026-05-11 06:24:05 -07:00
aweiker 1ca9250e4a Merge pull request 'feat(gitea): add retry logic for 5xx errors' (#69) from issue-68 into main
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Reviewed-on: #69
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-11 12:59:50 +00:00
Rodin 1b38e6ad00 fix(gitea): ensure consistent lastErr return for network errors
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Move lastErr assignment outside the retry condition so that both
network errors and HTTP 5xx paths return lastErr consistently.

Previously, on the final retry attempt, a network error would return
the raw err variable instead of lastErr. While they held the same
value in practice, the inconsistency was confusing when reading the
code.

Now both paths:
- Network errors: assign lastErr before checking retry, return lastErr
- HTTP 5xx: assign lastErr before checking retry, return lastErr

Addresses review finding #3 (MINOR) from sonnet review on PR #69.
2026-05-11 05:31:39 -07:00
Rodin 5498dccd60 fix(gitea): address MINOR review findings on retry logic
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1. Fix non-deterministic test TestDoGet_RetriesOnTemporaryNetError:
   - Replace timing-dependent listener approach with mockTransport
   - mockTransport allows controlled injection of net.OpError failures
   - Test now makes deterministic assertions: exactly 3 attempts (2 fail + 1 success)
   - Added SetHTTPClient() method for test transport injection

2. Sanitize error content in retry warning logs:
   - Added sanitizeErrorForLog() helper that omits response body content
   - For APIError: logs only 'HTTP <status>' instead of full body
   - For other errors: preserves error type information
   - Addresses security concern about logging server error content at WARN level
   - Full error with body still returned to caller for proper error handling

Both changes have corresponding test coverage.
2026-05-11 05:15:07 -07:00
Aaron Weiker ecfbfddc7c fix(gitea): redact query params from retry warning logs
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Addresses security review finding: retry warnings were logging the full
request URL which could inadvertently leak sensitive query parameters
if future callers pass them.

Added redactURL() helper that:
- Strips query parameters from URLs before logging (replaces with [redacted])
- Returns [invalid URL] for unparseable URLs to avoid leaking any data
- Preserves the base path for debugging context

The error itself (lastErr) is kept as-is since APIError.Error() already
truncates response bodies to 200 chars, and network errors don't contain
user-controlled data.
2026-05-11 04:52:41 -07:00
Rodin ac53ecfa5d fix(gitea): improve retry logic precision for net.OpError
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Address review feedback on isTemporaryNetError being too broad:

1. RetryBackoff field: Added doc comment clarifying it must be
   configured before the first request (addresses concurrency concern).

2. isTemporaryNetError: Now inspects the underlying syscall error
   instead of treating all net.OpError as retriable. Only retries on:
   - ECONNREFUSED (connection refused)
   - ECONNRESET (connection reset)
   - ENETUNREACH (network unreachable)
   - EHOSTUNREACH (host unreachable)
   - ETIMEDOUT (connection timed out)

   Permanent errors like EACCES, EPERM are no longer retried.

3. DNS errors: Changed from Temporary() to IsTimeout, since
   "no such host" is permanent and shouldn't be retried.

4. Empty backoff slice: Added comment explaining that retry without
   delay is intentional when caller explicitly configures it.

Addresses MINOR findings from sonnet-review-bot and gpt-review-bot.
2026-05-11 04:32:15 -07:00
Rodin 090ae3848c fix(gitea): make retry backoff configurable and retry temp net errors
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Address review feedback:

1. Make backoff delays injectable via Client.RetryBackoff field
   - Defaults to {1s, 2s} when nil for production
   - Tests can set shorter values for fast execution
   - Fixes slow unit tests that previously waited 3+ seconds

2. Add retry on temporary network errors (net.OpError, net.DNSError)
   - Connection refused, network unreachable, DNS failures now retry
   - Non-temporary network errors still fail immediately
   - Context cancellation still respected during backoff

Added isTemporaryNetError helper and TestIsTemporaryNetError test.
Updated existing retry tests to use configurable short backoffs.
2026-05-11 04:23:27 -07:00
Rodin 23da7eedf5 fix(gitea): address review feedback on retry logic
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- Remove dead backoff[0] element; array now only contains retry delays
- Fix time.After timer leak by using time.NewTimer with timer.Stop()
- Add io.LimitReader (64KB) for error body reads to bound memory allocation

Addresses feedback from sonnet-review-bot, security-review-bot, and gpt-review-bot.
2026-05-11 01:08:01 -07:00
Rodin 7279cdd216 feat(gitea): add retry logic for 5xx errors in doGet
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Addresses transient HTTP 500 errors from Gitea API during pattern fetches.

Changes:
- Add retry with exponential backoff (1s, 2s) to doGet(), max 3 attempts
- Add IsServerError() helper to detect 5xx responses
- No retry on 4xx errors (client errors should propagate immediately)
- Respects context cancellation during backoff waits
- Logs retries at WARN level for observability

All existing tests pass. New tests:
- TestIsServerError: validates 5xx detection across edge cases
- TestDoGet_RetriesOn500: verifies recovery after transient errors
- TestDoGet_FailsAfterMaxRetries: verifies proper failure after exhaustion
- TestDoGet_NoRetryOn4xx: ensures client errors don't retry
- TestDoGet_RespectsContextCancellation: validates cancellation during backoff

Closes #68
2026-05-11 00:59:47 -07:00
aweiker 4c327b61d4 Merge pull request 'feat: log loaded pattern files for debugging' (#65) from issue-64 into main
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Reviewed-on: #65
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
2026-05-11 06:53:00 +00:00
aweiker 877dbf9999 Merge pull request 'docs: add read:user to required token scopes' (#67) from issue-66 into main
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Reviewed-on: #67
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
2026-05-11 06:52:21 +00:00
Rodin 4a1cb6b47c docs: add read:user to required token scopes
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The read:user scope is needed for the bot to self-request as a
reviewer on PRs. Without it, the bot still functions but cannot
add itself to the reviewer list.

Closes #66
2026-05-10 23:40:24 -07:00
Rodin deade3c5a0 feat: log loaded pattern files for debugging
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When patterns-repo is configured, now logs at Info level:
- File paths loaded from each repo
- Count of files per repo

At Debug level logs skipped files (non-markdown/txt/yaml).

Warns if no pattern files were loaded from a repo (likely
misconfigured patterns-files path).

Closes #64
2026-05-10 23:37:14 -07:00
aweiker c54cee134e Merge pull request 'feat: load personas from target repo .review-bot/personas/' (#61) from issue-60 into main
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Reviewed-on: #61
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-11 02:54:46 +00:00
Rodin 1dd73bc4df Revert "ci: disable setup-go cache (cache server unreachable)"
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This reverts commit 8f564ea4f8.
2026-05-10 19:44:08 -07:00
Rodin 8f564ea4f8 ci: disable setup-go cache (cache server unreachable)
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Cache server at 192.168.109.55:35239 times out, adding 4+ minutes
to each job. Disable until cache infra is fixed.
2026-05-10 19:43:46 -07:00
Rodin 9775cb098c fix: address PR #61 review findings
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MAJOR:
- LoadRepoPersonas: add MaxPersonaFileSize check before parsing to
  prevent resource exhaustion from oversized YAML files committed
  to target repositories

MINOR:
- isNotFoundError: tighten substring match to 'HTTP 404' only to
  avoid masking auth/transport errors containing generic 'not found'
- main.go: remove duplicate flag.Parse() call
- main.go: add comment explaining nil map indexing is safe in Go
  when LoadRepoPersonas returns an error

Tests updated to reflect the intentional behavior change in
isNotFoundError and added test case for oversized file rejection.
2026-05-10 19:29:13 -07:00
Rodin 3f06ba2ea6 feat: load personas from target repo .review-bot/personas/
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Implements #60.

- Add ParsePersonaBytes() for parsing personas from byte data
- Add LoadRepoPersonas() to fetch personas from repo via Gitea API
- Add MergePersonas() to combine built-in and repo personas
- Add GetBuiltinPersonasMap() helper
- Update main.go to load repo personas first, fall back to built-in
- Add giteaClientAdapter to bridge gitea.Client to review.GiteaClient

When --persona is specified, the bot now:
1. Attempts to fetch personas from .review-bot/personas/*.yaml
2. If the named persona exists in the repo, uses it
3. Otherwise falls back to built-in personas

This allows repos to define domain-specific personas (e.g., trading
experts for gargoyle, crypto experts for kms-lite) without modifying
the review-bot codebase.
2026-05-10 19:05:37 -07:00
aweiker 593b249e09 Merge pull request 'feat: add YAML support for persona files' (#58) from issue-57 into main
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Reviewed-on: #58
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-11 01:39:43 +00:00
Rodin 10cd6203d4 fix: address remaining PR #58 review findings
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1. Remove dead JSON fallback in LoadBuiltinPersona
   - The embed directive only includes *.yaml files
   - JSON fallback code could never succeed
   - Simplified function to only try YAML

2. JSON parsing now rejects unknown fields
   - Switched from json.Unmarshal to json.Decoder
   - DisallowUnknownFields() matches YAML's KnownFields(true)
   - Added test coverage for JSON unknown field rejection

3. Documented symlink support in LoadPersona
   - os.Stat follows symlinks, so symlinks to regular files work
   - Added doc comment explaining the behavior
   - Added test for symlink support
2026-05-10 17:53:42 -07:00
Aaron Weiker 26f326cf51 fix: add YAML alias cycle detection and multi-document rejection
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Address security review findings:

MAJOR: Add cycle detection to checkYAMLDepth using a visited set
(seen map[*yaml.Node]struct{}) to prevent infinite recursion from
crafted YAML with self-referential aliases.

MINOR fixes:
- Add MaxYAMLNodes (1000) limit as defense-in-depth against
  wide-but-shallow structures that bypass depth limits
- Increment depth when following alias targets (was incorrectly
  passing same depth, allowing alias chains to bypass depth limit)
- Reject multi-document YAML files instead of silently ignoring
  additional documents (prevents confusing silent data loss)

Tests added:
- TestYAMLAliasCycleDetection: Direct test of cycle detection logic
- TestYAMLMultiDocumentRejection: Verifies multi-doc files rejected
- TestYAMLNodeCountLimit: Verifies wide structures are rejected
- TestCheckYAMLDepthCycleDetectionDirect: Unit test with artificial cycle
2026-05-10 17:12:01 -07:00
Rodin 4fed59ac85 yaml: enable strict field checking to catch typos
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Addresses PR #58 MINOR finding: YAML decoder now rejects unknown fields.

- Enable KnownFields(true) on YAML decoder to catch typos like
  'focuss' or 'identiy' in persona files
- Since yaml.Node.Decode() doesn't support KnownFields, we now
  do a two-pass decode: first pass checks depth limits, second
  pass decodes with strict field checking
- Add tests for unknown field rejection at top-level and nested levels
2026-05-10 16:50:07 -07:00
Rodin 6035afeea7 fix: address MINOR review findings from c3e8f0f review
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2026-05-10 16:29:44 -07:00
Rodin c3e8f0f231 fix: address PR review findings
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MAJOR fixes:
- Remove false security claim about gopkg.in/yaml.v3 having built-in depth protection
- Add explicit YAML depth limiting via yaml.Node API (MaxYAMLDepth=20)
- Add file size limit for persona files (MaxPersonaFileSize=64KB)
- Add test for deeply nested YAML rejection

MINOR fixes:
- Add sort.Strings to ListBuiltinPersonas for deterministic ordering
- Update design doc to reflect actual library used (gopkg.in/yaml.v3)
- Update README: 'Zero dependencies' → 'Minimal dependencies'
- Add test for file size limit
- Add test for sorted persona list
2026-05-10 14:43:31 -07:00
Rodin 7898dd939f feat: add YAML support for persona files (#57)
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- Add gopkg.in/yaml.v3 dependency (approved in CONVENTIONS.md)
- Update parsePersona to detect format by file extension
- Support both .yaml and .yml extensions (case-insensitive)
- Convert built-in personas to YAML format
- Add comprehensive tests for YAML parsing
- Update README with YAML examples and documentation

YAML provides cleaner multi-line strings via literal block scalars
and supports comments, making persona definitions more readable.
JSON remains supported for backwards compatibility.

Closes #57
2026-05-10 14:16:41 -07:00
rodin fededd18ad Merge pull request 'docs: allow approved third-party packages' (#59) from allow-deps into main
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docs: strict dependency allowlist with CI enforcement
2026-05-10 21:07:10 +00:00
Rodin 01cde16d47 fix: validate all deps and improve robustness
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Addresses GPT review feedback:

1. MAJOR - Test deps now validated: All direct module deps (from go.mod)
   are checked against the allowlist, whether used in prod or tests.

2. MINOR - Prefix match: Uses grep -E with word boundary (^pkg(/|$|$))
   to avoid false positives on similarly-prefixed modules.

3. MINOR - Bash version check: Script now fails early with helpful
   message if Bash < 4 (macOS default). Added shebang: #!/usr/bin/env bash

4. NIT - Removed redundant grep -v '_test' (go list -deps already
   excludes test-only deps without -test flag).
2026-05-10 14:02:06 -07:00
Rodin aeb0c8cb79 fix: enforce Scope column and improve portability
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Addresses review feedback:

1. MAJOR - Scope enforcement: Script now parses the Scope column and
   ensures 'test only' packages don't appear in non-test code. Uses
   'go list -deps' to check production imports.

2. MINOR - Portability: Replaced 'grep -P' (GNU-only) with awk-based
   parsing that works on macOS/BSD.

3. MINOR - Robustness: Table parsing uses awk to split on '|' and
   extract columns properly, handling whitespace variations.

4. MINOR - Glob safety: Prefix matching now uses parameter expansion
   instead of glob patterns to prevent metacharacter issues.
2026-05-10 13:57:49 -07:00
Rodin 70267b68f4 fix: address review feedback on dependency allowlist
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Fixes:
- Single source of truth: script now parses allowlist from CONVENTIONS.md
- Fail closed: script exits non-zero if 'go list' fails
- Direct deps only: uses '-f' flag to exclude transitive deps
- Added 'precommit' to .PHONY in Makefile
- Removed unused ALLOWED_PATTERN variable
- Added Scope column to distinguish test-only vs production deps
- Clarified that transitive deps of approved packages are allowed
- Added note that enforcement script parses the table
2026-05-10 13:53:55 -07:00
Rodin 4b96231b32 docs: strict dependency allowlist with CI enforcement
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STRICT ALLOWLIST policy: Only packages explicitly listed in CONVENTIONS.md
may be imported. No exceptions.

## Changes

- Updates CONVENTIONS.md with strict allowlist language
- Adds scripts/check-deps.sh to enforce the allowlist
- Adds 'make check-deps' and 'make precommit' targets
- CI will fail if any unapproved dependency is detected

## Approved packages

- gopkg.in/yaml.v3 — YAML parsing
- github.com/google/go-cmp — test comparisons

## Process for new dependencies

1. Open a PR that ONLY updates CONVENTIONS.md
2. Requires explicit approval from Aaron
3. After merge, a separate PR may use the package
2026-05-10 13:45:12 -07:00
rodin 230419f0e2 Merge pull request 'feat: native SAP AI Core support' (#54) from feat/aicore-provider-v2 into main
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feat: native SAP AI Core support (#54)
2026-05-10 20:03:32 +00:00
Rodin 7dab35de41 feat: native SAP AI Core support
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Add native SAP AI Core provider that handles OAuth token management and
deployment discovery automatically. This eliminates the need for the
external LLM proxy when running in SAP environments.

