Files
review-bot/cmd/review-bot/validatedocmap.go
T
Rodin af8b29fa5d
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fix(#141): restore runValidateDocmap doc comment inadvertently truncated
2026-05-15 07:34:18 +00:00

264 lines
9.2 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"bufio"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot/review"
)
// maxDocmapBytes is the maximum size of the doc-map YAML file that will be
// read. Files larger than this are rejected before reading to prevent memory
// exhaustion from an oversized PR-controlled file.
const maxDocmapBytes int64 = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
// validateDocmapPath checks that localPath is safe to read as the doc-map
// file. It enforces three invariants before the file is opened:
//
// 1. The path resolves to a regular file within resolvedRoot (path
// confinement): prevents a PR-controlled --docmap from reading arbitrary
// host files via absolute paths or ".." traversal.
// 2. The path is not a symlink: prevents denial-of-service via /dev/zero or
// information disclosure via symlinks that point outside the workspace.
// 3. The file does not exceed maxDocmapBytes: prevents memory exhaustion
// from an oversized but legitimately committed doc-map file.
//
// resolvedRoot must already be an absolute, symlink-free path (obtained from
// filepath.Abs + filepath.EvalSymlinks).
func validateDocmapPath(localPath, resolvedRoot string) error {
// Resolve the docmap path to an absolute path.
absPath, err := filepath.Abs(localPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot resolve path: %w", err)
}
// Lstat: do NOT follow symlinks. We want to inspect the entry itself.
fi, err := os.Lstat(absPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot stat file: %w", err)
}
// Reject symlinks outright — a symlink can point to /dev/zero or arbitrary
// host paths, bypassing both the confinement check and the size check.
if fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("symlinks are not allowed")
}
// Confine to resolvedRoot: the cleaned absolute path must be a descendant
// of the repo root. This catches paths that escaped via "..", absolute
// paths that happen to be outside the root, etc.
rel, err := filepath.Rel(resolvedRoot, absPath)
if err != nil || rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
return fmt.Errorf("path must be within --repo-root")
}
// Enforce size cap before reading to prevent memory exhaustion.
if fi.Size() > maxDocmapBytes {
return fmt.Errorf("file size %d bytes exceeds %d-byte limit", fi.Size(), maxDocmapBytes)
}
return nil
}
// runValidateDocmap implements the `review-bot validate-docmap` subcommand.
//
// It reads changed file paths from stdin (one per line, as produced by
// `git diff --name-only`), parses a doc-map YAML file, and performs two checks:
//
// 1. Coverage check: every changed file must be matched by at least one
// paths: glob in the docmap. Fails if any file is uncovered.
//
// 2. Stale-docs check: every docs: entry in the docmap must exist on disk
// (relative to --repo-root). Fails if any path is missing.
//
// Both checks always run — all failures are reported before exiting.
//
// Exit codes:
//
// 0 — clean (all files covered, all docs exist)
// 1 — one or more coverage or stale-doc failures
// 2 — usage error, missing flag, or YAML parse error
func runValidateDocmap(args []string) int {
fs := flag.NewFlagSet("validate-docmap", flag.ContinueOnError)
fs.SetOutput(errWriter)
docmapFlag := fs.String("docmap", "", "Path to doc-map YAML file (required)")
repoRootFlag := fs.String("repo-root", ".", "Repo root for resolving docs: paths (default: cwd)")
if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
// flag.ContinueOnError already wrote the error to errWriter.
return 2
}
if *docmapFlag == "" {
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Error: --docmap is required")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "usage: review-bot validate-docmap --docmap <path> [--repo-root <dir>]")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, " Changed files are read from stdin, one per line.")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, " Example: git diff --name-only origin/main HEAD | review-bot validate-docmap --docmap .review-bot/doc-map.yml")
return 2
}
// Resolve repoRoot first — the docmap path is validated against it below.
// Use an absolute, symlink-free path so a symlinked --repo-root cannot
// bypass the escape guard in validateDocmapPath or checkStaleDocs.
absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(*repoRootFlag)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: failed to resolve --repo-root %q: %v\n", *repoRootFlag, err)
return 2
}
resolvedRoot, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(absRoot)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: --repo-root %q does not exist\n", *repoRootFlag)
} else {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: failed to resolve --repo-root %q: %v\n", *repoRootFlag, err)
}
return 2
}
// Harden the docmap file path before reading it. The --docmap flag value
// may reference a PR-controlled file (e.g. .review-bot/doc-map.yml).
