feat: reject cross-host redirects and HTTPS→HTTP downgrades (#95) #111

Merged
aweiker merged 2 commits from review-bot-issue-95 into main 2026-05-13 16:58:49 +00:00
4 changed files with 301 additions and 5 deletions
+47 -2
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@@ -78,18 +78,63 @@ type Client struct {
MaxDiffSize int64
Review

[MINOR] defaultCheckRedirect duplicates identical logic in github/client.go. Consider consolidating shared redirect policy in an internal package to avoid duplication and keep behavior consistent (see internal/ packages pattern).

**[MINOR]** defaultCheckRedirect duplicates identical logic in github/client.go. Consider consolidating shared redirect policy in an internal package to avoid duplication and keep behavior consistent (see internal/ packages pattern).
Review

[NIT] defaultCheckRedirect compares URL schemes and hosts with case-sensitive equality. While practical, schemes and hosts are case-insensitive by spec; using strings.EqualFold for scheme/host comparisons would make this more robust in edge cases.

**[NIT]** defaultCheckRedirect compares URL schemes and hosts with case-sensitive equality. While practical, schemes and hosts are case-insensitive by spec; using strings.EqualFold for scheme/host comparisons would make this more robust in edge cases.
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in github/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
Review

[NIT] The duplication comment says Changes here must be mirrored there but there is no enforcement mechanism (no shared test, no lint rule, no CI check). This is a maintenance risk. A follow-up to extract this into a shared internal/ package would eliminate the drift risk entirely. The PR description acknowledges this is intentional due to package separation, but the internal/ pattern exists precisely for this use case.

**[NIT]** The duplication comment says `Changes here must be mirrored there` but there is no enforcement mechanism (no shared test, no lint rule, no CI check). This is a maintenance risk. A follow-up to extract this into a shared `internal/` package would eliminate the drift risk entirely. The PR description acknowledges this is intentional due to package separation, but the `internal/` pattern exists precisely for this use case.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
Review

[MINOR] The defaultCheckRedirect function is duplicated verbatim between gitea/client.go and github/client.go. Since these are separate packages this is unavoidable without introducing a shared internal package, but it means any future change must be made in both places. A comment noting the duplication and pointing to the sibling package would help future maintainers. Alternatively, an internal/httppolicy package could house the shared function — though that adds structural complexity for a single function.

**[MINOR]** The `defaultCheckRedirect` function is duplicated verbatim between `gitea/client.go` and `github/client.go`. Since these are separate packages this is unavoidable without introducing a shared internal package, but it means any future change must be made in both places. A comment noting the duplication and pointing to the sibling package would help future maintainers. Alternatively, an `internal/httppolicy` package could house the shared function — though that adds structural complexity for a single function.
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
Review

[NIT] The comment 'Guard: net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 but defend against zero-length to avoid panic on index out of range' is accurate but slightly misleading: net/http does guarantee len(via) >= 1 when CheckRedirect is called during an actual redirect, but the test TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed calls the function directly with nil. The guard is appropriate for testability and defensive coding; the comment could be tightened to say 'Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers'.

**[NIT]** The comment 'Guard: net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 but defend against zero-length to avoid panic on index out of range' is accurate but slightly misleading: net/http does guarantee `len(via) >= 1` when `CheckRedirect` is called during an actual redirect, but the test `TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed` calls the function directly with `nil`. The guard is appropriate for testability and defensive coding; the comment could be tightened to say 'Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers'.
Review

[MINOR] Scheme comparison is case-sensitive (prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http"). If a server returns a Location with an uppercase or mixed-case scheme (e.g., "HTTP"), this may bypass the downgrade check depending on parsing behavior. Use strings.EqualFold or normalize schemes to lowercase before comparison.

