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Author SHA1 Message Date
Rodin 0619e2b617 fix: address review feedback on check-deps script
- Accept import paths starting with digit (e.g., 9fans.net/go) by
  relaxing filter from ^[a-zA-Z] to ^[[:alnum:]]
- Fix misleading comment: loop uses Bash process substitution, not POSIX
- Remove redundant \$ from grep regex (literal $ unreachable)
- Capture stderr separately in go list to avoid mixing errors with output
- Clarify CONVENTIONS.md wording on transitive vs direct deps

Reviewed-by: sonnet-review-bot
Reviewed-by: gpt-review-bot
2026-05-10 14:09:03 -07:00
36 changed files with 300 additions and 5387 deletions
+24 -330
View File
@@ -1,43 +1,17 @@
# This composite action supports both Gitea Actions and GitHub Actions runners.
# It detects the VCS host type by checking whether github.api_url is set
# (present on GitHub.com and GHES runners, absent on Gitea runners) and uses
# the appropriate releases API for version resolution and binary download
# (REST API on GitHub, direct URLs on Gitea).
#
# Security notes:
# - On GitHub/GHES (VCS_TYPE=github), inputs.vcs-url is IGNORED to prevent
# token exfiltration. API calls use github.api_url; downloads use
# github.server_url. Tokens are never sent to user-supplied URLs.
# - On Gitea (VCS_TYPE=gitea), inputs.vcs-url is validated (https scheme,
# no whitespace/newlines, and DNS resolution to a public IP) before use.
# Python3 resolves the hostname and rejects RFC1918, RFC6598 (carrier-grade
# NAT), loopback, link-local, and other reserved addresses to prevent SSRF attacks.
# The installed review-bot binary additionally uses a safe HTTP transport
# (DialContext-level IP check) for all Gitea API calls at runtime.
# The binary also exposes a `validate-url` subcommand for use in any future
# shell steps that need to validate a URL before passing it to curl.
# - action-repo is validated against owner/repo pattern.
# - Tokens are passed via masked environment variables, not step outputs.
#
# This composite action is designed for Gitea Actions runners.
# Gitea Actions supports GitHub Actions syntax including $GITHUB_OUTPUT,
# actions/cache, and actions/checkout.
# Requirements: python3, sha256sum, curl (all present on ubuntu-* runners).
name: 'AI Code Review'
description: 'Run AI-powered code review on a pull request using review-bot'
inputs:
vcs-url:
description: 'VCS server URL (only used on Gitea runners; ignored on GitHub/GHES). Defaults to server_url.'
gitea-url:
description: 'Gitea instance URL (defaults to server_url)'
required: false
default: ''
repo:
description: 'Repository to review (owner/name, defaults to current)'
required: false
default: ''
action-repo:
description: 'Repository hosting review-bot releases (owner/name). Defaults to github.action_repository or rodin/review-bot.'
required: false
default: ''
action-repo-token:
description: 'Token for downloading release assets from action-repo (defaults to github.token on GitHub, reviewer-token on Gitea). Required for private repos.'
description: 'Repository (owner/name, defaults to current)'
required: false
default: ''
pr-number:
@@ -45,7 +19,7 @@ inputs:
required: false
default: ''
reviewer-token:
description: 'Token for posting the review'
description: 'Gitea token for posting the review'
required: true
reviewer-name:
description: 'Display name for the reviewer'
@@ -138,325 +112,45 @@ runs:
id: version
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# --- Input Validation ---
# Determine the repo hosting review-bot releases (not the repo being reviewed)
ACTION_REPO="${{ inputs.action-repo }}"
if [ -z "$ACTION_REPO" ]; then
# github.action_repository is the repo containing the running action
ACTION_REPO="${{ github.action_repository }}"
fi
if [ -z "$ACTION_REPO" ]; then
# Final fallback for Gitea (which may not set action_repository)
ACTION_REPO="rodin/review-bot"
echo "::notice::action-repo not specified and github.action_repository is empty; falling back to rodin/review-bot"
fi
# Validate ACTION_REPO matches owner/repo pattern (prevent path traversal)
if ! printf '%s' "$ACTION_REPO" | grep -qE '^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+/[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$'; then
echo "Error: action-repo '${ACTION_REPO}' does not match expected owner/repo format" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Detect VCS host type using github.api_url context.
# github.api_url is set on GitHub.com (https://api.github.com) and GHES
# (https://<host>/api/v3). It is empty/unset on Gitea Actions runners.
GITHUB_API_URL="${{ github.api_url }}"
if [ -n "$GITHUB_API_URL" ]; then
VCS_TYPE="github"
else
VCS_TYPE="gitea"
fi
# Determine SERVER_URL based on VCS type.
# SECURITY: On GitHub/GHES, ALWAYS use github.server_url — never trust
# inputs.vcs-url to prevent token exfiltration to attacker-controlled hosts.
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
SERVER_URL="${{ github.server_url }}"
if [ -n "${{ inputs.vcs-url }}" ]; then
echo "::warning::inputs.vcs-url is ignored on GitHub/GHES runners (VCS_TYPE=github). Using github.server_url instead."
fi
else
SERVER_URL="${{ inputs.vcs-url || github.server_url }}"
fi
# Strip trailing slash if present
SERVER_URL="${SERVER_URL%/}"
# Validate SERVER_URL for Gitea path: must be https, no whitespace/newlines.
# The [^[:space:]] class already rejects newlines, so no separate newline check needed.
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "gitea" ]; then
if ! printf '%s' "$SERVER_URL" | grep -qE '^https://[^[:space:]]+$'; then
echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' must be an https:// URL with no whitespace" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Additional IP-level SSRF defense: resolve the hostname and reject
# requests to RFC1918, RFC6598 (carrier-grade NAT), loopback, link-local,
# and other reserved addresses.
# python3 is required on ubuntu-* runners (see requirements comment above).
# Use printf to write the script to a temp file so the python lines are valid
# YAML (each indented line becomes a printf argument — no unindented code).
# SERVER_URL is passed via CHECK_URL env var, never interpolated into python code.
printf '%s\n' \
'import socket,ipaddress,sys,os' \
'from urllib.parse import urlparse' \
'u=os.environ["CHECK_URL"]; parsed=urlparse(u)' \
'if parsed.username or parsed.password:' \
' print("Error: URL contains user-info — not allowed",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(2)' \
'h=parsed.hostname' \
'(print("Error: no hostname",file=sys.stderr) or sys.exit(2)) if not h else None' \
'try: rs=socket.getaddrinfo(h,None)' \
'except socket.gaierror as e: print(f"DNS error: {e}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
'if not rs: print("Error: no addresses",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
'for _,_,_,_,(a,*_) in rs:' \
' ip=ipaddress.ip_address(a)' \
' if isinstance(ip,ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped: ip=ip.ipv4_mapped' \
' cgn=ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")' \
' if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved or ip in cgn:' \
' print(f"blocked: {a}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
> /tmp/_ssrf_check.py
CHECK_URL="${SERVER_URL}" python3 /tmp/_ssrf_check.py || {
echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' resolves to a private/reserved IP address" >&2
exit 1
}
fi
# Determine auth token for release API requests
ACTION_TOKEN="${{ inputs.action-repo-token }}"
if [ -z "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
ACTION_TOKEN="${{ github.token }}"
else
ACTION_TOKEN="${{ inputs.reviewer-token }}"
fi
fi
# Validate token contains no control characters (defense-in-depth against header injection)
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
if printf '%s' "$ACTION_TOKEN" | LC_ALL=C grep -q '[^[:print:]]'; then
echo "Error: ACTION_TOKEN contains control characters" >&2
exit 1
fi
fi
GITEA_URL="${{ inputs.gitea-url || github.server_url }}"
REPO="${{ inputs.repo || 'rodin/review-bot' }}"
if [ "${{ inputs.version }}" = "latest" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
# SECURITY: Use github.api_url which is a trusted platform-provided value.
# Never construct API URLs from user-supplied inputs on GitHub.
API_URL="${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases?per_page=1"
else
# Gitea API — SERVER_URL was validated above
API_URL="${SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases?limit=1"
fi
# Fetch latest version with inline auth header (no intermediate variable)
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" "$API_URL" \
| python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
else
VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" "$API_URL" \
| python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
fi
else
VERSION=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 "$API_URL" \
| python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
fi
VERSION=$(curl -sSf "${GITEA_URL}/api/v1/repos/${REPO}/releases?limit=1" \
| python3 -c "import sys, json; releases = json.load(sys.stdin); print(releases[0]['tag_name'] if releases else '')")
if [ -z "$VERSION" ]; then
echo "Failed to determine latest version from ${API_URL}" >&2
echo "Failed to determine latest version" >&2
exit 1
fi
else
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
fi
# Validate VERSION: no slashes or whitespace (prevent path traversal).
# [:space:] includes newlines and carriage returns in POSIX.
if printf '%s' "$VERSION" | grep -qE '[/[:space:]]'; then
echo "Error: VERSION '${VERSION}' contains invalid characters (newline, slash, or whitespace)" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Detect OS and architecture for platform-specific binary download
OS_RAW=$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
case "$OS_RAW" in
linux) OS="linux" ;;
darwin) OS="darwin" ;;
*)
echo "Error: unsupported OS: $(uname -s)" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
RAW_ARCH=$(uname -m)
case "$RAW_ARCH" in
x86_64) ARCH="amd64" ;;
aarch64 | arm64) ARCH="arm64" ;;
*)
echo "Error: unsupported architecture: $RAW_ARCH" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
echo "version=${VERSION}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "os=${OS}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "arch=${ARCH}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "action_repo=${ACTION_REPO}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "server_url=${SERVER_URL}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "vcs_type=${VCS_TYPE}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# SECURITY: Pass token via masked environment variable instead of step output.
# Step outputs can leak in debug logs; GITHUB_ENV with masking is safer.
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
echo "::add-mask::${ACTION_TOKEN}"
echo "ACTION_TOKEN=${ACTION_TOKEN}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Cache review-bot binary
id: cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot
key: review-bot-${{ steps.version.outputs.os }}-${{ steps.version.outputs.arch }}-${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
key: review-bot-linux-amd64-${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
- name: Install review-bot
if: steps.cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
SERVER_URL="${{ steps.version.outputs.server_url }}"
ACTION_REPO="${{ steps.version.outputs.action_repo }}"
GITEA_URL="${{ inputs.gitea-url || github.server_url }}"
REPO="${{ inputs.repo || 'rodin/review-bot' }}"
VERSION="${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
VCS_TYPE="${{ steps.version.outputs.vcs_type }}"
OS="${{ steps.version.outputs.os }}"
ARCH="${{ steps.version.outputs.arch }}"
# Read token from masked environment variable (set in Determine version step)
# Falls back to empty if not set (public repos don't need auth)
ACTION_TOKEN="${ACTION_TOKEN:-}"
BINARY="review-bot-${OS}-${ARCH}"
BINARY="review-bot-linux-amd64"
# SECURITY: Re-validate SERVER_URL at the start of this step to mitigate DNS
# rebinding attacks. A DNS TTL expiry between "Determine version" and here
# could allow an attacker to change the resolved IP to a private/reserved
# address, causing curl to send ACTION_TOKEN to an internal host.
# Only needed on Gitea path (VCS_TYPE=gitea); GitHub/GHES uses platform-controlled URLs.
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "gitea" ]; then
printf '%s\n' \
'import socket,ipaddress,sys,os' \
'from urllib.parse import urlparse' \
'u=os.environ["CHECK_URL"]; parsed=urlparse(u)' \
'if parsed.username or parsed.password:' \
' print("Error: URL contains user-info — not allowed",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(2)' \
'h=parsed.hostname' \
'(print("Error: no hostname",file=sys.stderr) or sys.exit(2)) if not h else None' \
'try: rs=socket.getaddrinfo(h,None)' \
'except socket.gaierror as e: print(f"DNS error: {e}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
'if not rs: print("Error: no addresses",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
'for _,_,_,_,(a,*_) in rs:' \
' ip=ipaddress.ip_address(a)' \
' if isinstance(ip,ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped: ip=ip.ipv4_mapped' \
' cgn=ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")' \
' if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved or ip in cgn:' \
' print(f"blocked: {a}",file=sys.stderr); sys.exit(1)' \
> /tmp/_ssrf_check_install.py
CHECK_URL="${SERVER_URL}" python3 /tmp/_ssrf_check_install.py || {
echo "Error: SERVER_URL '${SERVER_URL}' resolves to a private/reserved IP address" >&2
exit 1
}
fi
if [ "$VCS_TYPE" = "github" ]; then
# GitHub/GHES: Use REST API for release asset downloads.
# Web release URLs ({server}/.../releases/download/{tag}/{asset}) redirect
# to S3 and don't reliably support Authorization headers for private repos.
# The REST API endpoint with Accept: application/octet-stream is required.
# GITHUB_API_URL: trusted platform value, same as detected in "Determine version" step.
GITHUB_API_URL="${{ github.api_url }}"
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
RELEASE_JSON=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/tags/${VERSION}")
else
RELEASE_JSON=$(curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/tags/${VERSION}")
fi
# Extract asset IDs for binary and checksums
BINARY_ASSET_ID=$(printf '%s' "$RELEASE_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys, json; assets = json.load(sys.stdin).get('assets', []); matches = [a['id'] for a in assets if a['name'] == '${BINARY}']; print(matches[0] if matches else '')")
if [ -z "$BINARY_ASSET_ID" ]; then
echo "Error: could not find asset '${BINARY}' in release ${VERSION}" >&2
exit 1
fi
CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID=$(printf '%s' "$RELEASE_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys, json; assets = json.load(sys.stdin).get('assets', []); matches = [a['id'] for a in assets if a['name'] == 'checksums.txt']; print(matches[0] if matches else '')")
if [ -z "$CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID" ]; then
echo "Error: could not find asset 'checksums.txt' in release ${VERSION}" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Download assets via REST API with Accept: application/octet-stream
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${BINARY_ASSET_ID}" \
-o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
-H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID}" \
-o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
else
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${BINARY_ASSET_ID}" \
-o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSfL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Accept: application/octet-stream" \
"${GITHUB_API_URL}/repos/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/assets/${CHECKSUMS_ASSET_ID}" \
-o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
fi
else
# Gitea: Direct download via web release URLs (Gitea serves assets
# directly without redirects — no -L needed).
# SECURITY: Omitting -L prevents forwarding Authorization header to
# unexpected hosts if Gitea ever introduces CDN redirects.
DOWNLOAD_URL="${SERVER_URL}/${ACTION_REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}"
if [ -n "$ACTION_TOKEN" ]; then
curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
-H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
-H "Authorization: token ${ACTION_TOKEN}" \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
else
curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/${BINARY}" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSf --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \
"${DOWNLOAD_URL}/checksums.txt" -o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
fi
fi
curl -sSfL "${GITEA_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/${BINARY}" \
-o "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
curl -sSfL "${GITEA_URL}/${REPO}/releases/download/${VERSION}/checksums.txt" \
-o "${{ runner.temp }}/checksums.txt"
# Verify SHA-256 checksum
# NOTE: This verifies integrity (download wasn't corrupted) but not
# authenticity — both binary and checksums come from the same server.
# For stronger guarantees, consider GPG signature verification.
cd "${{ runner.temp }}"
EXPECTED=$(grep -E "^[0-9a-f]+[[:space:]]+\*?${BINARY}$" checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')
# sha256sum (GNU) is not available on macOS; use shasum -a 256 on darwin.
if [ "${OS}" = "darwin" ]; then
ACTUAL=$(shasum -a 256 review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
else
ACTUAL=$(sha256sum review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
fi
EXPECTED=$(grep "${BINARY}" checksums.txt | awk '{print $1}')
ACTUAL=$(sha256sum review-bot | awk '{print $1}')
if [ -z "$EXPECTED" ]; then
echo "Error: no checksum found for ${BINARY}" >&2
@@ -470,12 +164,12 @@ runs:
fi
chmod +x "${{ runner.temp }}/review-bot"
echo "Installed review-bot-${OS}-${ARCH} ${VERSION} (checksum verified)"
echo "Installed review-bot ${VERSION} (checksum verified)"
- name: Run review
shell: bash
env:
VCS_URL: ${{ steps.version.outputs.server_url }}
GITEA_URL: ${{ inputs.gitea-url || github.server_url }}
GITEA_REPO: ${{ inputs.repo || github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ inputs.pr-number || github.event.pull_request.number }}
REVIEWER_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.reviewer-token }}
+3 -5
View File
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ jobs:
- name: security
token_secret: SECURITY_REVIEW_TOKEN
model: gpt-5
patterns_repo: rodin/security-patterns
patterns_files: "."
system_prompt_file: SECURITY_REVIEW.md
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@@ -49,7 +47,7 @@ jobs:
- run: go build -o review-bot ./cmd/review-bot
- name: Run ${{ matrix.name }} review
env:
VCS_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}
GITEA_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}
GITEA_REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
REVIEWER_TOKEN: ${{ secrets[matrix.token_secret] }}
@@ -62,8 +60,8 @@ jobs:
AICORE_API_URL: ${{ secrets.AICORE_API_URL }}
AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP: ${{ secrets.AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP }}
CONVENTIONS_FILE: "CONVENTIONS.md"
PATTERNS_REPO: ${{ matrix.patterns_repo || 'rodin/go-patterns' }}
PATTERNS_FILES: ${{ matrix.patterns_files || 'README.md,patterns/' }}
PATTERNS_REPO: "rodin/go-patterns"
PATTERNS_FILES: "README.md,patterns/"
LLM_TIMEOUT: "600"
SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE: ${{ matrix.system_prompt_file }}
run: ./review-bot
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@
| Package | Use Case | Scope |
|---------|----------|-------|
| `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` | YAML parsing and AST inspection (subpkgs: `ast`, `parser`) | production |
| `gopkg.in/yaml.v3` | YAML parsing (persona files, config) | production |
| `github.com/google/go-cmp` | Test comparisons (`cmp.Diff`) | test only |
**Any import not in this table or the Go standard library is forbidden.**
Transitive dependencies of approved packages are automatically allowed.
Only *direct* dependencies (listed in go.mod without `// indirect`) are checked against this allowlist. Transitive dependencies pulled in by approved packages are implicitly allowed.
To request a new dependency:
1. Open a PR that ONLY updates this table
-175
View File
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
# Plan: Issue #125 — Rename GITEA_URL → VCS_URL
## Problem
The `GITEA_URL` environment variable (and `--gitea-url` flag) implies the binary only works with Gitea.
Now that review-bot supports both Gitea and GitHub/GHES, this name is misleading.
Renaming to `VCS_URL` makes the binary platform-agnostic in its interface.
## Constraints
- Must not break existing users who already use `GITEA_URL` — need a fallback
- The CLI flag `--gitea-url` should also be updated to `--vcs-url` for consistency
- `INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL` in integration tests is a test-only env var, not the binary's interface; but should be updated for clarity
- The action YAML uses `GITEA_URL` as an internal shell variable in bash scripts — distinct from the env var passed to the binary
- All changes must compile and pass existing tests
## Files Affected
### Binary / Go source
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `cmd/review-bot/main.go` | Rename `--gitea-url``--vcs-url`, add `VCS_URL` as primary, keep `GITEA_URL` fallback |
| `cmd/review-bot/integration_test.go` | Rename `INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL``INTEGRATION_VCS_URL` (test-only, no external compat concern) |
| `integration_test.go` | Same — rename `INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL``INTEGRATION_VCS_URL` |
### Action YAML
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `.gitea/actions/review/action.yml` | Rename input `gitea-url``vcs-url`; update env var passed to binary: `VCS_URL` instead of `GITEA_URL`; keep internal bash var as `GITEA_URL` (only used for release download, not passed to binary) |
| `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` | Rename `GITEA_URL` env var to `VCS_URL` in Run review step |
### Documentation
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `README.md` | Update CLI example, env var table entry |
## Proposed Approach
### 1. Backward-compatible env var lookup in main.go
Replace:
```go
giteaURL := flag.String("gitea-url", envOrDefault("GITEA_URL", ""), "Gitea instance URL")
```
With:
```go
giteaURL := flag.String("vcs-url", envOrDefaultFallback("VCS_URL", "GITEA_URL", ""), "VCS server URL (e.g. https://gitea.example.com)")
```
Add a helper:
```go
// envOrDefaultFallback reads primary env var; if empty, falls back to deprecated env var.
func envOrDefaultFallback(primary, deprecated, defaultVal string) string {
if v := os.Getenv(primary); v != "" {
return v
}
if v := os.Getenv(deprecated); v != "" {
slog.Warn("deprecated env var in use; rename to " + primary, "old", deprecated, "new", primary)
return v
}
return defaultVal
}
```
**Note:** This must be called AFTER `setupLogger` conceptually, but the flag default is evaluated at flag registration time. Since `setupLogger` runs before `flag.Parse()`, the slog.Warn will print correctly at runtime. We use `log.Printf` as a fallback if this proves problematic.
