fix: remove trailing whitespace in action.yml

- Add --vcs-url flag as primary (reads VCS_URL env var)
- Keep --gitea-url and GITEA_URL as deprecated fallbacks with warnings
- Update action.yml: rename gitea-url input to vcs-url, pass VCS_URL to binary
- Update ci.yml: use VCS_URL env var in Run review step
- Update integration tests: INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL -> INTEGRATION_VCS_URL
- Update README: --vcs-url / VCS_URL with fallback note in env var table

Backward compat: existing GITEA_URL users get a deprecation warning and
continue to work unchanged until they migrate to VCS_URL.

.gitea/actions/review/action.yml

@@ -1,43 +1,17 @@
-# This composite action supports both Gitea Actions and GitHub Actions runners.
-# It detects the VCS host type by checking whether github.api_url is set
-# (present on GitHub.com and GHES runners, absent on Gitea runners) and uses
-# the appropriate releases API for version resolution and binary download
-# (REST API on GitHub, direct URLs on Gitea).
-#
-# Security notes:
-# - On GitHub/GHES (VCS_TYPE=github), inputs.vcs-url is IGNORED to prevent
-#   token exfiltration. API calls use github.api_url; downloads use
-#   github.server_url. Tokens are never sent to user-supplied URLs.
-# - On Gitea (VCS_TYPE=gitea), inputs.vcs-url is validated (https scheme,
-#   no whitespace/newlines, and DNS resolution to a public IP) before use.
-#   Python3 resolves the hostname and rejects RFC1918, RFC6598 (carrier-grade
-#   NAT), loopback, link-local, and other reserved addresses to prevent SSRF attacks.
-#   The installed review-bot binary additionally uses a safe HTTP transport
-#   (DialContext-level IP check) for all Gitea API calls at runtime.
-#   The binary also exposes a `validate-url` subcommand for use in any future
-#   shell steps that need to validate a URL before passing it to curl.
-# - action-repo is validated against owner/repo pattern.
-# - Tokens are passed via masked environment variables, not step outputs.
-#
+# This composite action is designed for Gitea Actions runners.
+# Gitea Actions supports GitHub Actions syntax including $GITHUB_OUTPUT,
+# actions/cache, and actions/checkout.
 # Requirements: python3, sha256sum, curl (all present on ubuntu-* runners).
 name: 'AI Code Review'
 description: 'Run AI-powered code review on a pull request using review-bot'
 
 inputs:
   vcs-url:
-    description: 'VCS server URL (only used on Gitea runners; ignored on GitHub/GHES). Defaults to server_url.'
+    description: 'VCS server URL (defaults to server_url)'
     required: false
     default: ''
   repo:
-    description: 'Repository to review (owner/name, defaults to current)'
-    required: false
-    default: ''
-  action-repo:
-    description: 'Repository hosting review-bot releases (owner/name). Defaults to github.action_repository or rodin/review-bot.'
-    required: false
-    default: ''
-  action-repo-token:
-    description: 'Token for downloading release assets from action-repo (defaults to github.token on GitHub, reviewer-token on Gitea). Required for private repos.'
+    description: 'Repository (owner/name, defaults to current)'
     required: false
     default: ''
   pr-number:
@@ -45,7 +19,7 @@ inputs:
     required: false
     default: ''
   reviewer-token:
-    description: 'Token for posting the review'
+    description: 'Gitea token for posting the review'
     required: true
   reviewer-name:
     description: 'Display name for the reviewer'
@@ -138,325 +112,45 @@ runs:
       id: version
       shell: bash
       run: |
-        set -euo pipefail
-
-        # --- Input Validation ---
-
-        # Determine the repo hosting review-bot releases (not the repo being reviewed)
-        ACTION_REPO="${{ inputs.action-repo }}"
-        if [ -z "$ACTION_REPO" ]; then
-          # github.action_repository is the repo containing the running action
-          ACTION_REPO="${{ github.action_repository }}"
-        fi
-        if [ -z "$ACTION_REPO" ]; then
-          # Final fallback for Gitea (which may not set action_repository)
-          ACTION_REPO="rodin/review-bot"
-          echo "::notice::action-repo not specified and github.action_repository is empty; falling back to rodin/review-bot"
-        fi
-
-        # Validate ACTION_REPO matches owner/repo pattern (prevent path traversal)
-        if ! printf '%s' "$ACTION_REPO" | grep -qE '^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+/[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$'; then
-          echo "Error: action-repo '${ACTION_REPO}' does not match expected owner/repo format" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-
-        # Detect VCS host type using github.api_url context.
-        # github.api_url is set on GitHub.com (https://api.github.com) and GHES
-        # (https://<host>/api/v3). It is empty/unset on Gitea Actions runners.
-        GITHUB_API_URL="${{ github.api_url }}"
-        if [ -n "$GITHUB_API_URL" ]; then
-          VCS_TYPE="github"
-        else
-          VCS_TYPE="gitea"
-        fi
-
-        # Determine SERVER_URL based on VCS type.
-        # SECURITY: On GitHub/GHES, ALWAYS use github.server_url — never trust
-        # inputs.vcs-url to prevent token exfiltration to attacker-controlled hosts.
-        if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
-          SERVER_URL="${{ github.server_url }}"
-          if [ -n "${{ inputs.vcs-url }}" ]; then
-            echo "::warning::inputs.vcs-url is ignored on GitHub/GHES runners (VCS_TYPE=github). Using github.server_url instead."
-          fi
-        else
-          SERVER_URL="${{ inputs.vcs-url || github.server_url }}"
-        fi
-        # Strip trailing slash if present
-        SERVER_URL="${SERVER_URL%/}"
-
-        # Validate SERVER_URL for Gitea path: must be https, no whitespace/newlines.
-        # The [^[:space:]] class already rejects newlines, so no separate newline check needed.
-        if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "gitea" ]; then
-          if ! printf '%s' "$SERVER_URL" | grep -qE '^https://[^[:space:]]+$'; then
-            echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' must be an https:// URL with no whitespace" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # Additional IP-level SSRF defense: resolve the hostname and reject
-          # requests to RFC1918, RFC6598 (carrier-grade NAT), loopback, link-local,
-          # and other reserved addresses.
-          # python3 is required on ubuntu-* runners (see requirements comment above).
