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Author SHA1 Message Date
claw 9f8e9aa8d3 fix: timer leak and http field shadowing in github client
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- Add timer.Stop() to the timer.C branch to prevent timer leak on the
  normal path (previously only called in ctx.Done branch)
- Rename struct field 'http' to 'httpClient' to avoid shadowing the
  net/http import

Addresses self-review findings on PR #110.
2026-05-13 06:22:30 -07:00
claw 31a28b1dd5 address review feedback: baseURL TODO, timer-cancel test, fast retry test, doc note
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- Add TODO comment on unused baseURL field explaining its intended
  future use by higher-level exported methods
- Rewrite TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled to actually exercise the
  timer-cancel path in the retry select (goroutine cancels context
  while client is blocked in timer.C select)
- Change Retry-After: 1 to Retry-After: 0 in IntegerSeconds test
  to avoid unnecessary 1s sleep during test runs
- Add doc note on SetRetryBackoff explaining that an empty non-nil
  slice silently drops Retry-After delays
2026-05-13 06:08:51 -07:00
claw e414471a16 fix(github): address review feedback on Retry-After implementation
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- Fix data race: copy retryBackoff slice per-request to prevent
  concurrent doRequest calls from racing on shared state
- Fix parseRetryAfter: trim whitespace before parsing for robustness
- Fix parseRetryAfter: treat delta-seconds of 0 as valid per RFC 7231
- Add bounded read on success path (10 MB limit) for defense-in-depth
- Clean up TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds: remove dead
  code block and commented-out reasoning
- Fix import ordering: context before errors (goimports compliance)
2026-05-13 05:54:06 -07:00
claw 41e1d48b54 feat(github): support HTTP-date format in Retry-After header
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Implement the github package client with Retry-After header parsing that
supports both integer seconds (e.g. "Retry-After: 120") and HTTP-date
format (e.g. "Retry-After: Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT") per RFC 7231
§7.1.3.

Key design decisions:
- Use http.ParseTime which handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats
- Cap maximum retry delay at 60s (maxRetryAfter) to prevent stalling
- If HTTP-date is in the past, use delay of 0 (retry immediately)
- Inject time.Now via c.now field for deterministic testing

Closes #94
2026-05-13 05:10:52 -07:00
aweiker d722035629 Merge pull request 'fix(deps): replace gopkg.in/yaml.v3 with github.com/goccy/go-yaml' (#89) from review-bot-issue-87 into main
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Reviewed-on: #89
Reviewed-by: security-review-bot <10+security-review-bot@noreply.gitea.weiker.me>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Weiker <aaron@weiker.org>
2026-05-13 03:47:01 +00:00
claw b9b7be3b4e fix: address review #2888 findings (comment clarity, test cleanup)
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- Clarify depth-aware short-circuit comment to unambiguously describe
  the relationship between current depth and previous validation depth
- Add comment to MappingValueNode case explaining intentional depth+2
  behavior from parent MappingNode perspective
- Restructure unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit doc comment as bullet list
  covering all three safety checks (depth, multi-doc, strict fields)
- Replace t.Error with t.Fatal in TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection to remove
  redundant nil guard on subsequent err.Error() call
2026-05-12 19:06:52 -07:00
claw baa917f228 fix: handle MergeKeyNode explicitly in depth check, add size limit to ParsePersonaBytes
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- Add explicit case for *ast.MergeKeyNode in checkYAMLDepth switch to
  make it clear this is an intentional leaf (no children to recurse)
  rather than relying on the default case. Prevents future library
  changes from silently bypassing depth checks.

- Add MaxPersonaFileSize bound check at the top of ParsePersonaBytes.
  While callers already check size, the public API should defend itself
  (defense in depth) against arbitrarily large inputs that could cause
  excessive memory/CPU before AST validation runs.

- Add tests for both behaviors.

Addresses review #2879 findings.