// Validate that it:
// 1. Resolves within resolvedRoot (prevent reading arbitrary host files).
// 2. Is not a symlink (prevent /dev/zero or symlink-based host probing).
// 3. Does not exceed maxDocmapBytes (prevent memory exhaustion from an
// oversized committed file).
if err := validateDocmapPath(*docmapFlag, resolvedRoot); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: --docmap %q is invalid: %v\n", *docmapFlag, err)
return 2
}
// Parse docmap YAML.
cfg, err := review.ParseDocMapConfig(*docmapFlag)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: failed to parse docmap %q: %v\n", *docmapFlag, err)
return 2
}
// Read changed files from stdin.
changedFiles, err := readLines(os.Stdin)
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: failed to read stdin: %v\n", err)
return 2
}
failed := false
// --- Check 1: Coverage ---
// Note: an empty docmap (no mappings) means every changed file is
// uncovered — there are no patterns to match against. This is intentional:
// if you declare a doc-map, every changed file must be accounted for.
// On empty stdin the check is vacuously true (no files to cover).
var uncovered []string
for _, f := range changedFiles {
// Normalize Windows-style backslashes to forward slashes so that
// changed-file paths from git on Windows match doc-map globs.
f = strings.ReplaceAll(f, "\\", "/")
if !review.FileCoveredByDocMap(cfg, f) {
uncovered = append(uncovered, f)
}
}
if len(uncovered) > 0 {
failed = true
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "ERROR: changed files with no docmap coverage:")
for _, f := range uncovered {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, " %s\n", f)
}
}
// --- Check 2: Stale docs ---
// checkStaleDocs validates each path before touching the filesystem; see
// its documentation for the path-traversal hardening applied.
staleDocs := checkStaleDocs(cfg, resolvedRoot)
if len(staleDocs) > 0 {
failed = true
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "ERROR: stale docmap docs: entries (paths do not exist):")
for _, d := range staleDocs {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, " %s\n", d)
}
}
if failed {
return 1
}
fmt.Fprintln(outWriter, "OK: docmap is valid")
return 0
}
// checkStaleDocs returns deduplicated docs: entries that do not exist under
// repoRoot.
//
// Path-traversal hardening: each docPath is validated with
// review.ValidateDocPath (rejects absolute paths and ".." segments) and then
// confined to repoRoot via filepath.Clean + filepath.Rel before os.Lstat is
// called. Symlinks are treated as stale — a CI tool running against
// PR-controlled content must not follow symlinks that could probe arbitrary
// host paths. Paths that fail any check are treated as invalid (reported as
// stale) without following any symlinks.
func checkStaleDocs(cfg *review.DocMapConfig, repoRoot string) []string {
seen := make(map[string]struct{})
var stale []string
for _, mapping := range cfg.Mappings {
for _, docPath := range mapping.Docs {
if docPath == "" {
continue
}
if _, ok := seen[docPath]; ok {
continue
}
seen[docPath] = struct{}{}
// Guard 1: reject absolute paths and ".." segments sourced from
// PR-controlled YAML before joining with repoRoot.
if err := review.ValidateDocPath(docPath); err != nil {
stale = append(stale, docPath)
continue
}
// Guard 2: verify the cleaned joined path does not escape repoRoot.
// filepath.Clean resolves any remaining ".." after the join; the
// filepath.Rel check confirms the path is still under repoRoot.
fullPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(repoRoot, filepath.FromSlash(docPath)))
rel, err := filepath.Rel(repoRoot, fullPath)
if err != nil || rel == ".." || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
stale = append(stale, docPath)
continue
}
// Use Lstat (not Stat) so symlinks are never followed. A symlink
// under repoRoot could point anywhere on the host, allowing a
// malicious PR to probe file existence. Treat symlinks as stale.
fi, err := os.Lstat(fullPath)
if err != nil {
stale = append(stale, docPath)
continue
}
if fi.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
stale = append(stale, docPath)
}
}
}
return stale
}
// readLines reads all non-empty trimmed lines from r.
func readLines(r io.Reader) ([]string, error) {
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(r)
var lines []string
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if line != "" {
lines = append(lines, line)
}
}
return lines, scanner.Err()
}