Actually — flag defaults are evaluated at registration (line 57), before `setupLogger`. The warning won't go through slog. Two options:
- Use `log.Printf` for the deprecation warning (always visible)
- Move the fallback lookup to after `flag.Parse()`, checking if the parsed value is still empty
**Decision:** Move fallback to a post-parse check. This is cleaner:
```go
vcsURL := flag.String("vcs-url", os.Getenv("VCS_URL"), "VCS server URL")
flag.Parse()
// Backward compat: fall back to deprecated GITEA_URL
if *vcsURL == "" {
if v := os.Getenv("GITEA_URL"); v != "" {
slog.Warn("GITEA_URL is deprecated; use VCS_URL instead")
*vcsURL = v
}
}
```
This is clean, idiomatic, and the warning goes through slog correctly.
### 2. Keep `--gitea-url` as deprecated alias
Add a hidden flag for backward compat:
```go
giteaURLAlias := flag.String("gitea-url", "", "Deprecated: use --vcs-url")
```
Post-parse:
```go
if *vcsURL == "" && *giteaURLAlias != "" {
slog.Warn("--gitea-url is deprecated; use --vcs-url instead")
*vcsURL = *giteaURLAlias
}
```
### 3. Internal variable rename
Rename `giteaURL` local variable → `vcsURL` throughout `main.go` for consistency.
### 4. Error message update
```go
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Required: --vcs-url, --repo, --pr, --reviewer-token, --llm-model\n")
```
### 5. Action YAML changes
In `.gitea/actions/review/action.yml`:
- Input `gitea-url``vcs-url` (with same description, `required: false`, `default: ''`)
- Line 172: `GITEA_URL: ${{ inputs.gitea-url || github.server_url }}``VCS_URL: ${{ inputs.vcs-url || github.server_url }}`
- Lines 115, 140: internal bash vars `GITEA_URL=` are used for downloading binaries — NOT passed to the review-bot binary. Leave them as internal bash vars (they're scope-local in bash). These could be renamed to `SERVER_URL` or `BASE_URL` for local clarity, but renaming them isn't strictly required.
In `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml`:
- Line 52: `GITEA_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}``VCS_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}`
### 6. Integration test updates
`INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL``INTEGRATION_VCS_URL` in both test files.
### 7. README
- CLI example: `--gitea-url``--vcs-url`
- Env var table: `GITEA_URL``VCS_URL`, add note about `GITEA_URL` fallback
## Backward Compatibility Summary
| Old | New | Fallback? |
|-----|-----|-----------|
| `GITEA_URL` env var | `VCS_URL` | ✅ with deprecation warning |
| `--gitea-url` flag | `--vcs-url` | ✅ with deprecation warning |
| `gitea-url` action input | `vcs-url` | ⚠️ No (action version bump handles this) |
| `INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL` | `INTEGRATION_VCS_URL` | N/A (test-only) |
## Error Cases
- Both `VCS_URL` and `GITEA_URL` set: `VCS_URL` wins (primary takes precedence)
- Both `--vcs-url` and `--gitea-url` provided: `--vcs-url` wins
- Neither set: existing "missing required flags" error unchanged
## Edge Cases
- `os.Getenv` returns "" for unset AND set-to-empty — consistent with existing behavior
- The `envOrDefault` helper is unchanged; we add `envOrDefaultFallback` for the one renamed var
## Testing Strategy
- Existing unit tests pass unchanged (they don't test env var parsing directly)
- Integration tests updated to use new env var name
- Manual: `GITEA_URL=https://example.com ./review-bot --repo x --pr 1 ...` should print deprecation warning and proceed
- Manual: `VCS_URL=https://example.com ./review-bot ...` should work silently
## Completion Checklist
1. `VCS_URL` is read first; `GITEA_URL` is fallback with deprecation warning
2. `--vcs-url` flag is primary; `--gitea-url` is deprecated alias with warning
3. Error message references `--vcs-url` not `--gitea-url`
4. `action.yml` passes `VCS_URL` (not `GITEA_URL`) to the binary
5. `ci.yml` passes `VCS_URL` (not `GITEA_URL`) to the binary
6. README updated in CLI example and env var table
7. Integration tests use `INTEGRATION_VCS_URL`
8. `go test ./...` passes
9. `go vet ./...` passes
10. `go build ./cmd/review-bot` succeeds
## Open Questions
- Should the CLI flag `--gitea-url` be completely hidden from `--help` or just deprecated with a note? The issue doesn't specify. Decision: keep it visible but add "(deprecated: use --vcs-url)" to the description.
- Should action.yml also add `gitea-url` as a deprecated input alias? The issue says "Update the action to pass the new env var name" — no mention of backward compat for the action input. Decision: rename only, no alias (action users pin a version anyway).
- The bash-internal `GITEA_URL` variable in action.yml scripts (used for release download, not passed to binary) — rename for clarity? Decision: yes, rename to `BASE_URL` to avoid confusion with the env var.
+33 -47
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ AI-powered code review bot for Gitea pull requests. Fetches diff + context, send
- **Smart budget**: Automatically trims context to fit model token limits
- **Idempotent reviews**: Posts new review, then cleans up stale ones (one review per bot)
- **Custom prompts**: Load additional instructions from a file (e.g. security-focused review)
- **Minimal dependencies**: Go stdlib + `gopkg.in/yaml.v3` only
- **Zero dependencies**: Go stdlib only
## Quick Start: Composite Action
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ AI Core handles OAuth token management and deployment discovery automatically. M
| `patterns-files` | No | `README.md` | Files/directories to fetch from pattern repos |
| `system-prompt-file` | No | `""` | Local file with additional system prompt instructions |
| `persona` | No | `""` | Built-in persona name (security, architect, docs) |
| `persona-file` | No | `""` | Path to persona file (YAML or JSON) with custom review focus |
| `persona-file` | No | `""` | Path to persona JSON file with custom review focus |
| `temperature` | No | `0` | LLM temperature (0 = server default) |
| `timeout` | No | `300` | LLM request timeout in seconds |
| `dry-run` | No | `false` | Print review to stdout instead of posting |
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ Rules:
```bash
review-bot \
--vcs-url https://gitea.example.com \
--gitea-url https://gitea.example.com \
--repo owner/name \
--pr 42 \
--reviewer-token "$GITEA_TOKEN" \
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ All flags have environment variable equivalents:
| Flag | Env Var |
|------|---------|
| `--vcs-url` | `VCS_URL` (fallback: `GITEA_URL`) |
| `--gitea-url` | `GITEA_URL` |
| `--repo` | `GITEA_REPO` |
| `--pr` | `PR_NUMBER` |
| `--reviewer-token` | `REVIEWER_TOKEN` |
@@ -329,12 +329,11 @@ All flags have environment variable equivalents:
### Token Scopes Required
| Scope | Purpose |
|-------|--------|
|-------|---------|
| `write:issue` | Post and delete reviews |
| `write:repository` | Read PR diffs, file content, commit statuses |
| `read:user` | Self-request as reviewer (optional but recommended) |
Without `read:user`, the bot still works but cannot add itself to the PR's reviewer list.
No `read:user` scope needed — the bot identifies itself from the review response.
## Development
@@ -409,38 +408,32 @@ Each persona posts independently with its own sentinel, so reviews don't interfe
### Custom Personas
Create a YAML file with your domain-specific review focus:
Create a JSON file with your domain-specific review focus:
```yaml
# .review/personas/trading.yaml
name: trading
display_name: Trading Domain Expert
identity: |
You are a trading systems expert reviewing code for correctness.
Your expertise:
- Order lifecycle and state machines
- Fill handling and partial fills
- Position tracking and P&L calculations
- Event sourcing invariants
focus:
- Order state machine correctness
- Fill handling edge cases (partial, overfill)
- Position and P&L calculation accuracy
- Event replay determinism
- Decimal precision for money
ignore:
- Code style
- General performance
- Documentation formatting
severity:
major: "Bugs that cause incorrect positions, fills, or money calculations"
minor: "Edge cases that could cause issues under unusual conditions"
nit: "Clarity improvements for domain logic"
```json
// .review/personas/trading.json
{
"name": "trading",
"display_name": "Trading Domain Expert",
"identity": "You are a trading systems expert reviewing code for correctness.\n\nYour expertise:\n- Order lifecycle and state machines\n- Fill handling and partial fills\n- Position tracking and P&L calculations\n- Event sourcing invariants",
"focus": [
"Order state machine correctness",
"Fill handling edge cases (partial, overfill)",
"Position and P&L calculation accuracy",
"Event replay determinism",
"Decimal precision for money"
],
"ignore": [
"Code style",
"General performance",
"Documentation formatting"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Bugs that cause incorrect positions, fills, or money calculations",
"minor": "Edge cases that could cause issues under unusual conditions",
"nit": "Clarity improvements for domain logic"
}
}
```
Use it in CI:
@@ -449,24 +442,17 @@ Use it in CI:
- uses: rodin/review-bot/.gitea/actions/review@v1
with:
reviewer-name: trading
persona-file: .review/personas/trading.yaml
persona-file: .review/personas/trading.json
...
```
YAML is the recommended format for personas because it supports:
- Multi-line strings with `|` blocks (cleaner identity definitions)
- Comments for documentation
- More readable arrays and nested structures
JSON is also supported for backwards compatibility—just use `.json` extension.
### Persona vs system-prompt-file
| Feature | `persona` / `persona-file` | `system-prompt-file` |
|---------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Replaces base prompt | Yes | No (appends) |
| Structured format | Yes (YAML/JSON) | No (freeform) |
| Structured format | Yes (JSON) | No (freeform) |
| Focus/ignore lists | Yes | Manual |
| Severity calibration | Yes | Manual |
| Header display name | Yes | No |
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
## Dev Loop: review-bot — 2026-05-14 19:15 UTC
### Latest: ✅ issue-123 MERGED
- **PR #129:** Merged to main at commit 4440823
- **Feature:** IP-level SSRF defense with RFC6598 CGN check
- **Status:** Complete, all review feedback addressed
---
## Review-Bot Current State
### Merged to main:
- ✅ issue-123 (SSRF defense) — 5 commits
- ✅ issue-125 (VCS_URL rename + deprecation)
- ✅ issue-124 (multi-arch binary support)
- ✅ issue-120 (GitHub Actions + VCS abstraction) — partial merge
- And 100+ prior completed issues
### Open Branches (>0 commits ahead of main):
- **issue-120:** 30 commits ahead (GHE release dry-run + extensive VCS abstraction work)
- Status: Awaiting human review/decision on integration
### Completed Recently:
- Multiple issue-* and review-bot-issue-* branches
- All recent work landed in main or merged into feature branches
---
## Next Actions for Dev-Loop
1. **Check if issue-120 needs human intervention or PR created**
2. **Identify next highest-priority open issue to start**
3. **Review any blocked or stalled branches**
4. **Perform health check:**
- No orphaned worktrees
- No merge conflicts
- All tests passing on main
---
## Worktrees Active
worktrees active
+4 -4
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
// Integration test requires a running Gitea instance and LLM endpoint.
// Set environment variables:
//
// INTEGRATION_VCS_URL - VCS base URL
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL - Gitea base URL
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_TOKEN - Gitea API token with repo access
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_REPO - owner/repo with an open PR
// INTEGRATION_PR_NUMBER - PR number to test against
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import (
// INTEGRATION_LLM_API_KEY - LLM API key
// INTEGRATION_LLM_MODEL - Model name
func TestIntegration_FullReviewFlow(t *testing.T) {
giteaURL := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_VCS_URL")
giteaURL := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL")
giteaToken := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_TOKEN")
giteaRepo := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_REPO")
prNumStr := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_PR_NUMBER")
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func TestIntegration_FullReviewFlow(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestIntegration_PostAndCleanup(t *testing.T) {
giteaURL := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_VCS_URL")
giteaURL := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL")
giteaToken := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_TOKEN")
giteaRepo := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_REPO")
prNumStr := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_PR_NUMBER")
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ func TestIntegration_PostAndCleanup(t *testing.T) {
// Post a test review
sentinel := "<!-- review-bot:integration-test -->"
testBody := "# Integration Test Review\n\nThis is a test review.\n\n" + sentinel
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, "COMMENT", testBody, "", nil)
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, "COMMENT", testBody, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("PostReview: %v", err)
}
+37 -133
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"flag"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"path/filepath"
@@ -20,13 +19,6 @@ import (
var version = "dev"
// outWriter and errWriter are the output and error writers for subcommands.
// They are variables so tests can capture output.
var (
outWriter io.Writer = os.Stdout
errWriter io.Writer = os.Stderr
)
// setupLogger configures the global slog default logger based on format and verbosity.
func setupLogger(format, verbosity string) {
var level slog.Level
@@ -57,22 +49,12 @@ func setupLogger(format, verbosity string) {
}
func main() {
// Dispatch subcommands before flag parsing so they get their own args.
// e.g. `review-bot validate-url <url>`
if len(os.Args) > 1 {
switch os.Args[1] {
case "validate-url":
os.Exit(runValidateURL(os.Args[2:]))
}
}
versionFlag := flag.Bool("version", false, "Print version and exit")
// Logging flags
logFormat := flag.String("log-format", envOrDefault("LOG_FORMAT", "text"), "Log output format: text or json")
verbosity := flag.String("verbosity", envOrDefault("LOG_VERBOSITY", "info"), "Log verbosity: debug, info, warn, error")
// CLI flags
vcsURL := flag.String("vcs-url", os.Getenv("VCS_URL"), "VCS server URL (e.g. https://gitea.example.com)")
giteaURLAlias := flag.String("gitea-url", "", "Deprecated: use --vcs-url")
giteaURL := flag.String("gitea-url", envOrDefault("GITEA_URL", ""), "Gitea instance URL")
repo := flag.String("repo", envOrDefault("GITEA_REPO", ""), "Repository (owner/name)")
prNum := flag.String("pr", envOrDefault("PR_NUMBER", ""), "Pull request number")
reviewerName := flag.String("reviewer-name", envOrDefault("REVIEWER_NAME", ""), "Reviewer display name")
@@ -83,7 +65,7 @@ func main() {
conventionsFile := flag.String("conventions-file", envOrDefault("CONVENTIONS_FILE", ""), "Conventions file path in repo (e.g. CLAUDE.md)")
systemPromptFile := flag.String("system-prompt-file", envOrDefault("SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE", ""), "Local file with additional system prompt instructions")
patternsRepo := flag.String("patterns-repo", envOrDefault("PATTERNS_REPO", ""), "Repo with language patterns (e.g. rodin/elixir-patterns)")
patternsFiles := flag.String("patterns-files", envOrDefault("PATTERNS_FILES", ""), "Comma-separated file paths to fetch from patterns repo (empty = all files)")
patternsFiles := flag.String("patterns-files", envOrDefault("PATTERNS_FILES", "README.md"), "Comma-separated file paths to fetch from patterns repo")
dryRun := flag.Bool("dry-run", false, "Print review to stdout instead of posting")
llmTemp := flag.Float64("llm-temperature", envOrDefaultFloat("LLM_TEMPERATURE", 0), "LLM temperature (0 = server default)")
llmTimeout := flag.Int("llm-timeout", envOrDefaultInt("LLM_TIMEOUT", 300), "LLM request timeout in seconds (default 300)")
@@ -97,6 +79,7 @@ func main() {
aicoreAPIURL := flag.String("aicore-api-url", envOrDefault("AICORE_API_URL", ""), "SAP AI Core API URL (for provider=aicore)")
aicoreResourceGroup := flag.String("aicore-resource-group", envOrDefault("AICORE_RESOURCE_GROUP", "default"), "SAP AI Core resource group (for provider=aicore)")
flag.Parse()
flag.Parse()
if *versionFlag {
@@ -109,24 +92,12 @@ func main() {
slog.Info("review-bot starting", "version", version)
// Backward compatibility: fall back to deprecated env var / flag if VCS_URL / --vcs-url not set.
if *vcsURL == "" {
if v := os.Getenv("GITEA_URL"); v != "" {
slog.Warn("GITEA_URL is deprecated; rename the environment variable to VCS_URL")
*vcsURL = v
}
}
if *vcsURL == "" && *giteaURLAlias != "" {
slog.Warn("--gitea-url is deprecated; use --vcs-url instead")
*vcsURL = *giteaURLAlias
}
// Validate required fields
// For aicore provider, llm-base-url and llm-api-key are not required
isAICore := llm.Provider(*llmProvider) == llm.ProviderAICore
if *vcsURL == "" || *repo == "" || *prNum == "" || *reviewerToken == "" || *llmModel == "" {
if *giteaURL == "" || *repo == "" || *prNum == "" || *reviewerToken == "" || *llmModel == "" {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Error: missing required flags or environment variables\n\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Required: --vcs-url, --repo, --pr, --reviewer-token, --llm-model\n")
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Required: --gitea-url, --repo, --pr, --reviewer-token, --llm-model\n")
os.Exit(1)
}
if !isAICore && (*llmBaseURL == "" || *llmAPIKey == "") {
@@ -145,7 +116,29 @@ func main() {
os.Exit(1)
}
// NOTE: Persona loading deferred until after Gitea client init to support repo personas
// Load persona if specified
var persona *review.Persona
if *personaName != "" {
var err error
persona, err = review.LoadBuiltinPersona(*personaName)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona", "persona", *personaName, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded built-in persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName)
} else if *personaFile != "" {
resolvedPath, err := validateWorkspacePath(*personaFile, "persona-file")
if err != nil {
slog.Error("invalid persona-file path", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
persona, err = review.LoadPersona(resolvedPath)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona file", "file", *personaFile, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded persona from file", "file", *personaFile, "persona", persona.Name)
}
// Validate reviewer-name: only safe characters allowed in sentinel
if err := validateReviewerName(*reviewerName); err != nil {
@@ -169,7 +162,7 @@ func main() {
}
// Initialize clients
giteaClient := gitea.NewClient(*vcsURL, *reviewerToken)
giteaClient := gitea.NewClient(*giteaURL, *reviewerToken)
llmClient := llm.NewClient(*llmBaseURL, *llmAPIKey, *llmModel)
if *llmTemp < 0 || *llmTemp > 2 {
slog.Error("invalid LLM temperature", "temperature", *llmTemp, "range", "0-2")
@@ -203,43 +196,6 @@ func main() {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), overallTimeout)
defer cancel()
// Load persona if specified (after Gitea client init to support repo personas)
var persona *review.Persona
if *personaName != "" {
// Try loading from repo first, then fall back to built-in
repoPersonas, err := review.LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, newGiteaClientAdapter(giteaClient), owner, repoName)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not load repo personas", "repo", owner+"/"+repoName, "error", err)
// Continue with built-in personas only.
// NOTE: repoPersonas is nil here, but map indexing on a nil map is safe in Go
// (returns the zero value), so the fallback to built-in below works correctly.
}
if p, ok := repoPersonas[*personaName]; ok {
persona = p
slog.Info("loaded repo persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName, "repo", owner+"/"+repoName)
} else {
// Fall back to built-in
persona, err = review.LoadBuiltinPersona(*personaName)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona", "persona", *personaName, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded built-in persona", "persona", persona.Name, "display", persona.DisplayName)
}
} else if *personaFile != "" {
resolvedPath, err := validateWorkspacePath(*personaFile, "persona-file")
if err != nil {
slog.Error("invalid persona-file path", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
persona, err = review.LoadPersona(resolvedPath)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to load persona file", "file", *personaFile, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
slog.Info("loaded persona from file", "file", *personaFile, "persona", persona.Name)
}
slog.Info("reviewing pull request", "pr", prNumber, "repo", fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", owner, repoName))
// Step 1: Fetch PR metadata
@@ -474,7 +430,7 @@ func main() {
// POST new review
slog.Info("posting review", "event", event, "pr", prNumber)
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, event, reviewBody, evaluatedSHA, inlineComments)
posted, err := giteaClient.PostReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, event, reviewBody, inlineComments)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to post review", "pr", prNumber, "event", event, "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
@@ -483,7 +439,7 @@ func main() {
// Supersede all old reviews with link to the new one
if len(oldReviews) > 0 {
newReviewURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s/pulls/%d#pullrequestreview-%d", strings.TrimRight(*vcsURL, "/"), owner, repoName, prNumber, posted.ID)
newReviewURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s/pulls/%d#pullrequestreview-%d", strings.TrimRight(*giteaURL, "/"), owner, repoName, prNumber, posted.ID)
for _, oldReview := range oldReviews {
cid, err := giteaClient.GetTimelineReviewCommentIDForReview(ctx, owner, repoName, prNumber, oldReview.ID)
if err != nil {
@@ -553,25 +509,11 @@ func fetchFileContext(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, owner, repo, re
// patternsRepo is comma-separated list of owner/name repos.
