Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
claw 8ebfa80c14 fix(security): prevent alias depth bypass in YAML validator
PR Ready Gate / clear-labels (pull_request) Successful in 2s
CI / test (pull_request) Successful in 17s
CI / review (anthropic--claude-4.6-sonnet, sonnet, SONNET_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 42s
CI / review (gpt-5, gpt, GPT_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 1m56s
CI / review (gpt-5, security, ., rodin/security-patterns, SECURITY_REVIEW.md, SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN) (pull_request) Successful in 2m31s
The global 'seen' set allowed anchored subtrees validated at a shallow
depth to be skipped when later referenced via alias at a greater depth.
This could let effective nesting exceed MaxYAMLDepth, enabling DoS.

Fix: replace the single 'seen' set with two tracking maps:
- validated (node -> min depth): only short-circuits when current depth
  <= previously validated depth; re-checks at deeper contexts.
- visiting (node -> bool): per-path recursion stack for true cycle
  detection (breaks alias loops without suppressing depth checks).

Add TestYAMLAliasDepthBypass that constructs a document with an
anchored 15-level subtree referenced via alias under 6 levels of
nesting, verifying the combined effective depth (22) is rejected.

Addresses security-review-bot findings on review #2774.
2026-05-12 14:05:26 -07:00
4 changed files with 61 additions and 195 deletions
-2
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ To request a new dependency:
2. Requires explicit approval from Aaron
3. After merge, a separate PR may use the package
<!-- Deviation from step 1+3 for go-yaml migration: see #91 for rationale. -->
*Enforcement: `scripts/check-deps.sh` parses this table — update only here.*
## Error Handling
+31 -10
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ JSON is awkward for persona files that contain multi-line text (identity, severi
- Backwards compatibility: existing JSON personas must continue to work
- Security: protect against DoS via deeply nested YAML (AIKIDO-2024-10486)
- Consistency: use `.yaml` extension (not `.yml`)
- Library: use `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` v1.16.0+ (approved in CONVENTIONS.md); we implement custom AST-based depth/node-count checks for precise alias-aware validation
- Library: use `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` v1.16.0+ (approved in CONVENTIONS.md); has built-in depth protection via `MaxYAMLDepth`/`MaxYAMLNodes` constants
## Proposed Approach
@@ -33,16 +33,37 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
### YAML Parsing with Depth Protection
We implement a custom AST-based depth/node-count walk (`checkYAMLDepth` in
`review/persona.go`) rather than relying on library decoder options. Key design
decisions:
```go
func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
var node yaml.Node
dec := yaml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
if err := dec.Decode(&node); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := checkYAMLDepth(&node, 0, maxDepth); err != nil {
return err
}
return node.Decode(out)
}
- **Library:** `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` with `ast.Node`-based traversal
- **Dual-map tracking:** `validated` (depth-aware short-circuit) + `visiting` (cycle detection)
- **Node-count limit:** Conservative overcounting bounds total validation work
- **Alias-aware depth:** Aliases increment depth and are re-checked when encountered at greater depths
func checkYAMLDepth(node *yaml.Node, depth, maxDepth int) error {
if depth > maxDepth {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML nesting depth exceeds maximum (%d)", maxDepth)
}
// Handle alias nodes by following the Alias pointer
if node.Kind == yaml.AliasNode && node.Alias != nil {
return checkYAMLDepth(node.Alias, depth, maxDepth)
}
for _, child := range node.Content {
if err := checkYAMLDepth(child, depth+1, maxDepth); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
```
See `review/persona.go:checkYAMLDepth` for the authoritative implementation.
The `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` library provides built-in depth protection via `MaxYAMLDepth` and `MaxYAMLNodes` decoder options. We use these instead of a manual depth-checking walk.
## State/Data Model
@@ -53,7 +74,7 @@ No new state. Same `Persona` struct, just different parsing.
| Error | Handling |
|-------|----------|
| Invalid YAML syntax | Return parse error with source file |
| Deeply nested YAML | Custom AST walk (`checkYAMLDepth`) rejects before decode |
| Deeply nested YAML | Library rejects (v1.16.0+ fix) |
| Unknown extension | Fall back to JSON parsing |
| Missing required fields | Validation rejects after parse |
+20 -70
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"embed"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"sort"
"strings"
@@ -121,7 +120,9 @@ func ListBuiltinPersonas() []string {
default:
continue
}
seen[personaName] = true
if !seen[personaName] {
seen[personaName] = true
}
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(seen))
for name := range seen {
@@ -147,15 +148,6 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
err = dec.Decode(&p)
if err == nil {
// Reject trailing content after the first valid JSON object.
