Compare commits

...

18 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
claw ab2a6c8aef Address review feedback on PR #113
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 22s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 34s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m33s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m47s
- Fix AllowInsecureHTTP doc comment: say '_test.go file in the same
  package' instead of 'export_test.go' (MINOR #1)
- Remove dead u.Fragment = "" from redactURL: HTTP requests never
  carry fragments over the wire per RFC 7230 §5.1 (MINOR #2)
- Use 127.0.0.1:1 in scheme-rejection tests to make intent clearer
  that no network call should occur (NIT #3)
2026-05-13 13:04:23 -07:00
claw 6b7f3f6924 fix: address NIT findings from sonnet review (#113)
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 1s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 35s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m32s
- Fix AllowInsecureHTTP doc comment: 'silently ignored' -> 'ignored' (it logs a warning)
- Remove unnecessary nil guard in redactURL (assigning nil to nil is a no-op)
- Add clarifying comment about acceptable double URL parse in doRequest
2026-05-13 12:48:02 -07:00
claw 4c032a3b53 fix: move AllowInsecureHTTPForTest to export_test.go, fix gofmt alignment
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 1s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 30s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m45s
2026-05-13 11:58:25 -07:00
claw 64c9d551ba fix: address review feedback — restore timer.Stop() and fix test spacing
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 24s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 32s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m8s
- Restore timer.Stop() no-op in case <-timer.C for symmetry with ctx.Done
- Add missing blank line between TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsHTTP and
  TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsUppercaseHTTP
- Remove double blank line before TestAllowInsecureHTTP_WithoutEnvVar_Rejected

Resolves review comments from sonnet-review-bot on PR #113.
2026-05-13 11:44:28 -07:00
claw db7b7e66bf fix: use case-insensitive HTTP scheme check and redact userinfo
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 30s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 56s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m53s
Address review feedback on PR #113:

- MAJOR (both reviews): Replace strings.HasPrefix(reqURL, "http://")
  with url.Parse + strings.EqualFold for case-insensitive scheme
  comparison per RFC 3986. Prevents bypass via HTTP:// or Http://.

- MINOR (security): Enhance redactURL to strip userinfo component
  (user:pass@host) in addition to query params, preventing credential
  leakage in error messages and logs.

- NIT (gpt): Remove redundant timer.Stop() after timer.C fires —
  it's a no-op and the comment was misleading.

- Add tests for uppercase/mixed-case HTTP scheme rejection and
  userinfo redaction.
2026-05-13 11:35:10 -07:00
claw 0232343126 feat(github): add safeguards against accidental AllowInsecureHTTP use in production
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 1s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 13s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 38s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m45s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m9s
Three-layer defense for the AllowInsecureHTTP client option:

1. Environment gate: AllowInsecureHTTP() requires REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1
   env var. Without it, the option is silently ignored with a slog.Warn.

2. Warning log on activation: When the env gate IS satisfied, a slog.Warn
   fires at client construction time so operators notice in production logs.

3. Test bypass: AllowInsecureHTTPForTest() skips the env gate entirely,
   keeping test code clean (no t.Setenv needed in every test).

Additionally, doRequest now rejects HTTP URLs unless allowInsecureHTTP is set
on the client, providing defense-in-depth against credential leakage.

Closes #96
2026-05-13 11:24:07 -07:00
aweiker b26514714f Merge pull request 'feat(gitea): pass commit_id explicitly in PostReview (#107)' (#112) from review-bot-issue-107 into main
CI / test (push) Successful in 18s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
Reviewed-on: #112
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 18:07:38 +00:00
claw 028d46942a fix(gitea): update PostReview doc comment to include COMMENT event value
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 16s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 25s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 53s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m4s
2026-05-13 10:41:52 -07:00
claw e59c2bc831 feat(gitea): pass commit_id explicitly in PostReview (#107)
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 18s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 25s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 42s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 57s
Add commitID parameter to gitea.Client.PostReview so the review is
anchored to the specific commit that was evaluated. The caller
(cmd/review-bot) already computes evaluatedSHA from pr.Head.Sha;
this wires it through to the Gitea API payload.

When commitID is empty, omitempty drops it from the JSON and Gitea
defaults to the current PR head (backward-compatible).

