MINOR #1: Move AllowInsecureHTTPForTest to export_test.go so it is only
available in test binaries and does not pollute the production API surface.
MINOR #2: Replace url.Parse with a strings.EqualFold prefix check in
doRequest's HTTPS enforcement, avoiding a per-request allocation.
NIT #3: Push back — slog.Warn on ignored AllowInsecureHTTP is a deliberate
design choice that helps operators debug 'refusing to send credentials'
errors when the env gate is not set.
Add defense-in-depth for the AllowInsecureHTTP client option:
1. HTTPS enforcement: doRequest now rejects non-HTTPS URLs when
credentials are present and insecure mode is not explicitly enabled.
2. Environment gate: AllowInsecureHTTP() requires REVIEW_BOT_ALLOW_INSECURE=1
env var. Without it, the option is silently ignored and a warning is logged.
This prevents accidental enablement from config drift.
3. Warning on activation: When the env gate IS satisfied, a slog.Warn fires
at client construction time so operators notice in logs.
4. Test bypass: AllowInsecureHTTPForTest() skips the env gate for test
convenience with httptest.Server, keeping tests clean.
Closes#96
- Replace Unicode arrows (→) with ASCII (->) in error messages and
comments for log compatibility (gpt-review NITs #19626, #19628)
- Improve guard comment to clarify it exists for testability, not
runtime safety (sonnet-review NIT #19619)
- Add cross-reference comments noting intentional duplication between
gitea/client.go and github/client.go (sonnet-review #19618,
gpt-review #19625, #19627)
Pushed back on:
- internal/ package for dedup: structural overhead not warranted for
a single ~25-line function
- strings.EqualFold for scheme: Go's url.Parse normalizes schemes to
lowercase, making case-insensitive comparison unnecessary
Add defaultCheckRedirect to both GitHub and Gitea clients that rejects:
- HTTPS→HTTP protocol downgrades (prevents plaintext leakage)
- Cross-host redirects entirely (prevents consuming untrusted responses)
Same-host, same-or-upgraded-scheme redirects remain allowed.
Both NewClient constructors wire the policy, and SetHTTPClient(nil)
restores it. Callers providing a non-nil client are responsible for
configuring their own safe redirect policy.
Closes#95
- Add timer.Stop() to the timer.C branch to prevent timer leak on the
normal path (previously only called in ctx.Done branch)
- Rename struct field 'http' to 'httpClient' to avoid shadowing the
net/http import
Addresses self-review findings on PR #110.
- Add TODO comment on unused baseURL field explaining its intended
future use by higher-level exported methods
- Rewrite TestDoRequest_ContextCanceled to actually exercise the
timer-cancel path in the retry select (goroutine cancels context
while client is blocked in timer.C select)
- Change Retry-After: 1 to Retry-After: 0 in IntegerSeconds test
to avoid unnecessary 1s sleep during test runs
- Add doc note on SetRetryBackoff explaining that an empty non-nil
slice silently drops Retry-After delays
- Fix data race: copy retryBackoff slice per-request to prevent
concurrent doRequest calls from racing on shared state
- Fix parseRetryAfter: trim whitespace before parsing for robustness
- Fix parseRetryAfter: treat delta-seconds of 0 as valid per RFC 7231
- Add bounded read on success path (10 MB limit) for defense-in-depth
- Clean up TestDoRequest_429_RetryAfter_IntegerSeconds: remove dead
code block and commented-out reasoning
- Fix import ordering: context before errors (goimports compliance)
Implement the github package client with Retry-After header parsing that
supports both integer seconds (e.g. "Retry-After: 120") and HTTP-date
format (e.g. "Retry-After: Thu, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT") per RFC 7231
§7.1.3.
Key design decisions:
- Use http.ParseTime which handles RFC 1123, RFC 850, and ASCTIME formats
- Cap maximum retry delay at 60s (maxRetryAfter) to prevent stalling
- If HTTP-date is in the past, use delay of 0 (retry immediately)
- Inject time.Now via c.now field for deterministic testing
Closes#94
claw