Changes:
- Add AICoreClient with OAuth token caching and deployment URL discovery
- Support both Anthropic and OpenAI models via AI Core deployments
- Update CI to use native AI Core provider
- Update action inputs to accept AI Core credentials
- Update README with AI Core configuration examples

Model names must match AI Core deployment names (e.g. anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, gpt-5).
2026-05-10 10:25:10 -07:00
aweiker c41c9590b7 Merge pull request 'feat(persona): add role-based review personas' (#55) from issue-51 into main
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Reviewed-on: #55
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-10 17:16:10 +00:00
29 changed files with 4984 additions and 234 deletions
+33 -6
View File
@@ -26,18 +26,40 @@ inputs:
required: false
default: ''
llm-base-url:
description: 'OpenAI-compatible LLM API base URL'
required: true
description: 'OpenAI-compatible LLM API base URL (not required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
llm-api-key:
description: 'LLM API key'
required: true
description: 'LLM API key (not required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
llm-model:
description: 'LLM model name'
required: true
llm-provider:
description: 'LLM API provider: openai or anthropic (default openai)'
description: 'LLM API provider: openai, anthropic, or aicore (default openai)'
required: false
default: 'openai'
default: 'openai'
aicore-client-id:
description: 'SAP AI Core client ID (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-client-secret:
description: 'SAP AI Core client secret (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-auth-url:
description: 'SAP AI Core authentication URL (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-api-url:
description: 'SAP AI Core API URL (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-resource-group:
description: 'SAP AI Core resource group (default: default)'
required: false
default: 'default'
conventions-file:
description: 'Path to conventions file in the repo (e.g. CLAUDE.md)'
required: false
@@ -165,6 +187,11 @@ runs:
SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE: ${{ inputs.system-prompt-file }}
PERSONA: ${{ inputs.persona }}
PERSONA_FILE: ${{ inputs.persona-file }}
AICORE_CLIENT_ID: ${{ inputs.aicore-client-id }}
AICORE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ inputs.aicore-client-secret }}
AICORE_AUTH_URL: ${{ inputs.aicore-auth-url }}
AICORE_API_URL: ${{ inputs.aicore-api-url }}
AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP: ${{ inputs.aicore-resource-group }}
run: |
ARGS=""
if [ "${{ inputs.dry-run }}" = "true" ]; then
+14 -13
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,10 @@ jobs:
- run: go vet ./...
- run: go build -o review-bot ./cmd/review-bot
# Self-review: builds from source since we're pre-release
# Models configured to match SAP AI Core deployments
# Self-review using native SAP AI Core provider
# Models must match SAP AI Core deployments
# Available models: gpt-5, anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, anthropic--claude-4.6-opus
# Removed gpt-4.1, gpt-5-mini, gpt-4.1-mini - not deployed on AI Core
review:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
@@ -29,19 +31,15 @@ jobs:
include:
- name: sonnet
token_secret: SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN
provider: anthropic
llm_path: /anthropic/v1
model: anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet
- name: gpt
token_secret: GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN
provider: openai
llm_path: /openai/v1
model: gpt-5
- name: security
token_secret: SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN
provider: openai
llm_path: /openai/v1
model: gpt-5
patterns_repo: rodin/security-patterns
patterns_files: "."
system_prompt_file: SECURITY_REVIEW.md
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -56,13 +54,16 @@ jobs:
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
REVIEWER_TOKEN: ${{ secrets[matrix.token_secret] }}
REVIEWER_NAME: ${{ matrix.name }}
LLM_BASE_URL: ${{ secrets.LLM_BASE_URL }}${{ matrix.llm_path }}
LLM_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.LLM_API_KEY }}
LLM_PROVIDER: aicore
LLM_MODEL: ${{ matrix.model }}
LLM_PROVIDER: ${{ matrix.provider }}
AICORE_CLIENT_ID: ${{ secrets.AICORE_CLIENT_ID }}
AICORE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.AICORE_CLIENT_SECRET }}
AICORE_AUTH_URL: ${{ secrets.AICORE_AUTH_URL }}
AICORE_API_URL: ${{ secrets.AICORE_API_URL }}
AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP: ${{ secrets.AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP }}
CONVENTIONS_FILE: "CONVENTIONS.md"
PATTERNS_REPO: "rodin/go-patterns"
PATTERNS_FILES: "README.md,patterns/"
PATTERNS_REPO: ${{ matrix.patterns_repo || 'rodin/go-patterns' }}
PATTERNS_FILES: ${{ matrix.patterns_files || 'README.md,patterns/' }}
LLM_TIMEOUT: "600"
SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE: ${{ matrix.system_prompt_file }}
run: ./review-bot
+19 -1
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,26 @@
## Language & Dependencies
- Go standard library only — no external dependencies.
- Target the latest stable Go release.
- **STRICT ALLOWLIST:** Only packages listed below may be imported. No exceptions.
### Approved Third-Party Packages
| Package | Use Case | Scope |
|---------|----------|-------|
| `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` | YAML parsing and AST inspection (subpkgs: `ast`, `parser`) | production |
| `github.com/google/go-cmp` | Test comparisons (`cmp.Diff`) | test only |
**Any import not in this table or the Go standard library is forbidden.**
Transitive dependencies of approved packages are automatically allowed.
To request a new dependency:
1. Open a PR that ONLY updates this table
2. Requires explicit approval from Aaron
3. After merge, a separate PR may use the package
*Enforcement: `scripts/check-deps.sh` parses this table — update only here.*
## Error Handling
+7 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.PHONY: build test test-integration lint clean coverage
.PHONY: build test test-integration lint clean coverage check-deps precommit
build:
go build -o review-bot ./cmd/review-bot/
@@ -12,9 +12,15 @@ test-integration:
lint:
go vet ./...
check-deps:
@./scripts/check-deps.sh
clean:
rm -f review-bot
coverage:
go test -coverprofile=coverage.out ./...
go tool cover -func=coverage.out
# Precommit runs all checks required before pushing
precommit: check-deps lint test
+77 -35
View File
@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ AI-powered code review bot for Gitea pull requests. Fetches diff + context, send
## Features
- **Multi-provider**: OpenAI-compatible and Anthropic Messages API
- **Multi-provider**: OpenAI-compatible, Anthropic Messages API, and SAP AI Core
- **Context-aware**: Fetches full file content, conventions, language patterns, CI status
- **Smart budget**: Automatically trims context to fit model token limits
- **Idempotent reviews**: Posts new review, then cleans up stale ones (one review per bot)
- **Custom prompts**: Load additional instructions from a file (e.g. security-focused review)
- **Zero dependencies**: Go stdlib only
- **Minimal dependencies**: Go stdlib + `gopkg.in/yaml.v3` only
## Quick Start: Composite Action
@@ -168,28 +168,56 @@ Prints the review to CI logs without posting to the PR. Useful for testing promp
llm-provider: anthropic
```
### Using SAP AI Core
For SAP environments with AI Core deployments, use the `aicore` provider for native authentication:
```yaml
- uses: https://gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot/.gitea/actions/review@v0.1.0
with:
reviewer-token: ${{ secrets.REVIEW_TOKEN }}
reviewer-name: aicore-review
llm-model: anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet # or gpt-5
llm-provider: aicore
aicore-client-id: ${{ secrets.AICORE_CLIENT_ID }}
aicore-client-secret: ${{ secrets.AICORE_CLIENT_SECRET }}
aicore-auth-url: ${{ secrets.AICORE_AUTH_URL }}
aicore-api-url: ${{ secrets.AICORE_API_URL }}
aicore-resource-group: default
```
AI Core handles OAuth token management and deployment discovery automatically. Model names must match the deployment name in AI Core (e.g. `anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet`, `gpt-5`).
## Action Inputs
| Input | Required | Default | Description |
|-------|----------|---------|-------------|
| `reviewer-token` | Yes | — | Gitea token for posting reviews (needs `write:issue`, `write:repository`) |
| `reviewer-name` | No | `""` | Logical identity for this reviewer. Used as sentinel for idempotent cleanup. Set this when running multiple review bots on the same PR. |
| `llm-base-url` | Yes | — | LLM API base URL |
| `llm-api-key` | Yes | — | LLM API key |
| `llm-base-url` | No* | `""` | LLM API base URL (required unless using aicore provider) |
| `llm-api-key` | No* | `""` | LLM API key (required unless using aicore provider) |
| `llm-model` | Yes | — | Model name |
| `llm-provider` | No | `openai` | API provider: `openai` or `anthropic` |
| `llm-provider` | No | `openai` | API provider: `openai`, `anthropic`, or `aicore` |
| `aicore-client-id` | No** | `""` | SAP AI Core client ID |
| `aicore-client-secret` | No** | `""` | SAP AI Core client secret |
| `aicore-auth-url` | No** | `""` | SAP AI Core authentication URL |
| `aicore-api-url` | No** | `""` | SAP AI Core API URL |
| `aicore-resource-group` | No | `default` | SAP AI Core resource group |
| `conventions-file` | No | `""` | Path to coding conventions file in the repo |
| `patterns-repo` | No | `""` | Comma-separated repos with language patterns (e.g. `rodin/go-patterns`) |
| `patterns-files` | No | `README.md` | Files/directories to fetch from pattern repos |
| `system-prompt-file` | No | `""` | Local file with additional system prompt instructions |
| `persona` | No | `""` | Built-in persona name (security, architect, docs) |
| `persona-file` | No | `""` | Path to persona JSON file with custom review focus |
| `persona-file` | No | `""` | Path to persona file (YAML or JSON) with custom review focus |
| `temperature` | No | `0` | LLM temperature (0 = server default) |
| `timeout` | No | `300` | LLM request timeout in seconds |
| `dry-run` | No | `false` | Print review to stdout instead of posting |
| `update-existing` | No | `true` | Delete previous review from same bot before posting. Accepts: true/1/yes or false/0/no |
| `version` | No | `latest` | review-bot version to install |
*Required for `openai` and `anthropic` providers, not for `aicore`.
**Required only for `aicore` provider.
## Runner Requirements
The composite action requires these tools on the runner:
@@ -301,11 +329,12 @@ All flags have environment variable equivalents:
### Token Scopes Required
| Scope | Purpose |
|-------|---------|
|-------|--------|
| `write:issue` | Post and delete reviews |
| `write:repository` | Read PR diffs, file content, commit statuses |
| `read:user` | Self-request as reviewer (optional but recommended) |
No `read:user` scope needed — the bot identifies itself from the review response.
Without `read:user`, the bot still works but cannot add itself to the PR's reviewer list.
## Development
@@ -380,32 +409,38 @@ Each persona posts independently with its own sentinel, so reviews don't interfe
### Custom Personas
Create a JSON file with your domain-specific review focus:
Create a YAML file with your domain-specific review focus:
```json
// .review/personas/trading.json
{
"name": "trading",
"display_name": "Trading Domain Expert",
"identity": "You are a trading systems expert reviewing code for correctness.\n\nYour expertise:\n- Order lifecycle and state machines\n- Fill handling and partial fills\n- Position tracking and P&L calculations\n- Event sourcing invariants",
"focus": [
"Order state machine correctness",
"Fill handling edge cases (partial, overfill)",
"Position and P&L calculation accuracy",
"Event replay determinism",
"Decimal precision for money"
],
"ignore": [
"Code style",
"General performance",
"Documentation formatting"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Bugs that cause incorrect positions, fills, or money calculations",
"minor": "Edge cases that could cause issues under unusual conditions",
"nit": "Clarity improvements for domain logic"
}
}
```yaml
# .review/personas/trading.yaml
name: trading
display_name: Trading Domain Expert
identity: |
You are a trading systems expert reviewing code for correctness.
Your expertise:
- Order lifecycle and state machines
- Fill handling and partial fills
- Position tracking and P&L calculations
- Event sourcing invariants
focus:
- Order state machine correctness
- Fill handling edge cases (partial, overfill)
- Position and P&L calculation accuracy
- Event replay determinism
- Decimal precision for money
ignore:
- Code style
- General performance
- Documentation formatting
severity:
major: "Bugs that cause incorrect positions, fills, or money calculations"
minor: "Edge cases that could cause issues under unusual conditions"
nit: "Clarity improvements for domain logic"
```
Use it in CI:
@@ -414,17 +449,24 @@ Use it in CI:
- uses: rodin/review-bot/.gitea/actions/review@v1
with:
reviewer-name: trading
persona-file: .review/personas/trading.json
persona-file: .review/personas/trading.yaml
...
```
YAML is the recommended format for personas because it supports:
- Multi-line strings with `|` blocks (cleaner identity definitions)
- Comments for documentation
- More readable arrays and nested structures
JSON is also supported for backwards compatibility—just use `.json` extension.
### Persona vs system-prompt-file
| Feature | `persona` / `persona-file` | `system-prompt-file` |
|---------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Replaces base prompt | Yes | No (appends) |
| Structured format | Yes (JSON) | No (freeform) |
| Structured format | Yes (YAML/JSON) | No (freeform) |
| Focus/ignore lists | Yes | Manual |
| Severity calibration | Yes | Manual |
| Header display name | Yes | No |
+127 -35
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@@ -65,13 +65,19 @@ func main() {
conventionsFile := flag.String("conventions-file", envOrDefault("CONVENTIONS_FILE", ""), "Conventions file path in repo (e.g. CLAUDE.md)")
systemPromptFile := flag.String("system-prompt-file", envOrDefault("SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE", ""), "Local file with additional system prompt instructions")
patternsRepo := flag.String("patterns-repo", envOrDefault("PATTERNS_REPO", ""), "Repo with language patterns (e.g. rodin/elixir-patterns)")
patternsFiles := flag.String("patterns-files", envOrDefault("PATTERNS_FILES", "README.md"), "Comma-separated file paths to fetch from patterns repo")
patternsFiles := flag.String("patterns-files", envOrDefault("PATTERNS_FILES", ""), "Comma-separated file paths to fetch from patterns repo (empty = all files)")
dryRun := flag.Bool("dry-run", false, "Print review to stdout instead of posting")
llmTemp := flag.Float64("llm-temperature", envOrDefaultFloat("LLM_TEMPERATURE", 0), "LLM temperature (0 = server default)")
llmTimeout := flag.Int("llm-timeout", envOrDefaultInt("LLM_TIMEOUT", 300), "LLM request timeout in seconds (default 300)")
llmProvider := flag.String("llm-provider", envOrDefault("LLM_PROVIDER", "openai"), "LLM API provider: openai or anthropic")
llmProvider := flag.String("llm-provider", envOrDefault("LLM_PROVIDER", "openai"), "LLM API provider: openai, anthropic, or aicore")
personaName := flag.String("persona", envOrDefault("PERSONA", ""), "Built-in persona name (security, architect, docs)")
personaFile := flag.String("persona-file", envOrDefault("PERSONA_FILE", ""), "Path to persona JSON file")
// AI Core specific flags (only used when provider=aicore)
aicoreClientID := flag.String("aicore-client-id", envOrDefault("AICORE_CLIENT_ID", ""), "SAP AI Core client ID (for provider=aicore)")
aicoreClientSecret := flag.String("aicore-client-secret", envOrDefault("AICORE_CLIENT_SECRET", ""), "SAP AI Core client secret (for provider=aicore)")
aicoreAuthURL := flag.String("aicore-auth-url", envOrDefault("AICORE_AUTH_URL", ""), "SAP AI Core auth URL (for provider=aicore)")
aicoreAPIURL := flag.String("aicore-api-url", envOrDefault("AICORE_API_URL", ""), "SAP AI Core API URL (for provider=aicore)")
aicoreResourceGroup := flag.String("aicore-resource-group", envOrDefault("AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP", "default"), "SAP AI Core resource group (for provider=aicore)")
flag.Parse()
@@ -86,10 +92,20 @@ func main() {
slog.Info("review-bot starting", "version", version)
// Validate required fields
if *giteaURL == "" || *repo == "" || *prNum == "" || *reviewerToken == "" ||
*llmBaseURL == "" || *llmAPIKey == "" || *llmModel == "" {
// For aicore provider, llm-base-url and llm-api-key are not required
isAICore := llm.Provider(*llmProvider) == llm.ProviderAICore
if *giteaURL == "" || *repo == "" || *prNum == "" || *reviewerToken == "" || *llmModel == "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: missing required flags or environment variables\n\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Required: --gitea-url, --repo, --pr, --reviewer-token, --llm-base-url, --llm-api-key, --llm-model\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Required: --gitea-url, --repo, --pr, --reviewer-token, --llm-model\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
if !isAICore && (*llmBaseURL == "" || *llmAPIKey == "") {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: --llm-base-url and --llm-api-key are required for provider=%s\n", *llmProvider)
os.Exit(1)
}
if isAICore && (*aicoreClientID == "" || *aicoreClientSecret == "" || *aicoreAuthURL == "" || *aicoreAPIURL == "") {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: AI Core credentials required for provider=aicore\n\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Required: --aicore-client-id, --aicore-client-secret, --aicore-auth-url, --aicore-api-url\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
@@ -99,29 +115,7 @@ func main() {
os.Exit(1)
}
// Load persona if specified
var persona *review.Persona
if *personaName != "" {
var err error
persona, err = review.LoadBuiltinPersona(*personaName)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona", "persona", *personaName, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded built-in persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName)
} else if *personaFile != "" {
resolvedPath, err := validateWorkspacePath(*personaFile, "persona-file")
if err != nil {
slog.Error("invalid persona-file path", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
persona, err = review.LoadPersona(resolvedPath)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona file", "file", *personaFile, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded persona from file", "file", *personaFile, "persona", persona.Name)
}
// NOTE: Persona loading deferred until after Gitea client init to support repo personas
// Validate reviewer-name: only safe characters allowed in sentinel
if err := validateReviewerName(*reviewerName); err != nil {
@@ -157,8 +151,17 @@ func main() {
switch llm.Provider(*llmProvider) {
case llm.ProviderOpenAI, llm.ProviderAnthropic:
llmClient.WithProvider(llm.Provider(*llmProvider))
case llm.ProviderAICore:
llmClient.WithAICore(llm.AICoreConfig{
ClientID: *aicoreClientID,
ClientSecret: *aicoreClientSecret,
AuthURL: *aicoreAuthURL,
APIURL: *aicoreAPIURL,
ResourceGroup: *aicoreResourceGroup,
})
slog.Info("using SAP AI Core provider", "resource_group", *aicoreResourceGroup)
default:
slog.Error("invalid LLM provider", "provider", *llmProvider, "valid", "openai, anthropic")
slog.Error("invalid LLM provider", "provider", *llmProvider, "valid", "openai, anthropic, aicore")
os.Exit(1)
}
if *llmTimeout > 0 {
@@ -170,6 +173,43 @@ func main() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), overallTimeout)
defer cancel()
// Load persona if specified (after Gitea client init to support repo personas)
var persona *review.Persona
if *personaName != "" {
// Try loading from repo first, then fall back to built-in
repoPersonas, err := review.LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, newGiteaClientAdapter(giteaClient), owner, repoName)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not load repo personas", "repo", owner+"/"+repoName, "error", err)
// Continue with built-in personas only.
// NOTE: repoPersonas is nil here, but map indexing on a nil map is safe in Go
// (returns the zero value), so the fallback to built-in below works correctly.
}
if p, ok := repoPersonas[*personaName]; ok {
persona = p
slog.Info("loaded repo persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName, "repo", owner+"/"+repoName)
} else {
// Fall back to built-in
persona, err = review.LoadBuiltinPersona(*personaName)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona", "persona", *personaName, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded built-in persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName)
}
} else if *personaFile != "" {
resolvedPath, err := validateWorkspacePath(*personaFile, "persona-file")
if err != nil {
slog.Error("invalid persona-file path", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
persona, err = review.LoadPersona(resolvedPath)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona file", "file", *personaFile, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded persona from file", "file", *personaFile, "persona", persona.Name)
}
slog.Info("reviewing pull request", "pr", prNumber, "repo", fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", owner, repoName))
// Step 1: Fetch PR metadata
@@ -483,11 +523,25 @@ func fetchFileContext(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, owner, repo, re
// patternsRepo is comma-separated list of owner/name repos.
// patternsFiles is comma-separated list of file paths or directories.
// If a path ends with / or is a directory, all files within it are fetched recursively.
// If patternsFiles is empty, all files from the repo root are fetched.
func fetchPatterns(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, patternsRepo, patternsFiles string) string {
var sb strings.Builder
repos := strings.Split(patternsRepo, ",")
paths := strings.Split(patternsFiles, ",")
// Build the list of paths to fetch
var paths []string
if patternsFiles == "" {
// Empty patternsFiles means "fetch all files from repo root"
paths = []string{""}
} else {
for _, p := range strings.Split(patternsFiles, ",") {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p != "" {
paths = append(paths, p)
}
}
}
for _, repoRef := range repos {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -504,12 +558,10 @@ func fetchPatterns(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, patternsRepo, patt
}
owner, repo := parts[0], parts[1]
for _, path := range paths {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