Closes #107
2026-05-13 10:29:05 -07:00
aweiker dc2e1ca5de Merge pull request 'feat: reject cross-host redirects and HTTPS→HTTP downgrades (#95)' (#111) from review-bot-issue-95 into main
CI / test (push) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
Reviewed-on: #111
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 16:58:49 +00:00
claw 7de6fdd9ec fix: address review feedback on redirect policy
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 1s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 31s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 52s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m24s
- Replace Unicode arrows (→) with ASCII (->) in error messages and
  comments for log compatibility (gpt-review NITs #19626, #19628)
- Improve guard comment to clarify it exists for testability, not
  runtime safety (sonnet-review NIT #19619)
- Add cross-reference comments noting intentional duplication between
  gitea/client.go and github/client.go (sonnet-review #19618,
  gpt-review #19625, #19627)

Pushed back on:
- internal/ package for dedup: structural overhead not warranted for
  a single ~25-line function
- strings.EqualFold for scheme: Go's url.Parse normalizes schemes to
  lowercase, making case-insensitive comparison unnecessary
2026-05-13 09:28:46 -07:00
claw 1e0959b077 feat: reject cross-host redirects and HTTPS→HTTP downgrades (#95)
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 16s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 37s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m19s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m47s
Add defaultCheckRedirect to both GitHub and Gitea clients that rejects:
- HTTPS→HTTP protocol downgrades (prevents plaintext leakage)
- Cross-host redirects entirely (prevents consuming untrusted responses)

Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects remain allowed.

Both NewClient constructors wire the policy, and SetHTTPClient(nil)
restores it. Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for
configuring their own safe redirect policy.

Closes #95
2026-05-13 08:51:36 -07:00
aweiker 67c3db70cb Merge pull request 'feat(github): support HTTP-date format in Retry-After header' (#110) from review-bot-issue-94 into main
CI / test (push) Successful in 18s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
Reviewed-on: #110
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 15:34:25 +00:00
aweiker a845ce32eb Merge pull request 'feat(gitea): harden GetPullRequestDiff against unbounded diff size' (#109) from review-bot-issue-92 into main
CI / test (push) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (push) Has been skipped
Reviewed-on: #109
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 14:01:22 +00:00
claw 9f8e9aa8d3 fix: timer leak and http field shadowing in github client
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 46s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m57s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m17s
- Add timer.Stop() to the timer.C branch to prevent timer leak on the
  normal path (previously only called in ctx.Done branch)
- Rename struct field 'http' to 'httpClient' to avoid shadowing the
  net/http import

Addresses self-review findings on PR #110.
2026-05-13 06:22:30 -07:00
claw 31a28b1dd5 address review feedback: baseURL TODO, timer-cancel test, fast retry test, doc note
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 1s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 21s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 49s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m47s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m14s
- Add TODO comment on unused baseURL field explaining its intended
  future use by higher-level exported methods
- Rewrite TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled to actually exercise the
  timer-cancel path in the retry select (goroutine cancels context
  while client is blocked in timer.C select)
- Change Retry-After: 1 to Retry-After: 0 in IntegerSeconds test
  to avoid unnecessary 1s sleep during test runs
- Add doc note on SetRetryBackoff explaining that an empty non-nil
  slice silently drops Retry-After delays
2026-05-13 06:08:51 -07:00
claw e414471a16 fix(github): address review feedback on Retry-After implementation
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 23s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 43s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m21s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m22s
- Fix data race: copy retryBackoff slice per-request to prevent
  concurrent doRequest calls from racing on shared state
- Fix parseRetryAfter: trim whitespace before parsing for robustness
- Fix parseRetryAfter: treat delta-seconds of 0 as valid per RFC 7231
- Add bounded read on success path (10 MB limit) for defense-in-depth
- Clean up TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds: remove dead
  code block and commented-out reasoning
- Fix import ordering: context before errors (goimports compliance)
2026-05-13 05:54:06 -07:00
claw 41e1d48b54 feat(github): support HTTP-date format in Retry-After header
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 18s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 39s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m35s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m18s
Implement the github package client with Retry-After header parsing that
supports both integer seconds (e.g. "Retry-After: 120") and HTTP-date
format (e.g. "Retry-After: Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT") per RFC 7231
§7.1.3.