2026-05-12 18:45:48 -07:00
claw b0352ba1c9 docs: address review findings on YAML depth validation
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- Add safety note on Strict() decoder not expanding aliases recursively,
  since alias resolution uses the pre-validated AST (finding #1)
- Document that ast.Node map keys rely on pointer identity, which holds
  because all goccy/go-yaml AST types are pointer receivers (finding #2)
- Clarify AnchorNode comment: effective depth budget is reduced for
  anchor+alias pairs, not literally halved (finding #3)
- Improve test depth trace comment for accuracy (finding #4)
- Add HTML comment in CONVENTIONS.md referencing #91 for the two-step
  process deviation (finding #5)
2026-05-12 17:39:38 -07:00
claw 0b16c4143a test: use per-subtest TempDir in TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection
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Move t.TempDir() inside each subtest for idiomatic test isolation,
as suggested by reviewers.
2026-05-12 15:22:27 -07:00
claw 493349e11a fix: correct comment accuracy and improve trailing-content check clarity
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- Fix validated map comment: says 'minimum depth' but stores the maximum
  depth at which a node was validated (overwritten on deeper visits).
- Replace dec.More() with explicit dec.Decode check for trailing JSON
  content. More() is documented for use inside arrays/objects; the
  explicit EOF check is clearer at the top-level stream.
2026-05-12 14:51:49 -07:00
claw 5cedeee9f4 address self-review findings on PR #89
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MINOR fixes:
- docs/DESIGN-57-yaml-persona.md: fix Error Cases table entry to reflect
  custom AST walk (checkYAMLDepth) instead of stale library-level reference
- review/persona.go: add EOF check after JSON decode to reject trailing
  garbage after a valid JSON object (prevents silent acceptance of malformed
  input like '{"name":"x"}garbage')
- review/persona_test.go: add TestJSONTrailingContentRejected test

NIT fixes:
- review/persona.go: add default case to checkYAMLDepth switch with
  explanatory comment about scalar leaf nodes
- review/persona.go: document AnchorNode depth+1 conservative asymmetry
- review/persona.go: simplify redundant if-guard in ListBuiltinPersonas
2026-05-12 14:42:22 -07:00
claw 01b6af03a8 fix(review): address review 2792 feedback
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- Document nodeCount overcounting as intentional conservative behavior
  (bounds total validation work, not unique nodes)
- Improve TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection comment with concrete depth trace
- Replace outdated gopkg.in/yaml.v3 pseudocode in design doc with
  reference to authoritative implementation
- Update PR description to clarify pre-approval via issue #57
2026-05-12 14:24:06 -07:00
claw 80091fb080 fix(review): address feedback from reviews 2788, 2789, 2791
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- Move nodeCount increment after cycle detection to avoid over-counting
  cyclic references (sonnet #2)
- Use underscores in test case names used as filenames (sonnet #3)
- Fix function comment: 'prevent silent data loss' → 'prevent confusing
  behavior where additional documents are silently ignored' (sonnet #4)
- Mark design doc pseudocode as historical since implementation uses
  goccy/go-yaml ast.Node, not gopkg.in/yaml.v3 yaml.Node (sonnet #5)
2026-05-12 14:13:59 -07:00
6 changed files with 863 additions and 59 deletions
+2
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ To request a new dependency:
2. Requires explicit approval from Aaron
3. After merge, a separate PR may use the package
<!-- Deviation from step 1+3 for go-yaml migration: see #91 for rationale. -->
*Enforcement: `scripts/check-deps.sh` parses this table — update only here.*
## Error Handling
+9 -30
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@@ -33,37 +33,16 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
### YAML Parsing with Depth Protection
```go
func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
var node yaml.Node
dec := yaml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
if err := dec.Decode(&node); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := checkYAMLDepth(&node, 0, maxDepth); err != nil {
return err
}
return node.Decode(out)
}
We implement a custom AST-based depth/node-count walk (`checkYAMLDepth` in
`review/persona.go`) rather than relying on library decoder options. Key design
decisions:
func checkYAMLDepth(node *yaml.Node, depth, maxDepth int) error {
if depth > maxDepth {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML nesting depth exceeds maximum (%d)", maxDepth)
}
// Handle alias nodes by following the Alias pointer
if node.Kind == yaml.AliasNode && node.Alias != nil {
return checkYAMLDepth(node.Alias, depth, maxDepth)
}
for _, child := range node.Content {
if err := checkYAMLDepth(child, depth+1, maxDepth); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
```
- **Library:** `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` with `ast.Node`-based traversal
- **Dual-map tracking:** `validated` (depth-aware short-circuit) + `visiting` (cycle detection)
- **Node-count limit:** Conservative overcounting bounds total validation work
- **Alias-aware depth:** Aliases increment depth and are re-checked when encountered at greater depths
We implement a custom AST-based depth/node-count walk (`checkYAMLDepth`) rather than relying on library decoder options. This gives us precise control over how depth is counted across aliases and anchors, with a depth-aware validated map to prevent alias depth bypass.
