Files
review-bot/cmd/review-bot/validateurl.go
T
claw f84cc3bbcf
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fix(#123): address all review findings from PR #129
MAJOR fixes:
- gitea/ipcheck.go: replace startup panic with init()+error list pattern
  Hard-coded CIDRs that fail to parse now recorded in blockedCIDRParseErrors
  instead of panicking. TestBlockedCIDRsValid catches programming errors
  in CI without violating CONVENTIONS.md 'never panic' rule.
- .gitea/actions/review/action.yml: re-validate SERVER_URL at start of
  'Install review-bot' step to close DNS rebinding window between
  'Determine version' and install-step curl calls.

MINOR fixes:
- gitea/client.go: add Timeout: 10*time.Second to net.Dialer per PLAN.md spec
- cmd/review-bot/validateurl.go: switch isValidateError to errors.As so
  wrapped *validateError values are also detected
- gitea/ipcheck_test.go: clarify 198.51.100.1 (RFC5737 TEST-NET-2) comment;
  add TestBlockedCIDRsValid to surface CIDR parse errors as test failures

NIT fixes:
- .gitea/actions/review/action.yml: refactor Python list comprehension in
  SSRF check to for-loop (avoids side-effect-only comprehension, runner compat)
- gitea/export_test.go: expand comment explaining white-box test pattern
  (why package gitea not gitea_test, Go stdlib precedent)

Remove PLAN.md (implementation complete)
2026-05-14 01:42:47 -07:00

126 lines
3.5 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot/gitea"
)
// runValidateURL implements the `review-bot validate-url <url>` subcommand.
//
// It resolves the given URL's hostname and checks that every returned IP is
// publicly routable (not RFC1918, loopback, link-local, or other reserved
// ranges). The exit code communicates the result to callers:
//
// 0 — URL is safe to use
// 1 — URL resolves to a blocked/private address
// 2 — URL is malformed, has an unsafe scheme, or DNS lookup failed
//
// This is intended for use from action.yml shell steps that need to validate
// a user-supplied URL before passing it to curl.
func runValidateURL(args []string) int {
if len(args) != 1 {
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "usage: review-bot validate-url <url>")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Resolves <url> and verifies all resolved IPs are publicly routable.")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Exit 0=safe, 1=blocked, 2=error")
return 2
}
rawURL := args[0]
if err := validateURL(rawURL); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: %v\n", err)
var ve *validateError
if isValidateError(err, &ve) {
return ve.code
}
return 2
}
fmt.Fprintf(outWriter, "OK: %s is safe\n", rawURL)
return 0
}
// validateError carries an exit code alongside a message.
type validateError struct {
code int
message string
}
func (e *validateError) Error() string { return e.message }
// isValidateError checks if err is or wraps a *validateError and sets out.
// Uses errors.As so that wrapped *validateError values (e.g. from fmt.Errorf("...: %w", &validateError{...}))
// are also detected, making the function robust against future wrapping.
func isValidateError(err error, out **validateError) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
return errors.As(err, out)
}
// validateURL checks that rawURL is safe for use as a Gitea server URL:
// - Must be https:// (not http://)
// - Must have no user-info (user:pass@host)
// - Must resolve to at least one IP, all of which are publicly routable
func validateURL(rawURL string) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return &validateError{code: 2, message: fmt.Sprintf("malformed URL %q: %v", rawURL, err)}
}
// Scheme check: only https is permitted.
if !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "https") {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: fmt.Sprintf("URL scheme must be https (got %q)", parsed.Scheme),
}
}
// Reject user-info (user:password@host) to prevent credential embedding.
if parsed.User != nil {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: "URL must not contain user-info (user:password@host)",
}
}
host := parsed.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return &validateError{code: 2, message: fmt.Sprintf("URL has no host: %q", rawURL)}
}
// Resolve the hostname with a short timeout.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup failed for %q: %v", host, err),
}
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup returned no addresses for %q", host),
}
}
for _, a := range addrs {
if gitea.IsBlockedIP(a.IP) {
return &validateError{
code: 1,
message: fmt.Sprintf("blocked: %q resolves to private/reserved IP %s", host, a.IP),
}
}
}
return nil
}