continue
}
var repoLoadedFiles []string
var repoSkippedFiles []string
for _, path := range paths {
files, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(ctx, owner, repo, path)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not fetch patterns", "path", path, "repo", repoRef, "error", err)
@@ -519,11 +571,22 @@ func fetchPatterns(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, patternsRepo, patt
for filePath, content := range files {
// Only include markdown and text files as patterns
if !isPatternFile(filePath) {
repoSkippedFiles = append(repoSkippedFiles, filePath)
continue
}
repoLoadedFiles = append(repoLoadedFiles, filePath)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("### %s/%s\n\n%s\n\n", repoRef, filePath, content))
}
}
if len(repoLoadedFiles) > 0 {
slog.Info("loaded pattern files", "repo", repoRef, "count", len(repoLoadedFiles), "files", repoLoadedFiles)
} else {
slog.Warn("no pattern files loaded", "repo", repoRef, "paths", paths)
}
if len(repoSkippedFiles) > 0 {
slog.Debug("skipped non-pattern files", "repo", repoRef, "count", len(repoSkippedFiles), "files", repoSkippedFiles)
}
}
return sb.String()
}
@@ -757,3 +820,32 @@ func shouldSkipStaleReview(evaluatedSHA, currentSHA string) bool {
}
return evaluatedSHA != currentSHA
}
// giteaClientAdapter adapts gitea.Client to review.GiteaClient interface.
type giteaClientAdapter struct {
client *gitea.Client
}
func newGiteaClientAdapter(c *gitea.Client) *giteaClientAdapter {
return &giteaClientAdapter{client: c}
}
func (a *giteaClientAdapter) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]review.ContentEntry, error) {
entries, err := a.client.ListContents(ctx, owner, repo, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
result := make([]review.ContentEntry, len(entries))
for i, e := range entries {
result[i] = review.ContentEntry{
Name: e.Name,
Path: e.Path,
Type: e.Type,
}
}
return result, nil
}
func (a *giteaClientAdapter) GetFileContent(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath string) (string, error) {
return a.client.GetFileContent(ctx, owner, repo, filepath)
}
+46
View File
@@ -504,6 +504,52 @@ func TestIsPatternFile(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBuildPatternPaths verifies the path-building logic for fetchPatterns.
// Empty patternsFiles means "fetch all from root" (represented as [""]).
func TestBuildPatternPaths(t *testing.T) {
buildPaths := func(patternsFiles string) []string {
if patternsFiles == "" {
return []string{""}
}
var paths []string
for _, p := range strings.Split(patternsFiles, ",") {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p != "" {
paths = append(paths, p)
}
}
return paths
}
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
want []string
}{
{"empty fetches root", "", []string{""}},
{"single file", "README.md", []string{"README.md"}},
{"multiple files", "README.md,PATTERNS.md", []string{"README.md", "PATTERNS.md"}},
{"trims whitespace", " foo.md , bar.md ", []string{"foo.md", "bar.md"}},
{"skips empty between commas", "foo.md,,bar.md", []string{"foo.md", "bar.md"}},
{"directory path", "patterns/", []string{"patterns/"}},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := buildPaths(tc.input)
if len(got) != len(tc.want) {
t.Errorf("buildPaths(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.input, got, tc.want)
return
}
for i := range got {
if got[i] != tc.want[i] {
t.Errorf("buildPaths(%q)[%d] = %q, want %q", tc.input, i, got[i], tc.want[i])
}
}
})
}
}
func TestEvaluateCIStatus(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
# Design: YAML Support for Persona Files (#57)
## Problem
JSON is awkward for persona files that contain multi-line text (identity, severity descriptions). YAML supports cleaner multi-line strings and comments, improving readability and maintainability.
## Constraints
- Backwards compatibility: existing JSON personas must continue to work
- Security: protect against DoS via deeply nested YAML (AIKIDO-2024-10486)
- Consistency: use `.yaml` extension (not `.yml`)
- Library: use `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` v1.16.0+ (approved in CONVENTIONS.md); we implement custom AST-based depth/node-count checks for precise alias-aware validation
## Proposed Approach
1. **Update `parsePersona`** to detect format from file extension
2. **Add YAML parsing** with explicit depth limit (defense in depth)
3. **Keep JSON as fallback** for files without `.yaml`/`.yml` extension
4. **Convert built-in personas** to YAML format
5. **Update embed directive** to include both formats
### File Extension Detection
```go
func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
isYAML := strings.HasSuffix(source, ".yaml") || strings.HasSuffix(source, ".yml")
if isYAML {
return parseYAML(data, source)
}
return parseJSON(data, source)
}
```
### YAML Parsing with Depth Protection
We implement a custom AST-based depth/node-count walk (`checkYAMLDepth` in
`review/persona.go`) rather than relying on library decoder options. Key design
decisions:
- **Library:** `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` with `ast.Node`-based traversal
- **Dual-map tracking:** `validated` (depth-aware short-circuit) + `visiting` (cycle detection)
- **Node-count limit:** Conservative overcounting bounds total validation work
- **Alias-aware depth:** Aliases increment depth and are re-checked when encountered at greater depths
See `review/persona.go:checkYAMLDepth` for the authoritative implementation.
## State/Data Model
No new state. Same `Persona` struct, just different parsing.
## Error Cases
| Error | Handling |
|-------|----------|
| Invalid YAML syntax | Return parse error with source file |
| Deeply nested YAML | Custom AST walk (`checkYAMLDepth`) rejects before decode |
| Unknown extension | Fall back to JSON parsing |
| Missing required fields | Validation rejects after parse |
## Edge Cases
- File with `.json` extension but YAML content → JSON parse fails, user sees error
- File with no extension → defaults to JSON
- Embedded persona reference like `builtin:security` → detect by embed path (`personas/X.yaml`)
## Testing Strategy
1. Unit tests for YAML parsing (valid, invalid, deeply nested)
2. Unit tests for extension detection
3. Integration test for built-in personas (now YAML)
4. Backwards compat test: verify JSON still works for external files
## Completion Checklist
1. [ ] `go-yaml` dependency added at v1.16.0+
2. [ ] Extension detection uses case-insensitive comparison
3. [ ] YAML parse errors include source file name
4. [ ] JSON parsing still works for `.json` files
5. [ ] Built-in personas converted to YAML with readable multi-line strings
6. [ ] Embed directive updated to include `*.yaml`
7. [ ] Test for deeply nested YAML rejection
8. [ ] All existing tests pass
## Open Questions
- Should we support both `.yaml` AND `.yml`? Issue says `.yaml` only for consistency, but some users expect `.yml`. **Decision:** Support both for reading, recommend `.yaml` in docs.
- Should we add a "format" field to detect mismatched extension/content? **Decision:** No, keep it simple. Extension determines format.
+332 -22
View File
@@ -11,9 +11,12 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
)
@@ -39,12 +42,68 @@ func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound
}
// IsServerError reports whether an error is an API 5xx response.
func IsServerError(err error) bool {
var apiErr *APIError
return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.StatusCode >= 500 && apiErr.StatusCode < 600
}
// DefaultMaxDiffSize is the default maximum diff size in bytes (10 MB).
const DefaultMaxDiffSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024
// ErrDiffTooLarge is returned when a PR diff exceeds the configured MaxDiffSize.
var ErrDiffTooLarge = errors.New("diff size exceeds maximum allowed size")
// Client interacts with the Gitea API.
// A Client is safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
type Client struct {
baseURL string
token string
http *http.Client
// RetryBackoff defines the delays between retry attempts.
// RetryBackoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (after attempt i fails).
// If nil, defaults to {1s, 2s}. Set to shorter durations in tests.
//
// This field must be configured before the first request is made.
// Modifying it while requests are in flight is not safe.
RetryBackoff []time.Duration
// MaxDiffSize is the maximum number of bytes allowed when fetching a PR diff.
// If zero, defaults to DefaultMaxDiffSize (10 MB). Set to any negative value
// (or math.MaxInt64) to disable the limit.
//
// This field must be configured before the first request is made.
// Modifying it while requests are in flight is not safe.
MaxDiffSize int64
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in github/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// NewClient creates a new Gitea API client.
@@ -52,10 +111,33 @@ func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
http: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
http: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.http = hc
}
// PullRequest holds relevant PR metadata.
type PullRequest struct {
Title string `json:"title"`
@@ -103,9 +185,28 @@ func (c *Client) GetPullRequest(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number
}
// GetPullRequestDiff fetches the unified diff for a PR.
// It enforces MaxDiffSize to prevent unbounded memory allocation.
// Returns ErrDiffTooLarge if the diff exceeds the configured limit.
func (c *Client) GetPullRequestDiff(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int) (string, error) {
reqURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d.diff", c.baseURL, url.PathEscape(owner), url.PathEscape(repo), number)
body, err := c.doGet(ctx, reqURL)
maxSize := c.MaxDiffSize
if maxSize == 0 {
maxSize = DefaultMaxDiffSize
}
// When the limit is disabled (negative) or set to math.MaxInt64 (which
// would overflow the +1 detection and silently disable enforcement),
// use the standard unlimited doGet path.
if maxSize < 0 || maxSize == math.MaxInt64 {
body, err := c.doGet(ctx, reqURL)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetch diff: %w", err)
}
return string(body), nil
}
body, err := c.doGetLimited(ctx, reqURL, maxSize)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetch diff: %w", err)
}
@@ -210,24 +311,218 @@ func (c *Client) PostReview(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int,
return &review, nil
}
// isTemporaryNetError reports whether err is a temporary network error worth retrying.
// This includes connection refused, network unreachable, connection reset, and DNS
// timeouts. It explicitly excludes permanent errors like permission denied or
// "no such host" DNS failures.
func isTemporaryNetError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// Check for OpError and inspect the underlying syscall error.
// Not all OpErrors are transient — permission denied, for example, is permanent.
var opErr *net.OpError
if errors.As(err, &opErr) {
return isRetriableSyscallError(opErr.Err)
}
// DNS errors: only retry on timeout, not on "no such host" which is permanent.
var dnsErr *net.DNSError
if errors.As(err, &dnsErr) {
return dnsErr.IsTimeout
}
// Check for net.Error with Timeout() (Temporary is deprecated)
var netErr net.Error
if errors.As(err, &netErr) {
return netErr.Timeout()
}
return false
}
// isRetriableSyscallError reports whether the underlying error from a net.OpError
// is a transient syscall error worth retrying.
func isRetriableSyscallError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// Check for syscall.Errno directly or wrapped
var errno syscall.Errno
if errors.As(err, &errno) {
switch errno {
case syscall.ECONNREFUSED, // connection refused — server not listening
syscall.ECONNRESET, // connection reset by peer
syscall.ENETUNREACH, // network unreachable
syscall.EHOSTUNREACH, // host unreachable
syscall.ETIMEDOUT: // connection timed out
return true
default:
// EACCES, EPERM, etc. are permanent — don't retry
return false
}
}
// If we can't identify the specific syscall error, be conservative and retry.
// This handles wrapped errors or platform-specific error types.
// The retry count is limited, so erring on the side of retrying is safe.
return true
}
// redactURL strips query parameters and userinfo credentials from a URL for
// safe logging. This prevents accidental exposure of sensitive data (tokens in
// query strings, or user:pass in the authority) in log output.
func redactURL(rawURL string) string {
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
// If we cannot parse it, return a safe placeholder rather than
// potentially logging something sensitive.
return "[invalid URL]"
}
if parsed.User != nil {
parsed.User = url.User("REDACTED")
}
if parsed.RawQuery != "" {
parsed.RawQuery = "[redacted]"
}
return parsed.String()
}
// sanitizeErrorForLog returns a loggable version of an error that omits
// potentially sensitive content like response bodies. For APIError, only
// the status code is included; for other errors, the type is preserved.
func sanitizeErrorForLog(err error) string {
if err == nil {
return "<nil>"
}
var apiErr *APIError
if errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d", apiErr.StatusCode)
}
return err.Error()
}
// doGetWithReader performs an HTTP GET request with retry on 5xx errors and
// temporary network errors. Retries up to 3 times with exponential backoff
// (1s, 2s delays by default; configurable via Client.RetryBackoff for testing).
// The readBody function is called with the response body on success (2xx) and
// is responsible for reading and closing it.
func (c *Client) doGetWithReader(ctx context.Context, reqURL string, readBody func(io.ReadCloser) ([]byte, error)) ([]byte, error) {
const maxAttempts = 3
// backoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (i.e., after attempt i fails).
// First attempt (i=0) has no delay; retries wait 1s then 2s by default.
backoff := c.RetryBackoff
if backoff == nil {
backoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Second, 2 * time.Second}
}
// maxErrorBodyBytes limits how much of an error response body we read
// to protect against malicious servers sending unbounded data.
const maxErrorBodyBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KB
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++ {
if attempt > 0 {
// Determine delay: use backoff slice if available, otherwise retry immediately.
// An empty RetryBackoff slice means "retry without delay" — this is intentional
// as the caller explicitly configured no delays.
var delay time.Duration
if attempt-1 < len(backoff) {
delay = backoff[attempt-1]
}
if delay > 0 {
slog.Warn("retrying request after error",
"attempt", attempt+1,
"url", redactURL(reqURL),
"delay", delay.String(),
"lastError", sanitizeErrorForLog(lastErr))
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-timer.C:
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+c.token)
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Always capture the error for consistent return at loop end.
// This ensures both network errors and HTTP 5xx return lastErr.
lastErr = err
// Only retry temporary network errors when attempts remain.
if attempt < maxAttempts-1 && isTemporaryNetError(err) {
slog.Warn("temporary network error, will retry",
"attempt", attempt+1,
"url", redactURL(reqURL),
"error", err)
continue
}
// Non-retryable network error or final attempt exhausted.
return nil, lastErr
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
return readBody(resp.Body)
}
// Error path: limit how much we read from potentially malicious server
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
lastErr = &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(errBody)}
// Only retry on 5xx server errors
if resp.StatusCode < 500 || resp.StatusCode >= 600 {
return nil, lastErr
}
}
return nil, lastErr
}
// doGet performs an HTTP GET request with retry, reading the full response body.
func (c *Client) doGet(ctx context.Context, reqURL string) ([]byte, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+c.token)
return c.doGetWithReader(ctx, reqURL, func(body io.ReadCloser) ([]byte, error) {
defer body.Close()
return io.ReadAll(body)
})
}
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
return nil, &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(body)}
}
return io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
// doGetLimited performs an HTTP GET request with retry but enforces a maximum
// response body size. Returns ErrDiffTooLarge if the response exceeds maxBytes.
// It reads maxBytes+1 (clamped to avoid overflow) to detect truncation without
// buffering the entire body.
func (c *Client) doGetLimited(ctx context.Context, reqURL string, maxBytes int64) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doGetWithReader(ctx, reqURL, func(body io.ReadCloser) ([]byte, error) {
defer body.Close()
// Read up to maxBytes+1 to detect overflow.
// Clamp to prevent integer overflow when maxBytes == math.MaxInt64.
limitBytes := maxBytes + 1
if limitBytes <= 0 {
limitBytes = math.MaxInt64
}
limited := io.LimitReader(body, limitBytes)
data, err := io.ReadAll(limited)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if int64(len(data)) > maxBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: response exceeds %d bytes", ErrDiffTooLarge, maxBytes)
}
return data, nil
})
}
// escapePath escapes each segment of a relative file path for use in URLs.
@@ -251,7 +546,13 @@ type ContentEntry struct {
// ListContents lists files and directories at a given path in a repo.
// Pass an empty path to list the repository root.
// If the path points to a file (not a directory), Gitea returns a single
// object instead of an array; this method normalizes both cases to a slice.
func (c *Client) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]ContentEntry, error) {
// Normalize "." to empty string — Gitea API rejects "." with 500
if path == "." {
path = ""
}
var reqURL string
if path == "" {
reqURL = fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/contents", c.baseURL, url.PathEscape(owner), url.PathEscape(repo))
@@ -264,7 +565,16 @@ func (c *Client) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]
}
var entries []ContentEntry
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &entries); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse contents JSON: %w", err)
// Gitea returns a single object (not an array) when path is a file
var single ContentEntry
if err2 := json.Unmarshal(body, &single); err2 != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse contents JSON: %w", err)
}
// Guard against empty/malformed responses
if single.Name == "" && single.Path == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse contents JSON: empty response for path %q", path)
}
entries = []ContentEntry{single}
}
return entries, nil
}
@@ -317,9 +627,9 @@ func (c *Client) GetAllFilesInPath(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string
// Review represents a pull request review from the Gitea API.
type Review struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Body string `json:"body"`
User struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Body string `json:"body"`
User struct {
Login string `json:"login"`
} `json:"user"`
State string `json:"state"`
+523 -5
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,15 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestGetPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
@@ -276,11 +281,64 @@ func TestListContents(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestListContents_DotPath(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// "." should be normalized to empty path, which hits the root contents endpoint
if r.URL.Path != "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents" {
t.Errorf("expected root contents path, got: %s", r.URL.Path)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `[{"name":"README.md","path":"README.md","type":"file"}]`)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", ".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(entries) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 entry, got %d", len(entries))
}
if entries[0].Name != "README.md" {
t.Errorf("expected README.md, got %s", entries[0].Name)
}
}
func TestListContents_FilePath(t *testing.T) {
// Gitea returns a single object (not an array) when path is a file
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/README.md" {
t.Errorf("unexpected path: %s", r.URL.Path)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
// Single object, not an array
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":"README.md","path":"README.md","type":"file"}`)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(entries) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 entry, got %d", len(entries))
}
if entries[0].Name != "README.md" {
t.Errorf("expected README.md, got %s", entries[0].Name)
}
if entries[0].Type != "file" {
t.Errorf("expected type file, got %s", entries[0].Type)
}
}
func TestGetAllFilesInPath_File(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/README.md" {
// Gitea returns 404 for contents API on files (it's not a dir)
http.NotFound(w, r)
// Gitea returns a single object (not array) when path is a file
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":"README.md","path":"README.md","type":"file"}`)
return
}
if r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/raw/README.md" {
@@ -584,9 +642,9 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_403Propagates(t *testing.T) {
func TestIsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil error", nil, false},
{"non-API error", fmt.Errorf("network timeout"), false},
@@ -743,3 +801,463 @@ func TestResolveComment_Error(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("expected error for 404 response")
}
}
func TestIsServerError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil error", nil, false},
{"non-API error", fmt.Errorf("network timeout"), false},
{"404 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 404, Body: "not found"}, false},
{"500 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: "server error"}, true},
{"502 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 502, Body: "bad gateway"}, true},
{"503 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 503, Body: "unavailable"}, true},
{"599 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 599, Body: "edge case"}, true},
{"600 not server error", &APIError{StatusCode: 600, Body: "edge"}, false},
{"400 not server error", &APIError{StatusCode: 400, Body: "bad request"}, false},
{"wrapped 500", fmt.Errorf("fetch: %w", &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: "err"}), true},