-          # Use printf to write the script to a temp file so the python lines are valid
-          # YAML (each indented line becomes a printf argument — no unindented code).
-          # SERVER_URL is passed via CHECK_URL env var, never interpolated into python code.
-          printf '%s\n' \
-            'import socket,ipaddress,sys,os' \
-            'from urllib.parse import urlparse' \
-            'u=os.environ["CHECK_URL"]; parsed=urlparse(u)' \
-            'if parsed.username or parsed.password:' \
-            '  print("Error: URL contains user-info — not allowed",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(2)' \
-            'h=parsed.hostname' \
-            '(print("Error: no hostname",file=sys.stderr) or sys.exit(2)) if not h else None' \
-            'try: rs=socket.getaddrinfo(h,None)' \
-            'except socket.gaierror as e: print(f"DNS error: {e}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
-            'if not rs: print("Error: no addresses",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
-            'for _,_,_,_,(a,*_) in rs:' \
-            '  ip=ipaddress.ip_address(a)' \
-            '  if isinstance(ip,ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped: ip=ip.ipv4_mapped' \
-            '  cgn=ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")' \
-            '  if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved or ip in cgn:' \
-            '    print(f"blocked: {a}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
-            > /tmp/_ssrf_check.py
-          CHECK_URL="${SERVER_URL}" python3 /tmp/_ssrf_check.py || {
-            echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' resolves to a private/reserved IP address" >&2
-            exit 1
-          }
-        fi
-
-        # Determine auth token for release API requests
-        ACTION_TOKEN="${{ inputs.action-repo-token }}"
-        if [ -z "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-          if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
-            ACTION_TOKEN="${{ github.token }}"
-          else
-            ACTION_TOKEN="${{ inputs.reviewer-token }}"
-          fi
-        fi
-
-        # Validate token contains no control characters (defense-in-depth against header injection)
-        if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-          if printf '%s' "$ACTION_TOKEN" | LC_ALL=C grep -q '[^[:print:]]'; then
-            echo "Error: ACTION_TOKEN contains control characters" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-        fi
-
+        BASE_URL="${{ inputs.vcs-url || github.server_url }}"
+        REPO="${{ inputs.repo || 'rodin/review-bot' }}"
         if [ "${{ inputs.version }}" = "latest" ]; then
-          if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
-            # SECURITY: Use github.api_url which is a trusted platform-provided value.
-            # Never construct API URLs from user-supplied inputs on GitHub.
-            API_URL="${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases?per_page=1"
-          else
-            # Gitea API — SERVER_URL was validated above
-            API_URL="${SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases?limit=1"
-          fi
-
-          # Fetch latest version with inline auth header (no intermediate variable)
-          if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-            if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
-              VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-                -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" "$API_URL" \
-                | python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
-            else
-              VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-                -H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" "$API_URL" \
-                | python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
-            fi
-          else
-            VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 "$API_URL" \
-              | python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
-          fi
-
+          VERSION=$(curl -sSf "${BASE_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases?limit=1" \
+            | python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
           if [ -z "$VERSION" ]; then
-            echo "Failed to determine latest version from ${API_URL}" >&2
+            echo "Failed to determine latest version" >&2
             exit 1
           fi
         else
           VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
         fi
-
-        # Validate VERSION: no slashes or whitespace (prevent path traversal).
-        # [:space:] includes newlines and carriage returns in POSIX.
-        if printf '%s' "$VERSION" | grep -qE '[/[:space:]]'; then
-          echo "Error: VERSION '${VERSION}' contains invalid characters (newline, slash, or whitespace)" >&2
-          exit 1
-        fi
-
-        # Detect OS and architecture for platform-specific binary download
-        OS_RAW=$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
-        case "$OS_RAW" in
-          linux)  OS="linux" ;;
-          darwin) OS="darwin" ;;
-          *)
-            echo "Error: unsupported OS: $(uname -s)" >&2
-            exit 1
-            ;;
-        esac
-
-        RAW_ARCH=$(uname -m)
-        case "$RAW_ARCH" in
-          x86_64)           ARCH="amd64" ;;
-          aarch64 | arm64)  ARCH="arm64" ;;
-          *)
-            echo "Error: unsupported architecture: $RAW_ARCH" >&2
-            exit 1
-            ;;
-        esac
-
         echo "version=${VERSION}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-        echo "os=${OS}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-        echo "arch=${ARCH}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-        echo "action_repo=${ACTION_REPO}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-        echo "server_url=${SERVER_URL}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-        echo "vcs_type=${VCS_TYPE}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
-        # SECURITY: Pass token via masked environment variable instead of step output.
-        # Step outputs can leak in debug logs; GITHUB_ENV with masking is safer.
-        if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-          echo "::add-mask::${ACTION_TOKEN}"
-          echo "ACTION_TOKEN=${ACTION_TOKEN}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-        fi
 
     - name: Cache review-bot binary
       id: cache
       uses: actions/cache@v4
       with:
         path: ${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot
-        key: review-bot-${{ steps.version.outputs.os }}-${{ steps.version.outputs.arch }}-${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
+        key: review-bot-linux-amd64-${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
 
     - name: Install review-bot
       if: steps.cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
       shell: bash
       run: |
-        set -euo pipefail
-
-        SERVER_URL="${{ steps.version.outputs.server_url }}"
-        ACTION_REPO="${{ steps.version.outputs.action_repo }}"
+        BASE_URL="${{ inputs.vcs-url || github.server_url }}"
+        REPO="${{ inputs.repo || 'rodin/review-bot' }}"
         VERSION="${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
-        VCS_TYPE="${{ steps.version.outputs.vcs_type }}"
-        OS="${{ steps.version.outputs.os }}"
-        ARCH="${{ steps.version.outputs.arch }}"
-        # Read token from masked environment variable (set in Determine version step)
-        # Falls back to empty if not set (public repos don't need auth)
-        ACTION_TOKEN="${ACTION_TOKEN:-}"
-        BINARY="review-bot-${OS}-${ARCH}"
+        BINARY="review-bot-linux-amd64"
 
-        # SECURITY: Re-validate SERVER_URL at the start of this step to mitigate DNS
-        # rebinding attacks. A DNS TTL expiry between "Determine version" and here
-        # could allow an attacker to change the resolved IP to a private/reserved
-        # address, causing curl to send ACTION_TOKEN to an internal host.
