fix: symlink traversal + worst-wins pre-check + user scoping
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Security (MAJOR): - Add filepath.EvalSymlinks after Clean for system-prompt-file - Re-validate resolved path is still within workspace - Prevents symlink → /etc/shadow exfiltration via malicious repo Worst-wins: - Check BEFORE posting (not after) — no delete+repost dance - Identify sibling bots by <!-- review-bot: prefix in body - Only escalates for bot reviews, not human REQUEST_CHANGES - If sibling bot has REQUEST_CHANGES and we would APPROVE → post REQUEST_CHANGES instead Addresses security review finding #1 (MAJOR) and sonnet finding #1.
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@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ inputs:
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required: false
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default: 'false'
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update-existing:
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description: 'Delete previous review from same bot before posting. Accepts: true/1/yes or false/0/no (default true)'
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description: 'Delete previous review from same bot after posting new one. Accepts: true/1/yes or false/0/no (default true)'
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required: false
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default: 'true'
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system-prompt-file:
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