See `review/persona.go:checkYAMLDepth` for the authoritative implementation.
## State/Data Model
@@ -74,7 +53,7 @@ No new state. Same `Persona` struct, just different parsing.
| Error | Handling |
|-------|----------|
| Invalid YAML syntax | Return parse error with source file |
| Deeply nested YAML | Library rejects (v1.16.0+ fix) |
| Deeply nested YAML | Custom AST walk (`checkYAMLDepth`) rejects before decode |
| Unknown extension | Fall back to JSON parsing |
| Missing required fields | Validation rejects after parse |
+260
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@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
// Package github provides a client for the GitHub API.
// It supports pull request operations, file content retrieval,
// and review submission for both github.com and GitHub Enterprise.
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
defaultBaseURL = "https://api.github.com"
// maxRetryAttempts is the number of times doRequest will attempt a request.
maxRetryAttempts = 3
// maxRetryAfter caps the maximum delay from a Retry-After header to prevent
// a server from stalling the client indefinitely.
maxRetryAfter = 60 * time.Second
// maxErrorBodyBytes limits how much of an error response body we read
// to protect against malicious servers sending unbounded data.
maxErrorBodyBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KB
// maxResponseBodyBytes limits how much of a successful response body we read
// for defense-in-depth against servers returning excessively large payloads.
maxResponseBodyBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
)
// APIError represents an HTTP error response from the GitHub API.
// It carries the status code so callers can distinguish between
// different failure modes (e.g. 404 vs 500).
//
// The Body field stores up to 64 KiB of the raw response for programmatic
// inspection. Error() truncates to 200 bytes for safe logging, but callers
// should avoid logging or propagating Body directly in production since it may
// contain sensitive details from the upstream server.
type APIError struct {
StatusCode int
Body string
}
func (e *APIError) Error() string {
body := e.Body
if len(body) > 200 {
body = body[:200] + "...(truncated)"
}
// Sanitize newlines to prevent log injection from upstream response bodies.
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\n", " ")
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\r", " ")
return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d: %s", e.StatusCode, body)
}
// IsNotFound reports whether an error is an API 404 response.
func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound
}
return false
}
// IsUnauthorized reports whether an error is an API 401 response.
func IsUnauthorized(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized
}
return false
}
func asAPIError(err error) (*APIError, bool) {
if err == nil {
return nil, false
}
var target *APIError
if errors.As(err, &target) {
return target, true
}
return nil, false
}
// Client interacts with the GitHub API.
// A Client is safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
// SetHTTPClient and SetRetryBackoff are intended for test setup only and must
// be called before any goroutines issue requests; they have no synchronization.
type Client struct {
// TODO: baseURL is populated by NewClient but not yet consumed by doRequest/doGet.
// Higher-level exported methods (GetPullRequest, etc.) will use it to
// construct request URLs; remove this field if those methods end up
// accepting full URLs instead.
baseURL string
token string
httpClient *http.Client
// retryBackoff defines the delays between retry attempts for 429 responses.
// retryBackoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (after attempt i fails).