-        # Only needed on Gitea path (VCS_TYPE=gitea); GitHub/GHES uses platform-controlled URLs.
-        if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "gitea" ]; then
-          printf '%s\n' \
-            'import socket,ipaddress,sys,os' \
-            'from urllib.parse import urlparse' \
-            'u=os.environ["CHECK_URL"]; parsed=urlparse(u)' \
-            'if parsed.username or parsed.password:' \
-            '  print("Error: URL contains user-info — not allowed",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(2)' \
-            'h=parsed.hostname' \
-            '(print("Error: no hostname",file=sys.stderr) or sys.exit(2)) if not h else None' \
-            'try: rs=socket.getaddrinfo(h,None)' \
-            'except socket.gaierror as e: print(f"DNS error: {e}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
-            'if not rs: print("Error: no addresses",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
-            'for _,_,_,_,(a,*_) in rs:' \
-            '  ip=ipaddress.ip_address(a)' \
-            '  if isinstance(ip,ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped: ip=ip.ipv4_mapped' \
-            '  cgn=ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")' \
-            '  if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved or ip in cgn:' \
-            '    print(f"blocked: {a}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
-              > /tmp/_ssrf_check_install.py
-          CHECK_URL="${SERVER_URL}" python3 /tmp/_ssrf_check_install.py || {
-            echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' resolves to a private/reserved IP address" >&2
-            exit 1
-          }
-        fi
-
-        if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
-          # GitHub/GHES: Use REST API for release asset downloads.
-          # Web release URLs ({server}/.../releases/download/{tag}/{asset}) redirect
-          # to S3 and don't reliably support Authorization headers for private repos.
-          # The REST API endpoint with Accept: application/octet-stream is required.
-          # GITHUB_API_URL: trusted platform value, same as detected in "Determine version" step.
-          GITHUB_API_URL="${{ github.api_url }}"
-
-          if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-            RELEASE_JSON=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-              -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-              "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/tags/${VERSION}")
-          else
-            RELEASE_JSON=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-              "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/tags/${VERSION}")
-          fi
-
-          # Extract asset IDs for binary and checksums
-          BINARY_ASSET_ID=$(printf '%s' "$RELEASE_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys, json; assets = json.load(sys.stdin).get('assets', []); matches = [a['id'] for a in assets if a['name'] == '${BINARY}']; print(matches[0] if matches else '')")
-          if [ -z "$BINARY_ASSET_ID" ]; then
-            echo "Error: could not find asset '${BINARY}' in release ${VERSION}" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID=$(printf '%s' "$RELEASE_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys, json; assets = json.load(sys.stdin).get('assets', []); matches = [a['id'] for a in assets if a['name'] == 'checksums.txt']; print(matches[0] if matches else '')")
-          if [ -z "$CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID" ]; then
-            echo "Error: could not find asset 'checksums.txt' in release ${VERSION}" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # Download assets via REST API with Accept: application/octet-stream
-          if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-            curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-              -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-              -H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
-              "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${BINARY_ASSET_ID}" \
-              -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
-            curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-              -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-              -H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
-              "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID}" \
-              -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
-          else
-            curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-              -H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
-              "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${BINARY_ASSET_ID}" \
-              -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
-            curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-              -H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
-              "${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID}" \
-              -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
-          fi
-        else
-          # Gitea: Direct download via web release URLs (Gitea serves assets
-          # directly without redirects — no -L needed).
-          # SECURITY: Omitting -L prevents forwarding Authorization header to
-          # unexpected hosts if Gitea ever introduces CDN redirects.
-          DOWNLOAD_URL="${SERVER_URL}/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}"
-
-          if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
-            curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-              -H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-              "${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
-            curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-              -H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-              "${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
-          else
-            curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-              "${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
-            curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-              "${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
-          fi
-        fi
+        curl -sSfL "${BASE_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/${BINARY}" \
+          -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
+        curl -sSfL "${BASE_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/checksums.txt" \
+          -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
 
         # Verify SHA-256 checksum
-        # NOTE: This verifies integrity (download wasn't corrupted) but not
-        # authenticity — both binary and checksums come from the same server.
-        # For stronger guarantees, consider GPG signature verification.
         cd "${{ runner.temp }}"
-        EXPECTED=$(grep -E "^[0-9a-f]+[[:space:]]+\*?${BINARY}$" checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')
-        # sha256sum (GNU) is not available on macOS; use shasum -a 256 on darwin.
-        if [ "${OS}" = "darwin" ]; then
-          ACTUAL=$(shasum -a 256 review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
-        else
-          ACTUAL=$(sha256sum review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
-        fi
+        EXPECTED=$(grep "${BINARY}" checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')
+        ACTUAL=$(sha256sum review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
 
         if [ -z "$EXPECTED" ]; then
           echo "Error: no checksum found for ${BINARY}" >&2
@@ -470,12 +164,12 @@ runs:
         fi
 
         chmod +x "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
-        echo "Installed review-bot-${OS}-${ARCH} ${VERSION} (checksum verified)"
+        echo "Installed review-bot ${VERSION} (checksum verified)"
 
     - name: Run review
       shell: bash
       env:
-        VCS_URL: ${{ steps.version.outputs.server_url }}
+        VCS_URL: ${{ inputs.vcs-url || github.server_url }}
         GITEA_REPO: ${{ inputs.repo || github.repository }}
         PR_NUMBER: ${{ inputs.pr-number || github.event.pull_request.number }}
         REVIEWER_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.reviewer-token }}

README.md

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ Rules:
 
 ```bash
 review-bot \
-  --vcs-url https://gitea.example.com \
+  --gitea-url https://gitea.example.com \
   --repo owner/name \
   --pr 42 \
   --reviewer-token "$GITEA_TOKEN" \

TODO.md

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-## Dev Loop: review-bot — 2026-05-14 19:15 UTC
-
-### Latest: ✅ issue-123 MERGED
-- **PR #129:** Merged to main at commit 4440823
-- **Feature:** IP-level SSRF defense with RFC6598 CGN check
-- **Status:** Complete, all review feedback addressed
-
----
-
-## Review-Bot Current State
-
-### Merged to main:
-- ✅ issue-123 (SSRF defense) — 5 commits
-- ✅ issue-125 (VCS_URL rename + deprecation) 
-- ✅ issue-124 (multi-arch binary support)
-- ✅ issue-120 (GitHub Actions + VCS abstraction) — partial merge
-- And 100+ prior completed issues
-
-### Open Branches (>0 commits ahead of main):
-- **issue-120:** 30 commits ahead (GHE release dry-run + extensive VCS abstraction work)
-  - Status: Awaiting human review/decision on integration
-
-### Completed Recently:
-- Multiple issue-* and review-bot-issue-* branches
-- All recent work landed in main or merged into feature branches
-
----
-
-## Next Actions for Dev-Loop
-
-1. **Check if issue-120 needs human intervention or PR created**
-2. **Identify next highest-priority open issue to start**
-3. **Review any blocked or stalled branches**
-4. **Perform health check:**
-   - No orphaned worktrees
-   - No merge conflicts
-   - All tests passing on main
-
----
-
-## Worktrees Active
- worktrees active

cmd/review-bot/main.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"log/slog"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -20,13 +19,6 @@ import (
 
 var version = "dev"
 
-// outWriter and errWriter are the output and error writers for subcommands.