Key design decisions:
- Use http.ParseTime which handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats
- Cap maximum retry delay at 60s (maxRetryAfter) to prevent stalling
- If HTTP-date is in the past, use delay of 0 (retry immediately)
- Inject time.Now via c.now field for deterministic testing

Closes #94
2026-05-13 05:10:52 -07:00
8 changed files with 1239 additions and 15 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func TestIntegration_PostAndCleanup(t *testing.T) {
// Post a test review
sentinel := "<!-- review-bot:integration-test -->"
testBody := "# Integration Test Review\n\nThis is a test review.\n\n" + sentinel
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, "COMMENT", testBody, nil)
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, "COMMENT", testBody, "", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PostReview: %v", err)
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ func main() {
// POST new review
slog.Info("posting review", "event", event, "pr", prNumber)
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, event, reviewBody, inlineComments)
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, event, reviewBody, evaluatedSHA, inlineComments)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to post review", "pr", prNumber, "event", event, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
+53 -4
View File
@@ -78,18 +78,63 @@ type Client struct {
MaxDiffSize int64
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in github/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// NewClient creates a new Gitea API client.
func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
http: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
http: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for testing to inject mock transports.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.http = hc
}
@@ -217,18 +262,22 @@ func (c *Client) GetFileContentRef(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath, r
}
// PostReview submits a review to a PR and returns the created review.
// event should be "APPROVED" or "REQUEST_CHANGES".
// event should be one of "APPROVED", "REQUEST_CHANGES", or "COMMENT".
// commitID anchors the review to a specific commit SHA. If empty, Gitea
// defaults to the current PR head.
// comments are optional inline comments attached to specific lines.
func (c *Client) PostReview(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int, event, body string, comments []ReviewComment) (*Review, error) {
func (c *Client) PostReview(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int, event, body, commitID string, comments []ReviewComment) (*Review, error) {
reqURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d/reviews", c.baseURL, url.PathEscape(owner), url.PathEscape(repo), number)
payload := struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
Event string `json:"event"`
CommitID string `json:"commit_id,omitempty"`
Comments []ReviewComment `json:"comments,omitempty"`
}{
Body: body,
Event: event,
CommitID: commitID,
Comments: comments,
}
+133 -7
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
@@ -116,8 +117,9 @@ func TestPostReview(t *testing.T) {
}
var payload struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
Event string `json:"event"`
Body string `json:"body"`
Event string `json:"event"`
CommitID string `json:"commit_id"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode payload: %v", err)
@@ -128,14 +130,16 @@ func TestPostReview(t *testing.T) {
if payload.Event != "APPROVED" {
t.Errorf("expected event %q, got %q", "APPROVED", payload.Event)
}
if payload.CommitID != "abc123def" {
t.Errorf("expected commit_id %q, got %q", "abc123def", payload.CommitID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"id":100,"user":{"login":"review-bot"},"state":"APPROVED","stale":false}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
review, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 3, "APPROVED", "LGTM", nil)
review, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 3, "APPROVED", "LGTM", "abc123def", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
@@ -182,12 +186,35 @@ func TestPostReview_Non200(t *testing.T) {
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "test", nil)
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "test", "", nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403, got nil")
}
}
func TestPostReview_EmptyCommitID_OmittedFromPayload(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
var raw map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode payload: %v", err)
}
if _, exists := raw["commit_id"]; exists {
t.Errorf("expected commit_id to be omitted from payload when empty, but it was present")
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"id":200,"user":{"login":"bot"},"state":"APPROVED","stale":false}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "ok", "", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestGetFileContent(t *testing.T) {
expected := "# Conventions\n- Be nice\n"
@@ -944,8 +971,6 @@ func TestDoGet_RespectsContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, expected 1 before context cancel during backoff", attempts)
}
}
// mockTransport is a test helper that returns errors for the first N calls,
// then delegates to a real server.
type mockTransport struct {
@@ -1159,3 +1184,104 @@ func TestSanitizeErrorForLog(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "cdn.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "token abc" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.http == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil http client after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.http.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.http.Timeout)
}
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ func TestPostReview_WithComments(t *testing.T) {
{Path: "util.go", NewPosition: 10, Body: "[MINOR] Style issue"},
}
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "REQUEST_CHANGES", "summary", comments)
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "REQUEST_CHANGES", "summary", "", comments)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func TestPostReview_NilComments(t *testing.T) {
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "all good", nil)
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "all good", "", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
+378
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
// Package github provides a client for the GitHub API.
// It supports pull request operations, file content retrieval,
// and review submission for both github.com and GitHub Enterprise.
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