**[MINOR]** Scheme comparison is case-sensitive (prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http"). If a server returns a Location with an uppercase or mixed-case scheme (e.g., "HTTP"), this may bypass the downgrade check depending on parsing behavior. Use strings.EqualFold or normalize schemes to lowercase before comparison.
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
Review

[NIT] The defaultCheckRedirect function uses fmt.Errorf for all error paths, but none of these errors wrap an underlying cause (no %w). Per the error-handling patterns, fmt.Errorf without %w is fine here since these are newly constructed errors with no upstream cause to preserve. This is correct — just noting that errors.New could be used instead for the static messages (e.g. stopped after 10 redirects) since there's no format interpolation needed there, though fmt.Errorf is not wrong.

**[NIT]** The `defaultCheckRedirect` function uses `fmt.Errorf` for all error paths, but none of these errors wrap an underlying cause (no `%w`). Per the error-handling patterns, `fmt.Errorf` without `%w` is fine here since these are newly constructed errors with no upstream cause to preserve. This is correct — just noting that `errors.New` could be used instead for the static messages (e.g. `stopped after 10 redirects`) since there's no format interpolation needed there, though `fmt.Errorf` is not wrong.
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
Review

[NIT] Error messages include a Unicode arrow ("→"). While harmless, consider using ASCII ("->") for environments that may not render Unicode consistently in logs.

**[NIT]** Error messages include a Unicode arrow ("→"). While harmless, consider using ASCII ("->") for environments that may not render Unicode consistently in logs.
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// NewClient creates a new Gitea API client.
func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
http: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
http: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for testing to inject mock transports.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.http = hc
}
+102
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
@@ -1159,3 +1160,104 @@ func TestSanitizeErrorForLog(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "cdn.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "token abc" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.http == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil http client after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.http.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.http.Timeout)
}
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
+48 -3
View File
@@ -107,6 +107,34 @@ type Client struct {
now func() time.Time
Review

[MINOR] defaultCheckRedirect duplicates identical logic in gitea/client.go. A shared helper under internal/ could reduce duplication and ensure consistent policy across clients.

**[MINOR]** defaultCheckRedirect duplicates identical logic in gitea/client.go. A shared helper under internal/ could reduce duplication and ensure consistent policy across clients.
Review

[NIT] defaultCheckRedirect uses case-sensitive comparisons for scheme and host. Consider strings.EqualFold to be resilient to unusual case in redirect URLs.

**[NIT]** defaultCheckRedirect uses case-sensitive comparisons for scheme and host. Consider strings.EqualFold to be resilient to unusual case in redirect URLs.
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in gitea/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
security-review-bot marked this conversation as resolved
Review

[MINOR] Scheme comparison is case-sensitive (prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http"). A mixed/uppercase scheme in a redirect could bypass the downgrade check. Use strings.EqualFold or normalize schemes to lowercase before comparison.

**[MINOR]** Scheme comparison is case-sensitive (prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http"). A mixed/uppercase scheme in a redirect could bypass the downgrade check. Use strings.EqualFold or normalize schemes to lowercase before comparison.
return nil
Review

[NIT] Error messages use a Unicode arrow ("→"). Consider ASCII arrows ("->") to maximize compatibility with plain-text log consumers.

**[NIT]** Error messages use a Unicode arrow ("→"). Consider ASCII arrows ("->") to maximize compatibility with plain-text log consumers.
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// NewClient creates a new GitHub API client.
// If baseURL is empty, it defaults to https://api.github.com.
// For GitHub Enterprise, pass the API base URL (e.g. https://github.concur.com/api/v3).
@@ -117,14 +145,31 @@ func NewClient(token, baseURL string) *Client {
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
httpClient: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
now: time.Now,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
now: time.Now,
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for testing to inject mock transports.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.httpClient = hc
}
+104
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
@@ -407,3 +409,105 @@ func TestAPIError_Error_NewlineSanitized(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("secret-token", "https://api.github.com")
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "objects.githubusercontent.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Auth should be preserved on same-host redirect
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "Bearer token" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("token", "https://api.github.com")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.httpClient == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil httpClient after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.httpClient.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.httpClient.Timeout)
}
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}