// patternsFiles is comma-separated list of file paths or directories.
// If a path ends with / or is a directory, all files within it are fetched recursively.
// If patternsFiles is empty, all files from the repo root are fetched.
func fetchPatterns(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, patternsRepo, patternsFiles string) string {
var sb strings.Builder
repos := strings.Split(patternsRepo, ",")
// Build the list of paths to fetch
var paths []string
if patternsFiles == "" {
// Empty patternsFiles means "fetch all files from repo root"
paths = []string{""}
} else {
for _, p := range strings.Split(patternsFiles, ",") {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p != "" {
paths = append(paths, p)
}
}
}
paths := strings.Split(patternsFiles, ",")
for _, repoRef := range repos {
if ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -588,10 +530,12 @@ func fetchPatterns(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, patternsRepo, patt
}
owner, repo := parts[0], parts[1]
var repoLoadedFiles []string
var repoSkippedFiles []string
for _, path := range paths {
path = strings.TrimSpace(path)
if path == "" {
continue
}
files, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(ctx, owner, repo, path)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not fetch patterns", "path", path, "repo", repoRef, "error", err)
@@ -601,22 +545,11 @@ func fetchPatterns(ctx context.Context, client *gitea.Client, patternsRepo, patt
for filePath, content := range files {
// Only include markdown and text files as patterns
if !isPatternFile(filePath) {
repoSkippedFiles = append(repoSkippedFiles, filePath)
continue
}
repoLoadedFiles = append(repoLoadedFiles, filePath)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("### %s/%s\n\n%s\n\n", repoRef, filePath, content))
}
}
if len(repoLoadedFiles) > 0 {
slog.Info("loaded pattern files", "repo", repoRef, "count", len(repoLoadedFiles), "files", repoLoadedFiles)
} else {
slog.Warn("no pattern files loaded", "repo", repoRef, "paths", paths)
}
if len(repoSkippedFiles) > 0 {
slog.Debug("skipped non-pattern files", "repo", repoRef, "count", len(repoSkippedFiles), "files", repoSkippedFiles)
}
}
return sb.String()
}
@@ -850,32 +783,3 @@ func shouldSkipStaleReview(evaluatedSHA, currentSHA string) bool {
}
return evaluatedSHA != currentSHA
}
// giteaClientAdapter adapts gitea.Client to review.GiteaClient interface.
type giteaClientAdapter struct {
client *gitea.Client
}
func newGiteaClientAdapter(c *gitea.Client) *giteaClientAdapter {
return &giteaClientAdapter{client: c}
}
func (a *giteaClientAdapter) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]review.ContentEntry, error) {
entries, err := a.client.ListContents(ctx, owner, repo, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
result := make([]review.ContentEntry, len(entries))
for i, e := range entries {
result[i] = review.ContentEntry{
Name: e.Name,
Path: e.Path,
Type: e.Type,
}
}
return result, nil
}
func (a *giteaClientAdapter) GetFileContent(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath string) (string, error) {
return a.client.GetFileContent(ctx, owner, repo, filepath)
}
-46
View File
@@ -504,52 +504,6 @@ func TestIsPatternFile(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestBuildPatternPaths verifies the path-building logic for fetchPatterns.
// Empty patternsFiles means "fetch all from root" (represented as [""]).
func TestBuildPatternPaths(t *testing.T) {
buildPaths := func(patternsFiles string) []string {
if patternsFiles == "" {
return []string{""}
}
var paths []string
for _, p := range strings.Split(patternsFiles, ",") {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p != "" {
paths = append(paths, p)
}
}
return paths
}
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
want []string
}{
{"empty fetches root", "", []string{""}},
{"single file", "README.md", []string{"README.md"}},
{"multiple files", "README.md,PATTERNS.md", []string{"README.md", "PATTERNS.md"}},
{"trims whitespace", " foo.md , bar.md ", []string{"foo.md", "bar.md"}},
{"skips empty between commas", "foo.md,,bar.md", []string{"foo.md", "bar.md"}},
{"directory path", "patterns/", []string{"patterns/"}},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := buildPaths(tc.input)
if len(got) != len(tc.want) {
t.Errorf("buildPaths(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.input, got, tc.want)
return
}
for i := range got {
if got[i] != tc.want[i] {
t.Errorf("buildPaths(%q)[%d] = %q, want %q", tc.input, i, got[i], tc.want[i])
}
}
})
}
}
func TestEvaluateCIStatus(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
-125
View File
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"strings"
"time"
"gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot/gitea"
)
// runValidateURL implements the `review-bot validate-url <url>` subcommand.
//
// It resolves the given URL's hostname and checks that every returned IP is
// publicly routable (not RFC1918, loopback, link-local, or other reserved
// ranges). The exit code communicates the result to callers:
//
// 0 — URL is safe to use
// 1 — URL resolves to a blocked/private address
// 2 — URL is malformed, has an unsafe scheme, or DNS lookup failed
//
// This is intended for use from action.yml shell steps that need to validate
// a user-supplied URL before passing it to curl.
func runValidateURL(args []string) int {
if len(args) != 1 {
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "usage: review-bot validate-url <url>")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Resolves <url> and verifies all resolved IPs are publicly routable.")
fmt.Fprintln(errWriter, "Exit 0=safe, 1=blocked, 2=error")
return 2
}
rawURL := args[0]
if err := validateURL(rawURL); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(errWriter, "Error: %v\n", err)
var ve *validateError
if isValidateError(err, &ve) {
return ve.code
}
return 2
}
fmt.Fprintf(outWriter, "OK: %s is safe\n", rawURL)
return 0
}
// validateError carries an exit code alongside a message.
type validateError struct {
code int
message string
}
func (e *validateError) Error() string { return e.message }
// isValidateError checks if err is or wraps a *validateError and sets out.
// Uses errors.As so that wrapped *validateError values (e.g. from fmt.Errorf("...: %w", &validateError{...}))
// are also detected, making the function robust against future wrapping.
func isValidateError(err error, out **validateError) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
return errors.As(err, out)
}
// validateURL checks that rawURL is safe for use as a Gitea server URL:
// - Must be https:// (not http://)
// - Must have no user-info (user:pass@host)
// - Must resolve to at least one IP, all of which are publicly routable
func validateURL(rawURL string) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return &validateError{code: 2, message: fmt.Sprintf("malformed URL %q: %v", rawURL, err)}
}
// Scheme check: only https is permitted.
if !strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "https") {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: fmt.Sprintf("URL scheme must be https (got %q)", parsed.Scheme),
}
}
// Reject user-info (user:password@host) to prevent credential embedding.
if parsed.User != nil {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: "URL must not contain user-info (user:password@host)",
}
}
host := parsed.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return &validateError{code: 2, message: fmt.Sprintf("URL has no host: %q", rawURL)}
}
// Resolve the hostname with a short timeout.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup failed for %q: %v", host, err),
}
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return &validateError{
code: 2,
message: fmt.Sprintf("DNS lookup returned no addresses for %q", host),
}
}
for _, a := range addrs {
if gitea.IsBlockedIP(a.IP) {
return &validateError{
code: 1,
message: fmt.Sprintf("blocked: %q resolves to private/reserved IP %s", host, a.IP),
}
}
}
return nil
}
-127
View File
@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
package main
import (
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestRunValidateURL_Usage(t *testing.T) {
var errBuf bytes.Buffer
origErr := errWriter
errWriter = &errBuf
defer func() { errWriter = origErr }()
code := runValidateURL(nil)
if code != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected exit code 2 for no args, got %d", code)
}
if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), "usage") {
t.Errorf("expected usage in stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
}
errBuf.Reset()
code = runValidateURL([]string{"arg1", "arg2"})
if code != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected exit code 2 for too many args, got %d", code)
}
}
func TestValidateURL_MalformedURL(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
url string
wantMsg string
}{
{"empty", "", "must be https"},
{"http scheme", "http://example.com/", "must be https"},
{"ftp scheme", "ftp://example.com/", "must be https"},
{"no scheme", "example.com", "must be https"},
{"user info", "https://user:pass@example.com/", "user-info"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateURL(tc.url)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for URL %q, got nil", tc.url)
return
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.wantMsg) {
t.Errorf("error %q does not contain %q", err.Error(), tc.wantMsg)
}
var ve *validateError
if !isValidateError(err, &ve) {
t.Fatalf("expected *validateError, got %T", err)
}
if ve.code != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected code 2, got %d", ve.code)
}
})
}
}
func TestValidateURL_BlockedPrivateIP(t *testing.T) {
// localhost always resolves to 127.0.0.1 (loopback).
err := validateURL("https://localhost/")
if err == nil {
t.Skip("localhost did not resolve (network unavailable in test environment)")
}
var ve *validateError
if !isValidateError(err, &ve) {
t.Fatalf("expected *validateError, got %T: %v", err, err)
}
if ve.code != 1 && ve.code != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected code 1 (blocked) or 2 (dns fail), got %d: %s", ve.code, ve.message)
}
// If it resolved (code 1), the message must say "blocked".
if ve.code == 1 && !strings.Contains(ve.message, "blocked") {
t.Errorf("expected 'blocked' in message, got %q", ve.message)
}
}
func TestValidateURL_ExitCodes(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
url string
wantCode int
}{
{"http scheme", "http://example.com/", 2},
{"no scheme", "example.com", 2},
{"user info", "https://admin:secret@example.com/", 2},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateURL(tc.url)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for %q", tc.url)
}
var ve *validateError
if !isValidateError(err, &ve) {
t.Fatalf("expected *validateError, got %T", err)
}
if ve.code != tc.wantCode {
t.Errorf("code = %d, want %d (url=%q, msg=%s)", ve.code, tc.wantCode, tc.url, ve.message)
}
})
}
}
func TestRunValidateURL_WithCapture(t *testing.T) {
var outBuf, errBuf bytes.Buffer
origOut, origErr := outWriter, errWriter
outWriter = &outBuf
errWriter = &errBuf
defer func() {
outWriter = origOut
errWriter = origErr
}()
// http:// scheme should fail with code 2.
code := runValidateURL([]string{"http://example.com/"})
if code != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected code 2 for http:// URL, got %d", code)
}
if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), "must be https") {
t.Errorf("expected error about https in stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
}
}
-87
View File
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
# Design: YAML Support for Persona Files (#57)
## Problem
JSON is awkward for persona files that contain multi-line text (identity, severity descriptions). YAML supports cleaner multi-line strings and comments, improving readability and maintainability.
## Constraints
- Backwards compatibility: existing JSON personas must continue to work
- Security: protect against DoS via deeply nested YAML (AIKIDO-2024-10486)
- Consistency: use `.yaml` extension (not `.yml`)
- Library: use `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` v1.16.0+ (approved in CONVENTIONS.md); we implement custom AST-based depth/node-count checks for precise alias-aware validation
## Proposed Approach
1. **Update `parsePersona`** to detect format from file extension
2. **Add YAML parsing** with explicit depth limit (defense in depth)
3. **Keep JSON as fallback** for files without `.yaml`/`.yml` extension
4. **Convert built-in personas** to YAML format
5. **Update embed directive** to include both formats
### File Extension Detection
```go
func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
isYAML := strings.HasSuffix(source, ".yaml") || strings.HasSuffix(source, ".yml")
if isYAML {
return parseYAML(data, source)
}
return parseJSON(data, source)
}
```
### YAML Parsing with Depth Protection
We implement a custom AST-based depth/node-count walk (`checkYAMLDepth` in
`review/persona.go`) rather than relying on library decoder options. Key design
decisions:
- **Library:** `github.com/goccy/go-yaml` with `ast.Node`-based traversal
- **Dual-map tracking:** `validated` (depth-aware short-circuit) + `visiting` (cycle detection)
- **Node-count limit:** Conservative overcounting bounds total validation work
- **Alias-aware depth:** Aliases increment depth and are re-checked when encountered at greater depths
See `review/persona.go:checkYAMLDepth` for the authoritative implementation.
## State/Data Model
No new state. Same `Persona` struct, just different parsing.
## Error Cases
| Error | Handling |
|-------|----------|
| Invalid YAML syntax | Return parse error with source file |
| Deeply nested YAML | Custom AST walk (`checkYAMLDepth`) rejects before decode |
| Unknown extension | Fall back to JSON parsing |
| Missing required fields | Validation rejects after parse |
## Edge Cases
- File with `.json` extension but YAML content → JSON parse fails, user sees error
- File with no extension → defaults to JSON
- Embedded persona reference like `builtin:security` → detect by embed path (`personas/X.yaml`)
## Testing Strategy
1. Unit tests for YAML parsing (valid, invalid, deeply nested)
2. Unit tests for extension detection
3. Integration test for built-in personas (now YAML)
4. Backwards compat test: verify JSON still works for external files
## Completion Checklist
1. [ ] `go-yaml` dependency added at v1.16.0+
2. [ ] Extension detection uses case-insensitive comparison
3. [ ] YAML parse errors include source file name
4. [ ] JSON parsing still works for `.json` files
5. [ ] Built-in personas converted to YAML with readable multi-line strings
6. [ ] Embed directive updated to include `*.yaml`
7. [ ] Test for deeply nested YAML rejection
8. [ ] All existing tests pass
## Open Questions
- Should we support both `.yaml` AND `.yml`? Issue says `.yaml` only for consistency, but some users expect `.yml`. **Decision:** Support both for reading, recommend `.yaml` in docs.
- Should we add a "format" field to detect mismatched extension/content? **Decision:** No, keep it simple. Extension determines format.
+24 -417
View File
@@ -11,12 +11,9 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"syscall"
"time"
)
@@ -42,181 +39,23 @@ func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound
}
// IsServerError reports whether an error is an API 5xx response.
func IsServerError(err error) bool {
var apiErr *APIError
return errors.As(err, &apiErr) && apiErr.StatusCode >= 500 && apiErr.StatusCode < 600
}
// DefaultMaxDiffSize is the default maximum diff size in bytes (10 MB).
const DefaultMaxDiffSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024
// ErrDiffTooLarge is returned when a PR diff exceeds the configured MaxDiffSize.
var ErrDiffTooLarge = errors.New("diff size exceeds maximum allowed size")
// Client interacts with the Gitea API.
// A Client is safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
type Client struct {
baseURL string
token string
http *http.Client
// RetryBackoff defines the delays between retry attempts.
// RetryBackoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (after attempt i fails).
// If nil, defaults to {1s, 2s}. Set to shorter durations in tests.
//
// This field must be configured before the first request is made.
// Modifying it while requests are in flight is not safe.
RetryBackoff []time.Duration
// MaxDiffSize is the maximum number of bytes allowed when fetching a PR diff.
// If zero, defaults to DefaultMaxDiffSize (10 MB). Set to any negative value
// (or math.MaxInt64) to disable the limit.
//
// This field must be configured before the first request is made.
// Modifying it while requests are in flight is not safe.
MaxDiffSize int64
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in github/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// safeDialContext is the default DialContext for NewClient.
// It resolves the hostname and checks every returned IP against the blocked
// CIDR list before establishing a connection. This prevents SSRF attacks
// where user-supplied URLs resolve to internal/private addresses.
//
// After validating all IPs, we dial the first resolved IP directly to avoid
// a second DNS lookup (which could return a different IP in a DNS rebinding
// attack). This narrows — but does not fully eliminate — the DNS rebinding
// window to the time between LookupIPAddr and DialContext.
//
// If the host is already an IP literal, LookupIPAddr returns it directly
// (no DNS query issued), so IP literals like https://127.0.0.1/ are blocked.
func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: invalid address %q: %w", addr, err)
}
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: DNS lookup %q: %w", host, err)
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: no addresses returned for %q", host)
}
for _, a := range addrs {
if IsBlockedIP(a.IP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: blocked: %q resolves to private/reserved IP %s", host, a.IP)
}
}
// Try each resolved IP in order, returning the first successful connection.
// Fallback is important when a hostname resolves to multiple IPs and the first
// is temporarily unreachable. All IPs were already validated above, so dialing
// any of them is safe.
//
// Timeout: 10s per the design (PLAN.md); the outer http.Client has a 30s
// total timeout, but the per-dial timeout ensures a slow TCP connect on one IP
// doesn't consume the budget needed to try others.
d := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
var lastErr error
for _, a := range addrs {
conn, err := d.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(a.IP.String(), port))
if err == nil {
return conn, nil
}
lastErr = err
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("safeDialContext: all %d addresses for %q failed, last error: %w", len(addrs), host, lastErr)
}
// newSafeHTTPClient returns an *http.Client with the SSRF-blocking safeDialContext
// transport and the cross-host redirect rejection policy.
//
// We clone http.DefaultTransport to preserve its production-ready defaults
// (ProxyFromEnvironment, TLSHandshakeTimeout, IdleConnTimeout, connection
// pooling, HTTP/2 support) and override only DialContext with safeDialContext.
func newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client {
transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
transport.DialContext = safeDialContext
return &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
Transport: transport,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
// NewClient creates a new Gitea API client.
//
// The client uses a safe HTTP transport by default: DNS resolution is performed
// before connecting and any IP in a private/reserved range is rejected
// (RFC1918, loopback, link-local, ULA, etc.). Cross-host and HTTPS→HTTP
// redirects are also rejected.
//
// For tests that use httptest.NewServer (which listens on 127.0.0.1), call
// WithUnsafeDialer() to bypass the IP check.
func NewClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
http: newSafeHTTPClient(),
http: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
}
}
// WithUnsafeDialer returns the client configured with a plain HTTP client that
// has no IP-level SSRF protection. It preserves the redirect-rejection policy.
//
// This MUST only be used in tests. Production code must never call this method.
func (c *Client) WithUnsafeDialer() *Client {
c.http = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
return c
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default safe client (30s timeout, IP-blocking
// safeDialContext, and redirect-rejecting CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = newSafeHTTPClient()
}
c.http = hc
}
// PullRequest holds relevant PR metadata.
type PullRequest struct {
Title string `json:"title"`
@@ -264,28 +103,9 @@ func (c *Client) GetPullRequest(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number
}
// GetPullRequestDiff fetches the unified diff for a PR.
// It enforces MaxDiffSize to prevent unbounded memory allocation.
// Returns ErrDiffTooLarge if the diff exceeds the configured limit.
func (c *Client) GetPullRequestDiff(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int) (string, error) {
reqURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d.diff", c.baseURL, url.PathEscape(owner), url.PathEscape(repo), number)
maxSize := c.MaxDiffSize
if maxSize == 0 {
maxSize = DefaultMaxDiffSize
}
// When the limit is disabled (negative) or set to math.MaxInt64 (which
// would overflow the +1 detection and silently disable enforcement),
// use the standard unlimited doGet path.
if maxSize < 0 || maxSize == math.MaxInt64 {
body, err := c.doGet(ctx, reqURL)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetch diff: %w", err)
}
return string(body), nil
}
body, err := c.doGetLimited(ctx, reqURL, maxSize)
body, err := c.doGet(ctx, reqURL)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("fetch diff: %w", err)
}
@@ -341,22 +161,18 @@ func (c *Client) GetFileContentRef(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath, r
}
// PostReview submits a review to a PR and returns the created review.
// event should be one of "APPROVED", "REQUEST_CHANGES", or "COMMENT".
// commitID anchors the review to a specific commit SHA. If empty, Gitea
// defaults to the current PR head.
// event should be "APPROVED" or "REQUEST_CHANGES".
// comments are optional inline comments attached to specific lines.
func (c *Client) PostReview(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int, event, body, commitID string, comments []ReviewComment) (*Review, error) {
func (c *Client) PostReview(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int, event, body string, comments []ReviewComment) (*Review, error) {
reqURL := fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d/reviews", c.baseURL, url.PathEscape(owner), url.PathEscape(repo), number)
payload := struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
Event string `json:"event"`
CommitID string `json:"commit_id,omitempty"`
Comments []ReviewComment `json:"comments,omitempty"`
}{
Body: body,
Event: event,
CommitID: commitID,
Comments: comments,
}
@@ -394,218 +210,24 @@ func (c *Client) PostReview(ctx context.Context, owner, repo string, number int,
return &review, nil
}
// isTemporaryNetError reports whether err is a temporary network error worth retrying.
// This includes connection refused, network unreachable, connection reset, and DNS
// timeouts. It explicitly excludes permanent errors like permission denied or
// "no such host" DNS failures.
func isTemporaryNetError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// Check for OpError and inspect the underlying syscall error.