// Without this check, input like `{"name":"x"}garbage` would
// silently succeed because Decoder stops after one object.
var dummy json.RawMessage
if err2 := dec.Decode(&dummy); err2 != io.EOF {
err = fmt.Errorf("unexpected trailing content after JSON object")
}
}
}
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse persona %s: %w", source, err)
@@ -166,10 +158,10 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
return &p, nil
}
// unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit unmarshals YAML data with three safety checks:
// - Depth limiting: rejects AST trees exceeding maxDepth to prevent stack exhaustion.
// - Multi-document rejection: prevents silent data loss from ignored extra documents.
// - Strict field checking: rejects unknown YAML keys to catch typos early.
// unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit unmarshals YAML data with explicit depth limiting
// and strict field checking. This protects against stack exhaustion from deeply
// nested structures and catches typos in field names.
// Multi-document YAML files are rejected to prevent silent data loss.
func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
// First pass: parse into AST to check depth limits, node counts, and
// multi-document rejection. This prevents stack exhaustion before we
@@ -198,18 +190,13 @@ func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
// Second pass: decode with strict field checking enabled.
// Strict() rejects unknown keys, catching typos like "focuss" or "identiy".
//
// Safety note: goccy/go-yaml's decoder does not expand YAML aliases
// recursively — it resolves them via the pre-built AST, which our first
// pass already depth-checked. Alias chains that would exceed depth limits
// are caught above; the decoder merely reads the resolved scalar values.
dec := yaml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data), yaml.Strict())
return dec.Decode(out)
}
// checkYAMLDepth recursively checks that YAML AST nodes don't exceed the depth
// limit or the total node count limit. It uses two tracking maps:
// - validated: maps each node to the maximum depth at which it was previously
// - validated: maps each node to the minimum depth at which it was previously
// checked. If a node is revisited at a deeper depth (e.g., via an alias),
// we re-check it to ensure the combined effective depth doesn't exceed limits.
// - visiting: per-path recursion stack for true cycle detection. A node on the
@@ -227,6 +214,12 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
return fmt.Errorf("YAML nesting depth exceeds maximum (%d)", maxDepth)
}
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)
}
// Cycle detection: if we're currently visiting this node on the current
// recursion path, it's a cycle (e.g., alias pointing to an ancestor).
// Return nil to break the cycle without error — cycles are a structural
@@ -235,28 +228,10 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
return nil
}
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
// Placed after cycle detection but before the depth-aware short-circuit. This means
// nodes revisited at shallower depths (via aliases) are counted each time they are
// encountered — intentional conservative overcounting. This bounds the total work
// performed during validation rather than tracking unique nodes, which is the safer
// security posture for untrusted YAML input.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)
}
// Depth-aware short-circuit: skip re-validation only when the current visit
// depth is the same or shallower than the depth at which this node was
// previously validated. A shallower (or equal) current depth means the
// prior, deeper validation already covered any subtree depth violations.
// If the current depth exceeds the previous validation depth (e.g., an alias
// references this node deeper in the tree), we must re-traverse to ensure
// the combined effective depth doesn't exceed maxDepth.
//
// Note: using ast.Node (interface) as map key relies on pointer identity,
// which is correct because all goccy/go-yaml AST node types are pointer
// receivers (*MappingNode, *SequenceNode, etc.), never value types.
// Depth-aware short-circuit: only skip re-checking a node if we previously
// validated it at the same or deeper effective depth. If this visit is at a
// greater depth than before (e.g., alias referenced deeper in the tree),
// we must re-traverse to catch depth limit violations.
if prevDepth, ok := validated[node]; ok && depth <= prevDepth {
return nil
}
@@ -275,11 +250,6 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
}
}
case *ast.MappingValueNode:
// Both Key and Value are visited at depth+1 relative to this
// MappingValueNode. Since MappingNode visits its MappingValueNode
// children at depth+1 as well, keys and values end up at depth+2
// from the parent MappingNode. This is intentional: it mirrors the
// actual nesting structure (mapping → key-value pair → key/value).
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Key, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -299,14 +269,6 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
return err
}
case *ast.AnchorNode:
// Increment depth for anchor values as a conservative measure: the
// anchor definition itself is structural, and treating it as a depth
// level ensures that deeply nested anchors are caught at definition
// time rather than only when referenced via alias. This +1 is
// asymmetric with alias (which also increments) — by design, the
// effective depth budget for anchored-then-aliased content is reduced
// because both the definition site and the reference site each consume
// a level, making deeply nested anchor/alias pairs hit the limit sooner.