{"wrapped 404", fmt.Errorf("fetch: %w", &APIError{StatusCode: 404, Body: "err"}), false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := IsServerError(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsServerError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestDoGet_RetriesOn500(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts < 3 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"transient error"}`))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"success"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
// Use short backoff for fast tests
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
body, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success after retry, got error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"data":"success"}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", string(body), `{"data":"success"}`)
}
if attempts != 3 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 3", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoGet_FailsAfterMaxRetries(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"persistent error"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
// Use short backoff for fast tests
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
_, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after max retries")
}
var apiErr *APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected APIError, got: %v", err)
}
if apiErr.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 500", apiErr.StatusCode)
}
if attempts != 3 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 3 (max retries)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoGet_NoRetryOn4xx(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"forbidden"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403")
}
var apiErr *APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected APIError, got: %v", err)
}
if apiErr.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 403", apiErr.StatusCode)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 4xx)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoGet_RespectsContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"error"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
// Use longer backoff to give us time to cancel during the wait
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{100 * time.Millisecond, 100 * time.Millisecond}
// Cancel after first attempt returns and retry begins
go func() {
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
}()
_, err := client.doGet(ctx, server.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on context cancellation")
}
// Should have made 1 attempt, then context cancelled during backoff
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, expected 1 before context cancel during backoff", attempts)
}
}
// mockTransport is a test helper that returns errors for the first N calls,
// then delegates to a real server.
type mockTransport struct {
failCount int32 // number of failures remaining (atomic)
failErr error // error to return on failure
realServer *httptest.Server
attemptsMade atomic.Int32 // tracks total attempts
}
func (m *mockTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
m.attemptsMade.Add(1)
remaining := atomic.AddInt32(&m.failCount, -1)
if remaining >= 0 {
// Still have failures to return
return nil, m.failErr
}
// Redirect to real server
req.URL.Host = m.realServer.Listener.Addr().String()
req.URL.Scheme = "http"
return http.DefaultTransport.RoundTrip(req)
}
func TestDoGet_RetriesOnTemporaryNetError(t *testing.T) {
// Real server that will handle successful requests
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
// Mock transport: fail twice with ECONNREFUSED, then succeed
mt := &mockTransport{
failCount: 2,
failErr: &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED},
realServer: server,
}
client := NewClient("http://fake-host/", "test-token")
client.SetHTTPClient(&http.Client{Transport: mt})
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
body, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), "http://fake-host/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success after retries, got error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"status":"ok"}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", string(body), `{"status":"ok"}`)
}
// Should have made exactly 3 attempts: 2 failures + 1 success
if got := mt.attemptsMade.Load(); got != 3 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 3 (2 failures + 1 success)", got)
}
}
func TestIsTemporaryNetError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil error", nil, false},
{"plain error", fmt.Errorf("some error"), false},
// OpError with retriable syscall errors
{"OpError ECONNREFUSED", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED}, true},
{"OpError ECONNRESET", &net.OpError{Op: "read", Err: syscall.ECONNRESET}, true},
{"OpError ENETUNREACH", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.ENETUNREACH}, true},
{"OpError EHOSTUNREACH", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.EHOSTUNREACH}, true},
{"OpError ETIMEDOUT", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.ETIMEDOUT}, true},
// OpError with permanent syscall errors — should NOT retry
{"OpError EACCES", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.EACCES}, false},
{"OpError EPERM", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.EPERM}, false},
// OpError with unknown inner error — conservative retry
{"OpError unknown inner", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: fmt.Errorf("unknown")}, true},
// DNS errors
{"DNS timeout", &net.DNSError{IsTimeout: true}, true},
{"DNS no such host", &net.DNSError{IsTimeout: false, Name: "bad.host"}, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isTemporaryNetError(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isTemporaryNetError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsRetriableSyscallError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil", nil, false},
{"ECONNREFUSED", syscall.ECONNREFUSED, true},
{"ECONNRESET", syscall.ECONNRESET, true},
{"ENETUNREACH", syscall.ENETUNREACH, true},
{"EHOSTUNREACH", syscall.EHOSTUNREACH, true},
{"ETIMEDOUT", syscall.ETIMEDOUT, true},
{"EACCES (permanent)", syscall.EACCES, false},
{"EPERM (permanent)", syscall.EPERM, false},
{"ENOENT (permanent)", syscall.ENOENT, false},
{"unknown error", fmt.Errorf("something"), true}, // conservative retry
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isRetriableSyscallError(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isRetriableSyscallError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestRedactURL(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
want string
}{
{
name: "no query params",
input: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/pulls/1",
want: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/pulls/1",
},
{
name: "with query params - redacts",
input: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/raw/file?ref=main",
want: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/raw/file?[redacted]",
},
{
name: "multiple query params",
input: "https://example.com/path?token=secret&page=1",
want: "https://example.com/path?[redacted]",
},
{
name: "invalid URL",
input: "://invalid",
want: "[invalid URL]",
},
{
name: "empty string",
input: "",
want: "",
},
{
name: "with userinfo - redacts credentials",
input: "https://admin:secret@gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos",
want: "https://REDACTED@gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos",
},
{
name: "with userinfo and query params",
input: "https://user:pass@example.com/path?token=abc",
want: "https://REDACTED@example.com/path?[redacted]",
},
{
name: "username only - no password",
input: "https://user@example.com/path",
want: "https://REDACTED@example.com/path",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL(tt.input)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("redactURL(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSanitizeErrorForLog(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want string
}{
{
name: "nil error",
err: nil,
want: "<nil>",
},
{
name: "APIError omits body",
err: &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: "internal error: database connection failed"},
want: "HTTP 500",
},
{
name: "APIError with large body still only shows status",
err: &APIError{StatusCode: 502, Body: strings.Repeat("x", 1000)},
want: "HTTP 502",
},
{
name: "non-API error preserved",
err: fmt.Errorf("connection refused"),
want: "connection refused",
},
{
name: "wrapped APIError",
err: fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", &APIError{StatusCode: 503, Body: "service unavailable"}),
want: "HTTP 503",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := sanitizeErrorForLog(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("sanitizeErrorForLog() = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "cdn.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "token abc" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.http == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil http client after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.http.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.http.Timeout)
}
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
+97
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package gitea
import (
"context"
"errors"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestGetPullRequestDiff_SizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
diff string
maxDiffSize int64
wantErr error
wantDiff string
}{
{
name: "exceeds max size",
diff: strings.Repeat("+ added line\n", 1000), // ~13 KB
maxDiffSize: 100,
wantErr: ErrDiffTooLarge,
},
{
name: "within max size",
diff: "diff --git a/f.go b/f.go\n--- a/f.go\n+++ b/f.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new\n",
maxDiffSize: 1024,
wantDiff: "diff --git a/f.go b/f.go\n--- a/f.go\n+++ b/f.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new\n",
},
{
name: "exactly at limit",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 50),
maxDiffSize: 50,
wantDiff: strings.Repeat("x", 50),
},
{
name: "one byte over limit",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 51),
maxDiffSize: 50,
wantErr: ErrDiffTooLarge,
},
{
name: "disabled limit",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
maxDiffSize: -1,
wantDiff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
},
{
name: "math.MaxInt64 treated as disabled",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
maxDiffSize: math.MaxInt64,
wantDiff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
},
{
name: "default limit",
diff: "diff content",
maxDiffSize: 0, // zero means use DefaultMaxDiffSize
wantDiff: "diff content",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Write([]byte(tt.diff)) //nolint:errcheck // test handler
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client.MaxDiffSize = tt.maxDiffSize
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{}
got, err := client.GetPullRequestDiff(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if tt.wantErr != nil {
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("expected %v, got: %v", tt.wantErr, err)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tt.wantDiff {
t.Errorf("diff mismatch: got length %d, want length %d", len(got), len(tt.wantDiff))
}
})
}
}
+305
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
// Package github provides a client for the GitHub API.
// It supports pull request operations, file content retrieval,
// and review submission for both github.com and GitHub Enterprise.
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
defaultBaseURL = "https://api.github.com"
// maxRetryAttempts is the number of times doRequest will attempt a request.
maxRetryAttempts = 3
// maxRetryAfter caps the maximum delay from a Retry-After header to prevent
// a server from stalling the client indefinitely.
maxRetryAfter = 60 * time.Second
// maxErrorBodyBytes limits how much of an error response body we read
// to protect against malicious servers sending unbounded data.
maxErrorBodyBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KB
// maxResponseBodyBytes limits how much of a successful response body we read
// for defense-in-depth against servers returning excessively large payloads.
maxResponseBodyBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
)
// APIError represents an HTTP error response from the GitHub API.
// It carries the status code so callers can distinguish between
// different failure modes (e.g. 404 vs 500).
//
// The Body field stores up to 64 KiB of the raw response for programmatic
// inspection. Error() truncates to 200 bytes for safe logging, but callers
// should avoid logging or propagating Body directly in production since it may
// contain sensitive details from the upstream server.
type APIError struct {
StatusCode int
Body string
}
func (e *APIError) Error() string {
body := e.Body
if len(body) > 200 {
body = body[:200] + "...(truncated)"
}
// Sanitize newlines to prevent log injection from upstream response bodies.
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\n", " ")
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\r", " ")
return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d: %s", e.StatusCode, body)
}
// IsNotFound reports whether an error is an API 404 response.
func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound
}
return false
}
// IsUnauthorized reports whether an error is an API 401 response.
func IsUnauthorized(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized
}
return false
}
func asAPIError(err error) (*APIError, bool) {
if err == nil {
return nil, false
}
var target *APIError
if errors.As(err, &target) {
return target, true
}
return nil, false
}
// Client interacts with the GitHub API.
// A Client is safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
// SetHTTPClient and SetRetryBackoff are intended for test setup only and must
// be called before any goroutines issue requests; they have no synchronization.
type Client struct {
// TODO: baseURL is populated by NewClient but not yet consumed by doRequest/doGet.
// Higher-level exported methods (GetPullRequest, etc.) will use it to
// construct request URLs; remove this field if those methods end up
// accepting full URLs instead.
baseURL string
token string
httpClient *http.Client
// retryBackoff defines the delays between retry attempts for 429 responses.
// retryBackoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (after attempt i fails).
// If nil, defaults to {1s, 2s}.
retryBackoff []time.Duration
// now returns the current time. Defaults to time.Now.
// Override in tests to control HTTP-date Retry-After calculations.
now func() time.Time
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in gitea/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// NewClient creates a new GitHub API client.
// If baseURL is empty, it defaults to https://api.github.com.
// For GitHub Enterprise, pass the API base URL (e.g. https://github.concur.com/api/v3).
func NewClient(token, baseURL string) *Client {
if baseURL == "" {
baseURL = defaultBaseURL
}
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
now: time.Now,
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.httpClient = hc
}
// SetRetryBackoff sets the delays between retry attempts.
// This is intended for testing to speed up retry tests.
//
// Note: if an empty non-nil slice is provided, Retry-After delays parsed from
// server responses will be computed and capped but not applied (because
// attempt < len(backoff) is always false). This is acceptable for the
// test-only use case but callers should be aware of this edge case.
func (c *Client) SetRetryBackoff(backoff []time.Duration) {
c.retryBackoff = backoff
}
// parseRetryAfter parses a Retry-After header value, supporting both integer
// seconds (e.g. "120") and HTTP-date format (e.g. "Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
// as specified in RFC 7231 §7.1.3.
//
// For integer values, it returns the duration directly.
// For HTTP-date values, it computes the delay as the difference between the
// parsed time and now. If the date is in the past, it returns 0.
//
// Returns (0, false) if the value cannot be parsed as either format.
func (c *Client) parseRetryAfter(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
// Try integer seconds first (most common from GitHub).
// RFC 7231 allows delta-seconds of 0 to indicate immediate retry.
if seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err == nil && seconds >= 0 {
return time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second, true
}
// Try HTTP-date format (RFC 7231 §7.1.3).
// http.ParseTime handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats.
if retryAt, err := http.ParseTime(value); err == nil {
delay := retryAt.Sub(c.now())
if delay < 0 {
delay = 0
}
return delay, true
}
return 0, false
}
// doRequest performs an HTTP request with retry on 429 rate limit responses.
// It respects the Retry-After header when present, supporting both integer
// seconds and HTTP-date formats (capped at maxRetryAfter).
func (c *Client) doRequest(ctx context.Context, method, reqURL string, accept string) ([]byte, error) {
var backoff []time.Duration
if c.retryBackoff != nil {
backoff = append([]time.Duration(nil), c.retryBackoff...)
} else {
backoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Second, 2 * time.Second}
}
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
if attempt > 0 {
var delay time.Duration
if attempt-1 < len(backoff) {
delay = backoff[attempt-1]
}
if delay > 0 {
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-timer.C:
timer.Stop()
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
if accept != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept", accept)
} else {
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
}
resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("do request: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read response body: %w", err)
}
return body, nil
}
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
lastErr = &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(errBody)}
// Retry on 429 rate limit
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests && attempt < maxRetryAttempts-1 {
// Check for Retry-After header and override backoff if present.
// Supports both integer seconds (common) and HTTP-date format (RFC 7231).
if ra := resp.Header.Get("Retry-After"); ra != "" {
if delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter(ra); ok {
if delay > maxRetryAfter {
delay = maxRetryAfter
}
if attempt < len(backoff) {
backoff[attempt] = delay
}
}
}
continue
}
// Don't retry other errors
return nil, lastErr
}
return nil, lastErr
}
// doGet is a convenience wrapper for GET requests with the default Accept header.
func (c *Client) doGet(ctx context.Context, url string) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doRequest(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, "")
}
+513
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,513 @@
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestNewClient_DefaultBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
if c.baseURL != defaultBaseURL {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want %q", c.baseURL, defaultBaseURL)
}
}
func TestNewClient_CustomBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "https://github.concur.com/api/v3/")
if c.baseURL != "https://github.concur.com/api/v3" {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want trailing slash stripped", c.baseURL)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_Success(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer test-token" {
t.Errorf("Authorization = %q, want Bearer test-token", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("test-token", srv.URL)
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"ok":true}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, `{"ok":true}`)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate(t *testing.T) {
// Fix "now" to a known time for deterministic testing.
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 59, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 second in the future
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// Initial backoff is 0; the HTTP-date parser will compute 1s and override.
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate_InPast(t *testing.T) {
// If the HTTP-date is in the past, delay should be 0 (retry immediately).
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 hour in the past
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_NoRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_InvalidRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "not-a-number-or-date")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_404_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
w.Write([]byte("not found"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsNotFound, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 404)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_401_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte("unauthorized"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsUnauthorized(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsUnauthorized, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 401)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
// This test exercises the timer-cancel path in the retry select:
// select { case <-timer.C; case <-ctx.Done() }
// The server returns 429 with a long Retry-After, and we cancel the
// context shortly after the first response so that cancellation races
// against the timer rather than preventing the initial HTTP round-trip.
requestReceived := make(chan struct{}, 1)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
select {
case requestReceived <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "10")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{10 * time.Second, 10 * time.Second})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Cancel the context after the first request completes, while the
// client is blocked in the retry timer select.
go func() {
<-requestReceived
// Small delay to ensure we're inside the timer select.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
}()
_, err := c.doGet(ctx, srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("err = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("42")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 42*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 42s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_ZeroSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("0")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for zero seconds (RFC 7231 allows immediate retry)")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_NegativeSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("-5")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for negative seconds")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Future(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