defaultBaseURL = "https://api.github.com"
// maxRetryAttempts is the number of times doRequest will attempt a request.
maxRetryAttempts = 3
// maxRetryAfter caps the maximum delay from a Retry-After header to prevent
// a server from stalling the client indefinitely.
maxRetryAfter = 60 * time.Second
// maxErrorBodyBytes limits how much of an error response body we read
// to protect against malicious servers sending unbounded data.
maxErrorBodyBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KB
// maxResponseBodyBytes limits how much of a successful response body we read
// for defense-in-depth against servers returning excessively large payloads.
maxResponseBodyBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
)
// APIError represents an HTTP error response from the GitHub API.
// It carries the status code so callers can distinguish between
// different failure modes (e.g. 404 vs 500).
//
// The Body field stores up to 64 KiB of the raw response for programmatic
// inspection. Error() truncates to 200 bytes for safe logging, but callers
// should avoid logging or propagating Body directly in production since it may
// contain sensitive details from the upstream server.
type APIError struct {
StatusCode int
Body string
}
func (e *APIError) Error() string {
body := e.Body
if len(body) > 200 {
body = body[:200] + "...(truncated)"
}
// Sanitize newlines to prevent log injection from upstream response bodies.
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\n", " ")
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\r", " ")
return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d: %s", e.StatusCode, body)
}
// IsNotFound reports whether an error is an API 404 response.
func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound
}
return false
}
// IsUnauthorized reports whether an error is an API 401 response.
func IsUnauthorized(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized
}
return false
}
func asAPIError(err error) (*APIError, bool) {
if err == nil {
return nil, false
}
var target *APIError
if errors.As(err, &target) {
return target, true
}
return nil, false
}
// Client interacts with the GitHub API.
// A Client is safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
// SetHTTPClient and SetRetryBackoff are intended for test setup only and must
// be called before any goroutines issue requests; they have no synchronization.
type Client struct {
// TODO: baseURL is populated by NewClient but not yet consumed by doRequest/doGet.
// Higher-level exported methods (GetPullRequest, etc.) will use it to
// construct request URLs; remove this field if those methods end up
// accepting full URLs instead.
baseURL string
token string
httpClient *http.Client
// allowInsecureHTTP permits requests to HTTP (non-TLS) endpoints.
// When false, doRequest rejects URLs with an http:// scheme.
allowInsecureHTTP bool
// retryBackoff defines the delays between retry attempts for 429 responses.
// retryBackoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (after attempt i fails).
// If nil, defaults to {1s, 2s}.
retryBackoff []time.Duration
// now returns the current time. Defaults to time.Now.
// Override in tests to control HTTP-date Retry-After calculations.
now func() time.Time
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in gitea/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// ClientOption configures optional behavior of a Client.
type ClientOption func(*clientConfig)
type clientConfig struct {
allowInsecureHTTP bool
insecureIsTestBypass bool
}
// AllowInsecureHTTP permits sending credentials over plaintext HTTP connections.
// In production, this option is gated by the REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1
// environment variable. Without the env var set, the option is ignored
// and a warning is logged.
//
// For tests, use AllowInsecureHTTPForTest (defined in a _test.go file in the same package) which bypasses the env gate.
func AllowInsecureHTTP() ClientOption {
return func(cfg *clientConfig) {
cfg.allowInsecureHTTP = true
}
}
// NewClient creates a new GitHub API client.
// If baseURL is empty, it defaults to https://api.github.com.
// For GitHub Enterprise, pass the API base URL (e.g. https://github.concur.com/api/v3).
func NewClient(token, baseURL string, opts ...ClientOption) *Client {
if baseURL == "" {
baseURL = defaultBaseURL
}
var cfg clientConfig
for _, opt := range opts {
opt(&cfg)
}
if cfg.allowInsecureHTTP && !cfg.insecureIsTestBypass {
if os.Getenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE") != "1" {
slog.Warn("AllowInsecureHTTP ignored: set REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1 to enable")
cfg.allowInsecureHTTP = false
} else {
slog.Warn("AllowInsecureHTTP enabled — credentials may be sent over plaintext",
"env", "REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1")
}
}
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
allowInsecureHTTP: cfg.allowInsecureHTTP,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
now: time.Now,
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.httpClient = hc
}
// SetRetryBackoff sets the delays between retry attempts.
// This is intended for testing to speed up retry tests.
//
// Note: if an empty non-nil slice is provided, Retry-After delays parsed from
// server responses will be computed and capped but not applied (because
// attempt < len(backoff) is always false). This is acceptable for the
// test-only use case but callers should be aware of this edge case.
func (c *Client) SetRetryBackoff(backoff []time.Duration) {
c.retryBackoff = backoff
}
// parseRetryAfter parses a Retry-After header value, supporting both integer
// seconds (e.g. "120") and HTTP-date format (e.g. "Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
// as specified in RFC 7231 §7.1.3.
//
// For integer values, it returns the duration directly.
// For HTTP-date values, it computes the delay as the difference between the
// parsed time and now. If the date is in the past, it returns 0.
//
// Returns (0, false) if the value cannot be parsed as either format.
func (c *Client) parseRetryAfter(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
// Try integer seconds first (most common from GitHub).
// RFC 7231 allows delta-seconds of 0 to indicate immediate retry.
if seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err == nil && seconds >= 0 {
return time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second, true
}
// Try HTTP-date format (RFC 7231 §7.1.3).
// http.ParseTime handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats.
if retryAt, err := http.ParseTime(value); err == nil {
delay := retryAt.Sub(c.now())
if delay < 0 {
delay = 0
}
return delay, true
}