-// They are variables so tests can capture output.
-var (
-	outWriter io.Writer = os.Stdout
-	errWriter io.Writer = os.Stderr
-)
-
 // setupLogger configures the global slog default logger based on format and verbosity.
 func setupLogger(format, verbosity string) {
 	var level slog.Level
@@ -57,15 +49,6 @@ func setupLogger(format, verbosity string) {
 }
 
 func main() {
-	// Dispatch subcommands before flag parsing so they get their own args.
-	// e.g. `review-bot validate-url <url>`
-	if len(os.Args) > 1 {
-		switch os.Args[1] {
-		case "validate-url":
-			os.Exit(runValidateURL(os.Args[2:]))
-		}
-	}
-
 	versionFlag := flag.Bool("version", false, "Print version and exit")
 	// Logging flags
 	logFormat := flag.String("log-format", envOrDefault("LOG_FORMAT", "text"), "Log output format: text or json")

cmd/review-bot/validateurl.go

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-package main
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	"gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot/gitea"
-)
-
-// runValidateURL implements the `review-bot validate-url <url>` subcommand.
-//
-// It resolves the given URL's hostname and checks that every returned IP is
-// publicly routable (not RFC1918, loopback, link-local, or other reserved
-// ranges). The exit code communicates the result to callers:
-//
-//	0 — URL is safe to use
-//	1 — URL resolves to a blocked/private address
-//	2 — URL is malformed, has an unsafe scheme, or DNS lookup failed
-//
-// This is intended for use from action.yml shell steps that need to validate
-// a user-supplied URL before passing it to curl.
-func runValidateURL(args []string) int {
-	if len(args) != 1 {
-		fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "usage: review-bot validate-url <url>")
-		fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "")
-		fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Resolves <url> and verifies all resolved IPs are publicly routable.")
-		fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Exit 0=safe, 1=blocked, 2=error")
-		return 2
-	}
-	rawURL := args[0]
-
-	if err := validateURL(rawURL); err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: %v\n", err)
-		var ve *validateError
-		if isValidateError(err, &ve) {
-			return ve.code
-		}
-		return 2
-	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(outWriter, "OK: %s is safe\n", rawURL)
-	return 0
-}
-
-// validateError carries an exit code alongside a message.
-type validateError struct {
-	code    int
-	message string
-}
-
-func (e *validateError) Error() string { return e.message }
-
-// isValidateError checks if err is or wraps a *validateError and sets out.
-// Uses errors.As so that wrapped *validateError values (e.g. from fmt.Errorf("...: %w", &validateError{...}))
-// are also detected, making the function robust against future wrapping.
-func isValidateError(err error, out **validateError) bool {
-	if err == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return errors.As(err, out)
-}
-
-// validateURL checks that rawURL is safe for use as a Gitea server URL:
-//   - Must be https:// (not http://)
-//   - Must have no user-info (user:pass@host)
-//   - Must resolve to at least one IP, all of which are publicly routable
-func validateURL(rawURL string) error {
-	parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return &validateError{code: 2, message: fmt.Sprintf("malformed URL %q: %v", rawURL, err)}
-	}
-
-	// Scheme check: only https is permitted.
-	if !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "https") {
-		return &validateError{
-			code:    2,
-			message: fmt.Sprintf("URL scheme must be https (got %q)", parsed.Scheme),
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Reject user-info (user:password@host) to prevent credential embedding.
-	if parsed.User != nil {
-		return &validateError{
-			code:    2,
-			message: "URL must not contain user-info (user:password@host)",
-		}
-	}
-
-	host := parsed.Hostname()
-	if host == "" {
-		return &validateError{code: 2, message: fmt.Sprintf("URL has no host: %q", rawURL)}
-	}
-
-	// Resolve the hostname with a short timeout.
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
-	if err != nil {
-		return &validateError{
-			code:    2,
-			message: fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup failed for %q: %v", host, err),
-		}
-	}
-	if len(addrs) == 0 {
-		return &validateError{
-			code:    2,
-			message: fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup returned no addresses for %q", host),
-		}
-	}
-
-	for _, a := range addrs {
-		if gitea.IsBlockedIP(a.IP) {
-			return &validateError{
-				code:    1,
-				message: fmt.Sprintf("blocked: %q resolves to private/reserved IP %s", host, a.IP),
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}

cmd/review-bot/validateurl_test.go

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-package main
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestRunValidateURL_Usage(t *testing.T) {
-	var errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	origErr := errWriter
-	errWriter = &errBuf
-	defer func() { errWriter = origErr }()
-
-	code := runValidateURL(nil)
-	if code != 2 {
-		t.Errorf("expected exit code 2 for no args, got %d", code)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), "usage") {
-		t.Errorf("expected usage in stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
-	}
-
-	errBuf.Reset()
-	code = runValidateURL([]string{"arg1", "arg2"})
-	if code != 2 {
-		t.Errorf("expected exit code 2 for too many args, got %d", code)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidateURL_MalformedURL(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name    string
-		url     string
-		wantMsg string
-	}{
-		{"empty", "", "must be https"},
-		{"http scheme", "http://example.com/", "must be https"},
-		{"ftp scheme", "ftp://example.com/", "must be https"},
-		{"no scheme", "example.com", "must be https"},
-		{"user info", "https://user:pass@example.com/", "user-info"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateURL(tc.url)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Errorf("expected error for URL %q, got nil", tc.url)
-				return
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantMsg) {
-				t.Errorf("error %q does not contain %q", err.Error(), tc.wantMsg)
-			}
-			var ve *validateError
-			if !isValidateError(err, &ve) {
-				t.Fatalf("expected *validateError, got %T", err)
-			}
-			if ve.code != 2 {
-				t.Errorf("expected code 2, got %d", ve.code)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidateURL_BlockedPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
-	// localhost always resolves to 127.0.0.1 (loopback).