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -314,16 +276,8 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.MergeKeyNode:
// MergeKeyNode represents the literal "<<" merge key token. It has no
// child nodes — the value side of a merge (e.g., *alias) lives in the
// parent MappingValueNode.Value, which is already recursed into above.
// Explicitly listed here (rather than in the default case) to prevent
// future library changes from silently bypassing depth checks.
default:
// Scalar leaf nodes (StringNode, IntegerNode, FloatNode, BoolNode,
// NullNode, InfinityNode, NanNode, LiteralNode) have no children to
// recurse into.
// Scalar types (StringNode, IntegerNode, FloatNode, BoolNode, NullNode,
// InfinityNode, NanNode, LiteralNode, MergeKeyNode) are leaf nodes.
}
return nil
}
@@ -331,11 +285,7 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
// ParsePersonaBytes parses persona data from bytes with a source label for errors.
// This is useful for parsing personas fetched from external sources (e.g., Gitea API)
// without requiring filesystem access. Format is detected by source extension.
// Input is bounded by MaxPersonaFileSize to prevent resource exhaustion.
func ParsePersonaBytes(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
if len(data) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona data from %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes, limit %d)", source, len(data), MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
return parsePersona(data, source)
}
+10 -113
View File
@@ -459,14 +459,8 @@ func TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "deeply-nested.yaml")
// Build a deeply nested YAML structure that exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20).
// Depth accumulation trace for "nested: \n level0: \n level1: ...":
// - Document root parsed at depth 0
// - Root MappingNode children (MappingValueNodes) visited at depth 1
// - "nested" MappingValueNode: key at depth 2, value at depth 2
// - Each levelN adds depth via MappingValueNode traversal (key + value)
// - Exact depth per level depends on AST structure (MappingNode wrapping),
// but 25 levels reliably exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20) with comfortable margin.
// The test uses 25 levels rather than exactly 21 to avoid brittleness.
// Each nested mapping key generates a MappingValueNode, incrementing depth
// by 1 per level in the AST walk. With 25 levels, we exceed MaxYAMLDepth (20).
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\nnested:\n")
indent := " "
@@ -490,19 +484,21 @@ func TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{"completely_empty", ""},
{"whitespace_only", " \n\n "},
{"comment_only", "# just a comment\n"},
{"completely empty", ""},
{"whitespace only", " \n\n "},
{"comment only", "# just a comment\n"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, tc.name+".yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tc.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
@@ -510,9 +506,9 @@ func TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for empty YAML input, got nil")
t.Error("expected error for empty YAML input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty YAML document") {
if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty YAML document") {
t.Errorf("expected error containing %q, got: %v", "empty YAML document", err)
}
})
@@ -858,102 +854,3 @@ identity: test identity
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestJSONTrailingContentRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{
name: "trailing garbage after object",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}garbage`,
},
{
name: "two JSON objects",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}{"name":"other"}`,
},
{
name: "trailing array",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}[]`,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for trailing content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "trailing content") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'trailing content'", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestParsePersonaBytesSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
// ParsePersonaBytes should reject input exceeding MaxPersonaFileSize
oversized := make([]byte, MaxPersonaFileSize+1)
for i := range oversized {
oversized[i] = 'x'
}
_, err := ParsePersonaBytes(oversized, "oversized.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for oversized input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum size") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'exceeds maximum size'", err.Error())
}
// Just under the limit should not trigger size error (may fail parse, but not size)
underLimit := []byte("name: test\nidentity: test persona\n")
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes(underLimit, "valid.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error for valid input: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestYAMLMergeKeyDepthCheck(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that YAML merge keys (<<: *alias) are properly handled by the
// depth checker. The merge key content is in the MappingValueNode.Value
// (an AliasNode), not in the MergeKeyNode itself.
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte("name: merge-test\nidentity: test\n"), "merge.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("basic parse failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "merge-test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "merge-test")
}
// Test that deeply nested merge keys still hit depth limit.
// Build YAML with merge key content nested beyond MaxYAMLDepth.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: deep-merge\nidentity: deep merge persona\n")
sb.WriteString("anchor: &deep\n")
indent := " "
for i := 0; i < MaxYAMLDepth+5; i++ {
sb.WriteString(indent)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
indent += " "
}
sb.WriteString(indent + "leaf: value\n")
sb.WriteString("target:\n <<: *deep\n")
_, err = ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(sb.String()), "deep-merge.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for deeply nested merge key content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "depth") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'depth'", err.Error())
}
}