return 0, false
}
// redactURL redacts sensitive components from a URL for safe inclusion in error
// messages and log output. It removes userinfo (e.g., user:pass@) and replaces
// query parameters with a placeholder.
func redactURL(rawURL string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return "<unparseable URL>"
}
u.User = nil
if u.RawQuery != "" {
u.RawQuery = "<redacted>"
}
return u.String()
}
// doRequest performs an HTTP request with retry on 429 rate limit responses.
// It respects the Retry-After header when present, supporting both integer
// seconds and HTTP-date formats (capped at maxRetryAfter).
func (c *Client) doRequest(ctx context.Context, method, reqURL string, accept string) ([]byte, error) {
// NOTE: This parses reqURL a second time (http.NewRequestWithContext parses it
// again internally). Acceptable cost: URL parsing is cheap and threading the
// parsed *url.URL through would complicate the interface for negligible gain.
if !c.allowInsecureHTTP {
parsed, err := url.Parse(reqURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse request URL: %w", err)
}
if strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "http") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("refusing HTTP request to %s: use HTTPS or set AllowInsecureHTTP option", redactURL(reqURL))
}
}
var backoff []time.Duration
if c.retryBackoff != nil {
backoff = append([]time.Duration(nil), c.retryBackoff...)
} else {
backoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Second, 2 * time.Second}
}
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
if attempt > 0 {
var delay time.Duration
if attempt-1 < len(backoff) {
delay = backoff[attempt-1]
}
if delay > 0 {
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-timer.C:
timer.Stop() // no-op after fire; kept for symmetry with the ctx.Done case
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
if accept != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept", accept)
} else {
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
}
resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("do request: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read response body: %w", err)
}
return body, nil
}
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
lastErr = &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(errBody)}
// Retry on 429 rate limit
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests && attempt < maxRetryAttempts-1 {
// Check for Retry-After header and override backoff if present.
// Supports both integer seconds (common) and HTTP-date format (RFC 7231).
if ra := resp.Header.Get("Retry-After"); ra != "" {
if delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter(ra); ok {
if delay > maxRetryAfter {
delay = maxRetryAfter
}
if attempt < len(backoff) {
backoff[attempt] = delay
}
}
}
continue
}
// Don't retry other errors
return nil, lastErr
}
return nil, lastErr
}
// doGet is a convenience wrapper for GET requests with the default Accept header.
func (c *Client) doGet(ctx context.Context, url string) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doRequest(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, "")
}
+658
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestNewClient_DefaultBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
if c.baseURL != defaultBaseURL {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want %q", c.baseURL, defaultBaseURL)
}
}
func TestNewClient_CustomBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "https://github.concur.com/api/v3/")
if c.baseURL != "https://github.concur.com/api/v3" {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want trailing slash stripped", c.baseURL)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_Success(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer test-token" {
t.Errorf("Authorization = %q, want Bearer test-token", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("test-token", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"ok":true}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, `{"ok":true}`)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate(t *testing.T) {
// Fix "now" to a known time for deterministic testing.
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 59, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 second in the future
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// Initial backoff is 0; the HTTP-date parser will compute 1s and override.
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate_InPast(t *testing.T) {
// If the HTTP-date is in the past, delay should be 0 (retry immediately).
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 hour in the past
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_NoRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_InvalidRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "not-a-number-or-date")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_404_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
w.Write([]byte("not found"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsNotFound, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 404)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_401_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte("unauthorized"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsUnauthorized(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsUnauthorized, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 401)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
// This test exercises the timer-cancel path in the retry select:
// select { case <-timer.C; case <-ctx.Done() }
// The server returns 429 with a long Retry-After, and we cancel the
// context shortly after the first response so that cancellation races
// against the timer rather than preventing the initial HTTP round-trip.
requestReceived := make(chan struct{}, 1)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
select {
case requestReceived <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "10")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{10 * time.Second, 10 * time.Second})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Cancel the context after the first request completes, while the
// client is blocked in the retry timer select.
go func() {
<-requestReceived
// Small delay to ensure we're inside the timer select.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
}()