-	err := validateURL("https://localhost/")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Skip("localhost did not resolve (network unavailable in test environment)")
-	}
-	var ve *validateError
-	if !isValidateError(err, &ve) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected *validateError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-	if ve.code != 1 && ve.code != 2 {
-		t.Errorf("expected code 1 (blocked) or 2 (dns fail), got %d: %s", ve.code, ve.message)
-	}
-	// If it resolved (code 1), the message must say "blocked".
-	if ve.code == 1 && !strings.Contains(ve.message, "blocked") {
-		t.Errorf("expected 'blocked' in message, got %q", ve.message)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidateURL_ExitCodes(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name     string
-		url      string
-		wantCode int
-	}{
-		{"http scheme", "http://example.com/", 2},
-		{"no scheme", "example.com", 2},
-		{"user info", "https://admin:secret@example.com/", 2},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateURL(tc.url)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected error for %q", tc.url)
-			}
-			var ve *validateError
-			if !isValidateError(err, &ve) {
-				t.Fatalf("expected *validateError, got %T", err)
-			}
-			if ve.code != tc.wantCode {
-				t.Errorf("code = %d, want %d (url=%q, msg=%s)", ve.code, tc.wantCode, tc.url, ve.message)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunValidateURL_WithCapture(t *testing.T) {
-	var outBuf, errBuf bytes.Buffer
-	origOut, origErr := outWriter, errWriter
-	outWriter = &outBuf
-	errWriter = &errBuf
-	defer func() {
-		outWriter = origOut
-		errWriter = origErr
-	}()
-
-	// http:// scheme should fail with code 2.
-	code := runValidateURL([]string{"http://example.com/"})
-	if code != 2 {
-		t.Errorf("expected code 2 for http:// URL, got %d", code)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), "must be https") {
-		t.Errorf("expected error about https in stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
-	}
-}

gitea/client.go

@@ -106,113 +106,34 @@ func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// safeDialContext is the default DialContext for NewClient.
-// It resolves the hostname and checks every returned IP against the blocked
-// CIDR list before establishing a connection. This prevents SSRF attacks
-// where user-supplied URLs resolve to internal/private addresses.
-//
-// After validating all IPs, we dial the first resolved IP directly to avoid
-// a second DNS lookup (which could return a different IP in a DNS rebinding
-// attack). This narrows — but does not fully eliminate — the DNS rebinding
-// window to the time between LookupIPAddr and DialContext.
-//
-// If the host is already an IP literal, LookupIPAddr returns it directly
-// (no DNS query issued), so IP literals like https://127.0.0.1/ are blocked.
-func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: invalid address %q: %w", addr, err)
-	}
-	addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: DNS lookup %q: %w", host, err)
-	}
-	if len(addrs) == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: no addresses returned for %q", host)
-	}
-	for _, a := range addrs {
-		if IsBlockedIP(a.IP) {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: blocked: %q resolves to private/reserved IP %s", host, a.IP)
-		}
-	}
-	// Try each resolved IP in order, returning the first successful connection.
-	// Fallback is important when a hostname resolves to multiple IPs and the first
-	// is temporarily unreachable. All IPs were already validated above, so dialing
-	// any of them is safe.
-	//
-	// Timeout: 10s per the design (PLAN.md); the outer http.Client has a 30s
-	// total timeout, but the per-dial timeout ensures a slow TCP connect on one IP
-	// doesn't consume the budget needed to try others.
-	d := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
-	var lastErr error
-	for _, a := range addrs {
-		conn, err := d.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(a.IP.String(), port))
-		if err == nil {
-			return conn, nil
-		}
-		lastErr = err
-	}
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: all %d addresses for %q failed, last error: %w", len(addrs), host, lastErr)
-}
-
-// newSafeHTTPClient returns an *http.Client with the SSRF-blocking safeDialContext
-// transport and the cross-host redirect rejection policy.
-//
-// We clone http.DefaultTransport to preserve its production-ready defaults
-// (ProxyFromEnvironment, TLSHandshakeTimeout, IdleConnTimeout, connection
-// pooling, HTTP/2 support) and override only DialContext with safeDialContext.
-func newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client {
-	transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
-	transport.DialContext = safeDialContext
-	return &http.Client{
-		Timeout:       30 * time.Second,
-		Transport:     transport,
-		CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
-	}
-}
-
 // NewClient creates a new Gitea API client.
-//
-// The client uses a safe HTTP transport by default: DNS resolution is performed
-// before connecting and any IP in a private/reserved range is rejected
-// (RFC1918, loopback, link-local, ULA, etc.). Cross-host and HTTPS→HTTP
-// redirects are also rejected.
-//
-// For tests that use httptest.NewServer (which listens on 127.0.0.1), call
-// WithUnsafeDialer() to bypass the IP check.
 func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
 	return &Client{
 		baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
 		token:   token,
-		http:    newSafeHTTPClient(),
+		http: &http.Client{
+			Timeout:       30 * time.Second,
+			CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
+		},
 	}
 }
 
-// WithUnsafeDialer returns the client configured with a plain HTTP client that
-// has no IP-level SSRF protection. It preserves the redirect-rejection policy.
-//
-// This MUST only be used in tests. Production code must never call this method.
-func (c *Client) WithUnsafeDialer() *Client {
-	c.http = &http.Client{
-		Timeout:       30 * time.Second,
-		CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
-	}
-	return c
-}
-
 // SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
 // This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
 // called before any goroutines issue requests.