// Not all OpErrors are transient — permission denied, for example, is permanent.
var opErr *net.OpError
if errors.As(err, &opErr) {
return isRetriableSyscallError(opErr.Err)
}
// DNS errors: only retry on timeout, not on "no such host" which is permanent.
var dnsErr *net.DNSError
if errors.As(err, &dnsErr) {
return dnsErr.IsTimeout
}
// Check for net.Error with Timeout() (Temporary is deprecated)
var netErr net.Error
if errors.As(err, &netErr) {
return netErr.Timeout()
}
return false
}
// isRetriableSyscallError reports whether the underlying error from a net.OpError
// is a transient syscall error worth retrying.
func isRetriableSyscallError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// Check for syscall.Errno directly or wrapped
var errno syscall.Errno
if errors.As(err, &errno) {
switch errno {
case syscall.ECONNREFUSED, // connection refused — server not listening
syscall.ECONNRESET, // connection reset by peer
syscall.ENETUNREACH, // network unreachable
syscall.EHOSTUNREACH, // host unreachable
syscall.ETIMEDOUT: // connection timed out
return true
default:
// EACCES, EPERM, etc. are permanent — don't retry
return false
}
}
// If we can't identify the specific syscall error, be conservative and retry.
// This handles wrapped errors or platform-specific error types.
// The retry count is limited, so erring on the side of retrying is safe.
return true
}
// redactURL strips query parameters and userinfo credentials from a URL for
// safe logging. This prevents accidental exposure of sensitive data (tokens in
// query strings, or user:pass in the authority) in log output.
func redactURL(rawURL string) string {
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
// If we cannot parse it, return a safe placeholder rather than
// potentially logging something sensitive.
return "[invalid URL]"
}
if parsed.User != nil {
parsed.User = url.User("REDACTED")
}
if parsed.RawQuery != "" {
parsed.RawQuery = "[redacted]"
}
return parsed.String()
}
// sanitizeErrorForLog returns a loggable version of an error that omits
// potentially sensitive content like response bodies. For APIError, only
// the status code is included; for other errors, the type is preserved.
func sanitizeErrorForLog(err error) string {
if err == nil {
return "<nil>"
}
var apiErr *APIError
if errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d", apiErr.StatusCode)
}
return err.Error()
}
// doGetWithReader performs an HTTP GET request with retry on 5xx errors and
// temporary network errors. Retries up to 3 times with exponential backoff
// (1s, 2s delays by default; configurable via Client.RetryBackoff for testing).
// The readBody function is called with the response body on success (2xx) and
// is responsible for reading and closing it.
func (c *Client) doGetWithReader(ctx context.Context, reqURL string, readBody func(io.ReadCloser) ([]byte, error)) ([]byte, error) {
const maxAttempts = 3
// backoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (i.e., after attempt i fails).
// First attempt (i=0) has no delay; retries wait 1s then 2s by default.
backoff := c.RetryBackoff
if backoff == nil {
backoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Second, 2 * time.Second}
}
// maxErrorBodyBytes limits how much of an error response body we read
// to protect against malicious servers sending unbounded data.
const maxErrorBodyBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KB
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++ {
if attempt > 0 {
// Determine delay: use backoff slice if available, otherwise retry immediately.
// An empty RetryBackoff slice means "retry without delay" — this is intentional
// as the caller explicitly configured no delays.
var delay time.Duration
if attempt-1 < len(backoff) {
delay = backoff[attempt-1]
}
if delay > 0 {
slog.Warn("retrying request after error",
"attempt", attempt+1,
"url", redactURL(reqURL),
"delay", delay.String(),
"lastError", sanitizeErrorForLog(lastErr))
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-timer.C:
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+c.token)
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
// Always capture the error for consistent return at loop end.
// This ensures both network errors and HTTP 5xx return lastErr.
lastErr = err
// Only retry temporary network errors when attempts remain.
if attempt < maxAttempts-1 && isTemporaryNetError(err) {
slog.Warn("temporary network error, will retry",
"attempt", attempt+1,
"url", redactURL(reqURL),
"error", err)
continue
}
// Non-retryable network error or final attempt exhausted.
return nil, lastErr
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
return readBody(resp.Body)
}
// Error path: limit how much we read from potentially malicious server
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
lastErr = &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(errBody)}
// Only retry on 5xx server errors
if resp.StatusCode < 500 || resp.StatusCode >= 600 {
return nil, lastErr
}
}
return nil, lastErr
}
// doGet performs an HTTP GET request with retry, reading the full response body.
func (c *Client) doGet(ctx context.Context, reqURL string) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doGetWithReader(ctx, reqURL, func(body io.ReadCloser) ([]byte, error) {
defer body.Close()
return io.ReadAll(body)
})
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "token "+c.token)
// doGetLimited performs an HTTP GET request with retry but enforces a maximum
// response body size. Returns ErrDiffTooLarge if the response exceeds maxBytes.
// It reads maxBytes+1 (clamped to avoid overflow) to detect truncation without
// buffering the entire body.
func (c *Client) doGetLimited(ctx context.Context, reqURL string, maxBytes int64) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doGetWithReader(ctx, reqURL, func(body io.ReadCloser) ([]byte, error) {
defer body.Close()
// Read up to maxBytes+1 to detect overflow.
// Clamp to prevent integer overflow when maxBytes == math.MaxInt64.
limitBytes := maxBytes + 1
if limitBytes <= 0 {
limitBytes = math.MaxInt64
}
limited := io.LimitReader(body, limitBytes)
data, err := io.ReadAll(limited)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if int64(len(data)) > maxBytes {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: response exceeds %d bytes", ErrDiffTooLarge, maxBytes)
}
return data, nil
})
resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
return nil, &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(body)}
}
return io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
}
// escapePath escapes each segment of a relative file path for use in URLs.
@@ -629,13 +251,7 @@ type ContentEntry struct {
// ListContents lists files and directories at a given path in a repo.
// Pass an empty path to list the repository root.
// If the path points to a file (not a directory), Gitea returns a single
// object instead of an array; this method normalizes both cases to a slice.
func (c *Client) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]ContentEntry, error) {
// Normalize "." to empty string — Gitea API rejects "." with 500
if path == "." {
path = ""
}
var reqURL string
if path == "" {
reqURL = fmt.Sprintf("%s/api/v1/repos/%s/%s/contents", c.baseURL, url.PathEscape(owner), url.PathEscape(repo))
@@ -648,16 +264,7 @@ func (c *Client) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]
}
var entries []ContentEntry
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &entries); err != nil {
// Gitea returns a single object (not an array) when path is a file
var single ContentEntry
if err2 := json.Unmarshal(body, &single); err2 != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse contents JSON: %w", err)
}
// Guard against empty/malformed responses
if single.Name == "" && single.Path == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse contents JSON: empty response for path %q", path)
}
entries = []ContentEntry{single}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse contents JSON: %w", err)
}
return entries, nil
}
@@ -710,9 +317,9 @@ func (c *Client) GetAllFilesInPath(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string
// Review represents a pull request review from the Gitea API.
type Review struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Body string `json:"body"`
User struct {
ID int64 `json:"id"`
Body string `json:"body"`
User struct {
Login string `json:"login"`
} `json:"user"`
State string `json:"state"`
+40 -716
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,10 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestGetPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
@@ -36,7 +31,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequest(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
got, err := client.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -63,7 +58,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequestDiff(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
got, err := client.GetPullRequestDiff(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -88,7 +83,7 @@ func TestGetCommitStatuses(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
got, err := client.GetCommitStatuses(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "abc123")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -117,9 +112,8 @@ func TestPostReview(t *testing.T) {
}
var payload struct {
Body string `json:"body"`
Event string `json:"event"`
CommitID string `json:"commit_id"`
Body string `json:"body"`
Event string `json:"event"`
}
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode payload: %v", err)
@@ -130,16 +124,14 @@ func TestPostReview(t *testing.T) {
if payload.Event != "APPROVED" {
t.Errorf("expected event %q, got %q", "APPROVED", payload.Event)
}
if payload.CommitID != "abc123def" {
t.Errorf("expected commit_id %q, got %q", "abc123def", payload.CommitID)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"id":100,"user":{"login":"review-bot"},"state":"APPROVED","stale":false}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
review, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 3, "APPROVED", "LGTM", "abc123def", nil)
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
review, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 3, "APPROVED", "LGTM", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
@@ -158,7 +150,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequest_Non200(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 999)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 404, got nil")
@@ -171,7 +163,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequest_BadJSON(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for bad JSON, got nil")
@@ -185,36 +177,13 @@ func TestPostReview_Non200(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "test", "", nil)
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "test", nil)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403, got nil")
}
}
func TestPostReview_EmptyCommitID_OmittedFromPayload(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
var raw map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode payload: %v", err)
}
if _, exists := raw["commit_id"]; exists {
t.Errorf("expected commit_id to be omitted from payload when empty, but it was present")
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"id":200,"user":{"login":"bot"},"state":"APPROVED","stale":false}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "ok", "", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestGetFileContent(t *testing.T) {
expected := "# Conventions\n- Be nice\n"
@@ -226,7 +195,7 @@ func TestGetFileContent(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
got, err := client.GetFileContent(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "CONVENTIONS.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -246,7 +215,7 @@ func TestGetPullRequestFiles(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
files, err := client.GetPullRequestFiles(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -271,7 +240,7 @@ func TestGetFileContentRef(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
content, err := client.GetFileContentRef(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "main.go", "feature-branch")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -291,7 +260,7 @@ func TestListContents(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "docs")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -307,64 +276,11 @@ func TestListContents(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestListContents_DotPath(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// "." should be normalized to empty path, which hits the root contents endpoint
if r.URL.Path != "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents" {
t.Errorf("expected root contents path, got: %s", r.URL.Path)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `[{"name":"README.md","path":"README.md","type":"file"}]`)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", ".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(entries) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 entry, got %d", len(entries))
}
if entries[0].Name != "README.md" {
t.Errorf("expected README.md, got %s", entries[0].Name)
}
}
func TestListContents_FilePath(t *testing.T) {
// Gitea returns a single object (not an array) when path is a file
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path != "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/README.md" {
t.Errorf("unexpected path: %s", r.URL.Path)
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
// Single object, not an array
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":"README.md","path":"README.md","type":"file"}`)
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
entries, err := client.ListContents(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(entries) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 entry, got %d", len(entries))
}
if entries[0].Name != "README.md" {
t.Errorf("expected README.md, got %s", entries[0].Name)
}
if entries[0].Type != "file" {
t.Errorf("expected type file, got %s", entries[0].Type)
}
}
func TestGetAllFilesInPath_File(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/contents/README.md" {
// Gitea returns a single object (not array) when path is a file
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"name":"README.md","path":"README.md","type":"file"}`)
// Gitea returns 404 for contents API on files (it's not a dir)
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
if r.URL.Path == "/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/raw/README.md" {
@@ -375,7 +291,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_File(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
files, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -428,7 +344,7 @@ func TestListReviews(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
reviews, err := client.ListReviews(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -468,7 +384,7 @@ func TestListReviews_Pagination(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
reviews, err := client.ListReviews(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -493,7 +409,7 @@ func TestDeleteReview(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.DeleteReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, 10)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
@@ -507,7 +423,7 @@ func TestDeleteReview_Forbidden(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.DeleteReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, 10)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403, got nil")
@@ -536,7 +452,7 @@ func TestEditComment(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.EditComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 42, "updated body")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EditComment() error = %v", err)
@@ -550,7 +466,7 @@ func TestEditComment_Forbidden(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.EditComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 42, "new body")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403 response")
@@ -570,7 +486,7 @@ func TestGetTimelineReviewCommentID(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
id, err := client.GetTimelineReviewCommentID(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, "<!-- review-bot:sonnet -->")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetTimelineReviewCommentID() error = %v", err)
@@ -586,7 +502,7 @@ func TestGetTimelineReviewCommentID_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.GetTimelineReviewCommentID(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 5, "<!-- review-bot:sonnet -->")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error when sentinel not found")
@@ -609,7 +525,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_404FallsBackToFile(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
files, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "README.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected fallback to file on 404, got error: %v", err)
@@ -630,7 +546,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_500Propagates(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "somepath")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error to propagate for 500, got nil")
@@ -652,7 +568,7 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_403Propagates(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.GetAllFilesInPath(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", "private/stuff")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error to propagate for 403, got nil")
@@ -668,9 +584,9 @@ func TestGetAllFilesInPath_403Propagates(t *testing.T) {
func TestIsNotFound(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil error", nil, false},
{"non-API error", fmt.Errorf("network timeout"), false},
@@ -704,7 +620,7 @@ func TestGetAuthenticatedUser(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
login, err := client.GetAuthenticatedUser(context.Background())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetAuthenticatedUser() error = %v", err)
@@ -729,7 +645,7 @@ func TestRequestReviewer(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.RequestReviewer(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 7, "bot-user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RequestReviewer() error = %v", err)
@@ -745,7 +661,7 @@ func TestRequestReviewer_204(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.RequestReviewer(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "user")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RequestReviewer() should accept 204, got error = %v", err)
@@ -759,7 +675,7 @@ func TestRequestReviewer_Error(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.RequestReviewer(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "user")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403 response")
@@ -779,7 +695,7 @@ func TestListReviewComments(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
comments, err := client.ListReviewComments(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, 42)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListReviewComments() error = %v", err)
@@ -807,7 +723,7 @@ func TestResolveComment(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.ResolveComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 99)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveComment() error = %v", err)
@@ -821,601 +737,9 @@ func TestResolveComment_Error(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
err := client.ResolveComment(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 99)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 404 response")
}
}
func TestIsServerError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil error", nil, false},
{"non-API error", fmt.Errorf("network timeout"), false},
{"404 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 404, Body: "not found"}, false},
{"500 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: "server error"}, true},
{"502 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 502, Body: "bad gateway"}, true},
{"503 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 503, Body: "unavailable"}, true},
{"599 APIError", &APIError{StatusCode: 599, Body: "edge case"}, true},
{"600 not server error", &APIError{StatusCode: 600, Body: "edge"}, false},
{"400 not server error", &APIError{StatusCode: 400, Body: "bad request"}, false},
{"wrapped 500", fmt.Errorf("fetch: %w", &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: "err"}), true},
{"wrapped 404", fmt.Errorf("fetch: %w", &APIError{StatusCode: 404, Body: "err"}), false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := IsServerError(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("IsServerError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestDoGet_RetriesOn500(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts < 3 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"transient error"}`))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"success"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
// Use short backoff for fast tests
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
body, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success after retry, got error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"data":"success"}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", string(body), `{"data":"success"}`)
}
if attempts != 3 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 3", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoGet_FailsAfterMaxRetries(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"persistent error"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
// Use short backoff for fast tests
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
_, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after max retries")
}
var apiErr *APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected APIError, got: %v", err)
}
if apiErr.StatusCode != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 500", apiErr.StatusCode)
}
if attempts != 3 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 3 (max retries)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoGet_NoRetryOn4xx(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"forbidden"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), server.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 403")
}
var apiErr *APIError
if !errors.As(err, &apiErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected APIError, got: %v", err)
}
if apiErr.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 403", apiErr.StatusCode)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 4xx)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoGet_RespectsContextCancellation(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
w.Write([]byte(`{"message":"error"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
// Use longer backoff to give us time to cancel during the wait
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{100 * time.Millisecond, 100 * time.Millisecond}
// Cancel after first attempt returns and retry begins
go func() {
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
}()
_, err := client.doGet(ctx, server.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on context cancellation")
}
// Should have made 1 attempt, then context cancelled during backoff
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, expected 1 before context cancel during backoff", attempts)
}
}
// mockTransport is a test helper that returns errors for the first N calls,
// then delegates to a real server.
type mockTransport struct {
failCount int32 // number of failures remaining (atomic)
failErr error // error to return on failure
realServer *httptest.Server
attemptsMade atomic.Int32 // tracks total attempts
}
func (m *mockTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
m.attemptsMade.Add(1)
remaining := atomic.AddInt32(&m.failCount, -1)
if remaining >= 0 {
// Still have failures to return
return nil, m.failErr
}
// Redirect to real server
req.URL.Host = m.realServer.Listener.Addr().String()
req.URL.Scheme = "http"
return http.DefaultTransport.RoundTrip(req)
}
func TestDoGet_RetriesOnTemporaryNetError(t *testing.T) {
// Real server that will handle successful requests
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
// Mock transport: fail twice with ECONNREFUSED, then succeed
mt := &mockTransport{
failCount: 2,
failErr: &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Net: "tcp", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED},
realServer: server,
}
client := NewClient("http://fake-host/", "test-token")
client.SetHTTPClient(&http.Client{Transport: mt})
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Millisecond, 1 * time.Millisecond}
body, err := client.doGet(context.Background(), "http://fake-host/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected success after retries, got error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"status":"ok"}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", string(body), `{"status":"ok"}`)
}
// Should have made exactly 3 attempts: 2 failures + 1 success
if got := mt.attemptsMade.Load(); got != 3 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 3 (2 failures + 1 success)", got)
}
}
func TestIsTemporaryNetError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil error", nil, false},
{"plain error", fmt.Errorf("some error"), false},
// OpError with retriable syscall errors
{"OpError ECONNREFUSED", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.ECONNREFUSED}, true},
{"OpError ECONNRESET", &net.OpError{Op: "read", Err: syscall.ECONNRESET}, true},
{"OpError ENETUNREACH", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.ENETUNREACH}, true},
{"OpError EHOSTUNREACH", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.EHOSTUNREACH}, true},
{"OpError ETIMEDOUT", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.ETIMEDOUT}, true},
// OpError with permanent syscall errors — should NOT retry
{"OpError EACCES", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.EACCES}, false},
{"OpError EPERM", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: syscall.EPERM}, false},
// OpError with unknown inner error — conservative retry
{"OpError unknown inner", &net.OpError{Op: "dial", Err: fmt.Errorf("unknown")}, true},
// DNS errors
{"DNS timeout", &net.DNSError{IsTimeout: true}, true},
{"DNS no such host", &net.DNSError{IsTimeout: false, Name: "bad.host"}, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isTemporaryNetError(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isTemporaryNetError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsRetriableSyscallError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want bool
}{
{"nil", nil, false},
{"ECONNREFUSED", syscall.ECONNREFUSED, true},
{"ECONNRESET", syscall.ECONNRESET, true},
{"ENETUNREACH", syscall.ENETUNREACH, true},
{"EHOSTUNREACH", syscall.EHOSTUNREACH, true},
{"ETIMEDOUT", syscall.ETIMEDOUT, true},
{"EACCES (permanent)", syscall.EACCES, false},
{"EPERM (permanent)", syscall.EPERM, false},
{"ENOENT (permanent)", syscall.ENOENT, false},
{"unknown error", fmt.Errorf("something"), true}, // conservative retry
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isRetriableSyscallError(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isRetriableSyscallError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestRedactURL(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
want string
}{
{
name: "no query params",
input: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/pulls/1",
want: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/pulls/1",
},
{
name: "with query params - redacts",
input: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/raw/file?ref=main",
want: "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/owner/repo/raw/file?[redacted]",
},
{
name: "multiple query params",
input: "https://example.com/path?token=secret&page=1",
want: "https://example.com/path?[redacted]",
},
{
name: "invalid URL",
input: "://invalid",
want: "[invalid URL]",
},
{
name: "empty string",
input: "",
want: "",
},
{
name: "with userinfo - redacts credentials",
input: "https://admin:secret@gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos",
want: "https://REDACTED@gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos",
},
{
name: "with userinfo and query params",
input: "https://user:pass@example.com/path?token=abc",
want: "https://REDACTED@example.com/path?[redacted]",
},
{
name: "username only - no password",
input: "https://user@example.com/path",
want: "https://REDACTED@example.com/path",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL(tt.input)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("redactURL(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSanitizeErrorForLog(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
err error
want string
}{
{
name: "nil error",
err: nil,
want: "<nil>",
},
{
name: "APIError omits body",
err: &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: "internal error: database connection failed"},
want: "HTTP 500",
},
{
name: "APIError with large body still only shows status",
err: &APIError{StatusCode: 502, Body: strings.Repeat("x", 1000)},
want: "HTTP 502",
},
{
name: "non-API error preserved",
err: fmt.Errorf("connection refused"),
want: "connection refused",
},
{
name: "wrapped APIError",
err: fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", &APIError{StatusCode: 503, Body: "service unavailable"}),
want: "HTTP 503",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := sanitizeErrorForLog(tt.err)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("sanitizeErrorForLog() = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "cdn.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"token abc"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "token abc" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:3000", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "gitea.example.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.http == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil http client after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.http.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.http.Timeout)
}
if c.http.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
// TestSafeDialContextBlocksPrivateIPs verifies that NewClient (which uses
// safeDialContext by default) refuses to connect to private/reserved IPs.
func TestSafeDialContextBlocksPrivateIPs(t *testing.T) {
// These servers listen on 127.0.0.1, so the safe dialer will block them.