// Should be 10 seconds in the future.
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Past(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0 (past date)", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_RFC850_Format(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// RFC 850 format
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Monday, 01-Dec-25 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for RFC 850 format")
}
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("not-valid")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for invalid value")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_EmptyString(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for empty string")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_MaxCap(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that parseRetryAfter returns the raw value (capping is done by caller).
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("3600")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 3600*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 3600s (caller is responsible for capping)", delay)
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_Truncation(t *testing.T) {
longBody := make([]byte, 300)
for i := range longBody {
longBody[i] = 'x'
}
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: string(longBody)}
msg := apiErr.Error()
if len(msg) > 250 {
// "HTTP 500: " (10) + 200 + "...(truncated)" (14) = 224
t.Errorf("error message too long: %d chars", len(msg))
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_NewlineSanitized(t *testing.T) {
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 400, Body: "line1\nline2\rline3"}
msg := apiErr.Error()
for _, c := range msg {
if c == '\n' || c == '\r' {
t.Errorf("error message contains unsanitized newline: %q", msg)
break
}
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("secret-token", "https://api.github.com")
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "objects.githubusercontent.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Auth should be preserved on same-host redirect
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "Bearer token" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("token", "https://api.github.com")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.httpClient == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil httpClient after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.httpClient.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.httpClient.Timeout)
}
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
module gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot
go 1.26.2
require github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
+391
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
package llm
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// AICoreOpenAIAPIVersion is the API version used for OpenAI models through AI Core.
// Update this when SAP AI Core releases a new stable version.
const AICoreOpenAIAPIVersion = "2024-12-01-preview"
// maxErrorBodyLen limits the length of response bodies included in error messages
// to prevent leaking potentially sensitive upstream details in logs.
const maxErrorBodyLen = 200
// AICoreConfig holds SAP AI Core authentication and connection settings.
type AICoreConfig struct {
ClientID string
ClientSecret string
AuthURL string
APIURL string
ResourceGroup string
}
// AICoreClient wraps AI Core authentication and deployment discovery.
// Thread-safe for concurrent use after construction.
//
// Design: The deployment cache is populated once and never invalidated. This is
// acceptable for short-lived CI runner processes, but longer-lived deployments
// may want to add a TTL or re-fetch on errors.
type AICoreClient struct {
config AICoreConfig
http *http.Client
mu sync.RWMutex
token string
tokenExpiry time.Time
deployments map[string]string // model name -> deployment URL
}
// NewAICoreClient creates a new AI Core client with the given configuration.
// The client uses a default 5-minute timeout; use WithTimeout to customize.
func NewAICoreClient(cfg AICoreConfig) *AICoreClient {
return &AICoreClient{
config: cfg,
http: &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Minute},
deployments: make(map[string]string),
}
}
// WithTimeout sets the HTTP request timeout for AI Core calls.
// This should be called during construction, before concurrent use.
func (c *AICoreClient) WithTimeout(d time.Duration) *AICoreClient {
c.http.Timeout = d
return c
}
// truncateBody truncates a response body for inclusion in error messages.
// This prevents leaking potentially sensitive upstream response details in logs.
func truncateBody(body []byte) string {
if len(body) <= maxErrorBodyLen {
return string(body)
}
return string(body[:maxErrorBodyLen]) + "..."
}
// getToken returns a valid OAuth token, refreshing if necessary.
func (c *AICoreClient) getToken(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
c.mu.RLock()
if c.token != "" && time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute).Before(c.tokenExpiry) {
token := c.token
c.mu.RUnlock()
return token, nil
}
c.mu.RUnlock()
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
// Double-check after acquiring write lock
if c.token != "" && time.Now().Add(5*time.Minute).Before(c.tokenExpiry) {
return c.token, nil
}
token, expiry, err := c.fetchToken(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
c.token = token
c.tokenExpiry = expiry
return token, nil
}
func (c *AICoreClient) fetchToken(ctx context.Context) (string, time.Time, error) {
tokenURL := strings.TrimRight(c.config.AuthURL, "/") + "/oauth/token"
data := url.Values{}
data.Set("grant_type", "client_credentials")
data.Set("client_id", c.config.ClientID)
data.Set("client_secret", c.config.ClientSecret)
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, tokenURL, strings.NewReader(data.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("create token request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("token request: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("read token response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("token request failed (status %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, truncateBody(body))
}
var tokenResp struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
ExpiresIn int `json:"expires_in"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &tokenResp); err != nil {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("parse token response: %w", err)
}
if tokenResp.AccessToken == "" {
return "", time.Time{}, fmt.Errorf("empty access token in response")
}
expiry := time.Now().Add(time.Duration(tokenResp.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
return tokenResp.AccessToken, expiry, nil
}
// getDeploymentURL returns the deployment URL for a model, fetching deployments if needed.
// getDeploymentURL returns the deployment URL for a model, fetching deployments if needed.
// Also returns a valid token for use by the caller, avoiding redundant getToken calls.
//
// Note: The token is fetched before acquiring the write lock to avoid holding the lock
// during network I/O. In rare cases where multiple goroutines race and one waits a long
// time for the write lock, the token could theoretically expire. The 5-minute refresh
// buffer in getToken makes this extremely unlikely in practice.
func (c *AICoreClient) getDeploymentURL(ctx context.Context, model string) (deployURL, token string, err error) {
c.mu.RLock()
if u, ok := c.deployments[model]; ok {
c.mu.RUnlock()
// Still need a token for the caller
token, err = c.getToken(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("get token: %w", err)
}
return u, token, nil
}
c.mu.RUnlock()
// Fetch token first (before acquiring write lock to avoid holding lock during I/O)
token, err = c.getToken(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("get token for deployments: %w", err)
}
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
// Double-check after acquiring write lock
if u, ok := c.deployments[model]; ok {
return u, token, nil
}
if err := c.fetchDeployments(ctx, token); err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
if u, ok := c.deployments[model]; ok {
return u, token, nil
}
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("no deployment found for model %q", model)
}
func (c *AICoreClient) fetchDeployments(ctx context.Context, token string) error {
deployURL := strings.TrimRight(c.config.APIURL, "/") + "/v2/lm/deployments"
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, deployURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create deployments request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
req.Header.Set("AI-Resource-Group", c.config.ResourceGroup)
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deployments request: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read deployments response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return fmt.Errorf("deployments request failed (status %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, truncateBody(body))
}
var deployResp struct {
Resources []struct {
DeploymentURL string `json:"deploymentUrl"`
Status string `json:"status"`
Details struct {
Resources struct {
BackendDetails struct {
Model struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
} `json:"model"`
} `json:"backend_details"`
} `json:"resources"`
} `json:"details"`
} `json:"resources"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &deployResp); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse deployments response: %w", err)
}
for _, r := range deployResp.Resources {
if r.Status != "RUNNING" {
continue
}
modelName := r.Details.Resources.BackendDetails.Model.Name
if modelName == "" {
continue
}
c.deployments[modelName] = r.DeploymentURL
}
return nil
}
// CompleteAnthropic sends a request to an Anthropic model via AI Core.
func (c *AICoreClient) CompleteAnthropic(ctx context.Context, model string, messages []Message, maxTokens int, temperature float64) (string, error) {
deployURL, token, err := c.getDeploymentURL(ctx, model)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Extract system message
var system string
var userMessages []anthropicMsg
for _, m := range messages {
if m.Role == "system" {
system = m.Content
} else {
userMessages = append(userMessages, anthropicMsg{
Role: m.Role,
Content: m.Content,
})
}
}
reqBody := anthropicRequest{
AnthropicVersion: "bedrock-2023-05-31", // SAP AI Core uses Bedrock format
// Model omitted - AI Core deployment already specifies model
MaxTokens: maxTokens,
System: system,
Messages: userMessages,
}
if temperature > 0 {
reqBody.Temperature = temperature
}
data, err := json.Marshal(reqBody)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("marshal request: %w", err)
}
// AI Core uses /invoke for Anthropic models
invokeURL := strings.TrimRight(deployURL, "/") + "/invoke"
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, invokeURL, bytes.NewReader(data))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
req.Header.Set("AI-Resource-Group", c.config.ResourceGroup)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AI Core request: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AI Core API error (status %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, truncateBody(body))
}
var anthropicResp anthropicResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &anthropicResp); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse response: %w", err)
}
if len(anthropicResp.Content) == 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no content in response")
}
var sb strings.Builder
for _, block := range anthropicResp.Content {
if block.Type == "text" {
sb.WriteString(block.Text)
}
}
result := sb.String()
if result == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no text content in response")
}
return result, nil
}
// CompleteOpenAI sends a request to an OpenAI model via AI Core.
func (c *AICoreClient) CompleteOpenAI(ctx context.Context, model string, messages []Message, temperature float64) (string, error) {
deployURL, token, err := c.getDeploymentURL(ctx, model)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
reqBody := ChatRequest{
Model: model,
Temperature: temperature,
Messages: messages,
}
data, err := json.Marshal(reqBody)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("marshal request: %w", err)
}
// AI Core uses /chat/completions?api-version=<version> for OpenAI models
chatURL := strings.TrimRight(deployURL, "/") + "/chat/completions?api-version=" + AICoreOpenAIAPIVersion
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, chatURL, bytes.NewReader(data))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
req.Header.Set("AI-Resource-Group", c.config.ResourceGroup)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AI Core request: %w", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read response: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AI Core API error (status %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, truncateBody(body))
}
var openaiResp ChatResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &openaiResp); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("parse response: %w", err)
}
if len(openaiResp.Choices) == 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no choices in response")
}
return openaiResp.Choices[0].Message.Content, nil
}
// IsAnthropicModel returns true if the model name indicates an Anthropic model.
// SAP AI Core uses "anthropic--" prefix for Anthropic models (e.g., "anthropic--claude-3-5-sonnet").
func IsAnthropicModel(model string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(model, "anthropic--")
}
+535
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
package llm
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestAICoreClient_TokenFetch(t *testing.T) {
tokenCalls := int32(0)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/oauth/token" {
atomic.AddInt32(&tokenCalls, 1)
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
t.Errorf("expected POST for token, got %s", r.Method)
}
if r.Header.Get("Content-Type") != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" {
t.Errorf("expected form content type")
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": "test-token-123",
"expires_in": 3600,
})
return
}
t.Errorf("unexpected path: %s", r.URL.Path)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewAICoreClient(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: server.URL,
APIURL: server.URL,
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
token, err := client.getToken(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if token != "test-token-123" {
t.Errorf("expected token 'test-token-123', got %q", token)
}
// Second call should use cached token
token2, err := client.getToken(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if token2 != "test-token-123" {
t.Errorf("expected cached token")
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&tokenCalls) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 token call (cached), got %d", tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestAICoreClient_DeploymentFetch(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/oauth/token" {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": "test-token",
"expires_in": 3600,
})
return
}
if r.URL.Path == "/v2/lm/deployments" {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer test-token" {
t.Errorf("expected Bearer auth")
}
if r.Header.Get("AI-Resource-Group") != "default" {
t.Errorf("expected resource group header")
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"resources": []map[string]interface{}{
{
"id": "deploy-123",
"deploymentUrl": "https://example.com/v2/inference/deployments/deploy-123",
"status": "RUNNING",
"details": map[string]interface{}{
"resources": map[string]interface{}{
"backend_details": map[string]interface{}{
"model": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet",
},
},
},
},
},
{
"id": "deploy-456",
"deploymentUrl": "https://example.com/v2/inference/deployments/deploy-456",
"status": "STOPPED",
"details": map[string]interface{}{
"resources": map[string]interface{}{
"backend_details": map[string]interface{}{
"model": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "gpt-5",
},
},
},
},
},
{
"id": "deploy-789",
"deploymentUrl": "https://example.com/v2/inference/deployments/deploy-789",
"status": "RUNNING",
"details": map[string]interface{}{
"resources": map[string]interface{}{
"backend_details": map[string]interface{}{
"model": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "gpt-5",
},
},
},
},
},
},
})
return
}
t.Errorf("unexpected path: %s", r.URL.Path)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewAICoreClient(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: server.URL,
APIURL: server.URL,
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
// Should find running deployment
url, _, err := client.getDeploymentURL(context.Background(), "anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if url != "https://example.com/v2/inference/deployments/deploy-123" {
t.Errorf("unexpected URL: %s", url)
}
// Should find running gpt-5, not stopped one
url, _, err = client.getDeploymentURL(context.Background(), "gpt-5")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if url != "https://example.com/v2/inference/deployments/deploy-789" {
t.Errorf("unexpected URL: %s", url)
}
// Should error on unknown model
_, _, err = client.getDeploymentURL(context.Background(), "unknown-model")
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for unknown model")
}
}
func TestAICoreClient_CompleteAnthropic(t *testing.T) {
// baseURL is set after server creation; captured by closure in handlers
var baseURL string
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/oauth/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": "test-token",
"expires_in": 3600,
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/v2/lm/deployments", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"resources": []map[string]interface{}{
{
"id": "deploy-anthropic",
"deploymentUrl": baseURL + "/deployments/anthropic",
"status": "RUNNING",
"details": map[string]interface{}{
"resources": map[string]interface{}{
"backend_details": map[string]interface{}{
"model": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet",
},
},
},
},
},
},
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/deployments/anthropic/invoke", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "Bearer test-token" {
t.Errorf("expected Bearer auth on invoke")
}
var req anthropicRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode request: %v", err)
}
if req.AnthropicVersion != "bedrock-2023-05-31" {
t.Errorf("expected bedrock anthropic_version in request")
}
if req.System != "You are helpful" {
t.Errorf("expected system prompt: %q", req.System)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"content": []map[string]interface{}{
{"type": "text", "text": "Hello from AI Core!"},
},
})
})
server := httptest.NewServer(mux)
baseURL = server.URL
defer server.Close()
client := NewAICoreClient(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: server.URL,
APIURL: server.URL,
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
result, err := client.CompleteAnthropic(context.Background(), "anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet", []Message{
{Role: "system", Content: "You are helpful"},
{Role: "user", Content: "Hello"},
}, 8192, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if result != "Hello from AI Core!" {
t.Errorf("expected 'Hello from AI Core!', got %q", result)
}
}
func TestAICoreClient_CompleteOpenAI(t *testing.T) {
var baseURL string
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/oauth/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": "test-token",
"expires_in": 3600,
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/v2/lm/deployments", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"resources": []map[string]interface{}{
{
"id": "deploy-openai",
"deploymentUrl": baseURL + "/deployments/openai",
"status": "RUNNING",
"details": map[string]interface{}{
"resources": map[string]interface{}{
"backend_details": map[string]interface{}{
"model": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "gpt-5",
},
},
},
},
},
},
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/deployments/openai/chat/completions", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Query().Get("api-version") != AICoreOpenAIAPIVersion {
t.Errorf("expected api-version %s, got %s", AICoreOpenAIAPIVersion, r.URL.Query().Get("api-version"))
}
var req ChatRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode request: %v", err)
}
if req.Model != "gpt-5" {
t.Errorf("expected model gpt-5, got %s", req.Model)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ChatResponse{
Choices: []struct {
Message struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
} `json:"message"`
}{
{Message: struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
}{Content: "Hello from GPT-5!"}},
},
})
})
server := httptest.NewServer(mux)
baseURL = server.URL
defer server.Close()
client := NewAICoreClient(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: server.URL,
APIURL: server.URL,
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
result, err := client.CompleteOpenAI(context.Background(), "gpt-5", []Message{
{Role: "user", Content: "Hello"},
}, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if result != "Hello from GPT-5!" {
t.Errorf("expected 'Hello from GPT-5!', got %q", result)
}
}
func TestIsAnthropicModel(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
model string
expected bool
}{
// SAP AI Core uses "anthropic--" prefix for Anthropic models
{"anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet", true},
{"anthropic--claude-4.6-opus", true},
{"anthropic--claude-3-5-sonnet", true},
// Non-prefixed model names are not detected as Anthropic
// (SAP AI Core always uses the prefix for Anthropic models)
{"claude-sonnet-4", false},
{"gpt-5", false},
{"gpt-4.1", false},
{"llama-3", false},
{"my-claude-model", false}, // Avoid false positives on "claude" substring
}
for _, tt := range tests {
got := IsAnthropicModel(tt.model)
if got != tt.expected {
t.Errorf("IsAnthropicModel(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.model, got, tt.expected)
}
}
}
func TestAICoreClient_TokenExpiry(t *testing.T) {
tokenCalls := int32(0)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/oauth/token" {
call := atomic.AddInt32(&tokenCalls, 1)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": fmt.Sprintf("token-%d", call),
"expires_in": 1, // 1 second expiry
})
return
}
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewAICoreClient(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: server.URL,
