fix(review): address review 2792 feedback
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- Document nodeCount overcounting as intentional conservative behavior
  (bounds total validation work, not unique nodes)
- Improve TestYAMLDeeplyNestedRejection comment with concrete depth trace
- Replace outdated gopkg.in/yaml.v3 pseudocode in design doc with
  reference to authoritative implementation
- Update PR description to clarify pre-approval via issue #57
This commit is contained in:
claw
2026-05-12 14:24:06 -07:00
parent 80091fb080
commit 01b6af03a8
3 changed files with 20 additions and 37 deletions
+5 -1
View File
@@ -224,7 +224,11 @@ func checkYAMLDepth(node ast.Node, depth, maxDepth, maxNodes int, validated map[
}
// Track total nodes visited as defense-in-depth against wide-but-shallow attacks.
// Placed after cycle detection to avoid over-counting cyclic references.
// Placed after cycle detection but before the depth-aware short-circuit. This means
// nodes revisited at shallower depths (via aliases) are counted each time they are
// encountered — intentional conservative overcounting. This bounds the total work
// performed during validation rather than tracking unique nodes, which is the safer
// security posture for untrusted YAML input.
*nodeCount++
if *nodeCount > maxNodes {
return fmt.Errorf("YAML node count exceeds maximum (%d)", maxNodes)