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review-bot/.gitea/actions/review/action.yml
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fix(action): address security review - prevent token exfiltration and add input validation
Security fixes:
- On GitHub/GHES (VCS_TYPE=github), inputs.gitea-url is now completely
  ignored. API calls use github.api_url; downloads use github.server_url.
  Tokens are never sent to user-supplied URLs.
- Replace action_token step output with masked GITHUB_ENV variable to
  prevent token leakage in debug logs.
- Validate action-repo against owner/repo pattern to prevent path traversal.
- Validate SERVER_URL in Gitea path: require https:// scheme, reject
  whitespace and newlines.
- Strengthen VERSION validation: block slashes and whitespace in addition
  to newlines.
- Add integrity check in Install step: verify SERVER_URL matches
  github.server_url on GitHub runners.

Addresses findings from security-review-bot on PR #121.
Deferred: full IP-level SSRF defense (see #123).
2026-05-13 21:29:15 -07:00

368 lines
15 KiB
YAML

# This composite action supports both Gitea Actions and GitHub Actions runners.
# It detects the VCS host type using the github.api_url context (set only on
# GitHub/GHES runners) and uses the appropriate releases API for version
# resolution and binary download.
#
# Security notes:
# - On GitHub/GHES (VCS_TYPE=github), inputs.gitea-url is IGNORED to prevent
# token exfiltration. API calls use github.api_url; downloads use
# github.server_url. Tokens are never sent to user-supplied URLs.
# - On Gitea (VCS_TYPE=gitea), inputs.gitea-url is validated (https scheme,
# no whitespace/newlines) before use.
# - action-repo is validated against owner/repo pattern.
# - Tokens are passed via masked environment variables, not step outputs.
#
# Requirements: python3, sha256sum, curl (all present on ubuntu-* runners).
name: 'AI Code Review'
description: 'Run AI-powered code review on a pull request using review-bot'
inputs:
gitea-url:
description: 'Gitea instance URL (only used on Gitea runners; ignored on GitHub/GHES). Defaults to server_url.'
required: false
default: ''
repo:
description: 'Repository to review (owner/name, defaults to current)'
required: false
default: ''
action-repo:
description: 'Repository hosting review-bot releases (owner/name). Defaults to github.action_repository or rodin/review-bot.'
required: false
default: ''
action-repo-token:
description: 'Token for downloading release assets from action-repo (defaults to github.token on GitHub, reviewer-token on Gitea). Required for private repos.'
required: false
default: ''
pr-number:
description: 'Pull request number (defaults to current PR)'
required: false
default: ''
reviewer-token:
description: 'Token for posting the review'
required: true
reviewer-name:
description: 'Display name for the reviewer'
required: false
default: ''
llm-base-url:
description: 'OpenAI-compatible LLM API base URL (not required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
llm-api-key:
description: 'LLM API key (not required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
llm-model:
description: 'LLM model name'
required: true
llm-provider:
description: 'LLM API provider: openai, anthropic, or aicore (default openai)'
required: false
default: 'openai'
aicore-client-id:
description: 'SAP AI Core client ID (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-client-secret:
description: 'SAP AI Core client secret (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-auth-url:
description: 'SAP AI Core authentication URL (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-api-url:
description: 'SAP AI Core API URL (required for aicore provider)'
required: false
default: ''
aicore-resource-group:
description: 'SAP AI Core resource group (default: default)'
required: false
default: 'default'
conventions-file:
description: 'Path to conventions file in the repo (e.g. CLAUDE.md)'
required: false
default: ''
patterns-repo:
description: 'Comma-separated repos with language patterns (e.g. rodin/elixir-patterns,rodin/phoenix-conventions)'
required: false
default: ''
patterns-files:
description: 'Comma-separated file paths or directories to fetch from patterns repos'
required: false
default: 'README.md'
temperature:
description: 'LLM temperature (0 = server default)'
required: false
default: '0'
timeout:
description: 'LLM request timeout in seconds (default 300)'
required: false
default: '300'
version:
description: 'review-bot version to install (e.g. v0.1.0, defaults to latest)'
required: false
default: 'latest'
dry-run:
description: 'Print review to stdout instead of posting'
required: false
default: 'false'
update-existing:
description: 'Delete previous review from same bot after posting new one. Accepts: true/1/yes or false/0/no (default true)'