// If nil, defaults to {1s, 2s}.
retryBackoff []time.Duration
// now returns the current time. Defaults to time.Now.
// Override in tests to control HTTP-date Retry-After calculations.
now func() time.Time
}
// NewClient creates a new GitHub API client.
// If baseURL is empty, it defaults to https://api.github.com.
// For GitHub Enterprise, pass the API base URL (e.g. https://github.concur.com/api/v3).
func NewClient(token, baseURL string) *Client {
if baseURL == "" {
baseURL = defaultBaseURL
}
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
httpClient: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
now: time.Now,
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for testing to inject mock transports.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
c.httpClient = hc
}
// SetRetryBackoff sets the delays between retry attempts.
// This is intended for testing to speed up retry tests.
//
// Note: if an empty non-nil slice is provided, Retry-After delays parsed from
// server responses will be computed and capped but not applied (because
// attempt < len(backoff) is always false). This is acceptable for the
// test-only use case but callers should be aware of this edge case.
func (c *Client) SetRetryBackoff(backoff []time.Duration) {
c.retryBackoff = backoff
}
// parseRetryAfter parses a Retry-After header value, supporting both integer
// seconds (e.g. "120") and HTTP-date format (e.g. "Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
// as specified in RFC 7231 §7.1.3.
//
// For integer values, it returns the duration directly.
// For HTTP-date values, it computes the delay as the difference between the
// parsed time and now. If the date is in the past, it returns 0.
//
// Returns (0, false) if the value cannot be parsed as either format.
func (c *Client) parseRetryAfter(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
// Try integer seconds first (most common from GitHub).
// RFC 7231 allows delta-seconds of 0 to indicate immediate retry.
if seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err == nil && seconds >= 0 {
return time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second, true
}
// Try HTTP-date format (RFC 7231 §7.1.3).
// http.ParseTime handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats.
if retryAt, err := http.ParseTime(value); err == nil {
delay := retryAt.Sub(c.now())
if delay < 0 {
delay = 0
}
return delay, true
}
return 0, false
}
// doRequest performs an HTTP request with retry on 429 rate limit responses.
// It respects the Retry-After header when present, supporting both integer
// seconds and HTTP-date formats (capped at maxRetryAfter).
func (c *Client) doRequest(ctx context.Context, method, reqURL string, accept string) ([]byte, error) {
var backoff []time.Duration
if c.retryBackoff != nil {
backoff = append([]time.Duration(nil), c.retryBackoff...)
} else {
backoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Second, 2 * time.Second}
}
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
if attempt > 0 {
var delay time.Duration
if attempt-1 < len(backoff) {
delay = backoff[attempt-1]
}
if delay > 0 {
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-timer.C:
timer.Stop()
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
if accept != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept", accept)
} else {
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
}
resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("do request: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read response body: %w", err)
}
return body, nil
}
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
lastErr = &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(errBody)}
// Retry on 429 rate limit
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests && attempt < maxRetryAttempts-1 {
// Check for Retry-After header and override backoff if present.
// Supports both integer seconds (common) and HTTP-date format (RFC 7231).
if ra := resp.Header.Get("Retry-After"); ra != "" {
if delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter(ra); ok {
if delay > maxRetryAfter {
delay = maxRetryAfter
}
if attempt < len(backoff) {
backoff[attempt] = delay
}
}
}
continue
}
// Don't retry other errors
return nil, lastErr
}
return nil, lastErr
}
// doGet is a convenience wrapper for GET requests with the default Accept header.
func (c *Client) doGet(ctx context.Context, url string) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doRequest(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, "")
}
+409
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@@ -0,0 +1,409 @@
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestNewClient_DefaultBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
if c.baseURL != defaultBaseURL {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want %q", c.baseURL, defaultBaseURL)
}
}
func TestNewClient_CustomBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "https://github.concur.com/api/v3/")
if c.baseURL != "https://github.concur.com/api/v3" {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want trailing slash stripped", c.baseURL)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_Success(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer test-token" {
t.Errorf("Authorization = %q, want Bearer test-token", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("test-token", srv.URL)
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"ok":true}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, `{"ok":true}`)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate(t *testing.T) {
// Fix "now" to a known time for deterministic testing.
