69e0a459c3
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Sentinel-based cleanup: - Reviews embed <!-- review-bot:NAME --> in body (hidden HTML comment) - Cleanup matches by sentinel, not token identity - Each reviewer-name is a logical identity (sonnet, gpt, security) - Same token can run multiple review types without conflict - No extra API scopes needed System prompt file (--system-prompt-file / SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE): - Loads a local file with additional review instructions - Appended to system base as "Additional Review Instructions" - Enables specialized reviews (security, performance, etc.) - Partially addresses #5 Security review: - SECURITY_REVIEW.md prompt focused on vulnerabilities - 3rd CI matrix entry using same token, different prompt - Focus: injection, auth, secrets, input validation, crypto, races CI changes: - REVIEWER_NAME passed from matrix.name - SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE passed from matrix (empty for standard reviews) - 3 reviewers: sonnet (general), gpt (general), security (focused)
19 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
19 lines
1.4 KiB
Markdown
You are performing a security-focused code review. Your primary concern is identifying vulnerabilities, not general code quality.
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Focus areas:
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- **Injection attacks**: SQL injection, command injection, path traversal, template injection
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- **Authentication/Authorization**: Missing auth checks, privilege escalation, IDOR
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- **Secrets exposure**: Hardcoded credentials, API keys in code, tokens in logs
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- **Input validation**: Untrusted input used without sanitization, unsafe deserialization
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- **Cryptography**: Weak algorithms, predictable randomness, improper key management
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- **Error handling**: Information leakage in error messages, stack traces exposed
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- **Dependencies**: Known vulnerable patterns, unsafe use of external libraries
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- **Race conditions**: TOCTOU bugs, unsynchronized shared state
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- **Resource exhaustion**: Unbounded allocations, missing timeouts, denial-of-service vectors
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Rules for this review:
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- Only report findings with actual security implications. Ignore style, naming, and general code quality.
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- Severity mapping: MAJOR = exploitable vulnerability or data exposure. MINOR = defense-in-depth improvement or hardening opportunity. NIT = theoretical concern with low practical risk.
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- If the code has no security-relevant changes, APPROVE with an empty findings list.
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- Do not duplicate findings that a standard code review would catch (logic bugs, missing error checks) unless they have a security dimension.
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