Add signature verification for release binary downloads #25
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Problem
The composite action downloads the review-bot binary from a Gitea release and verifies a SHA256 checksum. Both the binary and checksum come from the same source — this guards against corruption but not a compromised distribution point.
Proposal
Sign release binaries with a GPG key (or cosign) and verify the signature in the composite action before executing. This provides cryptographic proof of authenticity, not just integrity.
Priority
Low — we control the Gitea instance and the release pipeline. This is defense-in-depth for a supply-chain attack scenario that requires compromising our infrastructure first.
Context
Flagged as [NIT] by the security reviewer in PR #22.
Closing as wontfix. The threat model (we own the Gitea instance, checksums verify integrity) doesn't justify adding GPG/cosign infrastructure for an internal tool. If we ever publish this externally, we can revisit.