 //
-// Passing nil restores the default safe client (30s timeout, IP-blocking
-// safeDialContext, and redirect-rejecting CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
+// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
+// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
 //
 // Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
 // CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
 // redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
 func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
 	if hc == nil {
-		hc = newSafeHTTPClient()
+		hc = &http.Client{
+			Timeout:       30 * time.Second,
+			CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
+		}
 	}
 	c.http = hc
 }

gitea/client_test.go

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	got, err := client.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequestDiff(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	got, err := client.GetPullRequestDiff(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func TestGetCommitStatuses(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	got, err := client.GetCommitStatuses(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "abc123")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func TestPostReview(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	review, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 3, "APPROVED", "LGTM", "abc123def", nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequest_Non200(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 999)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 404, got nil")
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequest_BadJSON(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for bad JSON, got nil")
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func TestPostReview_Non200(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "test", "", nil)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 403, got nil")
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ func TestPostReview_EmptyCommitID_OmittedFromPayload(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "ok", "", nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ func TestGetFileContent(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	got, err := client.GetFileContent(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "CONVENTIONS.md")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequestFiles(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	files, err := client.GetPullRequestFiles(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ func TestGetFileContentRef(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	content, err := client.GetFileContentRef(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "main.go", "feature-branch")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ func TestListContents(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "docs")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ func TestListContents_DotPath(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", ".")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ func TestListContents_FilePath(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_File(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	files, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ func TestListReviews(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	reviews, err := client.ListReviews(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ func TestListReviews_Pagination(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	reviews, err := client.ListReviews(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ func TestDeleteReview(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.DeleteReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, 10)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ func TestDeleteReview_Forbidden(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.DeleteReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, 10)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 403, got nil")
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ func TestEditComment(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.EditComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 42, "updated body")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("EditComment() error = %v", err)
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ func TestEditComment_Forbidden(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.EditComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 42, "new body")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 403 response")
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ func TestGetTimelineReviewCommentID(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	id, err := client.GetTimelineReviewCommentID(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, "<!-- review-bot:sonnet -->")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GetTimelineReviewCommentID() error = %v", err)
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ func TestGetTimelineReviewCommentID_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.GetTimelineReviewCommentID(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, "<!-- review-bot:sonnet -->")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error when sentinel not found")
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_404FallsBackToFile(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	files, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("expected fallback to file on 404, got error: %v", err)
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_500Propagates(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "somepath")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error to propagate for 500, got nil")
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_403Propagates(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "private/stuff")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error to propagate for 403, got nil")
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ func TestGetAuthenticatedUser(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	login, err := client.GetAuthenticatedUser(context.Background())
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("GetAuthenticatedUser() error = %v", err)
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ func TestRequestReviewer(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.RequestReviewer(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 7, "bot-user")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("RequestReviewer() error = %v", err)
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ func TestRequestReviewer_204(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.RequestReviewer(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "user")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("RequestReviewer() should accept 204, got error = %v", err)
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ func TestRequestReviewer_Error(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.RequestReviewer(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "user")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 403 response")
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ func TestListReviewComments(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	comments, err := client.ListReviewComments(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, 42)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ListReviewComments() error = %v", err)
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ func TestResolveComment(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.ResolveComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 99)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("ResolveComment() error = %v", err)
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ func TestResolveComment_Error(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	err := client.ResolveComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 99)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 404 response")
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ func TestDoGet_RetriesOn500(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	// Use short backoff for fast tests
 	client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
 
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ func TestDoGet_FailsAfterMaxRetries(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	// Use short backoff for fast tests
 	client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
 
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ func TestDoGet_NoRetryOn4xx(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for 403")
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ func TestDoGet_RespectsContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	// Use longer backoff to give us time to cancel during the wait
 	client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{100 * time.Millisecond, 100 * time.Millisecond}
 
@@ -1285,137 +1285,3 @@ func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
 	}
 }
-
-// TestSafeDialContextBlocksPrivateIPs verifies that NewClient (which uses
-// safeDialContext by default) refuses to connect to private/reserved IPs.
-func TestSafeDialContextBlocksPrivateIPs(t *testing.T) {
-	// These servers listen on 127.0.0.1, so the safe dialer will block them.
-	// We use NewClient (NOT NewTestClient) to exercise the real safe dialer.
-	privateURLs := []struct {
-		name string
-		url  string
-	}{
-		{"loopback localhost", "http://localhost/"},
-		{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "http://127.0.0.1/"},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range privateURLs {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			c := NewClient(tc.url, "token")
-			_, err := c.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Errorf("expected error connecting to %s, got nil", tc.url)
-			}
-			// Error must mention SSRF/blocked, not a random network error.
-			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "blocked") &&
-				!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") &&
-				!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "loopback") &&
-				!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "reserved") {
-				t.Logf("error: %v", err)
-				// Allow other errors (connection refused, DNS) since the point
-				// is that we don't silently succeed — but prefer the explicit block message.
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestWithUnsafeDialerAllowsLocalhost verifies that WithUnsafeDialer bypasses
-// the IP check, allowing tests to connect to httptest.Server (127.0.0.1).
-func TestWithUnsafeDialerAllowsLocalhost(t *testing.T) {
-	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-		w.Write([]byte(`{"title":"test","body":"","head":{"sha":"abc","ref":"main"}}`))
-	}))
-	defer server.Close()
-
-	// WithUnsafeDialer should allow connecting to 127.0.0.1.
-	c := NewClient(server.URL, "token").WithUnsafeDialer()
-	pr, err := c.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error with unsafe dialer: %v", err)
-	}
-	if pr.Title != "test" {
-		t.Errorf("expected title 'test', got %q", pr.Title)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestNewClient_HasSafeTransport verifies that NewClient installs the
-// SSRF-blocking transport (i.e. Transport is not nil and DialContext is set).
-func TestNewClient_HasSafeTransport(t *testing.T) {
-	c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
-	if c.http.Transport == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected Transport to be set on NewClient (safe dialer)")
-	}
-	transport, ok := c.http.Transport.(*http.Transport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected *http.Transport, got %T", c.http.Transport)
-	}
-	if transport.DialContext == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected DialContext to be set on transport (safe dialer)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresSafeTransport verifies that SetHTTPClient(nil)
-// restores the safe transport (not just any client).
-func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresSafeTransport(t *testing.T) {
-	c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
-	c.SetHTTPClient(&http.Client{}) // replace with plain client
-	c.SetHTTPClient(nil)            // restore
-	transport, ok := c.http.Transport.(*http.Transport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected *http.Transport after SetHTTPClient(nil), got %T", c.http.Transport)
-	}
-	if transport.DialContext == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected DialContext to be restored after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestNewSafeHTTPClient_PreservesDefaultTransportSettings verifies that
-// newSafeHTTPClient clones http.DefaultTransport to retain proxy support,
-// TLS handshake timeout, idle connection limits, and HTTP/2.