APIURL: server.URL,
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
// First call
token1, err := client.getToken(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first getToken: %v", err)
}
// Force token expiry by manipulating expiry time
client.mu.Lock()
client.tokenExpiry = time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
client.mu.Unlock()
// Should fetch new token
token2, err := client.getToken(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second getToken: %v", err)
}
if token1 == token2 {
t.Error("expected different tokens after expiry")
}
if atomic.LoadInt32(&tokenCalls) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 token calls, got %d", tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestAICoreClient_WithTimeout(t *testing.T) {
client := NewAICoreClient(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: "https://auth.example.com",
APIURL: "https://api.example.com",
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
// Default timeout is 5 minutes
if client.http.Timeout != 5*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("expected default timeout 5m, got %v", client.http.Timeout)
}
// WithTimeout should update the timeout
client.WithTimeout(10 * time.Minute)
if client.http.Timeout != 10*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("expected timeout 10m, got %v", client.http.Timeout)
}
}
func TestClient_WithAICore(t *testing.T) {
client := NewClient("http://example.com", "key", "model")
if client.provider != ProviderOpenAI {
t.Errorf("expected default provider openai, got %s", client.provider)
}
client.WithAICore(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "id",
ClientSecret: "secret",
AuthURL: "https://auth.example.com",
APIURL: "https://api.example.com",
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
if client.provider != ProviderAICore {
t.Errorf("expected provider aicore, got %s", client.provider)
}
if client.aicore == nil {
t.Error("expected aicore client to be set")
}
}
func TestClient_WithTimeout_PropagatestoAICore(t *testing.T) {
client := NewClient("http://example.com", "key", "model").
WithAICore(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "id",
ClientSecret: "secret",
AuthURL: "https://auth.example.com",
APIURL: "https://api.example.com",
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
// Default should be 5 minutes (inherited from parent client)
if client.aicore.http.Timeout != 5*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("expected aicore default timeout 5m, got %v", client.aicore.http.Timeout)
}
// WithTimeout should propagate to AI Core client
client.WithTimeout(15 * time.Minute)
if client.http.Timeout != 15*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("expected parent timeout 15m, got %v", client.http.Timeout)
}
if client.aicore.http.Timeout != 15*time.Minute {
t.Errorf("expected aicore timeout 15m, got %v", client.aicore.http.Timeout)
}
}
func TestClient_CompleteAICore(t *testing.T) {
var baseURL string
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/oauth/token", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"access_token": "test-token",
"expires_in": 3600,
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/v2/lm/deployments", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"resources": []map[string]interface{}{
{
"id": "deploy-test",
"deploymentUrl": baseURL + "/deployments/test",
"status": "RUNNING",
"details": map[string]interface{}{
"resources": map[string]interface{}{
"backend_details": map[string]interface{}{
"model": map[string]interface{}{
"name": "gpt-5",
},
},
},
},
},
},
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/deployments/test/chat/completions", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(ChatResponse{
Choices: []struct {
Message struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
} `json:"message"`
}{
{Message: struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
}{Content: "AI Core via Client works!"}},
},
})
})
server := httptest.NewServer(mux)
baseURL = server.URL
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient("", "", "gpt-5").WithAICore(AICoreConfig{
ClientID: "test-id",
ClientSecret: "test-secret",
AuthURL: server.URL,
APIURL: server.URL,
ResourceGroup: "default",
})
result, err := client.Complete(context.Background(), []Message{
{Role: "user", Content: "Hello"},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result, "AI Core via Client works!") {
t.Errorf("unexpected result: %s", result)
}
}
+38 -7
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// Package llm provides clients for LLM chat completion APIs.
//
// Supports OpenAI-compatible (default) and Anthropic Messages API providers.
// Supports OpenAI-compatible (default), Anthropic Messages API, and SAP AI Core providers.
package llm
import (
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ const (
ProviderOpenAI Provider = "openai"
// ProviderAnthropic uses the Anthropic Messages API endpoint.
ProviderAnthropic Provider = "anthropic"
// ProviderAICore uses SAP AI Core with OAuth authentication.
ProviderAICore Provider = "aicore"
)
// Client calls an LLM chat completion API.
@@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ type Client struct {
temperature float64
provider Provider
http *http.Client
aicore *AICoreClient // Only set when provider is aicore
}
// NewClient creates a new LLM client. Default provider is OpenAI-compatible.
@@ -49,8 +52,12 @@ func NewClient(baseURL, apiKey, model string) *Client {
}
// WithTimeout sets the HTTP request timeout for LLM calls (default 5 minutes).
// When using AI Core, this also sets the timeout on the AI Core client.
func (c *Client) WithTimeout(d time.Duration) *Client {
c.http.Timeout = d
if c.aicore != nil {
c.aicore.WithTimeout(d)
}
return c
}
@@ -60,12 +67,21 @@ func (c *Client) WithTemperature(t float64) *Client {
return c
}
// WithProvider sets the API provider format (openai or anthropic).
// WithProvider sets the API provider format (openai, anthropic, or aicore).
func (c *Client) WithProvider(p Provider) *Client {
c.provider = p
return c
}
// WithAICore configures the client to use SAP AI Core for authentication.
// This sets the provider to aicore automatically.
// The AI Core client inherits the current HTTP timeout from this client.
func (c *Client) WithAICore(cfg AICoreConfig) *Client {
c.provider = ProviderAICore
c.aicore = NewAICoreClient(cfg).WithTimeout(c.http.Timeout)
return c
}
// Message represents a chat message.
type Message struct {
Role string `json:"role"`
@@ -82,6 +98,8 @@ func (c *Client) Complete(ctx context.Context, messages []Message) (string, erro
switch c.provider {
case ProviderAnthropic:
result, err = c.completeAnthropic(ctx, messages)
case ProviderAICore:
result, err = c.completeAICore(ctx, messages)
default:
result, err = c.completeOpenAI(ctx, messages)
}
@@ -106,6 +124,18 @@ func (c *Client) Complete(ctx context.Context, messages []Message) (string, erro
return "", err
}
// completeAICore routes to AI Core using the appropriate endpoint based on model type.
func (c *Client) completeAICore(ctx context.Context, messages []Message) (string, error) {
if c.aicore == nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AI Core client not configured")
}
if IsAnthropicModel(c.model) {
return c.aicore.CompleteAnthropic(ctx, c.model, messages, 8192, c.temperature)
}
return c.aicore.CompleteOpenAI(ctx, c.model, messages, c.temperature)
}
// isRetryableError returns true for transient errors worth retrying.
func isRetryableError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
@@ -176,11 +206,12 @@ func (c *Client) completeOpenAI(ctx context.Context, messages []Message) (string
// --- Anthropic Messages API implementation ---
type anthropicRequest struct {
Model string `json:"model"`
MaxTokens int `json:"max_tokens"`
System string `json:"system,omitempty"`
Messages []anthropicMsg `json:"messages"`
Temperature float64 `json:"temperature,omitempty"`
AnthropicVersion string `json:"anthropic_version,omitempty"`
Model string `json:"model,omitempty"`
MaxTokens int `json:"max_tokens"`
System string `json:"system,omitempty"`
Messages []anthropicMsg `json:"messages"`
Temperature float64 `json:"temperature,omitempty"`
}
type anthropicMsg struct {
+276 -21
View File
@@ -1,81 +1,163 @@
package review
import (
"bytes"
"embed"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"sort"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml/ast"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml/parser"
)
//go:embed personas/*.json
//go:embed personas/*.yaml
var embeddedPersonas embed.FS
// MaxPersonaFileSize is the maximum size for persona files (64 KB).
// This prevents denial-of-service via excessively large files.
const MaxPersonaFileSize = 64 * 1024
// MaxYAMLDepth is the maximum nesting depth allowed in YAML persona files.
// This prevents stack exhaustion from deeply nested structures.
const MaxYAMLDepth = 20
// MaxYAMLNodes is the maximum number of YAML nodes allowed in persona files.
// This prevents DoS via wide-but-shallow structures that bypass depth limits.
const MaxYAMLNodes = 1000
// Persona defines a specialized review role with focused expertise.
type Persona struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
ModelPref string `json:"model_preference,omitempty"`
Identity string `json:"identity"`
Focus []string `json:"focus"`
Ignore []string `json:"ignore"`
Severity Severity `json:"severity"`
OutputFormat string `json:"output_format,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name" yaml:"name"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name" yaml:"display_name"`
ModelPref string `json:"model_preference,omitempty" yaml:"model_preference,omitempty"`
Identity string `json:"identity" yaml:"identity"`
Focus []string `json:"focus" yaml:"focus"`
Ignore []string `json:"ignore" yaml:"ignore"`
Severity Severity `json:"severity" yaml:"severity"`
OutputFormat string `json:"output_format,omitempty" yaml:"output_format,omitempty"`
}
// Severity defines what constitutes each severity level for this persona.
// These are prompt guidance for the LLM, not output format changes.
type Severity struct {
Major string `json:"major"`
Minor string `json:"minor"`
Nit string `json:"nit"`
Major string `json:"major" yaml:"major"`
Minor string `json:"minor" yaml:"minor"`
Nit string `json:"nit" yaml:"nit"`
}
// LoadPersona loads a persona from a JSON file path.
// LoadPersona loads a persona from a JSON or YAML file path.
// Format is detected by file extension: .yaml/.yml for YAML, .json or other for JSON.
// Files larger than MaxPersonaFileSize are rejected.
//
// Symlinks are supported: os.Stat follows symlinks, so a symlink pointing to
// a regular file will pass the IsRegular() check. Symlinks to non-regular files
// (directories, FIFOs, devices) are still rejected.
func LoadPersona(path string) (*Persona, error) {
// os.Stat follows symlinks, so symlinks to regular files are supported.
// The IsRegular() check operates on the target, not the symlink itself.
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read persona file %s: %w", path, err)
}
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona file %s is not a regular file", path)
}
if info.Size() > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona file %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes)", path, MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read persona file %s: %w", path, err)
}
// Re-check size after read to defend against TOCTOU races where file
// grows between stat and read (e.g., appending process, replaced file).
if len(data) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona file %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes)", path, MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
return parsePersona(data, path)
}
// LoadBuiltinPersona loads a built-in persona by name.
// Returns an error if the persona doesn't exist.
// Built-in personas are stored in YAML format only (see embed directive).
func LoadBuiltinPersona(name string) (*Persona, error) {
filename := name + ".json"
data, err := embeddedPersonas.ReadFile("personas/" + filename) // embed.FS paths use forward slashes per io/fs spec
yamlFile := name + ".yaml"
data, err := embeddedPersonas.ReadFile("personas/" + yamlFile)
if err != nil {
available := ListBuiltinPersonas()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown built-in persona %q (available: %s)", name, strings.Join(available, ", "))
}
return parsePersona(data, "builtin:"+name)
return parsePersona(data, "builtin:"+yamlFile)
}
// ListBuiltinPersonas returns the names of all built-in personas.
// ListBuiltinPersonas returns the names of all built-in personas in sorted order.
// Returns an empty slice if the embedded directory cannot be read.
func ListBuiltinPersonas() []string {
entries, err := embeddedPersonas.ReadDir("personas")
if err != nil {
return []string{}
}
var names []string
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for _, e := range entries {
if e.IsDir() {
continue
}
name := e.Name()
if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".json") {
names = append(names, strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".json"))
// Strip extension to get persona name
var personaName string
switch {
case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".yaml"):
personaName = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".yaml")
case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".yml"):
personaName = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".yml")
case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".json"):
personaName = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".json")
default:
continue
}
seen[personaName] = true
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(seen))
for name := range seen {
names = append(names, name)
}
sort.Strings(names)
return names
}
// parsePersona parses persona data from JSON or YAML format.
// Format is detected by the source file extension.
func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
lowerSource := strings.ToLower(source)
isYAML := strings.HasSuffix(lowerSource, ".yaml") || strings.HasSuffix(lowerSource, ".yml")
var p Persona
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &p); err != nil {
var err error
if isYAML {
err = unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data, &p, MaxYAMLDepth)
} else {
// Use json.Decoder with DisallowUnknownFields for consistency with
// YAML's Strict() - both reject unknown fields to catch typos.
dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
err = dec.Decode(&p)
if err == nil {
// Reject trailing content after the first valid JSON object.
// Without this check, input like `{"name":"x"}garbage` would
// silently succeed because Decoder stops after one object.
var dummy json.RawMessage
if err2 := dec.Decode(&dummy); err2 != io.EOF {
err = fmt.Errorf("unexpected trailing content after JSON object")
}
}
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse persona %s: %w", source, err)
}
if err := validatePersona(&p, source); err != nil {
@@ -84,6 +166,179 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
return &p, nil
}
// unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit unmarshals YAML data with three safety checks:
// - Depth limiting: rejects AST trees exceeding maxDepth to prevent stack exhaustion.
// - Multi-document rejection: prevents silent data loss from ignored extra documents.
// - Strict field checking: rejects unknown YAML keys to catch typos early.
func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
// First pass: parse into AST to check depth limits, node counts, and
// multi-document rejection. This prevents stack exhaustion before we
// attempt to decode into structs.
file, err := parser.ParseBytes(data, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Reject empty YAML input (whitespace-only, comment-only, or truly empty files).
// The parser returns a single doc with nil body for these cases.
if len(file.Docs) == 0 || file.Docs[0].Body == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("empty YAML document")
}
// Reject multi-document YAML files - silently ignoring additional documents
// could lead to confusing behavior where users think their changes take effect.
if len(file.Docs) > 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("multi-document YAML is not supported; only single-document files are allowed")
}
nodeCount := 0
if err := checkYAMLDepth(file.Docs[0].Body, 0, maxDepth, MaxYAMLNodes, make(map[ast.Node]int), make(map[ast.Node]bool), &nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
// Second pass: decode with strict field checking enabled.
// Strict() rejects unknown keys, catching typos like "focuss" or "identiy".
//
// Safety note: goccy/go-yaml's decoder does not expand YAML aliases
// recursively — it resolves them via the pre-built AST, which our first
// pass already depth-checked. Alias chains that would exceed depth limits
// are caught above; the decoder merely reads the resolved scalar values.
dec := yaml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data), yaml.Strict())
return dec.Decode(out)
}
// checkYAMLDepth recursively checks that YAML AST nodes don't exceed the depth
// limit or the total node count limit. It uses two tracking maps:
// - validated: maps each node to the maximum depth at which it was previously
// checked. If a node is revisited at a deeper depth (e.g., via an alias),
// we re-check it to ensure the combined effective depth doesn't exceed limits.
// - visiting: per-path recursion stack for true cycle detection. A node on the
// current path is a cycle (alias loop); we return nil to avoid infinite recursion.
//
// This design prevents the alias depth bypass where an anchored subtree validated
// at a shallow depth could be referenced via alias at a greater depth, effectively
// exceeding MaxYAMLDepth.
func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[ast.Node]int, visiting map[ast.Node]bool, nodeCount *int) error {
if node == nil {
return nil
}
if depth > maxDepth {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML nesting depth exceeds maximum (%d)", maxDepth)
}
// Cycle detection: if we're currently visiting this node on the current
// recursion path, it's a cycle (e.g., alias pointing to an ancestor).
// Return nil to break the cycle without error — cycles are a structural
// property, not a depth violation.
if visiting[node] {
return nil
}
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
// Placed after cycle detection but before the depth-aware short-circuit. This means
// nodes revisited at shallower depths (via aliases) are counted each time they are
// encountered — intentional conservative overcounting. This bounds the total work
// performed during validation rather than tracking unique nodes, which is the safer
// security posture for untrusted YAML input.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)
}
// Depth-aware short-circuit: skip re-validation only when the current visit
// depth is the same or shallower than the depth at which this node was
// previously validated. A shallower (or equal) current depth means the
// prior, deeper validation already covered any subtree depth violations.
// If the current depth exceeds the previous validation depth (e.g., an alias
// references this node deeper in the tree), we must re-traverse to ensure
// the combined effective depth doesn't exceed maxDepth.
//
// Note: using ast.Node (interface) as map key relies on pointer identity,
// which is correct because all goccy/go-yaml AST node types are pointer
// receivers (*MappingNode, *SequenceNode, etc.), never value types.
if prevDepth, ok := validated[node]; ok && depth <= prevDepth {
return nil
}
validated[node] = depth
// Mark as visiting (on the current recursion path) for cycle detection.
visiting[node] = true
defer func() { visiting[node] = false }()
// Walk children based on node type.
switch n := node.(type) {
case *ast.MappingNode:
for _, value := range n.Values {
if err := checkYAMLDepth(value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
}
case *ast.MappingValueNode:
// Both Key and Value are visited at depth+1 relative to this
// MappingValueNode. Since MappingNode visits its MappingValueNode
// children at depth+1 as well, keys and values end up at depth+2
// from the parent MappingNode. This is intentional: it mirrors the
// actual nesting structure (mapping → key-value pair → key/value).
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Key, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.SequenceNode:
for _, value := range n.Values {
if err := checkYAMLDepth(value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
}
case *ast.AliasNode:
// Follow alias to its target, incrementing depth since aliases expand
// the effective structure.
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.AnchorNode:
// Increment depth for anchor values as a conservative measure: the
// anchor definition itself is structural, and treating it as a depth
// level ensures that deeply nested anchors are caught at definition
// time rather than only when referenced via alias. This +1 is
// asymmetric with alias (which also increments) — by design, the
// effective depth budget for anchored-then-aliased content is reduced
// because both the definition site and the reference site each consume
// a level, making deeply nested anchor/alias pairs hit the limit sooner.
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.TagNode:
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.MergeKeyNode:
// MergeKeyNode represents the literal "<<" merge key token. It has no
// child nodes — the value side of a merge (e.g., *alias) lives in the
// parent MappingValueNode.Value, which is already recursed into above.
// Explicitly listed here (rather than in the default case) to prevent
// future library changes from silently bypassing depth checks.
default:
// Scalar leaf nodes (StringNode, IntegerNode, FloatNode, BoolNode,
// NullNode, InfinityNode, NanNode, LiteralNode) have no children to
// recurse into.
}
return nil
}
// ParsePersonaBytes parses persona data from bytes with a source label for errors.
// This is useful for parsing personas fetched from external sources (e.g., Gitea API)
// without requiring filesystem access. Format is detected by source extension.
// Input is bounded by MaxPersonaFileSize to prevent resource exhaustion.
func ParsePersonaBytes(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
if len(data) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona data from %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes, limit %d)", source, len(data), MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
return parsePersona(data, source)
}
func validatePersona(p *Persona, source string) error {
