fix(#141): harden checkStaleDocs against path traversal
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Export review.ValidateDocPath and use it in checkStaleDocs before calling os.Stat. Add filepath.Clean + filepath.Rel confinement check as defense-in-depth to ensure doc paths from PR-controlled YAML cannot probe filesystem locations outside repoRoot. Also add tests covering: ../../etc/passwd, /etc/passwd, ../outside, a valid present path, and a valid missing path. Addresses security finding from security-review-bot on PR #142.
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@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ func runValidateDocmap(args []string) int {
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}
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// --- Check 2: Stale docs ---
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// checkStaleDocs validates each path before touching the filesystem; see
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// its documentation for the path-traversal hardening applied.
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repoRoot := filepath.Clean(*repoRootFlag)
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staleDocs := checkStaleDocs(cfg, repoRoot)
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if len(staleDocs) > 0 {
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@@ -101,7 +103,14 @@ func runValidateDocmap(args []string) int {
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return 0
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}
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// checkStaleDocs returns deduplicated docs: entries that do not exist under repoRoot.
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// checkStaleDocs returns deduplicated docs: entries that do not exist under
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// repoRoot.
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//
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// Path-traversal hardening: each docPath is validated with
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// review.ValidateDocPath (rejects absolute paths and ".." segments) and then
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// confined to repoRoot via filepath.Clean + filepath.Rel before os.Stat is
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// called. Paths that fail either check are treated as invalid (reported as
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// stale) without touching the host filesystem.
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func checkStaleDocs(cfg *review.DocMapConfig, repoRoot string) []string {
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seen := make(map[string]struct{})
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var stale []string
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@@ -116,7 +125,25 @@ func checkStaleDocs(cfg *review.DocMapConfig, repoRoot string) []string {
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}
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seen[docPath] = struct{}{}
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fullPath := filepath.Join(repoRoot, filepath.FromSlash(docPath))
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// Guard 1: reject absolute paths and ".." segments sourced from
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// PR-controlled YAML before joining with repoRoot.
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if err := review.ValidateDocPath(docPath); err != nil {
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stale = append(stale, docPath)
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continue
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}
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// Guard 2: verify the cleaned joined path does not escape repoRoot.
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// filepath.Clean resolves any remaining ".." after the join; the
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// filepath.Rel check confirms the path is still under repoRoot.
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fullPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(repoRoot, filepath.FromSlash(docPath)))
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rel, err := filepath.Rel(repoRoot, fullPath)
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if err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
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stale = append(stale, docPath)
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continue
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}
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// Safe to stat: path is relative, contains no "..", and is
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// confined within repoRoot.
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if _, err := os.Stat(fullPath); err != nil {
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stale = append(stale, docPath)
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}
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@@ -288,3 +288,50 @@ mappings:
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t.Errorf("expected docs/shared.md to appear exactly once in stderr (deduplicated), got %d occurrences: %q", count, stderr)
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}
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}
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// TestCheckStaleDocs_PathTraversal verifies that checkStaleDocs rejects
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// traversal and absolute paths without touching the host filesystem.
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func TestCheckStaleDocs_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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// Baseline: a valid doc that exists.
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makeDocFile(t, dir, "docs/valid.md")
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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docPath string
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wantStale bool
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}{
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{"dot-dot traversal", "../../etc/passwd", true},
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{"dot-dot single", "../outside", true},
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{"absolute path", "/etc/passwd", true},
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{"valid present path", "docs/valid.md", false},
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{"valid missing path", "docs/missing.md", true},
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}
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for _, tc := range tests {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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docmap := makeDocmapYAML(t, `
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mappings:
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- paths:
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- "lib/**"
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docs:
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- `+tc.docPath+`
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`)
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code, _, stderr := stdinValidateDocmap(t,
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"",
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[]string{"--docmap", docmap, "--repo-root", dir},
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)
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if tc.wantStale {
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if code != 1 {
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t.Errorf("path %q: expected exit 1 (stale/invalid), got %d; stderr: %q", tc.docPath, code, stderr)
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}
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} else {
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if code != 0 {
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t.Errorf("path %q: expected exit 0 (valid), got %d; stderr: %q", tc.docPath, code, stderr)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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}
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