-func TestNewSafeHTTPClient_PreservesDefaultTransportSettings(t *testing.T) {
-	c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
-	transport, ok := c.http.Transport.(*http.Transport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected *http.Transport, got %T", c.http.Transport)
-	}
-
-	defaults := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
-
-	// TLSHandshakeTimeout must be inherited (non-zero), not the zero value
-	// that a bare &http.Transport{} would have.
-	if transport.TLSHandshakeTimeout == 0 {
-		t.Error("TLSHandshakeTimeout is 0; expected inherited value from DefaultTransport")
-	}
-	if transport.TLSHandshakeTimeout != defaults.TLSHandshakeTimeout {
-		t.Errorf("TLSHandshakeTimeout = %v, want %v", transport.TLSHandshakeTimeout, defaults.TLSHandshakeTimeout)
-	}
-
-	// IdleConnTimeout must be inherited.
-	if transport.IdleConnTimeout == 0 {
-		t.Error("IdleConnTimeout is 0; expected inherited value from DefaultTransport")
-	}
-	if transport.IdleConnTimeout != defaults.IdleConnTimeout {
-		t.Errorf("IdleConnTimeout = %v, want %v", transport.IdleConnTimeout, defaults.IdleConnTimeout)
-	}
-
-	// MaxIdleConns must be inherited.
-	if transport.MaxIdleConns == 0 {
-		t.Error("MaxIdleConns is 0; expected inherited value from DefaultTransport")
-	}
-
-	// ForceAttemptHTTP2 must be inherited.
-	if !transport.ForceAttemptHTTP2 {
-		t.Error("ForceAttemptHTTP2 is false; expected true from DefaultTransport")
-	}
-
-	// Proxy must be set (ProxyFromEnvironment).
-	if transport.Proxy == nil {
-		t.Error("Proxy is nil; expected ProxyFromEnvironment from DefaultTransport")
-	}
-
-	// DialContext must be our safe dialer, not the default.
-	if transport.DialContext == nil {
-		t.Error("DialContext is nil; expected safeDialContext")
-	}
-}

gitea/diff_size_test.go

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequestDiff_SizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
 			}))
 			defer server.Close()
 
-			client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+			client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 			client.MaxDiffSize = tt.maxDiffSize
 			client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{}
 

gitea/export_test.go

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-// Package gitea — export_test.go exposes test helpers to test files in this
-// package. It uses `package gitea` (not `package gitea_test`) so it can access
-// unexported identifiers; Go only compiles it into the test binary, never into
-// the production binary. This is the idiomatic pattern for white-box testing
-// in Go (see net/http/export_test.go in the stdlib for the same approach).
-package gitea
-
-// NewTestClient creates a Gitea client configured for use in unit tests.
-// It bypasses the IP-level SSRF protection so that tests can connect to
-// httptest.Server instances (which listen on 127.0.0.1).
-//
-// Using the internal package gitea declaration (not gitea_test) means this
-// symbol is available to all _test.go files in this package. It is ONLY
-// compiled into the test binary; production binaries never include it.
-// Production code must use NewClient, which enables the safe dialer.
-func NewTestClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
-	return NewClient(baseURL, token).WithUnsafeDialer()
-}

gitea/ipcheck.go

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-// Package gitea provides a client for the Gitea API.
-// ipcheck.go implements IP-level SSRF protection by checking resolved addresses
-// against known blocked CIDR ranges (RFC1918, loopback, link-local, etc.).
-package gitea
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-)
-
-// blockedCIDRStrings is the canonical list of CIDR strings that should never
-// be contacted by review-bot. See IsBlockedIP for the full list of covered
-// address families.
-//
-// These are hard-coded literals: any parse failure is a programming error.
-// Validity is verified by TestBlockedCIDRsValid in ipcheck_test.go.
-var blockedCIDRStrings = []string{
-	// IPv4 loopback
-	"127.0.0.0/8",
-	// IPv4 unspecified / "this network"
-	"0.0.0.0/8",
-	// RFC1918 private ranges
-	"10.0.0.0/8",
-	"172.16.0.0/12",
-	"192.168.0.0/16",
-	// IPv4 link-local (APIPA, also used by AWS instance metadata 169.254.169.254)
-	"169.254.0.0/16",
-	// IPv4 shared address space (RFC6598, carrier-grade NAT)
-	"100.64.0.0/10",
-	// IPv4 multicast
-	"224.0.0.0/4",
-	// IPv4 reserved / broadcast
-	"240.0.0.0/4",
-	// IPv6 loopback
-	"::1/128",
-	// IPv6 unspecified
-	"::/128",
-	// IPv6 link-local
-	"fe80::/10",
-	// IPv6 unique local (ULA) — RFC4193
-	"fc00::/7",
-	// IPv6 multicast
-	"ff00::/8",
-}
-
-// blockedCIDRs is the parsed form of blockedCIDRStrings.
-// Any entry that fails to parse is recorded in blockedCIDRParseErrors instead
-// of panicking; tests verify this slice is always empty via TestBlockedCIDRsValid.
-var (
-	blockedCIDRs           []*net.IPNet
-	blockedCIDRParseErrors []string
-)
-
-func init() {
-	blockedCIDRs = make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(blockedCIDRStrings))
-	for _, r := range blockedCIDRStrings {
-		_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(r)
-		if err != nil {
-			// Record the error rather than panicking; TestBlockedCIDRsValid
-			// will catch this during tests, and the CI build will fail.
-			blockedCIDRParseErrors = append(blockedCIDRParseErrors,
-				fmt.Sprintf("ipcheck: invalid built-in CIDR %q: %v", r, err))
-			continue
-		}
-		blockedCIDRs = append(blockedCIDRs, cidr)
-	}
-}
-
-// IsBlockedIP reports whether ip is in a blocked address range.
-// It is exported for use by the validate-url subcommand and tests outside
-// this package.
-//
-// IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. ::ffff:192.168.1.1) are normalized to their
-// IPv4 form before checking so that IPv4 CIDRs catch them.
