The composite action downloads the review-bot binary from a Gitea release and verifies a SHA256 checksum. Both the binary and checksum come from the same source — this guards against corruption but not a compromised distribution point.
Proposal
Sign release binaries with a GPG key (or cosign) and verify the signature in the composite action before executing. This provides cryptographic proof of authenticity, not just integrity.
Priority
Low — we control the Gitea instance and the release pipeline. This is defense-in-depth for a supply-chain attack scenario that requires compromising our infrastructure first.
Context
Flagged as [NIT] by the security reviewer in PR #22.
## Problem
The composite action downloads the review-bot binary from a Gitea release and verifies a SHA256 checksum. Both the binary and checksum come from the same source — this guards against corruption but not a compromised distribution point.
## Proposal
Sign release binaries with a GPG key (or cosign) and verify the signature in the composite action before executing. This provides cryptographic proof of authenticity, not just integrity.
## Priority
Low — we control the Gitea instance and the release pipeline. This is defense-in-depth for a supply-chain attack scenario that requires compromising our infrastructure first.
## Context
Flagged as [NIT] by the security reviewer in PR #22.
Closing as wontfix. The threat model (we own the Gitea instance, checksums verify integrity) doesn't justify adding GPG/cosign infrastructure for an internal tool. If we ever publish this externally, we can revisit.
Closing as wontfix. The threat model (we own the Gitea instance, checksums verify integrity) doesn't justify adding GPG/cosign infrastructure for an internal tool. If we ever publish this externally, we can revisit.
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Problem
The composite action downloads the review-bot binary from a Gitea release and verifies a SHA256 checksum. Both the binary and checksum come from the same source — this guards against corruption but not a compromised distribution point.
Proposal
Sign release binaries with a GPG key (or cosign) and verify the signature in the composite action before executing. This provides cryptographic proof of authenticity, not just integrity.
Priority
Low — we control the Gitea instance and the release pipeline. This is defense-in-depth for a supply-chain attack scenario that requires compromising our infrastructure first.
Context
Flagged as [NIT] by the security reviewer in PR #22.
Closing as wontfix. The threat model (we own the Gitea instance, checksums verify integrity) doesn't justify adding GPG/cosign infrastructure for an internal tool. If we ever publish this externally, we can revisit.