// We use NewClient (NOT NewTestClient) to exercise the real safe dialer.
privateURLs := []struct {
name string
url string
}{
{"loopback localhost", "http://localhost/"},
{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "http://127.0.0.1/"},
}
for _, tc := range privateURLs {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient(tc.url, "token")
_, err := c.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error connecting to %s, got nil", tc.url)
}
// Error must mention SSRF/blocked, not a random network error.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "blocked") &&
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "private") &&
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "loopback") &&
!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "reserved") {
t.Logf("error: %v", err)
// Allow other errors (connection refused, DNS) since the point
// is that we don't silently succeed — but prefer the explicit block message.
}
})
}
}
// TestWithUnsafeDialerAllowsLocalhost verifies that WithUnsafeDialer bypasses
// the IP check, allowing tests to connect to httptest.Server (127.0.0.1).
func TestWithUnsafeDialerAllowsLocalhost(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Write([]byte(`{"title":"test","body":"","head":{"sha":"abc","ref":"main"}}`))
}))
defer server.Close()
// WithUnsafeDialer should allow connecting to 127.0.0.1.
c := NewClient(server.URL, "token").WithUnsafeDialer()
pr, err := c.GetPullRequest(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with unsafe dialer: %v", err)
}
if pr.Title != "test" {
t.Errorf("expected title 'test', got %q", pr.Title)
}
}
// TestNewClient_HasSafeTransport verifies that NewClient installs the
// SSRF-blocking transport (i.e. Transport is not nil and DialContext is set).
func TestNewClient_HasSafeTransport(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
if c.http.Transport == nil {
t.Fatal("expected Transport to be set on NewClient (safe dialer)")
}
transport, ok := c.http.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected *http.Transport, got %T", c.http.Transport)
}
if transport.DialContext == nil {
t.Fatal("expected DialContext to be set on transport (safe dialer)")
}
}
// TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresSafeTransport verifies that SetHTTPClient(nil)
// restores the safe transport (not just any client).
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresSafeTransport(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
c.SetHTTPClient(&http.Client{}) // replace with plain client
c.SetHTTPClient(nil) // restore
transport, ok := c.http.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected *http.Transport after SetHTTPClient(nil), got %T", c.http.Transport)
}
if transport.DialContext == nil {
t.Fatal("expected DialContext to be restored after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
// TestNewSafeHTTPClient_PreservesDefaultTransportSettings verifies that
// newSafeHTTPClient clones http.DefaultTransport to retain proxy support,
// TLS handshake timeout, idle connection limits, and HTTP/2.
func TestNewSafeHTTPClient_PreservesDefaultTransportSettings(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("https://gitea.example.com", "token")
transport, ok := c.http.Transport.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected *http.Transport, got %T", c.http.Transport)
}
defaults := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport)
// TLSHandshakeTimeout must be inherited (non-zero), not the zero value
// that a bare &http.Transport{} would have.
if transport.TLSHandshakeTimeout == 0 {
t.Error("TLSHandshakeTimeout is 0; expected inherited value from DefaultTransport")
}
if transport.TLSHandshakeTimeout != defaults.TLSHandshakeTimeout {
t.Errorf("TLSHandshakeTimeout = %v, want %v", transport.TLSHandshakeTimeout, defaults.TLSHandshakeTimeout)
}
// IdleConnTimeout must be inherited.
if transport.IdleConnTimeout == 0 {
t.Error("IdleConnTimeout is 0; expected inherited value from DefaultTransport")
}
if transport.IdleConnTimeout != defaults.IdleConnTimeout {
t.Errorf("IdleConnTimeout = %v, want %v", transport.IdleConnTimeout, defaults.IdleConnTimeout)
}
// MaxIdleConns must be inherited.
if transport.MaxIdleConns == 0 {
t.Error("MaxIdleConns is 0; expected inherited value from DefaultTransport")
}
// ForceAttemptHTTP2 must be inherited.
if !transport.ForceAttemptHTTP2 {
t.Error("ForceAttemptHTTP2 is false; expected true from DefaultTransport")
}
// Proxy must be set (ProxyFromEnvironment).
if transport.Proxy == nil {
t.Error("Proxy is nil; expected ProxyFromEnvironment from DefaultTransport")
}
// DialContext must be our safe dialer, not the default.
if transport.DialContext == nil {
t.Error("DialContext is nil; expected safeDialContext")
}
}
-97
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@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
package gitea
import (
"context"
"errors"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestGetPullRequestDiff_SizeLimits(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
diff string
maxDiffSize int64
wantErr error
wantDiff string
}{
{
name: "exceeds max size",
diff: strings.Repeat("+ added line\n", 1000), // ~13 KB
maxDiffSize: 100,
wantErr: ErrDiffTooLarge,
},
{
name: "within max size",
diff: "diff --git a/f.go b/f.go\n--- a/f.go\n+++ b/f.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new\n",
maxDiffSize: 1024,
wantDiff: "diff --git a/f.go b/f.go\n--- a/f.go\n+++ b/f.go\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-old\n+new\n",
},
{
name: "exactly at limit",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 50),
maxDiffSize: 50,
wantDiff: strings.Repeat("x", 50),
},
{
name: "one byte over limit",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 51),
maxDiffSize: 50,
wantErr: ErrDiffTooLarge,
},
{
name: "disabled limit",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
maxDiffSize: -1,
wantDiff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
},
{
name: "math.MaxInt64 treated as disabled",
diff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
maxDiffSize: math.MaxInt64,
wantDiff: strings.Repeat("x", 10000),
},
{
name: "default limit",
diff: "diff content",
maxDiffSize: 0, // zero means use DefaultMaxDiffSize
wantDiff: "diff content",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Write([]byte(tt.diff)) //nolint:errcheck // test handler
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client.MaxDiffSize = tt.maxDiffSize
client.RetryBackoff = []time.Duration{}
got, err := client.GetPullRequestDiff(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1)
if tt.wantErr != nil {
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("expected %v, got: %v", tt.wantErr, err)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tt.wantDiff {
t.Errorf("diff mismatch: got length %d, want length %d", len(got), len(tt.wantDiff))
}
})
}
}
-18
View File
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
// Package gitea — export_test.go exposes test helpers to test files in this
// package. It uses `package gitea` (not `package gitea_test`) so it can access
// unexported identifiers; Go only compiles it into the test binary, never into
// the production binary. This is the idiomatic pattern for white-box testing
// in Go (see net/http/export_test.go in the stdlib for the same approach).
package gitea
// NewTestClient creates a Gitea client configured for use in unit tests.
// It bypasses the IP-level SSRF protection so that tests can connect to
// httptest.Server instances (which listen on 127.0.0.1).
//
// Using the internal package gitea declaration (not gitea_test) means this
// symbol is available to all _test.go files in this package. It is ONLY
// compiled into the test binary; production binaries never include it.
// Production code must use NewClient, which enables the safe dialer.
func NewTestClient(baseURL, token string) *Client {
return NewClient(baseURL, token).WithUnsafeDialer()
}
-91
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@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
// Package gitea provides a client for the Gitea API.
// ipcheck.go implements IP-level SSRF protection by checking resolved addresses
// against known blocked CIDR ranges (RFC1918, loopback, link-local, etc.).
package gitea
import (
"fmt"
"net"
)
// blockedCIDRStrings is the canonical list of CIDR strings that should never
// be contacted by review-bot. See IsBlockedIP for the full list of covered
// address families.
//
// These are hard-coded literals: any parse failure is a programming error.
// Validity is verified by TestBlockedCIDRsValid in ipcheck_test.go.
var blockedCIDRStrings = []string{
// IPv4 loopback
"127.0.0.0/8",
// IPv4 unspecified / "this network"
"0.0.0.0/8",
// RFC1918 private ranges
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
// IPv4 link-local (APIPA, also used by AWS instance metadata 169.254.169.254)
"169.254.0.0/16",
// IPv4 shared address space (RFC6598, carrier-grade NAT)
"100.64.0.0/10",
// IPv4 multicast
"224.0.0.0/4",
// IPv4 reserved / broadcast
"240.0.0.0/4",
// IPv6 loopback
"::1/128",
// IPv6 unspecified
"::/128",
// IPv6 link-local
"fe80::/10",
// IPv6 unique local (ULA) — RFC4193
"fc00::/7",
// IPv6 multicast
"ff00::/8",
}
// blockedCIDRs is the parsed form of blockedCIDRStrings.
// Any entry that fails to parse is recorded in blockedCIDRParseErrors instead
// of panicking; tests verify this slice is always empty via TestBlockedCIDRsValid.
var (
blockedCIDRs []*net.IPNet
blockedCIDRParseErrors []string
)
func init() {
blockedCIDRs = make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(blockedCIDRStrings))
for _, r := range blockedCIDRStrings {
_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(r)
if err != nil {
// Record the error rather than panicking; TestBlockedCIDRsValid
// will catch this during tests, and the CI build will fail.
blockedCIDRParseErrors = append(blockedCIDRParseErrors,
fmt.Sprintf("ipcheck: invalid built-in CIDR %q: %v", r, err))
continue
}
blockedCIDRs = append(blockedCIDRs, cidr)
}
}
// IsBlockedIP reports whether ip is in a blocked address range.
// It is exported for use by the validate-url subcommand and tests outside
// this package.
//
// IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. ::ffff:192.168.1.1) are normalized to their
// IPv4 form before checking so that IPv4 CIDRs catch them.
//
// Based on:
// - RFC1918 private ranges
// - RFC5735 / RFC4193 special-use IPv4/IPv6 ranges
// - RFC4291 IPv6 link-local / loopback
func IsBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
// Normalize IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x) to plain IPv4.
if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil {
ip = v4
}
for _, cidr := range blockedCIDRs {
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
-144
View File
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
package gitea
import (
"net"
"testing"
)
func TestIsBlockedIP(t *testing.T) {
blocked := []struct {
name string
ip string
}{
// IPv4 loopback
{"loopback 127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"},
{"loopback 127.0.0.2", "127.0.0.2"},
{"loopback 127.255.255.255", "127.255.255.255"},
// IPv4 unspecified
{"unspecified 0.0.0.0", "0.0.0.0"},
{"unspecified 0.1.2.3", "0.1.2.3"},
// RFC1918
{"RFC1918 10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1"},
{"RFC1918 10.255.255.255", "10.255.255.255"},
{"RFC1918 172.16.0.1", "172.16.0.1"},
{"RFC1918 172.31.255.255", "172.31.255.255"},
{"RFC1918 192.168.0.1", "192.168.0.1"},
{"RFC1918 192.168.255.255", "192.168.255.255"},
// Link-local (APIPA / AWS metadata)
{"link-local 169.254.0.1", "169.254.0.1"},
{"link-local 169.254.169.254", "169.254.169.254"},
// Shared address space (carrier-grade NAT)
{"CGN 100.64.0.1", "100.64.0.1"},
{"CGN 100.127.255.255", "100.127.255.255"},
// Multicast
{"multicast 224.0.0.1", "224.0.0.1"},
{"multicast 239.255.255.255", "239.255.255.255"},
// Reserved
{"reserved 240.0.0.1", "240.0.0.1"},
{"broadcast 255.255.255.255", "255.255.255.255"},
// IPv6 loopback
{"IPv6 loopback ::1", "::1"},
// IPv6 unspecified
{"IPv6 unspecified ::", "::"},
// IPv6 link-local
{"IPv6 link-local fe80::1", "fe80::1"},
{"IPv6 link-local fe80::dead:beef", "fe80::dead:beef"},
// IPv6 ULA
{"IPv6 ULA fc00::1", "fc00::1"},
{"IPv6 ULA fd00::1", "fd00::1"},
// IPv6 multicast
{"IPv6 multicast ff02::1", "ff02::1"},
}
for _, tc := range blocked {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
if !IsBlockedIP(ip) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(%q) = false, want true", tc.ip)
}
})
}
allowed := []struct {
name string
ip string
}{
{"public 8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8"},
{"public 1.1.1.1", "1.1.1.1"},
{"public 198.51.100.1", "198.51.100.1"}, // RFC5737 TEST-NET-2 — a documentation-only range;
// not assigned to any real host, but intentionally left unblocked here because
// it has no special routing treatment (unlike RFC1918/loopback/link-local) and
// blocking it would require tracking every RFC5737 range without meaningful
// security benefit (no server should ever listen on a TEST-NET address).
{"public 151.101.1.1", "151.101.1.1"}, // Fastly
{"public IPv6 2001:4860:4860::8888", "2001:4860:4860::8888"}, // Google DNS
{"public IPv6 2606:4700:4700::1111", "2606:4700:4700::1111"}, // Cloudflare DNS
}
for _, tc := range allowed {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ip := net.ParseIP(tc.ip)
if ip == nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to parse IP %q", tc.ip)
}
if IsBlockedIP(ip) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(%q) = true, want false", tc.ip)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsBlockedIPv6MappedIPv4(t *testing.T) {
// ::ffff:192.168.1.1 is an IPv6-mapped IPv4 address — should be blocked as RFC1918.
// Construct it manually as a 16-byte IP.
mapped := net.IP{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xff, 192, 168, 1, 1}
if !IsBlockedIP(mapped) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(::ffff:192.168.1.1) = false, want true (IPv6-mapped IPv4 must be normalized)")
}
// ::ffff:8.8.8.8 — IPv6-mapped public IP — should be allowed.
mappedPublic := net.IP{0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xff, 8, 8, 8, 8}
if IsBlockedIP(mappedPublic) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(::ffff:8.8.8.8) = true, want false")
}
}
func TestIsBlockedIPEdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
// The boundary between RFC1918 and public ranges.
// 172.15.255.255 is NOT private (just below 172.16.0.0/12).
notPrivate := net.ParseIP("172.15.255.255")
if IsBlockedIP(notPrivate) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(172.15.255.255) = true, want false (outside 172.16.0.0/12)")
}
// 172.32.0.0 is NOT private (just above 172.31.255.255).
notPrivate2 := net.ParseIP("172.32.0.0")
if IsBlockedIP(notPrivate2) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(172.32.0.0) = true, want false (outside 172.16.0.0/12)")
}
// CGN: 100.63.255.255 is NOT in 100.64.0.0/10.
notCGN := net.ParseIP("100.63.255.255")
if IsBlockedIP(notCGN) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(100.63.255.255) = true, want false (outside 100.64.0.0/10)")
}
// CGN: 100.128.0.0 is NOT in 100.64.0.0/10.
notCGN2 := net.ParseIP("100.128.0.0")
if IsBlockedIP(notCGN2) {
t.Errorf("IsBlockedIP(100.128.0.0) = true, want false (outside 100.64.0.0/10)")
}
}
// TestBlockedCIDRsValid verifies that all entries in blockedCIDRStrings parse
// successfully. This catches programming errors in the CIDR list without
// requiring a startup panic. The init() function records parse failures in
// blockedCIDRParseErrors rather than panicking; this test makes those failures
// visible as test failures during CI.
func TestBlockedCIDRsValid(t *testing.T) {
if len(blockedCIDRParseErrors) > 0 {
for _, msg := range blockedCIDRParseErrors {
t.Errorf("CIDR parse error: %s", msg)
}
}
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@ func TestPostReview_WithComments(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
comments := []ReviewComment{
{Path: "main.go", NewPosition: 42, Body: "[MAJOR] Something bad"},
{Path: "util.go", NewPosition: 10, Body: "[MINOR] Style issue"},
}
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "REQUEST_CHANGES", "summary", "", comments)
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "REQUEST_CHANGES", "summary", comments)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ func TestPostReview_NilComments(t *testing.T) {
}))
defer server.Close()
client := NewTestClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "all good", "", nil)
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-token")
_, err := client.PostReview(context.Background(), "owner", "repo", 1, "APPROVED", "all good", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
-378
View File
@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
// Package github provides a client for the GitHub API.
// It supports pull request operations, file content retrieval,
// and review submission for both github.com and GitHub Enterprise.
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
const (
defaultBaseURL = "https://api.github.com"
// maxRetryAttempts is the number of times doRequest will attempt a request.
maxRetryAttempts = 3
// maxRetryAfter caps the maximum delay from a Retry-After header to prevent
// a server from stalling the client indefinitely.
maxRetryAfter = 60 * time.Second
// maxErrorBodyBytes limits how much of an error response body we read
// to protect against malicious servers sending unbounded data.
maxErrorBodyBytes = 64 * 1024 // 64 KB
// maxResponseBodyBytes limits how much of a successful response body we read
// for defense-in-depth against servers returning excessively large payloads.
maxResponseBodyBytes = 10 * 1024 * 1024 // 10 MB
)
// APIError represents an HTTP error response from the GitHub API.
// It carries the status code so callers can distinguish between
// different failure modes (e.g. 404 vs 500).
//
// The Body field stores up to 64 KiB of the raw response for programmatic
// inspection. Error() truncates to 200 bytes for safe logging, but callers
// should avoid logging or propagating Body directly in production since it may
// contain sensitive details from the upstream server.
type APIError struct {
StatusCode int
Body string
}
func (e *APIError) Error() string {
body := e.Body
if len(body) > 200 {
body = body[:200] + "...(truncated)"
}
// Sanitize newlines to prevent log injection from upstream response bodies.
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\n", " ")
body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\r", " ")
return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d: %s", e.StatusCode, body)
}
// IsNotFound reports whether an error is an API 404 response.
func IsNotFound(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound
}
return false
}
// IsUnauthorized reports whether an error is an API 401 response.
func IsUnauthorized(err error) bool {
if apiErr, ok := asAPIError(err); ok {
return apiErr.StatusCode == http.StatusUnauthorized
}
return false
}
func asAPIError(err error) (*APIError, bool) {
if err == nil {
return nil, false
}
var target *APIError
if errors.As(err, &target) {
return target, true
}
return nil, false
}
// Client interacts with the GitHub API.
// A Client is safe for concurrent use by multiple goroutines.
// SetHTTPClient and SetRetryBackoff are intended for test setup only and must
// be called before any goroutines issue requests; they have no synchronization.
type Client struct {
// TODO: baseURL is populated by NewClient but not yet consumed by doRequest/doGet.
// Higher-level exported methods (GetPullRequest, etc.) will use it to
// construct request URLs; remove this field if those methods end up
// accepting full URLs instead.
baseURL string
token string
httpClient *http.Client
// allowInsecureHTTP permits requests to HTTP (non-TLS) endpoints.
// When false, doRequest rejects URLs with an http:// scheme.
allowInsecureHTTP bool
// retryBackoff defines the delays between retry attempts for 429 responses.
// retryBackoff[i] is the delay before attempt i+1 (after attempt i fails).
// If nil, defaults to {1s, 2s}.
retryBackoff []time.Duration
// now returns the current time. Defaults to time.Now.
// Override in tests to control HTTP-date Retry-After calculations.
now func() time.Time
}
// defaultCheckRedirect is the redirect policy used by NewClient.
// NOTE: This function is intentionally duplicated in gitea/client.go (and vice versa)
// because the packages are separate. Changes here must be mirrored there.
// It rejects HTTPS->HTTP protocol downgrades (to prevent plaintext leakage)
// and cross-host redirects (to prevent following responses from untrusted
// endpoints). Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects are allowed.
func defaultCheckRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
// Guard for direct invocation in tests and any future callers;
// net/http guarantees len(via) >= 1 during actual redirects.
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
prev := via[len(via)-1]
// Reject protocol downgrade: HTTPS->HTTP leaks request metadata over plaintext.
if prev.URL.Scheme == "https" && req.URL.Scheme == "http" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: HTTPS to HTTP downgrade (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
// Reject cross-host redirect entirely to avoid consuming responses
// from untrusted endpoints.
if req.URL.Host != prev.URL.Host {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect: cross-host (%s -> %s)", prev.URL.Host, req.URL.Host)
}
return nil
}
// ClientOption configures optional behavior of a Client.
type ClientOption func(*clientConfig)
type clientConfig struct {
allowInsecureHTTP bool
insecureIsTestBypass bool
}
// AllowInsecureHTTP permits sending credentials over plaintext HTTP connections.
// In production, this option is gated by the REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1
// environment variable. Without the env var set, the option is ignored
// and a warning is logged.
//
// For tests, use AllowInsecureHTTPForTest (defined in a _test.go file in the same package) which bypasses the env gate.
func AllowInsecureHTTP() ClientOption {
return func(cfg *clientConfig) {
cfg.allowInsecureHTTP = true
}
}
// NewClient creates a new GitHub API client.
// If baseURL is empty, it defaults to https://api.github.com.