required: false
default: 'true'
system-prompt-file:
description: 'Local file with additional system prompt instructions (e.g. security review focus)'
required: false
default: ''
persona:
description: 'Built-in persona name (security, architect, docs)'
required: false
default: ''
persona-file:
description: 'Path to custom persona JSON file'
required: false
default: ''
runs:
using: 'composite'
steps:
- name: Determine version
id: version
shell: bash
run: |
# --- Input Validation ---
# Determine the repo hosting review-bot releases (not the repo being reviewed)
ACTION_REPO="${{ inputs.action-repo }}"
if [ -z "$ACTION_REPO" ]; then
# github.action_repository is the repo containing the running action
ACTION_REPO="${{ github.action_repository }}"
fi
if [ -z "$ACTION_REPO" ]; then
# Final fallback for Gitea (which may not set action_repository)
ACTION_REPO="rodin/review-bot"
fi
# Validate ACTION_REPO matches owner/repo pattern (防止 path traversal)
if ! printf '%s' "$ACTION_REPO" | grep -qE '^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+/[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$'; then
echo "Error: action-repo '${ACTION_REPO}' does not match expected owner/repo format" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Detect VCS host type using github.api_url context.
# github.api_url is set on GitHub.com (https://api.github.com) and GHES
# (https://<host>/api/v3). It is empty/unset on Gitea Actions runners.
GITHUB_API_URL="${{ github.api_url }}"
if [ -n "$GITHUB_API_URL" ]; then
VCS_TYPE="github"
else
VCS_TYPE="gitea"
fi
# Determine SERVER_URL based on VCS type.
# SECURITY: On GitHub/GHES, ALWAYS use github.server_url — never trust
# inputs.gitea-url to prevent token exfiltration to attacker-controlled hosts.
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
SERVER_URL="${{ github.server_url }}"
if [ -n "${{ inputs.gitea-url }}" ]; then
echo "::warning::inputs.gitea-url is ignored on GitHub/GHES runners (VCS_TYPE=github). Using github.server_url instead."
fi
else
SERVER_URL="${{ inputs.gitea-url || github.server_url }}"
fi
# Strip trailing slash if present
SERVER_URL="${SERVER_URL%/}"
# Validate SERVER_URL for Gitea path: must be https, no whitespace/newlines
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "gitea" ]; then
if ! printf '%s' "$SERVER_URL" | grep -qE '^https://[^[:space:]]+$'; then
echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' must be an https:// URL with no whitespace" >&2
exit 1
fi
if printf '%s' "$SERVER_URL" | grep -q $'\n'; then
echo "Error: SERVER_URL contains unexpected newline" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
# Determine auth token for release API requests
ACTION_TOKEN="${{ inputs.action-repo-token }}"
if [ -z "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
ACTION_TOKEN="${{ github.token }}"
else
ACTION_TOKEN="${{ inputs.reviewer-token }}"
fi
fi
if [ "${{ inputs.version }}" = "latest" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
# SECURITY: Use github.api_url which is a trusted platform-provided value.
# Never construct API URLs from user-supplied inputs on GitHub.
API_URL="${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases?per_page=1"
else
# Gitea API — SERVER_URL was validated above
API_URL="${SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases?limit=1"
fi
# Build auth header if token is available
AUTH_HEADER=""
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
AUTH_HEADER="Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}"
else
AUTH_HEADER="Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}"
fi
fi
if [ -n "$AUTH_HEADER" ]; then
VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "$AUTH_HEADER" "$API_URL" \
| python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
else
VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 "$API_URL" \
| python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
fi
if [ -z "$VERSION" ]; then
echo "Failed to determine latest version from ${API_URL}" >&2
exit 1
fi
else
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
fi
# Validate VERSION: no newlines, no slashes, no whitespace (防止 path traversal)
if printf '%s' "$VERSION" | grep -qE '[\n\r/[:space:]]'; then
echo "Error: VERSION '${VERSION}' contains invalid characters (newline, slash, or whitespace)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "version=${VERSION}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "action_repo=${ACTION_REPO}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "server_url=${SERVER_URL}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "vcs_type=${VCS_TYPE}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# SECURITY: Pass token via masked environment variable instead of step output.