if p.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("persona %s: name is required", source)
+730 -10
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
package review
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml/ast"
)
func TestLoadBuiltinPersona(t *testing.T) {
@@ -87,6 +90,83 @@ func TestListBuiltinPersonas(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaFromYAMLFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.yaml")
content := `# Test persona
name: test
display_name: Test Persona
identity: |
You are a test persona.
Multi-line identity works.
focus:
- testing
- validation
ignore:
- nothing
severity:
major: Big problems
minor: Small problems
nit: Tiny problems
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
if p.DisplayName != "Test Persona" {
t.Errorf("DisplayName = %q, want %q", p.DisplayName, "Test Persona")
}
if len(p.Focus) != 2 {
t.Errorf("Focus len = %d, want 2", len(p.Focus))
}
if !strings.Contains(p.Identity, "Multi-line") {
t.Error("Identity should contain multi-line content")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaFromYMLFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.yml")
content := `name: test
display_name: Test YML
identity: Test identity
focus:
- testing
ignore: []
severity:
major: Big
minor: Small
nit: Tiny
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
if p.DisplayName != "Test YML" {
t.Errorf("DisplayName = %q, want %q", p.DisplayName, "Test YML")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaFromJSONFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
@@ -96,6 +176,7 @@ func TestLoadPersonaFromJSONFile(t *testing.T) {
"display_name": "Test Persona",
"identity": "You are a test persona.\nMulti-line identity works.",
"focus": ["testing", "validation"],
"ignore": ["nothing"],
"severity": {
"major": "Big problems",
@@ -130,22 +211,38 @@ func TestLoadPersonaFromJSONFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestLoadPersonaValidation(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
json string
content string
ext string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "missing name",
json: `{"identity": "test"}`,
name: "missing name yaml",
content: "identity: test\n",
ext: ".yaml",
wantErr: "name is required",
},
{
name: "missing identity",
json: `{"name": "test"}`,
name: "missing identity yaml",
content: "name: test\n",
ext: ".yaml",
wantErr: "identity is required",
},
{
name: "display_name defaults to name",
json: `{"name": "test", "identity": "test identity"}`,
name: "missing name json",
content: `{"identity": "test"}`,
ext: ".json",
wantErr: "name is required",
},
{
name: "missing identity json",
content: `{"name": "test"}`,
ext: ".json",
wantErr: "identity is required",
},
{
name: "display_name defaults to name",
content: "name: test\nidentity: test identity\n",
ext: ".yaml",
// No error expected - should succeed
},
}
@@ -153,8 +250,8 @@ func TestLoadPersonaValidation(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.json), 0644); err != nil {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test"+tt.ext)
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
@@ -184,12 +281,25 @@ func TestLoadPersonaValidation(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLoadPersonaFileNotFound(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LoadPersona("/nonexistent/path/persona.json")
_, err := LoadPersona("/nonexistent/path/persona.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for nonexistent file")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaInvalidYAML(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "invalid.yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("not valid yaml:\n - [broken"), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for invalid YAML")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "invalid.json")
@@ -203,6 +313,38 @@ func TestLoadPersonaInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaCaseInsensitiveExtension(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
ext string
}{
{"lowercase yaml", ".yaml"},
{"uppercase YAML", ".YAML"},
{"mixed case Yaml", ".Yaml"},
{"lowercase yml", ".yml"},
{"uppercase YML", ".YML"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test"+tt.ext)
content := "name: test\nidentity: test identity\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed for extension %s: %v", tt.ext, err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
})
}
}
func TestCapitalizeFirst(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
@@ -237,3 +379,581 @@ func TestListBuiltinPersonasReturnsEmptySlice(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("ListBuiltinPersonas should return empty slice, not nil")
}
}
func TestYAMLMultilineStrings(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "multiline.yaml")
// Test literal block scalar (|) which preserves newlines
content := `name: multiline
display_name: Multiline Test
identity: |
First line.
Second line.
Third line.
focus:
- item one
ignore: []
severity:
major: Major issue
minor: Minor issue
nit: Nit
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
// Literal block scalar preserves newlines
if !strings.Contains(p.Identity, "\n") {
t.Error("Identity should contain newlines from literal block scalar")
}
if !strings.Contains(p.Identity, "Second line") {
t.Error("Identity should contain 'Second line'")
}
}
func TestYAMLComments(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "comments.yaml")
content := `# This is a comment
name: commented # inline comment
display_name: Commented Persona
# Another comment
identity: Test identity
focus:
- item # comment after item
ignore: []
severity:
major: Major
minor: Minor
nit: Nit
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
// Comments should be ignored
if p.Name != "commented" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "commented")
}
if p.Focus[0] != "item" {
t.Errorf("Focus[0] = %q, want %q", p.Focus[0], "item")
}
}
func TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "deeply-nested.yaml")
// Build a deeply nested YAML structure that exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20).
// Depth accumulation trace for "nested: \n level0: \n level1: ...":
// - Document root parsed at depth 0
// - Root MappingNode children (MappingValueNodes) visited at depth 1
// - "nested" MappingValueNode: key at depth 2, value at depth 2
// - Each levelN adds depth via MappingValueNode traversal (key + value)
// - Exact depth per level depends on AST structure (MappingNode wrapping),
// but 25 levels reliably exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20) with comfortable margin.
// The test uses 25 levels rather than exactly 21 to avoid brittleness.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\nnested:\n")
indent := " "
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(indent, i+1))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
}
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(indent, 26))
sb.WriteString("value: too-deep\n")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(sb.String()), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for deeply nested YAML, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "nesting depth exceeds") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'nesting depth exceeds'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{"completely_empty", ""},
{"whitespace_only", " \n\n "},
{"comment_only", "# just a comment\n"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, tc.name+".yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tc.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for empty YAML input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty YAML document") {
t.Errorf("expected error containing %q, got: %v", "empty YAML document", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestYAMLFileSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "huge.yaml")
// Create a file larger than MaxPersonaFileSize (64 KB)
content := "name: test\nidentity: " + strings.Repeat("x", MaxPersonaFileSize+1) + "\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for oversized file, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum size") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'exceeds maximum size'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestYAMLAliasCycleDetection(t *testing.T) {
// Test that our checkYAMLDepth function handles alias cycles gracefully
// by using the visiting map to prevent infinite recursion.
// Create a node structure where an alias points to a parent node,
// simulating what could happen with crafted input.
parent := &ast.MappingNode{
Values: []*ast.MappingValueNode{
{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "name"},
Value: &ast.StringNode{Value: "test"},
},
},
}
// Create a child that aliases back to the parent (artificial cycle)
aliasToParent := &ast.AliasNode{
Value: parent,
}
parent.Values = append(parent.Values, &ast.MappingValueNode{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "nested"},
Value: aliasToParent,
})
nodeCount := 0
validated := make(map[ast.Node]int)
visiting := make(map[ast.Node]bool)
// This should NOT hang or stack overflow - cycle detection prevents infinite recursion
err := checkYAMLDepth(parent, 0, MaxYAMLDepth, MaxYAMLNodes, validated, visiting, &nodeCount)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("unexpected error traversing cyclic structure: %v", err)
}
// Verify we tracked the parent in the validated map
if _, ok := validated[parent]; !ok {
t.Error("parent node not tracked in validated map")
}
}
func TestYAMLMultiDocumentRejection(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "multi.yaml")
// Multi-document YAML (documents separated by ---)
content := `name: first
identity: first document
---
name: second
identity: second document
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for multi-document YAML, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "multi-document") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'multi-document'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestYAMLNodeCountLimit(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "wide.yaml")
// Build a YAML structure that's shallow but wide - many keys at the same level
// to test the node count limit (should exceed MaxYAMLNodes = 1000)
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\n")
for i := 0; i < 600; i++ {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("key%d: value%d\n", i, i))
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(sb.String()), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for wide YAML exceeding node count, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "node count exceeds") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'node count exceeds'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestCheckYAMLDepthCycleDetectionDirect(t *testing.T) {
// Direct test of cycle detection in checkYAMLDepth by creating
// a node structure with an artificial cycle.
node := &ast.MappingNode{
Values: []*ast.MappingValueNode{
{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "key"},
Value: &ast.StringNode{Value: "value"},
},
},
}
// Create a cycle by making a child reference the parent
cycleChild := &ast.AliasNode{
Value: node, // Points back to the parent
}
node.Values = append(node.Values, &ast.MappingValueNode{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "cyclic"},
Value: cycleChild,
})
nodeCount := 0
validated := make(map[ast.Node]int)
visiting := make(map[ast.Node]bool)
err := checkYAMLDepth(node, 0, MaxYAMLDepth, MaxYAMLNodes, validated, visiting, &nodeCount)
// Should complete without infinite recursion due to cycle detection
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// The validated map should contain multiple entries
if len(validated) < 2 {
t.Errorf("validated map has %d entries, expected at least 2", len(validated))
}
}
func TestYAMLAliasDepthBypass(t *testing.T) {
// Test that an anchored subtree first validated at a shallow depth is
// re-checked when referenced via alias at a deeper position. Without the
// depth-aware validated map, the alias reference would skip re-checking
// and allow the effective nesting to exceed MaxYAMLDepth.
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "alias-depth-bypass.yaml")
// Build YAML with an anchor at shallow depth containing a subtree near the limit,
// then reference it via alias deep enough that effective depth exceeds MaxYAMLDepth.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\n")
// Create the anchored subtree at depth 1 (key level) that nests 15 levels deep.
sb.WriteString("anchor_key: &deep_anchor\n")
for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", i+1))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
}
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", 16))
sb.WriteString("leaf: value\n")
// Create a wrapper that nests 6 levels deep, then references the anchor.
// Effective depth at alias target = 6 (wrapper nesting) + 1 (alias) + 15 (subtree) = 22 > 20
sb.WriteString("wrapper:\n")
for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", i+1))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("n%d:\n", i))
}
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", 7))
sb.WriteString("alias_ref: *deep_anchor\n")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(sb.String()), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for alias depth bypass, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "nesting depth exceeds") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'nesting depth exceeds'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestListBuiltinPersonasSortedOrder(t *testing.T) {
names := ListBuiltinPersonas()
if len(names) < 2 {
t.Skip("need at least 2 personas to test ordering")
}
// Verify the list is sorted
for i := 1; i < len(names); i++ {
if names[i-1] > names[i] {
t.Errorf("ListBuiltinPersonas not sorted: %q > %q", names[i-1], names[i])
}
}
}
func TestYAMLUnknownFieldsRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "unknown top-level field",
content: `name: test
identity: test identity
unknown_field: should fail
`,
wantErr: "unknown_field",
},
{
name: "typo in field name",
content: `name: test
identiy: typo should fail
`,
wantErr: "identiy",
},
{
name: "unknown field in severity",
content: `name: test
identity: test
severity:
major: Major
minro: typo
`,
wantErr: "minro",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "unknown.yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for unknown field %q, got nil", tt.wantErr)
return
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
func TestJSONUnknownFieldsRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "unknown top-level field",
content: `{
"name": "test",
"identity": "test identity",
"unknown_field": "should fail"
}`,
wantErr: "unknown_field",
},
{
name: "typo in field name",
content: `{
"name": "test",
"identiy": "typo should fail"
}`,
wantErr: "identiy",
},
{
name: "unknown field in severity",
content: `{
"name": "test",
"identity": "test",
"severity": {
"major": "ok",
"miner": "typo"
}
}`,
wantErr: "miner",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for unknown field, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaSymlink(t *testing.T) {
// Create a regular persona file
dir := t.TempDir()
realFile := filepath.Join(dir, "real.yaml")
content := `name: test
identity: test identity
`
if err := os.WriteFile(realFile, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
// Create a symlink to it
symlink := filepath.Join(dir, "link.yaml")
if err := os.Symlink(realFile, symlink); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create symlink: %v", err)
}
// LoadPersona should work via symlink
p, err := LoadPersona(symlink)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona via symlink failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestJSONTrailingContentRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{
name: "trailing garbage after object",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}garbage`,
},
{
name: "two JSON objects",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}{"name":"other"}`,
},
{
name: "trailing array",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}[]`,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for trailing content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "trailing content") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'trailing content'", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestParsePersonaBytesSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
// ParsePersonaBytes should reject input exceeding MaxPersonaFileSize
oversized := make([]byte, MaxPersonaFileSize+1)
for i := range oversized {
oversized[i] = 'x'
}
_, err := ParsePersonaBytes(oversized, "oversized.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for oversized input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum size") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'exceeds maximum size'", err.Error())
}
// Just under the limit should not trigger size error (may fail parse, but not size)
underLimit := []byte("name: test\nidentity: test persona\n")
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes(underLimit, "valid.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error for valid input: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestYAMLMergeKeyDepthCheck(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that YAML merge keys (<<: *alias) are properly handled by the
// depth checker. The merge key content is in the MappingValueNode.Value
// (an AliasNode), not in the MergeKeyNode itself.
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte("name: merge-test\nidentity: test\n"), "merge.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("basic parse failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "merge-test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "merge-test")
}
// Test that deeply nested merge keys still hit depth limit.
// Build YAML with merge key content nested beyond MaxYAMLDepth.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: deep-merge\nidentity: deep merge persona\n")
sb.WriteString("anchor: &deep\n")
indent := " "
for i := 0; i < MaxYAMLDepth+5; i++ {
sb.WriteString(indent)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
indent += " "
}
sb.WriteString(indent + "leaf: value\n")
sb.WriteString("target:\n <<: *deep\n")
_, err = ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(sb.String()), "deep-merge.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for deeply nested merge key content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "depth") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'depth'", err.Error())
}
}
-26
View File
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "architect",
"display_name": "Software Architect",
"identity": "You are a software architect reviewing code for design quality.\n\nYour expertise:\n- Design patterns and anti-patterns\n- Code organization and module boundaries\n- API design and contracts\n- Testability and dependency injection\n- Consistency with existing architecture\n- Technical debt identification",
"focus": [
"Design pattern violations or misuse",
"Module boundary violations (inappropriate coupling)",
"API design issues (unclear contracts, leaky abstractions)",
"Testability problems (hidden dependencies, god objects)",
"Inconsistency with existing codebase patterns",
"Unnecessary complexity or over-engineering",
"Missing abstractions or premature abstraction"
],
"ignore": [
"Security vulnerabilities (security persona handles these)",
"Performance micro-optimizations",
"Code style and formatting",
"Documentation typos",
"Test implementation details"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Architectural violations that will cause maintenance problems or make the codebase harder to evolve",
"minor": "Design issues that reduce clarity or testability but don't block progress",
"nit": "Minor pattern deviations or style preferences"
}
}
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# Software Architect Persona
# Focuses on design quality, patterns, and code organization
name: architect
display_name: Software Architect
identity: |
You are a software architect reviewing code for design quality.
Your expertise:
- Design patterns and anti-patterns
- Code organization and module boundaries
- API design and contracts
- Testability and dependency injection
- Consistency with existing architecture
- Technical debt identification
focus:
- Design pattern violations or misuse
- Module boundary violations (inappropriate coupling)
- API design issues (unclear contracts, leaky abstractions)
- Testability problems (hidden dependencies, god objects)
- Inconsistency with existing codebase patterns
- Unnecessary complexity or over-engineering
- Missing abstractions or premature abstraction
ignore:
- Security vulnerabilities (security persona handles these)
- Performance micro-optimizations
- Code style and formatting
- Documentation typos
- Test implementation details
severity:
major: "Architectural violations that will cause maintenance problems or make the codebase harder to evolve"
minor: "Design issues that reduce clarity or testability but don't block progress"
nit: "Minor pattern deviations or style preferences"
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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "docs",
"display_name": "Documentation Reviewer",
"identity": "You are a documentation specialist reviewing code for clarity and documentation quality.\n\nYour expertise:\n- API documentation and examples\n- Code comments and their accuracy\n- Error message clarity\n- README and guide quality\n- Naming clarity and self-documenting code",
"focus": [
"Missing or outdated documentation",
"Unclear or misleading comments",
"Poor error messages (cryptic, unhelpful, missing context)",
"Confusing naming (functions, variables, types)",
"Missing examples for complex APIs",
"Inconsistent terminology",
"Documentation that contradicts the code"
],
"ignore": [
"Security vulnerabilities",
"Performance issues",
"Design patterns",
"Test coverage",
"Code style (unless it affects readability)"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Documentation that actively misleads or missing docs for critical functionality",
"minor": "Unclear documentation or poor error messages that will confuse users",
"nit": "Minor clarity improvements or typo fixes"
}
}
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# Documentation Reviewer Persona
# Focuses on clarity, documentation quality, and self-documenting code
name: docs
display_name: Documentation Reviewer
identity: |
You are a documentation specialist reviewing code for clarity and documentation quality.
Your expertise:
- API documentation and examples
- Code comments and their accuracy
- Error message clarity
- README and guide quality
- Naming clarity and self-documenting code