_, err := c.doGet(ctx, srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("err = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("42")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 42*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 42s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_ZeroSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("0")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for zero seconds (RFC 7231 allows immediate retry)")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_NegativeSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("-5")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for negative seconds")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Future(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
// Should be 10 seconds in the future.
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Past(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0 (past date)", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_RFC850_Format(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// RFC 850 format
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Monday, 01-Dec-25 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for RFC 850 format")
}
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("not-valid")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for invalid value")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_EmptyString(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for empty string")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_MaxCap(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that parseRetryAfter returns the raw value (capping is done by caller).
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("3600")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 3600*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 3600s (caller is responsible for capping)", delay)
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_Truncation(t *testing.T) {
longBody := make([]byte, 300)
for i := range longBody {
longBody[i] = 'x'
}
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: string(longBody)}
msg := apiErr.Error()
if len(msg) > 250 {
// "HTTP 500: " (10) + 200 + "...(truncated)" (14) = 224
t.Errorf("error message too long: %d chars", len(msg))
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_NewlineSanitized(t *testing.T) {
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 400, Body: "line1\nline2\rline3"}
msg := apiErr.Error()
for _, c := range msg {
if c == '\n' || c == '\r' {
t.Errorf("error message contains unsanitized newline: %q", msg)
break
}
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("secret-token", "https://api.github.com")
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "objects.githubusercontent.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Auth should be preserved on same-host redirect
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "Bearer token" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("token", "https://api.github.com")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.httpClient == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil httpClient after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.httpClient.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.httpClient.Timeout)
}
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTPForTest_PermitsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("ok"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "ok" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "ok")
}
}
func TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("request should not have been sent")
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for HTTP request without AllowInsecureHTTP")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsUppercaseHTTP(t *testing.T) {
// Verify case-insensitive scheme check (RFC 3986).
c := NewClient("tok", "HTTP://127.0.0.1:1")
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), "HTTP://127.0.0.1:1/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for uppercase HTTP scheme")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsMixedCaseHTTP(t *testing.T) {
// Verify mixed case like "Http://" is also rejected.
c := NewClient("tok", "Http://127.0.0.1:1")
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), "Http://127.0.0.1:1/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for mixed-case HTTP scheme")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTP_WithoutEnvVar_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("request should not have been sent")
}))
defer srv.Close()
t.Setenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE", "")
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTP())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error: AllowInsecureHTTP without env var should be rejected")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTP_WithEnvVar_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("insecure-ok"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
t.Setenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE", "1")
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTP())
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "insecure-ok" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "insecure-ok")
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTP_EnvVarNotOne_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("request should not have been sent")
}))
defer srv.Close()
// "true" is not "1" — strict check
t.Setenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE", "true")
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTP())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error: env var 'true' is not '1'")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_WithQuery(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://localhost:1234/path?secret=token&foo=bar")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path?<redacted>"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_NoQuery(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://localhost:1234/path")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_Userinfo(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://user:pass@localhost:1234/path")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_UserinfoWithQuery(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://user:pass@localhost:1234/path?secret=token")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path?<redacted>"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
package github
// AllowInsecureHTTPForTest permits sending credentials over plaintext HTTP
// without requiring the REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE environment variable.
// This is intended exclusively for test code using httptest.Server.
//
// Defined in a _test.go file so it is only available to test binaries.
func AllowInsecureHTTPForTest() ClientOption {
return func(cfg *clientConfig) {
cfg.allowInsecureHTTP = true
cfg.insecureIsTestBypass = true
}
}