security: add workspace validation for persona-file
Apply the same path traversal and symlink protections to --persona-file that already exist for --system-prompt-file. This prevents: 1. Path traversal via ../ sequences to read files outside workspace 2. Symlink traversal to escape workspace boundaries 3. Reading arbitrary files on CI runners if workflow inputs are attacker-controlled Refactors path validation into shared validateWorkspacePath helper to reduce code duplication between system-prompt-file and persona-file. Addresses security-review-bot and gpt-review-bot findings on PR #55. Tests added: - Valid relative paths - Valid nested paths - Path traversal rejection - Absolute path normalization - Nonexistent file handling - Symlink escape detection
This commit is contained in:
+39
-25
@@ -110,8 +110,12 @@ func main() {
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}
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slog.Info("loaded built-in persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName)
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} else if *personaFile != "" {
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var err error
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persona, err = review.LoadPersona(*personaFile)
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resolvedPath, err := validateWorkspacePath(*personaFile, "persona-file")
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("invalid persona-file path", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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persona, err = review.LoadPersona(resolvedPath)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to load persona file", "file", *personaFile, "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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@@ -229,34 +233,14 @@ func main() {
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// Step 6b: Load additional system prompt if specified
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additionalPrompt := ""
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if *systemPromptFile != "" {
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workspace := os.Getenv("GITHUB_WORKSPACE")
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if workspace == "" {
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workspace, _ = os.Getwd()
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}
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absWorkspace, err := filepath.Abs(workspace)
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resolvedPath, err := validateWorkspacePath(*systemPromptFile, "system-prompt-file")
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to resolve workspace path", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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promptPath := filepath.Join(absWorkspace, *systemPromptFile)
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promptPath = filepath.Clean(promptPath)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(promptPath, absWorkspace+string(filepath.Separator)) && promptPath != absWorkspace {
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slog.Error("system-prompt-file resolves outside workspace", "path", promptPath, "workspace", absWorkspace)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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// Resolve symlinks and re-validate to prevent symlink traversal
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resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(promptPath)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to resolve system prompt file", "path", promptPath, "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(resolvedPath, absWorkspace+string(filepath.Separator)) && resolvedPath != absWorkspace {
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slog.Error("system-prompt-file symlink resolves outside workspace", "resolved", resolvedPath, "workspace", absWorkspace)
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slog.Error("invalid system-prompt-file path", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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data, err := os.ReadFile(resolvedPath)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Error("failed to read system prompt file", "path", promptPath, "error", err)
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slog.Error("failed to read system prompt file", "path", *systemPromptFile, "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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additionalPrompt = string(data)
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@@ -608,6 +592,36 @@ func validateReviewerName(name string) error {
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return nil
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}
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// validateWorkspacePath ensures a file path is within the workspace and resolves
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// symlinks to prevent traversal attacks. Returns the resolved absolute path or
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// an error if the path is outside the workspace.
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func validateWorkspacePath(path, pathName string) (string, error) {
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workspace := os.Getenv("GITHUB_WORKSPACE")
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if workspace == "" {
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workspace, _ = os.Getwd()
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}
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absWorkspace, err := filepath.Abs(workspace)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve workspace path: %w", err)
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}
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// Join and clean the path
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fullPath := filepath.Join(absWorkspace, path)
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fullPath = filepath.Clean(fullPath)
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// Check path is within workspace
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if !strings.HasPrefix(fullPath, absWorkspace+string(filepath.Separator)) && fullPath != absWorkspace {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%s resolves outside workspace: path=%s workspace=%s", pathName, fullPath, absWorkspace)
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}
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// Resolve symlinks and re-validate to prevent symlink traversal
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resolvedPath, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(fullPath)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve %s: %w", pathName, err)
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}
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if !strings.HasPrefix(resolvedPath, absWorkspace+string(filepath.Separator)) && resolvedPath != absWorkspace {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%s symlink resolves outside workspace: resolved=%s workspace=%s", pathName, resolvedPath, absWorkspace)
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}
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return resolvedPath, nil
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}
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// buildSupersededBody creates the body for a superseded review: struck-through banner
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// with collapsed original content and the commit it was evaluated against.
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func buildSupersededBody(originalBody, commitSHA, newReviewURL, sentinel string) string {
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
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"os"
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"os/exec"
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"strings"
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"path/filepath"
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"testing"
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"gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot/gitea"
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@@ -45,6 +46,113 @@ func TestValidateReviewerName(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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func TestValidateWorkspacePath(t *testing.T) {
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// Create a temp directory as our workspace
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tmpDir := t.TempDir()
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// Create a valid file inside the workspace
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validFile := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "valid.json")
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if err := os.WriteFile(validFile, []byte("{}"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to create test file: %v", err)
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}
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// Create a subdirectory with a file
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subDir := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "subdir")
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if err := os.MkdirAll(subDir, 0755); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to create subdir: %v", err)
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}
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nestedFile := filepath.Join(subDir, "nested.json")
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if err := os.WriteFile(nestedFile, []byte("{}"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to create nested file: %v", err)
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}
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// Create a symlink pointing outside the workspace
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symlinkPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "evil-symlink.json")
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if err := os.Symlink("/etc/passwd", symlinkPath); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("failed to create symlink: %v", err)
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}
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// Save and restore GITHUB_WORKSPACE
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origWorkspace := os.Getenv("GITHUB_WORKSPACE")
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defer os.Setenv("GITHUB_WORKSPACE", origWorkspace)
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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workspace string
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path string
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wantErr bool
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errMatch string
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}{
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{
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name: "valid relative path",
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workspace: tmpDir,
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path: "valid.json",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "valid nested path",
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workspace: tmpDir,
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path: "subdir/nested.json",
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wantErr: false,
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},
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{
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name: "path traversal attempt",
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workspace: tmpDir,
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path: "../../../etc/passwd",
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wantErr: true,
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errMatch: "resolves outside workspace",
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},
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{
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name: "absolute path gets normalized to relative",
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workspace: tmpDir,
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path: "/etc/passwd",
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wantErr: true,
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errMatch: "failed to resolve", // filepath.Join strips leading / making it <workspace>/etc/passwd which doesn't exist
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},
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{
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name: "nonexistent file",
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workspace: tmpDir,
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path: "nonexistent.json",
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wantErr: true,
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errMatch: "failed to resolve",
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},
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{
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name: "symlink escaping workspace",
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workspace: tmpDir,
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path: "evil-symlink.json",
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wantErr: true,
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errMatch: "symlink resolves outside workspace",
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},
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}
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for _, tc := range tests {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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os.Setenv("GITHUB_WORKSPACE", tc.workspace)
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resolved, err := validateWorkspacePath(tc.path, "test-file")
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if tc.wantErr {
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if err == nil {
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t.Errorf("expected error for %q, got nil", tc.path)
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} else if tc.errMatch != "" && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.errMatch) {
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t.Errorf("error %q should contain %q", err.Error(), tc.errMatch)
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}
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} else {
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if err != nil {
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t.Errorf("expected no error for %q, got %v", tc.path, err)
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}
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if resolved == "" {
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t.Error("expected non-empty resolved path")
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}
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// Verify resolved path is within workspace
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if !strings.HasPrefix(resolved, tc.workspace) {
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t.Errorf("resolved path %q not within workspace %q", resolved, tc.workspace)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func makeReview(id int64, login, state string, stale bool, body string) gitea.Review {
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r := gitea.Review{
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ID: id,
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