focus:
- Missing or outdated documentation
- Unclear or misleading comments
- Poor error messages (cryptic, unhelpful, missing context)
- Confusing naming (functions, variables, types)
- Missing examples for complex APIs
- Inconsistent terminology
- Documentation that contradicts the code
ignore:
- Security vulnerabilities
- Performance issues
- Design patterns
- Test coverage
- Code style (unless it affects readability)
severity:
major: "Documentation that actively misleads or missing docs for critical functionality"
minor: "Unclear documentation or poor error messages that will confuse users"
nit: "Minor clarity improvements or typo fixes"
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@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "security",
"display_name": "Security Specialist",
"identity": "You are a security specialist reviewing code for vulnerabilities.\n\nYour expertise:\n- OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities\n- Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template)\n- Authentication and authorization patterns\n- Secrets management and exposure risks\n- Race conditions with security implications\n- Event sourcing attack vectors (replay attacks, event injection)",
"focus": [
"Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template injection)",
"Authentication and authorization gaps or bypasses",
"Secrets exposure (hardcoded credentials, tokens in logs, config leaks)",
"Input validation failures (unsanitized input, unsafe deserialization)",
"Race conditions that could be exploited",
"Cryptographic weaknesses (weak algorithms, improper key handling)",
"Information disclosure through error messages or logs"
],
"ignore": [
"Code style and naming conventions",
"Performance optimizations (unless security-related)",
"Documentation quality",
"General code quality or readability",
"Test coverage"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Exploitable vulnerabilities: auth bypass, injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, RCE",
"minor": "Defense-in-depth issues: missing rate limiting, verbose errors, weak input validation",
"nit": "Theoretical risks with low exploitability or impact"
}
}
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# Security Specialist Persona
# Focuses on vulnerabilities, auth issues, and security best practices
name: security
display_name: Security Specialist
identity: |
You are a security specialist reviewing code for vulnerabilities.
Your expertise:
- OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
- Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template)
- Authentication and authorization patterns
- Secrets management and exposure risks
- Race conditions with security implications
- Event sourcing attack vectors (replay attacks, event injection)
focus:
- Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template injection)
- Authentication and authorization gaps or bypasses
- Secrets exposure (hardcoded credentials, tokens in logs, config leaks)
- Input validation failures (unsanitized input, unsafe deserialization)
- Race conditions that could be exploited
- Cryptographic weaknesses (weak algorithms, improper key handling)
- Information disclosure through error messages or logs
ignore:
- Code style and naming conventions
- Performance optimizations (unless security-related)
- Documentation quality
- General code quality or readability
- Test coverage
severity:
major: "Exploitable vulnerabilities: auth bypass, injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, RCE"
minor: "Defense-in-depth issues: missing rate limiting, verbose errors, weak input validation"
nit: "Theoretical risks with low exploitability or impact"
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package review
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"strings"
)
// RepoPersonaPath is the directory path where repo-specific personas are stored.
const RepoPersonaPath = ".review-bot/personas"
// GiteaClient defines the subset of gitea.Client methods needed for loading repo personas.
// This interface allows for easier testing and decouples the review package from gitea.
type GiteaClient interface {
ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]ContentEntry, error)
GetFileContent(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath string) (string, error)
}
// ContentEntry represents a file or directory entry from the contents API.
// This mirrors gitea.ContentEntry to avoid import cycles.
type ContentEntry struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Type string `json:"type"` // "file" or "dir"
}
// LoadRepoPersonas fetches personas from a repository's .review-bot/personas/ directory.
// Returns an empty map (not nil) if the directory doesn't exist or is empty.
// Individual parse failures are logged and skipped; the remaining personas are still returned.
// Auth errors and other non-404 errors are propagated.
// Files exceeding MaxPersonaFileSize are rejected to prevent resource exhaustion.
func LoadRepoPersonas(ctx context.Context, client GiteaClient, owner, repo string) (map[string]*Persona, error) {
result := make(map[string]*Persona)
entries, err := client.ListContents(ctx, owner, repo, RepoPersonaPath)
if err != nil {
// Check if this is a 404 (directory doesn't exist) - expected case
if isNotFoundError(err) {
slog.Debug("no repo personas directory found", "repo", owner+"/"+repo)
return result, nil
}
// Other errors (auth, server) should propagate
return nil, err
}
if len(entries) == 0 {
slog.Debug("repo personas directory is empty", "repo", owner+"/"+repo)
return result, nil
}
for _, entry := range entries {
if entry.Type != "file" {
continue
}
// Only process YAML files
if !isYAMLFile(entry.Name) {
continue
}
content, err := client.GetFileContent(ctx, owner, repo, entry.Path)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not fetch repo persona file",
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo,
"error", err)
continue
}
// Enforce size limit before parsing to prevent resource exhaustion
if len(content) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
slog.Warn("repo persona file exceeds maximum size",
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo,
"size", len(content),
"max", MaxPersonaFileSize)
continue
}
persona, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(content), entry.Path)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not parse repo persona file",
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo,
"error", err)
continue
}
result[persona.Name] = persona
slog.Debug("loaded repo persona",
"name", persona.Name,
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo)
}
return result, nil
}
// MergePersonas combines built-in personas with repo personas.
// Repo personas take precedence on name collision.
// Returns a new map; inputs are not modified.
func MergePersonas(builtin, repo map[string]*Persona) map[string]*Persona {
result := make(map[string]*Persona, len(builtin)+len(repo))
// Copy built-in personas first
for name, p := range builtin {
result[name] = p
}
// Overlay repo personas (override on collision)
for name, p := range repo {
if _, exists := result[name]; exists {
slog.Debug("repo persona overrides built-in", "name", name)
}
result[name] = p
}
return result
}
// GetBuiltinPersonasMap returns all built-in personas as a map keyed by name.
// Returns an empty map (not nil) if loading fails.
func GetBuiltinPersonasMap() map[string]*Persona {
result := make(map[string]*Persona)
for _, name := range ListBuiltinPersonas() {
p, err := LoadBuiltinPersona(name)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not load built-in persona", "name", name, "error", err)
continue
}
result[name] = p
}
return result
}
// isYAMLFile checks if a filename has a YAML extension.
func isYAMLFile(name string) bool {
lower := strings.ToLower(name)
return strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".yaml") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".yml")
}
// isNotFoundError checks if an error represents a 404 response.
// This uses a specific "HTTP 404" substring match rather than a generic "not found"
// match to avoid masking authentication failures or transport errors that might
// contain "not found" in their message.
func isNotFoundError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
return strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTP 404")
}
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package review
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestParsePersonaBytes(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
data string
source string
wantName string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "valid yaml",
data: `name: test
identity: test identity
focus:
- testing
`,
source: "test.yaml",
wantName: "test",
},
{
name: "missing name",
data: "identity: test\n",
source: "test.yaml",
wantErr: "name is required",
},
{
name: "invalid yaml",
data: "not: valid:\n yaml: [broken",
source: "test.yaml",
wantErr: "parse",
},
{
name: "json format by extension",
data: `{"name": "jsontest", "identity": "json identity"}`,
source: "test.json",
wantName: "jsontest",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(tt.data), tt.source)
if tt.wantErr != "" {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error containing %q, got nil", tt.wantErr)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != tt.wantName {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, tt.wantName)
}
})
}
}
// mockGiteaClient implements GiteaClient for testing.
type mockGiteaClient struct {
contents map[string][]ContentEntry // path -> entries
files map[string]string // path -> content
listErr error
fileErr map[string]error // path -> error
}
func (m *mockGiteaClient) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]ContentEntry, error) {
if m.listErr != nil {
return nil, m.listErr
}
entries, ok := m.contents[path]
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("list contents .review-bot/personas: HTTP 404: not found")
}
return entries, nil
}
func (m *mockGiteaClient) GetFileContent(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath string) (string, error) {
if m.fileErr != nil {
if err, ok := m.fileErr[filepath]; ok {
return "", err
}
}
content, ok := m.files[filepath]
if !ok {
return "", errors.New("HTTP 404: file not found")
}
return content, nil
}
func TestLoadRepoPersonas(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
t.Run("directory not found returns empty map", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{} // No contents configured -> 404
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if personas == nil {
t.Error("expected empty map, got nil")
}
if len(personas) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 personas, got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("empty directory returns empty map", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {},
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 personas, got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("loads valid personas", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "trading.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/trading.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "crypto.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/crypto.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/trading.yaml": `name: trading
display_name: Trading Expert
identity: You are a trading expert.
focus:
- order handling
- risk management
`,
".review-bot/personas/crypto.yaml": `name: crypto
display_name: Crypto Expert
identity: You are a cryptography expert.
focus:
- key management
- encryption
`,
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 personas, got %d", len(personas))
}
if personas["trading"] == nil {
t.Error("expected trading persona")
}
if personas["crypto"] == nil {
t.Error("expected crypto persona")
}
if personas["trading"].DisplayName != "Trading Expert" {
t.Errorf("trading display name = %q, want %q", personas["trading"].DisplayName, "Trading Expert")
}
})
t.Run("skips invalid persona files", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "valid.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/valid.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "invalid.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/invalid.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/valid.yaml": `name: valid
identity: Valid persona
`,
".review-bot/personas/invalid.yaml": "not valid yaml: [broken",
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Should have the valid one, skip the invalid
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (skipped invalid), got %d", len(personas))
}
if personas["valid"] == nil {
t.Error("expected valid persona")
}
})
t.Run("skips non-yaml files", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "persona.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "README.md", Path: ".review-bot/personas/README.md", Type: "file"},
{Name: "notes.txt", Path: ".review-bot/personas/notes.txt", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml": `name: test
identity: Test persona
`,
".review-bot/personas/README.md": "# Personas\n\nPut your personas here.",
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (yaml only), got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("skips subdirectories", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "persona.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "subdir", Path: ".review-bot/personas/subdir", Type: "dir"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml": `name: test
identity: Test persona
`,
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (files only), got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("propagates auth errors", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
listErr: errors.New("HTTP 401: unauthorized"),
}
_, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for auth failure")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "401") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing '401'", err.Error())
}
})
t.Run("skips files that fail to fetch", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "good.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/good.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "bad.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/bad.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/good.yaml": `name: good
identity: Good persona
`,
},
fileErr: map[string]error{
".review-bot/personas/bad.yaml": errors.New("HTTP 500: internal server error"),
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (skipped failed fetch), got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("skips oversized files", func(t *testing.T) {
// Create a content string that exceeds MaxPersonaFileSize (64KB)
oversizedContent := strings.Repeat("a", MaxPersonaFileSize+1)
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "normal.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/normal.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "huge.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/huge.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/normal.yaml": `name: normal
identity: Normal sized persona
`,
".review-bot/personas/huge.yaml": oversizedContent,
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Should have the normal one, skip the oversized
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (skipped oversized), got %d", len(personas))
}
if personas["normal"] == nil {
t.Error("expected normal persona")
}
})
}
func TestMergePersonas(t *testing.T) {
builtin := map[string]*Persona{
"security": {Name: "security", Identity: "Built-in security"},
"docs": {Name: "docs", Identity: "Built-in docs"},
}
repo := map[string]*Persona{
"security": {Name: "security", Identity: "Repo security override"},
"trading": {Name: "trading", Identity: "Repo trading"},
}
merged := MergePersonas(builtin, repo)
t.Run("repo overrides builtin on collision", func(t *testing.T) {
if merged["security"].Identity != "Repo security override" {
t.Errorf("security identity = %q, want repo override", merged["security"].Identity)
}
})
t.Run("builtin preserved when no collision", func(t *testing.T) {
if merged["docs"].Identity != "Built-in docs" {
t.Errorf("docs identity = %q, want built-in", merged["docs"].Identity)
}
})
t.Run("repo-only persona added", func(t *testing.T) {
if merged["trading"] == nil {
t.Error("expected trading persona from repo")
}
if merged["trading"].Identity != "Repo trading" {
t.Errorf("trading identity = %q, want repo", merged["trading"].Identity)
}
})
t.Run("original maps not modified", func(t *testing.T) {
if builtin["trading"] != nil {
t.Error("builtin map was modified")
}
if len(repo) != 2 {
t.Error("repo map was modified")
}
})
}
func TestGetBuiltinPersonasMap(t *testing.T) {
personas := GetBuiltinPersonasMap()
if len(personas) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected at least one built-in persona")
}
// Verify expected personas exist
expected := []string{"security", "architect", "docs"}
for _, name := range expected {
if personas[name] == nil {
t.Errorf("expected built-in persona %q", name)
}
}
// Verify personas are valid
for name, p := range personas {
if p.Name != name {
t.Errorf("persona %q has mismatched name %q", name, p.Name)
}
if p.Identity == "" {
t.Errorf("persona %q has empty identity", name)
}
}
}
func TestIsYAMLFile(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
want bool
}{
{"test.yaml", true},
{"test.yml", true},
{"test.YAML", true},
{"test.YML", true},
{"test.json", false},
{"test.md", false},
{"test.txt", false},
{"yaml", false},
{"yaml.md", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := isYAMLFile(tt.name); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isYAMLFile(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.name, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsNotFoundError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
err error
want bool
}{
{nil, false},
{errors.New("HTTP 404: not found"), true},
{errors.New("HTTP 404"), true},
// Intentionally false: generic "not found" could mask auth/transport errors.
// Only explicit HTTP 404 responses should be treated as "directory doesn't exist".
{errors.New("something not found"), false},
{errors.New("HTTP 401: unauthorized"), false},
{errors.New("connection refused"), false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
name := "nil"
if tt.err != nil {
name = tt.err.Error()
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := isNotFoundError(tt.err); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isNotFoundError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check-deps.sh - Enforces the strict dependency allowlist from CONVENTIONS.md
# Exit 1 if any unapproved import is found.
#
# Requires: Bash 4+ (for associative arrays), Go toolchain
#
# The allowlist is parsed from CONVENTIONS.md to maintain a single source of truth.
# Enforces Scope column: "test only" packages cannot appear in non-test code.
set -euo pipefail
# Check bash version
if ((BASH_VERSINFO[0] < 4)); then
echo "❌ Bash 4+ required (found ${BASH_VERSION})"
echo " On macOS: brew install bash"
exit 1
fi
CONVENTIONS_FILE="${1:-CONVENTIONS.md}"
if [ ! -f "$CONVENTIONS_FILE" ]; then
echo "❌ CONVENTIONS.md not found"
exit 1
fi
# Parse approved packages from CONVENTIONS.md table using awk (POSIX-compatible)
# Format: | `package` | use case | scope |
declare -A ALLOWED_PROD=()
declare -A ALLOWED_TEST=()
while IFS= read -r line; do
# Use awk to extract package and scope from table row
pkg=$(echo "$line" | awk -F'|' '{gsub(/^[[:space:]]*`|`[[:space:]]*$/, "", $2); print $2}')
scope=$(echo "$line" | awk -F'|' '{gsub(/^[[:space:]]+|[[:space:]]+$/, "", $4); print tolower($4)}')
if [ -n "$pkg" ] && [ "$pkg" != "Package" ] && [[ "$pkg" =~ ^[a-zA-Z] ]]; then
if [[ "$scope" == *"test"* ]]; then
ALLOWED_TEST["$pkg"]=1
else
ALLOWED_PROD["$pkg"]=1
fi
fi
done < <(grep '| `' "$CONVENTIONS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)
ALL_ALLOWED=("${!ALLOWED_PROD[@]}" "${!ALLOWED_TEST[@]}")
if [ ${#ALL_ALLOWED[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
echo "⚠️ No approved packages found in $CONVENTIONS_FILE"
echo " (This is fine if you want stdlib-only)"
fi
# Helper: check if import matches any package in an associative array (literal prefix, no glob)
matches_allowlist() {
local import="$1"
shift
local -n allowlist=$1
for allowed in "${!allowlist[@]}"; do
# Exact match
if [ "$import" = "$allowed" ]; then
return 0
fi
# Literal prefix match for subpackages: must match "pkg/" exactly
if [ "${import#"$allowed/"}" != "$import" ]; then
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
# Get direct module dependencies from go.mod
DIRECT_IMPORTS=$(go list -m -f '{{if and (not .Indirect) (not .Main)}}{{.Path}}{{end}}' all 2>&1) || {
echo "❌ Failed to list dependencies: $DIRECT_IMPORTS"
exit 1
}
DIRECT_IMPORTS=$(echo "$DIRECT_IMPORTS" | grep -v '^$' || true)
if [ -z "$DIRECT_IMPORTS" ]; then
echo "✅ No external dependencies"
exit 0
fi
# Check ALL direct dependencies are in some allowlist
VIOLATIONS=""
while IFS= read -r import; do
[ -z "$import" ] && continue
if ! matches_allowlist "$import" ALLOWED_PROD && ! matches_allowlist "$import" ALLOWED_TEST; then
VIOLATIONS="${VIOLATIONS} - ${import} (not in allowlist)"$'\n'
fi
done <<< "$DIRECT_IMPORTS"
if [ -n "$VIOLATIONS" ]; then
echo "❌ UNAPPROVED DEPENDENCIES DETECTED"
echo ""
echo "The following imports are not in the allowlist:"
printf "%s" "$VIOLATIONS"
echo ""
echo "To add a dependency, update CONVENTIONS.md (requires Aaron's approval)"
exit 1
fi
# Enforce Scope: test-only packages must not appear in non-test code
# Get imports used by non-test code only (go list -deps without -test excludes test deps)
PROD_IMPORTS=$(go list -deps -f '{{if not .Standard}}{{.ImportPath}}{{end}}' ./... 2>/dev/null || true)
TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD=""
for test_pkg in "${!ALLOWED_TEST[@]}"; do
# Use word-boundary matching: exact match or followed by /
if echo "$PROD_IMPORTS" | grep -qE "^${test_pkg}(/|\$|$)"; then
TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD="${TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD} - ${test_pkg} (marked 'test only' but used in production code)"$'\n'
fi
done
if [ -n "$TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD" ]; then
echo "❌ TEST-ONLY DEPENDENCIES IN PRODUCTION CODE"
echo ""
printf "%s" "$TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD"
echo ""
echo "These packages are marked 'test only' in CONVENTIONS.md"
echo "and must only be imported from *_test.go files."
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ All dependencies are approved"
echo " Direct module deps: $(echo "$DIRECT_IMPORTS" | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
echo " Production allowlist: ${#ALLOWED_PROD[@]}, Test-only allowlist: ${#ALLOWED_TEST[@]}"