// For GitHub Enterprise, pass the API base URL (e.g. https://github.concur.com/api/v3).
func NewClient(token, baseURL string, opts ...ClientOption) *Client {
if baseURL == "" {
baseURL = defaultBaseURL
}
var cfg clientConfig
for _, opt := range opts {
opt(&cfg)
}
if cfg.allowInsecureHTTP && !cfg.insecureIsTestBypass {
if os.Getenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE") != "1" {
slog.Warn("AllowInsecureHTTP ignored: set REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1 to enable")
cfg.allowInsecureHTTP = false
} else {
slog.Warn("AllowInsecureHTTP enabled — credentials may be sent over plaintext",
"env", "REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1")
}
}
return &Client{
baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
token: token,
allowInsecureHTTP: cfg.allowInsecureHTTP,
httpClient: &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
},
now: time.Now,
}
}
// SetHTTPClient sets the underlying HTTP client used for requests.
// This is intended for test setup only to inject mock transports; it must be
// called before any goroutines issue requests.
//
// Passing nil restores the default client (30s timeout + redirect-rejecting
// CheckRedirect policy matching NewClient).
//
// Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for configuring a safe
// CheckRedirect policy. Without one, the default net/http behavior will follow
// redirects and may forward the Authorization header to untrusted hosts.
func (c *Client) SetHTTPClient(hc *http.Client) {
if hc == nil {
hc = &http.Client{
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: defaultCheckRedirect,
}
}
c.httpClient = hc
}
// SetRetryBackoff sets the delays between retry attempts.
// This is intended for testing to speed up retry tests.
//
// Note: if an empty non-nil slice is provided, Retry-After delays parsed from
// server responses will be computed and capped but not applied (because
// attempt < len(backoff) is always false). This is acceptable for the
// test-only use case but callers should be aware of this edge case.
func (c *Client) SetRetryBackoff(backoff []time.Duration) {
c.retryBackoff = backoff
}
// parseRetryAfter parses a Retry-After header value, supporting both integer
// seconds (e.g. "120") and HTTP-date format (e.g. "Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
// as specified in RFC 7231 §7.1.3.
//
// For integer values, it returns the duration directly.
// For HTTP-date values, it computes the delay as the difference between the
// parsed time and now. If the date is in the past, it returns 0.
//
// Returns (0, false) if the value cannot be parsed as either format.
func (c *Client) parseRetryAfter(value string) (time.Duration, bool) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
// Try integer seconds first (most common from GitHub).
// RFC 7231 allows delta-seconds of 0 to indicate immediate retry.
if seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(value); err == nil && seconds >= 0 {
return time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second, true
}
// Try HTTP-date format (RFC 7231 §7.1.3).
// http.ParseTime handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats.
if retryAt, err := http.ParseTime(value); err == nil {
delay := retryAt.Sub(c.now())
if delay < 0 {
delay = 0
}
return delay, true
}
return 0, false
}
// redactURL redacts sensitive components from a URL for safe inclusion in error
// messages and log output. It removes userinfo (e.g., user:pass@) and replaces
// query parameters with a placeholder.
func redactURL(rawURL string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return "<unparseable URL>"
}
u.User = nil
if u.RawQuery != "" {
u.RawQuery = "<redacted>"
}
return u.String()
}
// doRequest performs an HTTP request with retry on 429 rate limit responses.
// It respects the Retry-After header when present, supporting both integer
// seconds and HTTP-date formats (capped at maxRetryAfter).
func (c *Client) doRequest(ctx context.Context, method, reqURL string, accept string) ([]byte, error) {
// NOTE: This parses reqURL a second time (http.NewRequestWithContext parses it
// again internally). Acceptable cost: URL parsing is cheap and threading the
// parsed *url.URL through would complicate the interface for negligible gain.
if !c.allowInsecureHTTP {
parsed, err := url.Parse(reqURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse request URL: %w", err)
}
if strings.EqualFold(parsed.Scheme, "http") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("refusing HTTP request to %s: use HTTPS or set AllowInsecureHTTP option", redactURL(reqURL))
}
}
var backoff []time.Duration
if c.retryBackoff != nil {
backoff = append([]time.Duration(nil), c.retryBackoff...)
} else {
backoff = []time.Duration{1 * time.Second, 2 * time.Second}
}
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < maxRetryAttempts; attempt++ {
if attempt > 0 {
var delay time.Duration
if attempt-1 < len(backoff) {
delay = backoff[attempt-1]
}
if delay > 0 {
timer := time.NewTimer(delay)
select {
case <-timer.C:
timer.Stop() // no-op after fire; kept for symmetry with the ctx.Done case
case <-ctx.Done():
timer.Stop()
return nil, ctx.Err()
}
}
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, reqURL, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
if accept != "" {
req.Header.Set("Accept", accept)
} else {
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/vnd.github+json")
}
resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("do request: %w", err)
}
if resp.StatusCode >= 200 && resp.StatusCode < 300 {
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read response body: %w", err)
}
return body, nil
}
errBody, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxErrorBodyBytes))
resp.Body.Close()
lastErr = &APIError{StatusCode: resp.StatusCode, Body: string(errBody)}
// Retry on 429 rate limit
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests && attempt < maxRetryAttempts-1 {
// Check for Retry-After header and override backoff if present.
// Supports both integer seconds (common) and HTTP-date format (RFC 7231).
if ra := resp.Header.Get("Retry-After"); ra != "" {
if delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter(ra); ok {
if delay > maxRetryAfter {
delay = maxRetryAfter
}
if attempt < len(backoff) {
backoff[attempt] = delay
}
}
}
continue
}
// Don't retry other errors
return nil, lastErr
}
return nil, lastErr
}
// doGet is a convenience wrapper for GET requests with the default Accept header.
func (c *Client) doGet(ctx context.Context, url string) ([]byte, error) {
return c.doRequest(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, "")
}
-658
View File
@@ -1,658 +0,0 @@
package github
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
func TestNewClient_DefaultBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
if c.baseURL != defaultBaseURL {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want %q", c.baseURL, defaultBaseURL)
}
}
func TestNewClient_CustomBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "https://github.concur.com/api/v3/")
if c.baseURL != "https://github.concur.com/api/v3" {
t.Errorf("baseURL = %q, want trailing slash stripped", c.baseURL)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_Success(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if got := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "Bearer test-token" {
t.Errorf("Authorization = %q, want Bearer test-token", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"ok":true}`))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("test-token", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != `{"ok":true}` {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, `{"ok":true}`)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "0")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate(t *testing.T) {
// Fix "now" to a known time for deterministic testing.
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 59, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 second in the future
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// Initial backoff is 0; the HTTP-date parser will compute 1s and override.
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_HTTPDate_InPast(t *testing.T) {
// If the HTTP-date is in the past, delay should be 0 (retry immediately).
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
retryAt := "Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT" // 1 hour in the past
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAt)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_NoRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
if attempts != 2 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 2", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_429_InvalidRetryAfter_UsesDefaultBackoff(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
if attempts == 1 {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "not-a-number-or-date")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
w.Write([]byte("rate limited"))
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{0, 0})
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "success" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "success")
}
}
func TestDoRequest_404_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
w.Write([]byte("not found"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsNotFound(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsNotFound, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 404)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_401_NoRetry(t *testing.T) {
attempts := 0
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
attempts++
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
w.Write([]byte("unauthorized"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !IsUnauthorized(err) {
t.Errorf("expected IsUnauthorized, got %v", err)
}
if attempts != 1 {
t.Errorf("attempts = %d, want 1 (no retry on 401)", attempts)
}
}
func TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled(t *testing.T) {
// This test exercises the timer-cancel path in the retry select:
// select { case <-timer.C; case <-ctx.Done() }
// The server returns 429 with a long Retry-After, and we cancel the
// context shortly after the first response so that cancellation races
// against the timer rather than preventing the initial HTTP round-trip.
requestReceived := make(chan struct{}, 1)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
select {
case requestReceived <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "10")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusTooManyRequests)
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
c.SetRetryBackoff([]time.Duration{10 * time.Second, 10 * time.Second})
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
// Cancel the context after the first request completes, while the
// client is blocked in the retry timer select.
go func() {
<-requestReceived
// Small delay to ensure we're inside the timer select.
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
cancel()
}()
_, err := c.doGet(ctx, srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
t.Errorf("err = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_IntegerSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("42")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 42*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 42s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_ZeroSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("0")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for zero seconds (RFC 7231 allows immediate retry)")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_NegativeSeconds(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("-5")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for negative seconds")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Future(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
// Should be 10 seconds in the future.
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_HTTPDate_Past(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 17, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 0 {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 0 (past date)", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_RFC850_Format(t *testing.T) {
fixedNow := time.Date(2025, 12, 1, 15, 59, 50, 0, time.UTC)
c := NewClient("tok", "")
c.now = func() time.Time { return fixedNow }
// RFC 850 format
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("Monday, 01-Dec-25 16:00:00 GMT")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true for RFC 850 format")
}
if delay != 10*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 10s", delay)
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_Invalid(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("not-valid")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for invalid value")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_EmptyString(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("tok", "")
_, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("")
if ok {
t.Error("expected ok=false for empty string")
}
}
func TestParseRetryAfter_MaxCap(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that parseRetryAfter returns the raw value (capping is done by caller).
c := NewClient("tok", "")
delay, ok := c.parseRetryAfter("3600")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected ok=true")
}
if delay != 3600*time.Second {
t.Errorf("delay = %v, want 3600s (caller is responsible for capping)", delay)
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_Truncation(t *testing.T) {
longBody := make([]byte, 300)
for i := range longBody {
longBody[i] = 'x'
}
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 500, Body: string(longBody)}
msg := apiErr.Error()
if len(msg) > 250 {
// "HTTP 500: " (10) + 200 + "...(truncated)" (14) = 224
t.Errorf("error message too long: %d chars", len(msg))
}
}
func TestAPIError_Error_NewlineSanitized(t *testing.T) {
apiErr := &APIError{StatusCode: 400, Body: "line1\nline2\rline3"}
msg := apiErr.Error()
for _, c := range msg {
if c == '\n' || c == '\r' {
t.Errorf("error message contains unsanitized newline: %q", msg)
break
}
}
}
func TestNewClient_HasCheckRedirect(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("secret-token", "https://api.github.com")
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect to be set")
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsHTTPSToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on HTTPS->HTTP redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS to HTTP downgrade") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsCrossHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "objects.githubusercontent.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error on cross-host redirect")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-host") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHost(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{"Authorization": []string{"Bearer token"}},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Auth should be preserved on same-host redirect
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "Bearer token" {
t.Errorf("expected Authorization to be preserved, got %q", auth)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_AllowsSameHostHTTPToHTTP(t *testing.T) {
prev := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/foo"}}
req := &http.Request{
URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "localhost:8080", Path: "/bar"},
Header: http.Header{},
}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, []*http.Request{prev})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_RejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
for i := range via {
via[i] = &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/"}}
}
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/final"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error after 10 redirects")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "10 redirects") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDefaultCheckRedirect_EmptyViaAllowed(t *testing.T) {
req := &http.Request{URL: &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: "api.github.com", Path: "/foo"}}
err := defaultCheckRedirect(req, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error with empty via: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSetHTTPClient_NilRestoresDefault(t *testing.T) {
c := NewClient("token", "https://api.github.com")
c.SetHTTPClient(nil)
if c.httpClient == nil {
t.Fatal("expected non-nil httpClient after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
if c.httpClient.Timeout != 30*time.Second {
t.Errorf("expected 30s timeout, got %v", c.httpClient.Timeout)
}
if c.httpClient.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("expected CheckRedirect policy after SetHTTPClient(nil)")
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTPForTest_PermitsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("ok"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTPForTest())
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "ok" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "ok")
}
}
func TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsHTTP(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("request should not have been sent")
}))
defer srv.Close()
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL)
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for HTTP request without AllowInsecureHTTP")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsUppercaseHTTP(t *testing.T) {
// Verify case-insensitive scheme check (RFC 3986).
c := NewClient("tok", "HTTP://127.0.0.1:1")
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), "HTTP://127.0.0.1:1/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for uppercase HTTP scheme")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestNoInsecureOption_RejectsMixedCaseHTTP(t *testing.T) {
// Verify mixed case like "Http://" is also rejected.
c := NewClient("tok", "Http://127.0.0.1:1")
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), "Http://127.0.0.1:1/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for mixed-case HTTP scheme")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTP_WithoutEnvVar_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("request should not have been sent")
}))
defer srv.Close()
t.Setenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE", "")
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTP())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error: AllowInsecureHTTP without env var should be rejected")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTP_WithEnvVar_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("insecure-ok"))
}))
defer srv.Close()
t.Setenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE", "1")
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTP())
body, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if string(body) != "insecure-ok" {
t.Errorf("body = %q, want %q", body, "insecure-ok")
}
}
func TestAllowInsecureHTTP_EnvVarNotOne_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
t.Fatal("request should not have been sent")
}))
defer srv.Close()
// "true" is not "1" — strict check
t.Setenv("REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE", "true")
c := NewClient("tok", srv.URL, AllowInsecureHTTP())
_, err := c.doGet(context.Background(), srv.URL+"/test")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error: env var 'true' is not '1'")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing HTTP request") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error message: %v", err)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_WithQuery(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://localhost:1234/path?secret=token&foo=bar")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path?<redacted>"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_NoQuery(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://localhost:1234/path")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_Userinfo(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://user:pass@localhost:1234/path")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestRedactURL_UserinfoWithQuery(t *testing.T) {
got := redactURL("http://user:pass@localhost:1234/path?secret=token")
want := "http://localhost:1234/path?<redacted>"
if got != want {
t.Errorf("redactURL = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
-13
View File
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
package github
// AllowInsecureHTTPForTest permits sending credentials over plaintext HTTP
// without requiring the REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE environment variable.
// This is intended exclusively for test code using httptest.Server.
//
// Defined in a _test.go file so it is only available to test binaries.
func AllowInsecureHTTPForTest() ClientOption {
return func(cfg *clientConfig) {
cfg.allowInsecureHTTP = true
cfg.insecureIsTestBypass = true
}
}
-2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
module gitea.weiker.me/rodin/review-bot
go 1.26.2
require github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2 h1:PmFC1S6h8ljIz6gMRBopkjP1TVT7xuwrButHID66PoM=
github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.19.2/go.mod h1:XBurs7gK8ATbW4ZPGKgcbrY1Br56PdM69F7LkFRi1kA=
+8 -9
View File
@@ -16,17 +16,16 @@ import (
// Integration test requires a running Gitea instance and LLM endpoint.
// Set environment variables:
//
// INTEGRATION_VCS_URL - VCS base URL
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_TOKEN - Gitea API token with repo access
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_REPO - owner/repo with an open PR
// INTEGRATION_PR_NUMBER - PR number to test against
// INTEGRATION_LLM_BASE_URL - LLM API base URL
// INTEGRATION_LLM_API_KEY - LLM API key
// INTEGRATION_LLM_MODEL - Model name
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL - Gitea base URL
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_TOKEN - Gitea API token with repo access
// INTEGRATION_GITEA_REPO - owner/repo with an open PR
// INTEGRATION_PR_NUMBER - PR number to test against
// INTEGRATION_LLM_BASE_URL - LLM API base URL
// INTEGRATION_LLM_API_KEY - LLM API key
// INTEGRATION_LLM_MODEL - Model name
func TestIntegration_FullReviewFlow(t *testing.T) {
giteaURL := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_VCS_URL")
giteaURL := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_URL")
giteaToken := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_TOKEN")
giteaRepo := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_GITEA_REPO")
prNumStr := os.Getenv("INTEGRATION_PR_NUMBER")
+21 -276
View File
@@ -1,163 +1,81 @@
package review
import (
"bytes"
"embed"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"sort"
"strings"
"unicode/utf8"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml/ast"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml/parser"
)
//go:embed personas/*.yaml
//go:embed personas/*.json
var embeddedPersonas embed.FS
// MaxPersonaFileSize is the maximum size for persona files (64 KB).
// This prevents denial-of-service via excessively large files.
const MaxPersonaFileSize = 64 * 1024
// MaxYAMLDepth is the maximum nesting depth allowed in YAML persona files.
// This prevents stack exhaustion from deeply nested structures.
const MaxYAMLDepth = 20
// MaxYAMLNodes is the maximum number of YAML nodes allowed in persona files.
// This prevents DoS via wide-but-shallow structures that bypass depth limits.
const MaxYAMLNodes = 1000
// Persona defines a specialized review role with focused expertise.
type Persona struct {
Name string `json:"name" yaml:"name"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name" yaml:"display_name"`
ModelPref string `json:"model_preference,omitempty" yaml:"model_preference,omitempty"`
Identity string `json:"identity" yaml:"identity"`
Focus []string `json:"focus" yaml:"focus"`
Ignore []string `json:"ignore" yaml:"ignore"`
Severity Severity `json:"severity" yaml:"severity"`
OutputFormat string `json:"output_format,omitempty" yaml:"output_format,omitempty"`
Name string `json:"name"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
ModelPref string `json:"model_preference,omitempty"`
Identity string `json:"identity"`
Focus []string `json:"focus"`
Ignore []string `json:"ignore"`
Severity Severity `json:"severity"`
OutputFormat string `json:"output_format,omitempty"`
}
// Severity defines what constitutes each severity level for this persona.
// These are prompt guidance for the LLM, not output format changes.
type Severity struct {
Major string `json:"major" yaml:"major"`
Minor string `json:"minor" yaml:"minor"`
Nit string `json:"nit" yaml:"nit"`
Major string `json:"major"`
Minor string `json:"minor"`
Nit string `json:"nit"`
}
// LoadPersona loads a persona from a JSON or YAML file path.
// Format is detected by file extension: .yaml/.yml for YAML, .json or other for JSON.
// Files larger than MaxPersonaFileSize are rejected.
//
// Symlinks are supported: os.Stat follows symlinks, so a symlink pointing to
// a regular file will pass the IsRegular() check. Symlinks to non-regular files
// (directories, FIFOs, devices) are still rejected.
// LoadPersona loads a persona from a JSON file path.
func LoadPersona(path string) (*Persona, error) {
// os.Stat follows symlinks, so symlinks to regular files are supported.
// The IsRegular() check operates on the target, not the symlink itself.
info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read persona file %s: %w", path, err)
}
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona file %s is not a regular file", path)
}
if info.Size() > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona file %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes)", path, MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read persona file %s: %w", path, err)
}
// Re-check size after read to defend against TOCTOU races where file
// grows between stat and read (e.g., appending process, replaced file).
if len(data) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona file %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes)", path, MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
return parsePersona(data, path)
}
// LoadBuiltinPersona loads a built-in persona by name.
// Returns an error if the persona doesn't exist.
// Built-in personas are stored in YAML format only (see embed directive).
func LoadBuiltinPersona(name string) (*Persona, error) {
yamlFile := name + ".yaml"
data, err := embeddedPersonas.ReadFile("personas/" + yamlFile)
filename := name + ".json"
data, err := embeddedPersonas.ReadFile("personas/" + filename) // embed.FS paths use forward slashes per io/fs spec
if err != nil {
available := ListBuiltinPersonas()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown built-in persona %q (available: %s)", name, strings.Join(available, ", "))
}
return parsePersona(data, "builtin:"+yamlFile)
return parsePersona(data, "builtin:"+name)
}
// ListBuiltinPersonas returns the names of all built-in personas in sorted order.
// ListBuiltinPersonas returns the names of all built-in personas.
// Returns an empty slice if the embedded directory cannot be read.
func ListBuiltinPersonas() []string {
entries, err := embeddedPersonas.ReadDir("personas")
if err != nil {
return []string{}
}
seen := make(map[string]bool)
var names []string
for _, e := range entries {
if e.IsDir() {
continue
}
name := e.Name()
// Strip extension to get persona name
var personaName string
switch {
case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".yaml"):
personaName = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".yaml")
case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".yml"):
personaName = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".yml")
case strings.HasSuffix(name, ".json"):
personaName = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".json")
default:
continue
if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".json") {
names = append(names, strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".json"))
}
seen[personaName] = true
}
names := make([]string, 0, len(seen))
for name := range seen {
names = append(names, name)
}
sort.Strings(names)
return names
}
// parsePersona parses persona data from JSON or YAML format.
// Format is detected by the source file extension.
func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
lowerSource := strings.ToLower(source)
isYAML := strings.HasSuffix(lowerSource, ".yaml") || strings.HasSuffix(lowerSource, ".yml")
var p Persona
var err error
if isYAML {
err = unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data, &p, MaxYAMLDepth)
} else {
// Use json.Decoder with DisallowUnknownFields for consistency with
// YAML's Strict() - both reject unknown fields to catch typos.
dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
err = dec.Decode(&p)
if err == nil {
// Reject trailing content after the first valid JSON object.
// Without this check, input like `{"name":"x"}garbage` would
// silently succeed because Decoder stops after one object.
var dummy json.RawMessage
if err2 := dec.Decode(&dummy); err2 != io.EOF {
err = fmt.Errorf("unexpected trailing content after JSON object")
}
}
}
if err != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &p); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse persona %s: %w", source, err)
}
if err := validatePersona(&p, source); err != nil {
@@ -166,179 +84,6 @@ func parsePersona(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
return &p, nil
}
// unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit unmarshals YAML data with three safety checks:
// - Depth limiting: rejects AST trees exceeding maxDepth to prevent stack exhaustion.