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 59, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 second in the future
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// Initial backoff is 0; the HTTP-date parser will compute 1s and override.
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate_InPast(t *testing.T) {
// If the HTTP-date is in the past, delay should be 0 (retry immediately).
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 hour in the past
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_NoRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_InvalidRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "not-a-number-or-date")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_404_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
w.Write([]byte("not found"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsNotFound, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 404)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_401_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte("unauthorized"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsUnauthorized(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsUnauthorized, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 401)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
// This test exercises the timer-cancel path in the retry select:
// select { case <-timer.C; case <-ctx.Done() }
// The server returns 429 with a long Retry-After, and we cancel the
// context shortly after the first response so that cancellation races
// against the timer rather than preventing the initial HTTP round-trip.
requestReceived := make(chan struct{}, 1)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
select {
case requestReceived <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "10")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{10 * time.Second, 10 * time.Second})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Cancel the context after the first request completes, while the
// client is blocked in the retry timer select.
go func() {
<-requestReceived
// Small delay to ensure we're inside the timer select.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
}()
_, err := c.doGet(ctx, srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("err = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("42")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 42*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 42s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_ZeroSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("0")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for zero seconds (RFC 7231 allows immediate retry)")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_NegativeSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("-5")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for negative seconds")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Future(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
// Should be 10 seconds in the future.
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Past(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0 (past date)", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_RFC850_Format(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// RFC 850 format
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Monday, 01-Dec-25 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for RFC 850 format")
}
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("not-valid")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for invalid value")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_EmptyString(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for empty string")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_MaxCap(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that parseRetryAfter returns the raw value (capping is done by caller).
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("3600")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 3600*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 3600s (caller is responsible for capping)", delay)
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_Truncation(t *testing.T) {
longBody := make([]byte, 300)
for i := range longBody {
longBody[i] = 'x'
}
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: string(longBody)}
msg := apiErr.Error()
if len(msg) > 250 {
// "HTTP 500: " (10) + 200 + "...(truncated)" (14) = 224
t.Errorf("error message too long: %d chars", len(msg))
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_NewlineSanitized(t *testing.T) {
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 400, Body: "line1\nline2\rline3"}
msg := apiErr.Error()
for _, c := range msg {
if c == '\n' || c == '\r' {
t.Errorf("error message contains unsanitized newline: %q", msg)
break
}
}
}
+70 -20
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"embed"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"sort"
"strings"
@@ -120,9 +121,7 @@ func ListBuiltinPersonas() []string {
default:
continue
}
if !seen[personaName] {
seen[personaName] = true
}
seen[personaName] = true
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(seen))
for name := range seen {
@@ -148,6 +147,15 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
err = dec.Decode(&p)
if err == nil {
// Reject trailing content after the first valid JSON object.
// Without this check, input like `{"name":"x"}garbage` would
// silently succeed because Decoder stops after one object.
var dummy json.RawMessage
if err2 := dec.Decode(&dummy); err2 != io.EOF {
err = fmt.Errorf("unexpected trailing content after JSON object")
}
}
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse persona %s: %w", source, err)
@@ -158,10 +166,10 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
return &p, nil
}
// unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit unmarshals YAML data with explicit depth limiting
// and strict field checking. This protects against stack exhaustion from deeply
// nested structures and catches typos in field names.
// Multi-document YAML files are rejected to prevent silent data loss.
// unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit unmarshals YAML data with three safety checks:
// - Depth limiting: rejects AST trees exceeding maxDepth to prevent stack exhaustion.
// - Multi-document rejection: prevents silent data loss from ignored extra documents.
// - Strict field checking: rejects unknown YAML keys to catch typos early.
func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
// First pass: parse into AST to check depth limits, node counts, and
// multi-document rejection. This prevents stack exhaustion before we
@@ -190,13 +198,18 @@ func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
// Second pass: decode with strict field checking enabled.