-//
-// Based on:
-//   - RFC1918 private ranges
-//   - RFC5735 / RFC4193 special-use IPv4/IPv6 ranges
-//   - RFC4291 IPv6 link-local / loopback
-func IsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
-	// Normalize IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x) to plain IPv4.
-	if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil {
-		ip = v4
-	}
-	for _, cidr := range blockedCIDRs {
-		if cidr.Contains(ip) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}

gitea/ipcheck_test.go

@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-package gitea
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestIsBlockedIP(t *testing.T) {
-	blocked := []struct {
-		name string
-		ip   string
-	}{
-		// IPv4 loopback
-		{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"},
-		{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2"},
-		{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255"},
-		// IPv4 unspecified
-		{"unspecified 0.0.0.0", "0.0.0.0"},
-		{"unspecified 0.1.2.3", "0.1.2.3"},
-		// RFC1918
-		{"RFC1918 10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1"},
-		{"RFC1918 10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255"},
-		{"RFC1918 172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1"},
-		{"RFC1918 172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255"},
-		{"RFC1918 192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1"},
-		{"RFC1918 192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255"},
-		// Link-local (APIPA / AWS metadata)
-		{"link-local 169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1"},
-		{"link-local 169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254"},
-		// Shared address space (carrier-grade NAT)
-		{"CGN 100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.1"},
-		{"CGN 100.127.255.255", "100.127.255.255"},
-		// Multicast
-		{"multicast 224.0.0.1", "224.0.0.1"},
-		{"multicast 239.255.255.255", "239.255.255.255"},
-		// Reserved
-		{"reserved 240.0.0.1", "240.0.0.1"},
-		{"broadcast 255.255.255.255", "255.255.255.255"},
-		// IPv6 loopback
-		{"IPv6 loopback ::1", "::1"},
-		// IPv6 unspecified
-		{"IPv6 unspecified ::", "::"},
-		// IPv6 link-local
-		{"IPv6 link-local fe80::1", "fe80::1"},
-		{"IPv6 link-local fe80::dead:beef", "fe80::dead:beef"},
-		// IPv6 ULA
-		{"IPv6 ULA fc00::1", "fc00::1"},
-		{"IPv6 ULA fd00::1", "fd00::1"},
-		// IPv6 multicast
-		{"IPv6 multicast ff02::1", "ff02::1"},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range blocked {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
-			if ip == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
-			}
-			if !IsBlockedIP(ip) {
-				t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(%q) = false, want true", tc.ip)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-
-	allowed := []struct {
-		name string
-		ip   string
-	}{
-		{"public 8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8"},
-		{"public 1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1"},
-		{"public 198.51.100.1", "198.51.100.1"}, // RFC5737 TEST-NET-2 — a documentation-only range;
-					// not assigned to any real host, but intentionally left unblocked here because
-					// it has no special routing treatment (unlike RFC1918/loopback/link-local) and
-					// blocking it would require tracking every RFC5737 range without meaningful
-					// security benefit (no server should ever listen on a TEST-NET address).
-		{"public 151.101.1.1", "151.101.1.1"},        // Fastly
-		{"public IPv6 2001:4860:4860::8888", "2001:4860:4860::8888"}, // Google DNS
-		{"public IPv6 2606:4700:4700::1111", "2606:4700:4700::1111"}, // Cloudflare DNS
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range allowed {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
-			if ip == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
-			}
-			if IsBlockedIP(ip) {
-				t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(%q) = true, want false", tc.ip)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestIsBlockedIPv6MappedIPv4(t *testing.T) {
-	// ::ffff:192.168.1.1 is an IPv6-mapped IPv4 address — should be blocked as RFC1918.
-	// Construct it manually as a 16-byte IP.
-	mapped := net.IP{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xff, 192, 168, 1, 1}
-	if !IsBlockedIP(mapped) {
-		t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(::ffff:192.168.1.1) = false, want true (IPv6-mapped IPv4 must be normalized)")
-	}
-
-	// ::ffff:8.8.8.8 — IPv6-mapped public IP — should be allowed.
-	mappedPublic := net.IP{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xff, 8, 8, 8, 8}
-	if IsBlockedIP(mappedPublic) {
-		t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(::ffff:8.8.8.8) = true, want false")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestIsBlockedIPEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
-	// The boundary between RFC1918 and public ranges.
-	// 172.15.255.255 is NOT private (just below 172.16.0.0/12).
-	notPrivate := net.ParseIP("172.15.255.255")
-	if IsBlockedIP(notPrivate) {
-		t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(172.15.255.255) = true, want false (outside 172.16.0.0/12)")
-	}
-	// 172.32.0.0 is NOT private (just above 172.31.255.255).
-	notPrivate2 := net.ParseIP("172.32.0.0")
-	if IsBlockedIP(notPrivate2) {
-		t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(172.32.0.0) = true, want false (outside 172.16.0.0/12)")
-	}
-	// CGN: 100.63.255.255 is NOT in 100.64.0.0/10.
-	notCGN := net.ParseIP("100.63.255.255")
-	if IsBlockedIP(notCGN) {
-		t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(100.63.255.255) = true, want false (outside 100.64.0.0/10)")
-	}
-	// CGN: 100.128.0.0 is NOT in 100.64.0.0/10.
-	notCGN2 := net.ParseIP("100.128.0.0")
-	if IsBlockedIP(notCGN2) {
-		t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(100.128.0.0) = true, want false (outside 100.64.0.0/10)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestBlockedCIDRsValid verifies that all entries in blockedCIDRStrings parse
-// successfully. This catches programming errors in the CIDR list without
-// requiring a startup panic. The init() function records parse failures in
-// blockedCIDRParseErrors rather than panicking; this test makes those failures
-// visible as test failures during CI.
-func TestBlockedCIDRsValid(t *testing.T) {
-	if len(blockedCIDRParseErrors) > 0 {
-		for _, msg := range blockedCIDRParseErrors {
-			t.Errorf("CIDR parse error: %s", msg)
-		}
-	}
-}

gitea/post_review_comments_test.go

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func TestPostReview_WithComments(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	comments := []ReviewComment{
 		{Path: "main.go", NewPosition: 42, Body: "[MAJOR] Something bad"},
 		{Path: "util.go", NewPosition: 10, Body: "[MINOR] Style issue"},
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func TestPostReview_NilComments(t *testing.T) {
 	}))
 	defer server.Close()
 
-	client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
+	client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
 	_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "all good", "", nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)