"ERROR: stale docmap docs: entries" had a vestigial "docs:" fragment
that reads awkwardly (looks like a YAML reference).
Change to: "ERROR: stale docmap entries (paths do not exist):"
Addresses NIT finding in review #4175.
Non-git tools (e.g. `find`, `ls`) can emit paths with a "./" prefix.
Without stripping this, "./cmd/foo.go" would not match the glob "cmd/**",
producing a false-positive uncovered-file failure.
Fix: add strings.TrimPrefix(f, "./") after backslash normalization.
Test: TestRunValidateDocmap_DotSlashPrefix
Addresses MINOR finding in review #4175.
Add IsRegular() check after Lstat so directories, FIFOs, and device nodes
produce a clear error ("docmap must be a regular file") instead of a
confusing downstream parse error.
Test: TestValidateDocmapPath_NonRegularFile
Addresses MINOR finding in review #4175.
The previous implementation called os.Lstat(absPath) which only avoids
following the *final* path component. A PR committing .review-bot/ as a
directory symlink pointing outside the repo would pass the filepath.Rel
confinement check because the textual path was inside the root while
the resolved destination was not.
Fix: call filepath.EvalSymlinks after filepath.Abs to resolve ALL symlink
components before the confinement check. If EvalSymlinks fails (dangling
symlink, nonexistent target) the path is rejected. The filepath.Rel check
then operates on the fully-resolved path.
Semantic change: file-level in-repo symlinks (target also within root) are
now allowed — the invariant is about where the content lives, not whether
the entry is a symlink. The test TestValidateDocmapPath_Symlink is updated
to test an out-of-repo symlink target, which must still be rejected.
Tests:
- TestValidateDocmapPath_DirSymlinkBypass: reproduces the attack vector
(dir symlink bypassing textual confinement check) and verifies it is
now rejected
- TestValidateDocmapPath_Symlink: updated to test out-of-repo symlink
Coverage: 54.0%
Address security-review-bot REQUEST_CHANGES findings on PR #142:
MAJOR (Finding #1): Docmap file path was read directly without validating it
is within --repo-root or checking for symlinks. A malicious PR could create
.review-bot/doc-map.yml as a symlink to /dev/zero (resource exhaustion) or an
arbitrary host file (information disclosure).
Fix: Add validateDocmapPath() called before ParseDocMapConfig(). It:
- Resolves --repo-root first (filepath.Abs + EvalSymlinks), moved up before
docmap parsing so both checks share the same resolved root
- Uses os.Lstat to detect symlinks and rejects them outright
- Confirms the docmap path is within resolvedRoot via filepath.Rel
- Checks file size against maxDocmapBytes (10 MB) before reading
MINOR (Finding #2): No upper bound on docmap YAML size.
Fix: os.Lstat size check enforces maxDocmapBytes cap before os.ReadFile.
Tests:
- TestValidateDocmapPath_Symlink: docmap is a symlink → exit 2
- TestValidateDocmapPath_OutsideRepoRoot: docmap outside repo-root → exit 2
- TestValidateDocmapPath_SizeLimit: docmap exceeds 10 MB cap → exit 2
- Updated all existing tests to use makeDocmapInDir() so the docmap
lives inside the repo-root, satisfying the new confinement check
Finding #1 [MAJOR]: replace os.Stat with os.Lstat in checkStaleDocs to
prevent symlink traversal. Symlinks under repoRoot could probe arbitrary
host file existence; Lstat never follows them. Symlinked docs are now
treated as stale.
Finding #2 [MINOR]: resolve --repo-root with filepath.Abs +
filepath.EvalSymlinks before passing to checkStaleDocs, so a symlinked
repo-root cannot bypass the filepath.Rel escape guard.
Finding #3 [NIT]: reject backslashes in ValidateDocPath to prevent
Windows platform edge cases where a path separator may be normalised
differently by the host OS or VCS backend.
Tests added:
- TestCheckStaleDocs_SymlinkOutside: symlink inside repo → outside
- TestCheckStaleDocs_SymlinkInsideRepo: intra-repo symlink also rejected
- TestRunValidateDocmap_SymlinkRepoRoot: symlinked --repo-root resolves OK
- TestValidateDocPath_Backslash: backslash paths rejected
- Backslash cases added to TestValidateDocPath invalid slice
All go test ./... pass, go vet ./... clean.
Export review.ValidateDocPath and use it in checkStaleDocs before
calling os.Stat. Add filepath.Clean + filepath.Rel confinement check
as defense-in-depth to ensure doc paths from PR-controlled YAML
cannot probe filesystem locations outside repoRoot.
Also add tests covering: ../../etc/passwd, /etc/passwd, ../outside,
a valid present path, and a valid missing path.
Addresses security finding from security-review-bot on PR #142.
Adds 'review-bot validate-docmap' for CI hard-fail on docmap coverage gaps.
Usage:
git diff --name-only origin/main HEAD | \
review-bot validate-docmap --docmap .review-bot/doc-map.yml --repo-root .
Flags:
--docmap (required) path to doc-map YAML file
--repo-root (optional, default '.') root for resolving docs: paths
Two checks, both always run:
1. Coverage: every stdin file must match at least one paths: glob.
2. Stale docs: every docs: entry must exist on disk under --repo-root.
Exit codes: 0=clean, 1=failures found, 2=usage/parse error.
Tests cover: clean pass, uncovered file, stale doc, both failures,
empty stdin, blank-line stdin, and duplicate docs: deduplication.
Rodin