// Strict() rejects unknown keys, catching typos like "focuss" or "identiy".
//
// Safety note: goccy/go-yaml's decoder does not expand YAML aliases
// recursively — it resolves them via the pre-built AST, which our first
// pass already depth-checked. Alias chains that would exceed depth limits
// are caught above; the decoder merely reads the resolved scalar values.
dec := yaml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data), yaml.Strict())
return dec.Decode(out)
}
// checkYAMLDepth recursively checks that YAML AST nodes don't exceed the depth
// limit or the total node count limit. It uses two tracking maps:
// - validated: maps each node to the minimum depth at which it was previously
// - validated: maps each node to the maximum depth at which it was previously
// checked. If a node is revisited at a deeper depth (e.g., via an alias),
// we re-check it to ensure the combined effective depth doesn't exceed limits.
// - visiting: per-path recursion stack for true cycle detection. A node on the
@@ -214,12 +227,6 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
return fmt.Errorf("YAML nesting depth exceeds maximum (%d)", maxDepth)
}
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)
}
// Cycle detection: if we're currently visiting this node on the current
// recursion path, it's a cycle (e.g., alias pointing to an ancestor).
// Return nil to break the cycle without error — cycles are a structural
@@ -228,10 +235,28 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
return nil
}
// Depth-aware short-circuit: only skip re-checking a node if we previously
// validated it at the same or deeper effective depth. If this visit is at a
// greater depth than before (e.g., alias referenced deeper in the tree),
// we must re-traverse to catch depth limit violations.
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
// Placed after cycle detection but before the depth-aware short-circuit. This means
// nodes revisited at shallower depths (via aliases) are counted each time they are
// encountered — intentional conservative overcounting. This bounds the total work
// performed during validation rather than tracking unique nodes, which is the safer
// security posture for untrusted YAML input.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)
}
// Depth-aware short-circuit: skip re-validation only when the current visit
// depth is the same or shallower than the depth at which this node was
// previously validated. A shallower (or equal) current depth means the
// prior, deeper validation already covered any subtree depth violations.
// If the current depth exceeds the previous validation depth (e.g., an alias
// references this node deeper in the tree), we must re-traverse to ensure
// the combined effective depth doesn't exceed maxDepth.
//
// Note: using ast.Node (interface) as map key relies on pointer identity,
// which is correct because all goccy/go-yaml AST node types are pointer
// receivers (*MappingNode, *SequenceNode, etc.), never value types.
if prevDepth, ok := validated[node]; ok && depth <= prevDepth {
return nil
}
@@ -250,6 +275,11 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
}
}
case *ast.MappingValueNode:
// Both Key and Value are visited at depth+1 relative to this
// MappingValueNode. Since MappingNode visits its MappingValueNode
// children at depth+1 as well, keys and values end up at depth+2
// from the parent MappingNode. This is intentional: it mirrors the
// actual nesting structure (mapping → key-value pair → key/value).
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Key, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -269,6 +299,14 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
return err
}
case *ast.AnchorNode:
// Increment depth for anchor values as a conservative measure: the
// anchor definition itself is structural, and treating it as a depth
// level ensures that deeply nested anchors are caught at definition
// time rather than only when referenced via alias. This +1 is
// asymmetric with alias (which also increments) — by design, the
// effective depth budget for anchored-then-aliased content is reduced
// because both the definition site and the reference site each consume
// a level, making deeply nested anchor/alias pairs hit the limit sooner.
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -276,8 +314,16 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
// Scalar types (StringNode, IntegerNode, FloatNode, BoolNode, NullNode,
// InfinityNode, NanNode, LiteralNode, MergeKeyNode) are leaf nodes.
case *ast.MergeKeyNode:
// MergeKeyNode represents the literal "<<" merge key token. It has no
// child nodes — the value side of a merge (e.g., *alias) lives in the
// parent MappingValueNode.Value, which is already recursed into above.