// - Multi-document rejection: prevents silent data loss from ignored extra documents.
// - Strict field checking: rejects unknown YAML keys to catch typos early.
func unmarshalYAMLWithDepthLimit(data []byte, out any, maxDepth int) error {
// First pass: parse into AST to check depth limits, node counts, and
// multi-document rejection. This prevents stack exhaustion before we
// attempt to decode into structs.
file, err := parser.ParseBytes(data, 0)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Reject empty YAML input (whitespace-only, comment-only, or truly empty files).
// The parser returns a single doc with nil body for these cases.
if len(file.Docs) == 0 || file.Docs[0].Body == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("empty YAML document")
}
// Reject multi-document YAML files - silently ignoring additional documents
// could lead to confusing behavior where users think their changes take effect.
if len(file.Docs) > 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("multi-document YAML is not supported; only single-document files are allowed")
}
nodeCount := 0
if err := checkYAMLDepth(file.Docs[0].Body, 0, maxDepth, MaxYAMLNodes, make(map[ast.Node]int), make(map[ast.Node]bool), &nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
// Second pass: decode with strict field checking enabled.
// Strict() rejects unknown keys, catching typos like "focuss" or "identiy".
//
// Safety note: goccy/go-yaml's decoder does not expand YAML aliases
// recursively — it resolves them via the pre-built AST, which our first
// pass already depth-checked. Alias chains that would exceed depth limits
// are caught above; the decoder merely reads the resolved scalar values.
dec := yaml.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(data), yaml.Strict())
return dec.Decode(out)
}
// checkYAMLDepth recursively checks that YAML AST nodes don't exceed the depth
// limit or the total node count limit. It uses two tracking maps:
// - validated: maps each node to the maximum depth at which it was previously
// checked. If a node is revisited at a deeper depth (e.g., via an alias),
// we re-check it to ensure the combined effective depth doesn't exceed limits.
// - visiting: per-path recursion stack for true cycle detection. A node on the
// current path is a cycle (alias loop); we return nil to avoid infinite recursion.
//
// This design prevents the alias depth bypass where an anchored subtree validated
// at a shallow depth could be referenced via alias at a greater depth, effectively
// exceeding MaxYAMLDepth.
func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[ast.Node]int, visiting map[ast.Node]bool, nodeCount *int) error {
if node == nil {
return nil
}
if depth > maxDepth {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML nesting depth exceeds maximum (%d)", maxDepth)
}
// Cycle detection: if we're currently visiting this node on the current
// recursion path, it's a cycle (e.g., alias pointing to an ancestor).
// Return nil to break the cycle without error — cycles are a structural
// property, not a depth violation.
if visiting[node] {
return nil
}
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
// Placed after cycle detection but before the depth-aware short-circuit. This means
// nodes revisited at shallower depths (via aliases) are counted each time they are
// encountered — intentional conservative overcounting. This bounds the total work
// performed during validation rather than tracking unique nodes, which is the safer
// security posture for untrusted YAML input.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)
}
// Depth-aware short-circuit: skip re-validation only when the current visit
// depth is the same or shallower than the depth at which this node was
// previously validated. A shallower (or equal) current depth means the
// prior, deeper validation already covered any subtree depth violations.
// If the current depth exceeds the previous validation depth (e.g., an alias
// references this node deeper in the tree), we must re-traverse to ensure
// the combined effective depth doesn't exceed maxDepth.
//
// Note: using ast.Node (interface) as map key relies on pointer identity,
// which is correct because all goccy/go-yaml AST node types are pointer
// receivers (*MappingNode, *SequenceNode, etc.), never value types.
if prevDepth, ok := validated[node]; ok && depth <= prevDepth {
return nil
}
validated[node] = depth
// Mark as visiting (on the current recursion path) for cycle detection.
visiting[node] = true
defer func() { visiting[node] = false }()
// Walk children based on node type.
switch n := node.(type) {
case *ast.MappingNode:
for _, value := range n.Values {
if err := checkYAMLDepth(value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
}
case *ast.MappingValueNode:
// Both Key and Value are visited at depth+1 relative to this
// MappingValueNode. Since MappingNode visits its MappingValueNode
// children at depth+1 as well, keys and values end up at depth+2
// from the parent MappingNode. This is intentional: it mirrors the
// actual nesting structure (mapping → key-value pair → key/value).
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Key, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.SequenceNode:
for _, value := range n.Values {
if err := checkYAMLDepth(value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
}
case *ast.AliasNode:
// Follow alias to its target, incrementing depth since aliases expand
// the effective structure.
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.AnchorNode:
// Increment depth for anchor values as a conservative measure: the
// anchor definition itself is structural, and treating it as a depth
// level ensures that deeply nested anchors are caught at definition
// time rather than only when referenced via alias. This +1 is
// asymmetric with alias (which also increments) — by design, the
// effective depth budget for anchored-then-aliased content is reduced
// because both the definition site and the reference site each consume
// a level, making deeply nested anchor/alias pairs hit the limit sooner.
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.TagNode:
if err := checkYAMLDepth(n.Value, depth+1, maxDepth, maxNodes, validated, visiting, nodeCount); err != nil {
return err
}
case *ast.MergeKeyNode:
// MergeKeyNode represents the literal "<<" merge key token. It has no
// child nodes — the value side of a merge (e.g., *alias) lives in the
// parent MappingValueNode.Value, which is already recursed into above.
// Explicitly listed here (rather than in the default case) to prevent
// future library changes from silently bypassing depth checks.
default:
// Scalar leaf nodes (StringNode, IntegerNode, FloatNode, BoolNode,
// NullNode, InfinityNode, NanNode, LiteralNode) have no children to
// recurse into.
}
return nil
}
// ParsePersonaBytes parses persona data from bytes with a source label for errors.
// This is useful for parsing personas fetched from external sources (e.g., Gitea API)
// without requiring filesystem access. Format is detected by source extension.
// Input is bounded by MaxPersonaFileSize to prevent resource exhaustion.
func ParsePersonaBytes(data []byte, source string) (*Persona, error) {
if len(data) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persona data from %s exceeds maximum size (%d bytes, limit %d)", source, len(data), MaxPersonaFileSize)
}
return parsePersona(data, source)
}
func validatePersona(p *Persona, source string) error {
if p.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("persona %s: name is required", source)
+10 -730
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
package review
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/goccy/go-yaml/ast"
)
func TestLoadBuiltinPersona(t *testing.T) {
@@ -90,83 +87,6 @@ func TestListBuiltinPersonas(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaFromYAMLFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.yaml")
content := `# Test persona
name: test
display_name: Test Persona
identity: |
You are a test persona.
Multi-line identity works.
focus:
- testing
- validation
ignore:
- nothing
severity:
major: Big problems
minor: Small problems
nit: Tiny problems
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
if p.DisplayName != "Test Persona" {
t.Errorf("DisplayName = %q, want %q", p.DisplayName, "Test Persona")
}
if len(p.Focus) != 2 {
t.Errorf("Focus len = %d, want 2", len(p.Focus))
}
if !strings.Contains(p.Identity, "Multi-line") {
t.Error("Identity should contain multi-line content")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaFromYMLFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.yml")
content := `name: test
display_name: Test YML
identity: Test identity
focus:
- testing
ignore: []
severity:
major: Big
minor: Small
nit: Tiny
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
if p.DisplayName != "Test YML" {
t.Errorf("DisplayName = %q, want %q", p.DisplayName, "Test YML")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaFromJSONFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
@@ -176,7 +96,6 @@ func TestLoadPersonaFromJSONFile(t *testing.T) {
"display_name": "Test Persona",
"identity": "You are a test persona.\nMulti-line identity works.",
"focus": ["testing", "validation"],
"ignore": ["nothing"],
"severity": {
"major": "Big problems",
@@ -211,38 +130,22 @@ func TestLoadPersonaFromJSONFile(t *testing.T) {
func TestLoadPersonaValidation(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
ext string
json string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "missing name yaml",
content: "identity: test\n",
ext: ".yaml",
name: "missing name",
json: `{"identity": "test"}`,
wantErr: "name is required",
},
{
name: "missing identity yaml",
content: "name: test\n",
ext: ".yaml",
name: "missing identity",
json: `{"name": "test"}`,
wantErr: "identity is required",
},
{
name: "missing name json",
content: `{"identity": "test"}`,
ext: ".json",
wantErr: "name is required",
},
{
name: "missing identity json",
content: `{"name": "test"}`,
ext: ".json",
wantErr: "identity is required",
},
{
name: "display_name defaults to name",
content: "name: test\nidentity: test identity\n",
ext: ".yaml",
name: "display_name defaults to name",
json: `{"name": "test", "identity": "test identity"}`,
// No error expected - should succeed
},
}
@@ -250,8 +153,8 @@ func TestLoadPersonaValidation(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test"+tt.ext)
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.json), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
@@ -281,25 +184,12 @@ func TestLoadPersonaValidation(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLoadPersonaFileNotFound(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LoadPersona("/nonexistent/path/persona.yaml")
_, err := LoadPersona("/nonexistent/path/persona.json")
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for nonexistent file")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaInvalidYAML(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "invalid.yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("not valid yaml:\n - [broken"), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for invalid YAML")
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "invalid.json")
@@ -313,38 +203,6 @@ func TestLoadPersonaInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaCaseInsensitiveExtension(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
ext string
}{
{"lowercase yaml", ".yaml"},
{"uppercase YAML", ".YAML"},
{"mixed case Yaml", ".Yaml"},
{"lowercase yml", ".yml"},
{"uppercase YML", ".YML"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test"+tt.ext)
content := "name: test\nidentity: test identity\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed for extension %s: %v", tt.ext, err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
})
}
}
func TestCapitalizeFirst(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
@@ -379,581 +237,3 @@ func TestListBuiltinPersonasReturnsEmptySlice(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("ListBuiltinPersonas should return empty slice, not nil")
}
}
func TestYAMLMultilineStrings(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "multiline.yaml")
// Test literal block scalar (|) which preserves newlines
content := `name: multiline
display_name: Multiline Test
identity: |
First line.
Second line.
Third line.
focus:
- item one
ignore: []
severity:
major: Major issue
minor: Minor issue
nit: Nit
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
// Literal block scalar preserves newlines
if !strings.Contains(p.Identity, "\n") {
t.Error("Identity should contain newlines from literal block scalar")
}
if !strings.Contains(p.Identity, "Second line") {
t.Error("Identity should contain 'Second line'")
}
}
func TestYAMLComments(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "comments.yaml")
content := `# This is a comment
name: commented # inline comment
display_name: Commented Persona
# Another comment
identity: Test identity
focus:
- item # comment after item
ignore: []
severity:
major: Major
minor: Minor
nit: Nit
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
p, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona failed: %v", err)
}
// Comments should be ignored
if p.Name != "commented" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "commented")
}
if p.Focus[0] != "item" {
t.Errorf("Focus[0] = %q, want %q", p.Focus[0], "item")
}
}
func TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "deeply-nested.yaml")
// Build a deeply nested YAML structure that exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20).
// Depth accumulation trace for "nested: \n level0: \n level1: ...":
// - Document root parsed at depth 0
// - Root MappingNode children (MappingValueNodes) visited at depth 1
// - "nested" MappingValueNode: key at depth 2, value at depth 2
// - Each levelN adds depth via MappingValueNode traversal (key + value)
// - Exact depth per level depends on AST structure (MappingNode wrapping),
// but 25 levels reliably exceeds MaxYAMLDepth (20) with comfortable margin.
// The test uses 25 levels rather than exactly 21 to avoid brittleness.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\nnested:\n")
indent := " "
for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(indent, i+1))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
}
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(indent, 26))
sb.WriteString("value: too-deep\n")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(sb.String()), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for deeply nested YAML, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "nesting depth exceeds") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'nesting depth exceeds'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestYAMLEmptyFileRejection(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{"completely_empty", ""},
{"whitespace_only", " \n\n "},
{"comment_only", "# just a comment\n"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, tc.name+".yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tc.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for empty YAML input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty YAML document") {
t.Errorf("expected error containing %q, got: %v", "empty YAML document", err)
}
})
}
}
func TestYAMLFileSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "huge.yaml")
// Create a file larger than MaxPersonaFileSize (64 KB)
content := "name: test\nidentity: " + strings.Repeat("x", MaxPersonaFileSize+1) + "\n"
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for oversized file, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum size") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'exceeds maximum size'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestYAMLAliasCycleDetection(t *testing.T) {
// Test that our checkYAMLDepth function handles alias cycles gracefully
// by using the visiting map to prevent infinite recursion.
// Create a node structure where an alias points to a parent node,
// simulating what could happen with crafted input.
parent := &ast.MappingNode{
Values: []*ast.MappingValueNode{
{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "name"},
Value: &ast.StringNode{Value: "test"},
},
},
}
// Create a child that aliases back to the parent (artificial cycle)
aliasToParent := &ast.AliasNode{
Value: parent,
}
parent.Values = append(parent.Values, &ast.MappingValueNode{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "nested"},
Value: aliasToParent,
})
nodeCount := 0
validated := make(map[ast.Node]int)
visiting := make(map[ast.Node]bool)
// This should NOT hang or stack overflow - cycle detection prevents infinite recursion
err := checkYAMLDepth(parent, 0, MaxYAMLDepth, MaxYAMLNodes, validated, visiting, &nodeCount)
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("unexpected error traversing cyclic structure: %v", err)
}
// Verify we tracked the parent in the validated map
if _, ok := validated[parent]; !ok {
t.Error("parent node not tracked in validated map")
}
}
func TestYAMLMultiDocumentRejection(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "multi.yaml")
// Multi-document YAML (documents separated by ---)
content := `name: first
identity: first document
---
name: second
identity: second document
`
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for multi-document YAML, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "multi-document") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'multi-document'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestYAMLNodeCountLimit(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "wide.yaml")
// Build a YAML structure that's shallow but wide - many keys at the same level
// to test the node count limit (should exceed MaxYAMLNodes = 1000)
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\n")
for i := 0; i < 600; i++ {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("key%d: value%d\n", i, i))
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(sb.String()), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Error("expected error for wide YAML exceeding node count, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "node count exceeds") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'node count exceeds'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestCheckYAMLDepthCycleDetectionDirect(t *testing.T) {
// Direct test of cycle detection in checkYAMLDepth by creating
// a node structure with an artificial cycle.
node := &ast.MappingNode{
Values: []*ast.MappingValueNode{
{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "key"},
Value: &ast.StringNode{Value: "value"},
},
},
}
// Create a cycle by making a child reference the parent
cycleChild := &ast.AliasNode{
Value: node, // Points back to the parent
}
node.Values = append(node.Values, &ast.MappingValueNode{
Key: &ast.StringNode{Value: "cyclic"},
Value: cycleChild,
})
nodeCount := 0
validated := make(map[ast.Node]int)
visiting := make(map[ast.Node]bool)
err := checkYAMLDepth(node, 0, MaxYAMLDepth, MaxYAMLNodes, validated, visiting, &nodeCount)
// Should complete without infinite recursion due to cycle detection
if err != nil {
t.Errorf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// The validated map should contain multiple entries
if len(validated) < 2 {
t.Errorf("validated map has %d entries, expected at least 2", len(validated))
}
}
func TestYAMLAliasDepthBypass(t *testing.T) {
// Test that an anchored subtree first validated at a shallow depth is
// re-checked when referenced via alias at a deeper position. Without the
// depth-aware validated map, the alias reference would skip re-checking
// and allow the effective nesting to exceed MaxYAMLDepth.
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "alias-depth-bypass.yaml")
// Build YAML with an anchor at shallow depth containing a subtree near the limit,
// then reference it via alias deep enough that effective depth exceeds MaxYAMLDepth.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: test\nidentity: test\n")
// Create the anchored subtree at depth 1 (key level) that nests 15 levels deep.
sb.WriteString("anchor_key: &deep_anchor\n")
for i := 0; i < 15; i++ {
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", i+1))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
}
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", 16))
sb.WriteString("leaf: value\n")
// Create a wrapper that nests 6 levels deep, then references the anchor.
// Effective depth at alias target = 6 (wrapper nesting) + 1 (alias) + 15 (subtree) = 22 > 20
sb.WriteString("wrapper:\n")
for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", i+1))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("n%d:\n", i))
}
sb.WriteString(strings.Repeat(" ", 7))
sb.WriteString("alias_ref: *deep_anchor\n")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(sb.String()), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for alias depth bypass, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "nesting depth exceeds") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing 'nesting depth exceeds'", err.Error())
}
}
func TestListBuiltinPersonasSortedOrder(t *testing.T) {
names := ListBuiltinPersonas()
if len(names) < 2 {
t.Skip("need at least 2 personas to test ordering")
}
// Verify the list is sorted
for i := 1; i < len(names); i++ {
if names[i-1] > names[i] {
t.Errorf("ListBuiltinPersonas not sorted: %q > %q", names[i-1], names[i])
}
}
}
func TestYAMLUnknownFieldsRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "unknown top-level field",
content: `name: test
identity: test identity
unknown_field: should fail
`,
wantErr: "unknown_field",
},
{
name: "typo in field name",
content: `name: test
identiy: typo should fail
`,
wantErr: "identiy",
},
{
name: "unknown field in severity",
content: `name: test
identity: test
severity:
major: Major
minro: typo
`,
wantErr: "minro",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "unknown.yaml")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected error for unknown field %q, got nil", tt.wantErr)
return
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
func TestJSONUnknownFieldsRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "unknown top-level field",
content: `{
"name": "test",
"identity": "test identity",
"unknown_field": "should fail"
}`,
wantErr: "unknown_field",
},
{
name: "typo in field name",
content: `{
"name": "test",
"identiy": "typo should fail"
}`,
wantErr: "identiy",
},
{
name: "unknown field in severity",
content: `{
"name": "test",
"identity": "test",
"severity": {
"major": "ok",
"miner": "typo"
}
}`,
wantErr: "miner",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for unknown field, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
}
})
}
}
func TestLoadPersonaSymlink(t *testing.T) {
// Create a regular persona file
dir := t.TempDir()
realFile := filepath.Join(dir, "real.yaml")
content := `name: test
identity: test identity
`
if err := os.WriteFile(realFile, []byte(content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
// Create a symlink to it
symlink := filepath.Join(dir, "link.yaml")
if err := os.Symlink(realFile, symlink); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to create symlink: %v", err)
}
// LoadPersona should work via symlink
p, err := LoadPersona(symlink)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LoadPersona via symlink failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestJSONTrailingContentRejected(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
content string
}{
{
name: "trailing garbage after object",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}garbage`,
},
{
name: "two JSON objects",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}{"name":"other"}`,
},
{
name: "trailing array",
content: `{"name":"test","identity":"test identity"}[]`,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
path := filepath.Join(dir, "test.json")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(tt.content), 0644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to write test file: %v", err)
}
_, err := LoadPersona(path)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for trailing content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "trailing content") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'trailing content'", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestParsePersonaBytesSizeLimit(t *testing.T) {
// ParsePersonaBytes should reject input exceeding MaxPersonaFileSize
oversized := make([]byte, MaxPersonaFileSize+1)
for i := range oversized {
oversized[i] = 'x'
}
_, err := ParsePersonaBytes(oversized, "oversized.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for oversized input, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exceeds maximum size") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'exceeds maximum size'", err.Error())
}
// Just under the limit should not trigger size error (may fail parse, but not size)
underLimit := []byte("name: test\nidentity: test persona\n")
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes(underLimit, "valid.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error for valid input: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "test")
}
}
func TestYAMLMergeKeyDepthCheck(t *testing.T) {
// Verify that YAML merge keys (<<: *alias) are properly handled by the
// depth checker. The merge key content is in the MappingValueNode.Value
// (an AliasNode), not in the MergeKeyNode itself.
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte("name: merge-test\nidentity: test\n"), "merge.yaml")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("basic parse failed: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != "merge-test" {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, "merge-test")
}
// Test that deeply nested merge keys still hit depth limit.