# Step outputs can leak in debug logs; GITHUB_ENV with masking is safer.
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
echo "::add-mask::${ACTION_TOKEN}"
echo "ACTION_TOKEN=${ACTION_TOKEN}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Cache review-bot binary
id: cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot
key: review-bot-linux-amd64-${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
- name: Install review-bot
if: steps.cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
shell: bash
run: |
SERVER_URL="${{ steps.version.outputs.server_url }}"
ACTION_REPO="${{ steps.version.outputs.action_repo }}"
VERSION="${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
VCS_TYPE="${{ steps.version.outputs.vcs_type }}"
# Read token from masked environment variable (set in Determine version step)
# Falls back to empty if not set (public repos don't need auth)
ACTION_TOKEN="${ACTION_TOKEN:-}"
BINARY="review-bot-linux-amd64"
# SECURITY: On GitHub/GHES, use github.server_url for downloads.
# SERVER_URL is already set correctly per VCS_TYPE in Determine version step,
# but verify the download destination matches expectations.
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
# Double-check: SERVER_URL must be github.server_url (platform-provided)
EXPECTED_SERVER="${{ github.server_url }}"
EXPECTED_SERVER="${EXPECTED_SERVER%/}"
if [ "$SERVER_URL" != "$EXPECTED_SERVER" ]; then
echo "Error: SERVER_URL mismatch on GitHub runner (possible tampering)" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
# Download URL format is the same on both Gitea and GitHub:
# {server}/{owner}/{repo}/releases/download/{tag}/{asset}
DOWNLOAD_URL="${SERVER_URL}/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}"
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
else
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
fi
else
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
fi
# Verify SHA-256 checksum
# NOTE: This verifies integrity (download wasn't corrupted) but not
# authenticity — both binary and checksums come from the same server.
# For stronger guarantees, consider GPG signature verification.
cd "${{ runner.temp }}"
EXPECTED=$(grep "${BINARY}" checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')
ACTUAL=$(sha256sum review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
if [ -z "$EXPECTED" ]; then
echo "Error: no checksum found for ${BINARY}" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ "$EXPECTED" != "$ACTUAL" ]; then
echo "Error: checksum mismatch!" >&2
echo " Expected: $EXPECTED" >&2
echo " Actual: $ACTUAL" >&2
exit 1
fi
chmod +x "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
echo "Installed review-bot ${VERSION} (checksum verified)"
- name: Run review
shell: bash
env:
GITEA_URL: ${{ inputs.gitea-url || github.server_url }}
GITEA_REPO: ${{ inputs.repo || github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ inputs.pr-number || github.event.pull_request.number }}
REVIEWER_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.reviewer-token }}
REVIEWER_NAME: ${{ inputs.reviewer-name }}
LLM_BASE_URL: ${{ inputs.llm-base-url }}
LLM_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.llm-api-key }}
LLM_MODEL: ${{ inputs.llm-model }}
CONVENTIONS_FILE: ${{ inputs.conventions-file }}
PATTERNS_REPO: ${{ inputs.patterns-repo }}
PATTERNS_FILES: ${{ inputs.patterns-files }}
LLM_TEMPERATURE: ${{ inputs.temperature }}
LLM_TIMEOUT: ${{ inputs.timeout }}
LLM_PROVIDER: ${{ inputs.llm-provider }}
UPDATE_EXISTING: ${{ inputs.update-existing }}
SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE: ${{ inputs.system-prompt-file }}
PERSONA: ${{ inputs.persona }}
PERSONA_FILE: ${{ inputs.persona-file }}
AICORE_CLIENT_ID: ${{ inputs.aicore-client-id }}
AICORE_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ inputs.aicore-client-secret }}
AICORE_AUTH_URL: ${{ inputs.aicore-auth-url }}
AICORE_API_URL: ${{ inputs.aicore-api-url }}
AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP: ${{ inputs.aicore-resource-group }}
run: |
ARGS=""
if [ "${{ inputs.dry-run }}" = "true" ]; then
ARGS="--dry-run"
fi
${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot $ARGS