// Explicitly listed here (rather than in the default case) to prevent
// future library changes from silently bypassing depth checks.
default:
// Scalar leaf nodes (StringNode, IntegerNode, FloatNode, BoolNode,
// NullNode, InfinityNode, NanNode, LiteralNode) have no children to
// recurse into.
}
return nil
}
@@ -285,7 +331,11 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
// ParsePersonaBytes parses persona data from bytes with a source label for errors.
// This is useful for parsing personas fetched from external sources (e.g., Gitea API)
// without requiring filesystem access. Format is detected by source extension.
// Input is bounded by MaxPersonaFileSize to prevent resource exhaustion.
func ParsePersonaBytes(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
if len(data) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona data from %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes, limit %d)", source, len(data), MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
return parsePersona(data, source)
}
+113 -9
View File
@@ -459,8 +459,14 @@ func TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "deeply-nested.yaml")
// Build a deeply nested YAML structure that exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20).
// Each nested mapping key generates a MappingValueNode, incrementing depth
// by 1 per level in the AST walk. With 25 levels, we exceed MaxYAMLDepth (20).
// Depth accumulation trace for "nested: \n level0: \n level1: ...":
// - Document root parsed at depth 0
// - Root MappingNode children (MappingValueNodes) visited at depth 1
// - "nested" MappingValueNode: key at depth 2, value at depth 2
// - Each levelN adds depth via MappingValueNode traversal (key + value)
// - Exact depth per level depends on AST structure (MappingNode wrapping),
// but 25 levels reliably exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20) with comfortable margin.
// The test uses 25 levels rather than exactly 21 to avoid brittleness.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\nnested:\n")
indent := " "
@@ -485,19 +491,18 @@ func TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{"completely empty", ""},
{"whitespace only", " \n\n "},
{"comment only", "# just a comment\n"},
{"completely_empty", ""},
{"whitespace_only", " \n\n "},
{"comment_only", "# just a comment\n"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, tc.name+".yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tc.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
@@ -505,9 +510,9 @@ func TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for empty YAML input, got nil")
t.Fatal("expected error for empty YAML input, got nil")
}
if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty YAML document") {
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty YAML document") {
t.Errorf("expected error containing %q, got: %v", "empty YAML document", err)
}
})
@@ -853,3 +858,102 @@ identity: test identity
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestJSONTrailingContentRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{
name: "trailing garbage after object",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}garbage`,
},
{
name: "two JSON objects",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}{"name":"other"}`,
},
{
name: "trailing array",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}[]`,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for trailing content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "trailing content") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'trailing content'", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestParsePersonaBytesSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
// ParsePersonaBytes should reject input exceeding MaxPersonaFileSize
oversized := make([]byte, MaxPersonaFileSize+1)
for i := range oversized {
oversized[i] = 'x'
}
_, err := ParsePersonaBytes(oversized, "oversized.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for oversized input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum size") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'exceeds maximum size'", err.Error())
}
// Just under the limit should not trigger size error (may fail parse, but not size)
underLimit := []byte("name: test\nidentity: test persona\n")
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes(underLimit, "valid.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error for valid input: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestYAMLMergeKeyDepthCheck(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that YAML merge keys (<<: *alias) are properly handled by the
// depth checker. The merge key content is in the MappingValueNode.Value
// (an AliasNode), not in the MergeKeyNode itself.
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte("name: merge-test\nidentity: test\n"), "merge.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("basic parse failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "merge-test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "merge-test")
}
// Test that deeply nested merge keys still hit depth limit.
// Build YAML with merge key content nested beyond MaxYAMLDepth.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: deep-merge\nidentity: deep merge persona\n")
sb.WriteString("anchor: &deep\n")
indent := " "
for i := 0; i < MaxYAMLDepth+5; i++ {
sb.WriteString(indent)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
indent += " "
}
sb.WriteString(indent + "leaf: value\n")
sb.WriteString("target:\n <<: *deep\n")
_, err = ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(sb.String()), "deep-merge.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for deeply nested merge key content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "depth") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'depth'", err.Error())
}
}