// Build YAML with merge key content nested beyond MaxYAMLDepth.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString("name: deep-merge\nidentity: deep merge persona\n")
sb.WriteString("anchor: &deep\n")
indent := " "
for i := 0; i < MaxYAMLDepth+5; i++ {
sb.WriteString(indent)
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("level%d:\n", i))
indent += " "
}
sb.WriteString(indent + "leaf: value\n")
sb.WriteString("target:\n <<: *deep\n")
_, err = ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(sb.String()), "deep-merge.yaml")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for deeply nested merge key content, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "depth") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want to contain 'depth'", err.Error())
}
}
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{
"name": "architect",
"display_name": "Software Architect",
"identity": "You are a software architect reviewing code for design quality.\n\nYour expertise:\n- Design patterns and anti-patterns\n- Code organization and module boundaries\n- API design and contracts\n- Testability and dependency injection\n- Consistency with existing architecture\n- Technical debt identification",
"focus": [
"Design pattern violations or misuse",
"Module boundary violations (inappropriate coupling)",
"API design issues (unclear contracts, leaky abstractions)",
"Testability problems (hidden dependencies, god objects)",
"Inconsistency with existing codebase patterns",
"Unnecessary complexity or over-engineering",
"Missing abstractions or premature abstraction"
],
"ignore": [
"Security vulnerabilities (security persona handles these)",
"Performance micro-optimizations",
"Code style and formatting",
"Documentation typos",
"Test implementation details"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Architectural violations that will cause maintenance problems or make the codebase harder to evolve",
"minor": "Design issues that reduce clarity or testability but don't block progress",
"nit": "Minor pattern deviations or style preferences"
}
}
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# Software Architect Persona
# Focuses on design quality, patterns, and code organization
name: architect
display_name: Software Architect
identity: |
You are a software architect reviewing code for design quality.
Your expertise:
- Design patterns and anti-patterns
- Code organization and module boundaries
- API design and contracts
- Testability and dependency injection
- Consistency with existing architecture
- Technical debt identification
focus:
- Design pattern violations or misuse
- Module boundary violations (inappropriate coupling)
- API design issues (unclear contracts, leaky abstractions)
- Testability problems (hidden dependencies, god objects)
- Inconsistency with existing codebase patterns
- Unnecessary complexity or over-engineering
- Missing abstractions or premature abstraction
ignore:
- Security vulnerabilities (security persona handles these)
- Performance micro-optimizations
- Code style and formatting
- Documentation typos
- Test implementation details
severity:
major: "Architectural violations that will cause maintenance problems or make the codebase harder to evolve"
minor: "Design issues that reduce clarity or testability but don't block progress"
nit: "Minor pattern deviations or style preferences"
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{
"name": "docs",
"display_name": "Documentation Reviewer",
"identity": "You are a documentation specialist reviewing code for clarity and documentation quality.\n\nYour expertise:\n- API documentation and examples\n- Code comments and their accuracy\n- Error message clarity\n- README and guide quality\n- Naming clarity and self-documenting code",
"focus": [
"Missing or outdated documentation",
"Unclear or misleading comments",
"Poor error messages (cryptic, unhelpful, missing context)",
"Confusing naming (functions, variables, types)",
"Missing examples for complex APIs",
"Inconsistent terminology",
"Documentation that contradicts the code"
],
"ignore": [
"Security vulnerabilities",
"Performance issues",
"Design patterns",
"Test coverage",
"Code style (unless it affects readability)"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Documentation that actively misleads or missing docs for critical functionality",
"minor": "Unclear documentation or poor error messages that will confuse users",
"nit": "Minor clarity improvements or typo fixes"
}
}
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# Documentation Reviewer Persona
# Focuses on clarity, documentation quality, and self-documenting code
name: docs
display_name: Documentation Reviewer
identity: |
You are a documentation specialist reviewing code for clarity and documentation quality.
Your expertise:
- API documentation and examples
- Code comments and their accuracy
- Error message clarity
- README and guide quality
- Naming clarity and self-documenting code
focus:
- Missing or outdated documentation
- Unclear or misleading comments
- Poor error messages (cryptic, unhelpful, missing context)
- Confusing naming (functions, variables, types)
- Missing examples for complex APIs
- Inconsistent terminology
- Documentation that contradicts the code
ignore:
- Security vulnerabilities
- Performance issues
- Design patterns
- Test coverage
- Code style (unless it affects readability)
severity:
major: "Documentation that actively misleads or missing docs for critical functionality"
minor: "Unclear documentation or poor error messages that will confuse users"
nit: "Minor clarity improvements or typo fixes"
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{
"name": "security",
"display_name": "Security Specialist",
"identity": "You are a security specialist reviewing code for vulnerabilities.\n\nYour expertise:\n- OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities\n- Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template)\n- Authentication and authorization patterns\n- Secrets management and exposure risks\n- Race conditions with security implications\n- Event sourcing attack vectors (replay attacks, event injection)",
"focus": [
"Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template injection)",
"Authentication and authorization gaps or bypasses",
"Secrets exposure (hardcoded credentials, tokens in logs, config leaks)",
"Input validation failures (unsanitized input, unsafe deserialization)",
"Race conditions that could be exploited",
"Cryptographic weaknesses (weak algorithms, improper key handling)",
"Information disclosure through error messages or logs"
],
"ignore": [
"Code style and naming conventions",
"Performance optimizations (unless security-related)",
"Documentation quality",
"General code quality or readability",
"Test coverage"
],
"severity": {
"major": "Exploitable vulnerabilities: auth bypass, injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, RCE",
"minor": "Defense-in-depth issues: missing rate limiting, verbose errors, weak input validation",
"nit": "Theoretical risks with low exploitability or impact"
}
}
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# Security Specialist Persona
# Focuses on vulnerabilities, auth issues, and security best practices
name: security
display_name: Security Specialist
identity: |
You are a security specialist reviewing code for vulnerabilities.
Your expertise:
- OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
- Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template)
- Authentication and authorization patterns
- Secrets management and exposure risks
- Race conditions with security implications
- Event sourcing attack vectors (replay attacks, event injection)
focus:
- Injection attacks (SQL, command, path traversal, template injection)
- Authentication and authorization gaps or bypasses
- Secrets exposure (hardcoded credentials, tokens in logs, config leaks)
- Input validation failures (unsanitized input, unsafe deserialization)
- Race conditions that could be exploited
- Cryptographic weaknesses (weak algorithms, improper key handling)
- Information disclosure through error messages or logs
ignore:
- Code style and naming conventions
- Performance optimizations (unless security-related)
- Documentation quality
- General code quality or readability
- Test coverage
severity:
major: "Exploitable vulnerabilities: auth bypass, injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, RCE"
minor: "Defense-in-depth issues: missing rate limiting, verbose errors, weak input validation"
nit: "Theoretical risks with low exploitability or impact"
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package review
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"strings"
)
// RepoPersonaPath is the directory path where repo-specific personas are stored.
const RepoPersonaPath = ".review-bot/personas"
// GiteaClient defines the subset of gitea.Client methods needed for loading repo personas.
// This interface allows for easier testing and decouples the review package from gitea.
type GiteaClient interface {
ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]ContentEntry, error)
GetFileContent(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath string) (string, error)
}
// ContentEntry represents a file or directory entry from the contents API.
// This mirrors gitea.ContentEntry to avoid import cycles.
type ContentEntry struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Path string `json:"path"`
Type string `json:"type"` // "file" or "dir"
}
// LoadRepoPersonas fetches personas from a repository's .review-bot/personas/ directory.
// Returns an empty map (not nil) if the directory doesn't exist or is empty.
// Individual parse failures are logged and skipped; the remaining personas are still returned.
// Auth errors and other non-404 errors are propagated.
// Files exceeding MaxPersonaFileSize are rejected to prevent resource exhaustion.
func LoadRepoPersonas(ctx context.Context, client GiteaClient, owner, repo string) (map[string]*Persona, error) {
result := make(map[string]*Persona)
entries, err := client.ListContents(ctx, owner, repo, RepoPersonaPath)
if err != nil {
// Check if this is a 404 (directory doesn't exist) - expected case
if isNotFoundError(err) {
slog.Debug("no repo personas directory found", "repo", owner+"/"+repo)
return result, nil
}
// Other errors (auth, server) should propagate
return nil, err
}
if len(entries) == 0 {
slog.Debug("repo personas directory is empty", "repo", owner+"/"+repo)
return result, nil
}
for _, entry := range entries {
if entry.Type != "file" {
continue
}
// Only process YAML files
if !isYAMLFile(entry.Name) {
continue
}
content, err := client.GetFileContent(ctx, owner, repo, entry.Path)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not fetch repo persona file",
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo,
"error", err)
continue
}
// Enforce size limit before parsing to prevent resource exhaustion
if len(content) > MaxPersonaFileSize {
slog.Warn("repo persona file exceeds maximum size",
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo,
"size", len(content),
"max", MaxPersonaFileSize)
continue
}
persona, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(content), entry.Path)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not parse repo persona file",
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo,
"error", err)
continue
}
result[persona.Name] = persona
slog.Debug("loaded repo persona",
"name", persona.Name,
"file", entry.Path,
"repo", owner+"/"+repo)
}
return result, nil
}
// MergePersonas combines built-in personas with repo personas.
// Repo personas take precedence on name collision.
// Returns a new map; inputs are not modified.
func MergePersonas(builtin, repo map[string]*Persona) map[string]*Persona {
result := make(map[string]*Persona, len(builtin)+len(repo))
// Copy built-in personas first
for name, p := range builtin {
result[name] = p
}
// Overlay repo personas (override on collision)
for name, p := range repo {
if _, exists := result[name]; exists {
slog.Debug("repo persona overrides built-in", "name", name)
}
result[name] = p
}
return result
}
// GetBuiltinPersonasMap returns all built-in personas as a map keyed by name.
// Returns an empty map (not nil) if loading fails.
func GetBuiltinPersonasMap() map[string]*Persona {
result := make(map[string]*Persona)
for _, name := range ListBuiltinPersonas() {
p, err := LoadBuiltinPersona(name)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("could not load built-in persona", "name", name, "error", err)
continue
}
result[name] = p
}
return result
}
// isYAMLFile checks if a filename has a YAML extension.
func isYAMLFile(name string) bool {
lower := strings.ToLower(name)
return strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".yaml") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, ".yml")
}
// isNotFoundError checks if an error represents a 404 response.
// This uses a specific "HTTP 404" substring match rather than a generic "not found"
// match to avoid masking authentication failures or transport errors that might
// contain "not found" in their message.
func isNotFoundError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
return strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTP 404")
}
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@@ -1,443 +0,0 @@
package review
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestParsePersonaBytes(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
data string
source string
wantName string
wantErr string
}{
{
name: "valid yaml",
data: `name: test
identity: test identity
focus:
- testing
`,
source: "test.yaml",
wantName: "test",
},
{
name: "missing name",
data: "identity: test\n",
source: "test.yaml",
wantErr: "name is required",
},
{
name: "invalid yaml",
data: "not: valid:\n yaml: [broken",
source: "test.yaml",
wantErr: "parse",
},
{
name: "json format by extension",
data: `{"name": "jsontest", "identity": "json identity"}`,
source: "test.json",
wantName: "jsontest",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
p, err := ParsePersonaBytes([]byte(tt.data), tt.source)
if tt.wantErr != "" {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error containing %q, got nil", tt.wantErr)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErr) {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing %q", err.Error(), tt.wantErr)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if p.Name != tt.wantName {
t.Errorf("Name = %q, want %q", p.Name, tt.wantName)
}
})
}
}
// mockGiteaClient implements GiteaClient for testing.
type mockGiteaClient struct {
contents map[string][]ContentEntry // path -> entries
files map[string]string // path -> content
listErr error
fileErr map[string]error // path -> error
}
func (m *mockGiteaClient) ListContents(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, path string) ([]ContentEntry, error) {
if m.listErr != nil {
return nil, m.listErr
}
entries, ok := m.contents[path]
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("list contents .review-bot/personas: HTTP 404: not found")
}
return entries, nil
}
func (m *mockGiteaClient) GetFileContent(ctx context.Context, owner, repo, filepath string) (string, error) {
if m.fileErr != nil {
if err, ok := m.fileErr[filepath]; ok {
return "", err
}
}
content, ok := m.files[filepath]
if !ok {
return "", errors.New("HTTP 404: file not found")
}
return content, nil
}
func TestLoadRepoPersonas(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
t.Run("directory not found returns empty map", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{} // No contents configured -> 404
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if personas == nil {
t.Error("expected empty map, got nil")
}
if len(personas) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 personas, got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("empty directory returns empty map", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {},
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 0 {
t.Errorf("expected 0 personas, got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("loads valid personas", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "trading.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/trading.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "crypto.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/crypto.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/trading.yaml": `name: trading
display_name: Trading Expert
identity: You are a trading expert.
focus:
- order handling
- risk management
`,
".review-bot/personas/crypto.yaml": `name: crypto
display_name: Crypto Expert
identity: You are a cryptography expert.
focus:
- key management
- encryption
`,
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 personas, got %d", len(personas))
}
if personas["trading"] == nil {
t.Error("expected trading persona")
}
if personas["crypto"] == nil {
t.Error("expected crypto persona")
}
if personas["trading"].DisplayName != "Trading Expert" {
t.Errorf("trading display name = %q, want %q", personas["trading"].DisplayName, "Trading Expert")
}
})
t.Run("skips invalid persona files", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "valid.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/valid.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "invalid.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/invalid.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/valid.yaml": `name: valid
identity: Valid persona
`,
".review-bot/personas/invalid.yaml": "not valid yaml: [broken",
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Should have the valid one, skip the invalid
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (skipped invalid), got %d", len(personas))
}
if personas["valid"] == nil {
t.Error("expected valid persona")
}
})
t.Run("skips non-yaml files", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "persona.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "README.md", Path: ".review-bot/personas/README.md", Type: "file"},
{Name: "notes.txt", Path: ".review-bot/personas/notes.txt", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml": `name: test
identity: Test persona
`,
".review-bot/personas/README.md": "# Personas\n\nPut your personas here.",
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (yaml only), got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("skips subdirectories", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "persona.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "subdir", Path: ".review-bot/personas/subdir", Type: "dir"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/persona.yaml": `name: test
identity: Test persona
`,
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (files only), got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("propagates auth errors", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
listErr: errors.New("HTTP 401: unauthorized"),
}
_, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for auth failure")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "401") {
t.Errorf("error = %q, want containing '401'", err.Error())
}
})
t.Run("skips files that fail to fetch", func(t *testing.T) {
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "good.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/good.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "bad.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/bad.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/good.yaml": `name: good
identity: Good persona
`,
},
fileErr: map[string]error{
".review-bot/personas/bad.yaml": errors.New("HTTP 500: internal server error"),
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (skipped failed fetch), got %d", len(personas))
}
})
t.Run("skips oversized files", func(t *testing.T) {
// Create a content string that exceeds MaxPersonaFileSize (64KB)
oversizedContent := strings.Repeat("a", MaxPersonaFileSize+1)
client := &mockGiteaClient{
contents: map[string][]ContentEntry{
RepoPersonaPath: {
{Name: "normal.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/normal.yaml", Type: "file"},
{Name: "huge.yaml", Path: ".review-bot/personas/huge.yaml", Type: "file"},
},
},
files: map[string]string{
".review-bot/personas/normal.yaml": `name: normal
identity: Normal sized persona
`,
".review-bot/personas/huge.yaml": oversizedContent,
},
}
personas, err := LoadRepoPersonas(ctx, client, "owner", "repo")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
// Should have the normal one, skip the oversized
if len(personas) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 persona (skipped oversized), got %d", len(personas))
}
if personas["normal"] == nil {
t.Error("expected normal persona")
}
})
}
func TestMergePersonas(t *testing.T) {
builtin := map[string]*Persona{
"security": {Name: "security", Identity: "Built-in security"},
"docs": {Name: "docs", Identity: "Built-in docs"},
}
repo := map[string]*Persona{
"security": {Name: "security", Identity: "Repo security override"},
"trading": {Name: "trading", Identity: "Repo trading"},
}
merged := MergePersonas(builtin, repo)
t.Run("repo overrides builtin on collision", func(t *testing.T) {
if merged["security"].Identity != "Repo security override" {
t.Errorf("security identity = %q, want repo override", merged["security"].Identity)
}
})
t.Run("builtin preserved when no collision", func(t *testing.T) {
if merged["docs"].Identity != "Built-in docs" {
t.Errorf("docs identity = %q, want built-in", merged["docs"].Identity)
}
})
t.Run("repo-only persona added", func(t *testing.T) {
if merged["trading"] == nil {
t.Error("expected trading persona from repo")
}
if merged["trading"].Identity != "Repo trading" {
t.Errorf("trading identity = %q, want repo", merged["trading"].Identity)
}
})
t.Run("original maps not modified", func(t *testing.T) {
if builtin["trading"] != nil {
t.Error("builtin map was modified")
}
if len(repo) != 2 {
t.Error("repo map was modified")
}
})
}
func TestGetBuiltinPersonasMap(t *testing.T) {
personas := GetBuiltinPersonasMap()
if len(personas) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected at least one built-in persona")
}
// Verify expected personas exist
expected := []string{"security", "architect", "docs"}
for _, name := range expected {
if personas[name] == nil {
t.Errorf("expected built-in persona %q", name)
}
}
// Verify personas are valid
for name, p := range personas {
if p.Name != name {
t.Errorf("persona %q has mismatched name %q", name, p.Name)
}
if p.Identity == "" {
t.Errorf("persona %q has empty identity", name)
}
}
}
func TestIsYAMLFile(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
want bool
}{
{"test.yaml", true},
{"test.yml", true},
{"test.YAML", true},
{"test.YML", true},
{"test.json", false},
{"test.md", false},
{"test.txt", false},
{"yaml", false},
{"yaml.md", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := isYAMLFile(tt.name); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isYAMLFile(%q) = %v, want %v", tt.name, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestIsNotFoundError(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
err error
want bool
}{
{nil, false},
{errors.New("HTTP 404: not found"), true},
{errors.New("HTTP 404"), true},
// Intentionally false: generic "not found" could mask auth/transport errors.
// Only explicit HTTP 404 responses should be treated as "directory doesn't exist".
{errors.New("something not found"), false},
{errors.New("HTTP 401: unauthorized"), false},
{errors.New("connection refused"), false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
name := "nil"
if tt.err != nil {
name = tt.err.Error()
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := isNotFoundError(tt.err); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("isNotFoundError(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.err, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
+12 -6
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ if [ ! -f "$CONVENTIONS_FILE" ]; then
exit 1
fi
# Parse approved packages from CONVENTIONS.md table using awk (POSIX-compatible)
# Parse approved packages from CONVENTIONS.md table
# Note: uses Bash process substitution (< <(...)) for the loop
# Format: | `package` | use case | scope |
declare -A ALLOWED_PROD=()
declare -A ALLOWED_TEST=()
@@ -33,7 +34,8 @@ while IFS= read -r line; do
pkg=$(echo "$line" | awk -F'|' '{gsub(/^[[:space:]]*`|`[[:space:]]*$/, "", $2); print $2}')
scope=$(echo "$line" | awk -F'|' '{gsub(/^[[:space:]]+|[[:space:]]+$/, "", $4); print tolower($4)}')
if [ -n "$pkg" ] && [ "$pkg" != "Package" ] && [[ "$pkg" =~ ^[a-zA-Z] ]]; then
# Accept packages starting with letter or digit (e.g., 9fans.net/go)
if [ -n "$pkg" ] && [ "$pkg" != "Package" ] && [[ "$pkg" =~ ^[[:alnum:]] ]]; then
if [[ "$scope" == *"test"* ]]; then
ALLOWED_TEST["$pkg"]=1
else
@@ -69,8 +71,12 @@ matches_allowlist() {
}
# Get direct module dependencies from go.mod
DIRECT_IMPORTS=$(go list -m -f '{{if and (not .Indirect) (not .Main)}}{{.Path}}{{end}}' all 2>&1) || {
echo "❌ Failed to list dependencies: $DIRECT_IMPORTS"
# Capture stderr separately to avoid mixing error messages with package list
GO_LIST_STDERR=$(mktemp)
trap 'rm -f "$GO_LIST_STDERR"' EXIT
DIRECT_IMPORTS=$(go list -m -f '{{if and (not .Indirect) (not .Main)}}{{.Path}}{{end}}' all 2>"$GO_LIST_STDERR") || {
echo "❌ Failed to list dependencies:"
cat "$GO_LIST_STDERR"
exit 1
}
DIRECT_IMPORTS=$(echo "$DIRECT_IMPORTS" | grep -v '^$' || true)
@@ -106,8 +112,8 @@ PROD_IMPORTS=$(go list -deps -f '{{if not .Standard}}{{.ImportPath}}{{end}}' ./.
TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD=""
for test_pkg in "${!ALLOWED_TEST[@]}"; do
# Use word-boundary matching: exact match or followed by /
if echo "$PROD_IMPORTS" | grep -qE "^${test_pkg}(/|\$|$)"; then
# Match exact package or subpackages (pkg or pkg/...)
if echo "$PROD_IMPORTS" | grep -qE "^${test_pkg}(/|$)"; then
TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD="${TEST_ONLY_IN_PROD} - ${test_pkg} (marked 'test only' but used in production code)"$'\n'
fi
done